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ABSTRACT 
Most traditions within political sociology have long acknowledged the 'central', 
'privileged' or even 'dominant' position of business in the politics of liberal 
democracies. However, the discipline is largely silent on the question of what 
constitutes the major political divisions within the business community and how they 
manifest themselves as different, possibly competing, corporate political strategies. 
This thesis attempts to remedy this situation through an analysis of the most 
comprehensive dataset on corporate political behaviour that is available today. The 
dataset includes social, economic and political data for 2005 / 6 on the 2000 largest 
enterprises in Australia and their 7 ,500 directors. Three major dimensions of 
business politics are explored: political partisanship, political leadership, and political 
cohesion. A distinct division is shown to exist between conservative 'partisan' 
corporations, and bipartisan 'hedging' corporations. A closely-related 
'insider/ outsider' division is found within the political leadership of business, 
between a 'core-corporate community' and 'outsider' corporations. The core-
corporate community shows a strong tendency towards bipartisan behaviour, while 
outsider corporations tend to be Coalition-only donors. The core-corporate 
community is comprised of the largest public listed corporations, and the 
corporations which comprise it tend to be located in regulated industries and have 
strong ties to the industrial and political leaders of business. Outsider corporations 
tend to be smaller, private corporations which have their own distinct business 
associations. Politically cohesive behaviour was found to exist between Coalition-
only donors, but found to be surprisingly absent amongst bipartisan donors. Instead 
of displaying any politically cohesive behaviour, the core-corporate community was 
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created by the mutual attraction of high status and highly influential directors and 
corporations. 
The strong colinearity of the three dimensions of partisanship, leadership and 
cohesion has been the source of much confusion within the existing literature. By 
distinguishing between them many paradoxes can be resolved. The dominant 
political force driving bipartisan donors, and consequentially the majority of the core-
corporate community, is not class-cohesion. The dominant political motive is rent-
seeking. There is no contagion of bipartisan donation behaviour through interlocks 
which produces coordinated action (Mizruchi 1992) or 'class-wide' consciousness 
(Useem 1984). Instead the major correlates of bipartisan donation behaviour are an 
incentive (such as location in a regulated industry) and an ability (such as large size or 
super-wealthy directors) to extract rents from the state. Political cohesion is, 
however, a more important force for understanding conservative partisanship: ties to 
conservative think tanks, certain super-wealthy individuals, and ties to other 
Coalition donors are all associated with a trend towards greater Coalition-only 
donations. However, cohesion is only part of the story. The outsider status of 
smaller corporations means they have no mechanism for extracting rents from the 
state, and thus their economic self-interest lies in the election of a conservative 
government, and, thus, they have a self-interest in undertaking conservative partisan 
political action themselves. 
There are six other major findings of this thesis, which also fit into this schema. (1) 
Defence contractors, and also oil and gas corporations engage in a bipartisan 
donation strategy but do so because they are political outsiders, with little 
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representation in the political leadership of business. In contrast, (2) while 
conservative think tanks are strong conservative partisans, they are also insiders 
drawing some of the most important directors and corporations into conservative 
politics. (3) Both the corporations of the super-wealthy and large legal and 
accounting partnerships are both insiders, with strong representation in the political 
leadership of business, presumably because of the considerable independent power 
provided by their wealth (in the case of super wealthy directors) or expertise (in the 
case of legal or accounting partnerships). However, they both also show an 
increased propensity to engage in partisan and bipartisan political behaviour, again 
presumably because of their independent sources of power. Both also have 
significantly fewer interlocks with other company boards, and thus could be 
considered as having low levels of cohesion. ( 4) Firms that are in industries which 
face hostile government regulation, such as oil and gas or tobacco have little access 
to the political leadership of business (outsiders). However, because of the hostile 
legislation they face, they show a tendency towards either strongly partisan or 
strongly bipartisan political behaviour. The decision to adopt one orientation or the 
other appears to be driven by purely pragmatic strategic considerations. (5) Foreign 
firms face a 'legitimacy tariff on their participation in publicly observable political 
behaviour (such as donations), but not on their less scrutinised forms of engagement 
in the political leadership of business. (6) Within the core-corporate community 
there exists an 'Inner Circle' of approximately 20 to 40 corporations which face what 
I term a 'status tariff'. For these corporations, the high status of both their directors 
and affiliated corporations is such that the risk of making a political donation, even 
to both major parties, is too high. These very high status firms show a marked 
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absence of donations, but no similar decline in more legitimate forms of political 
behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been almost 30 years since a tentative consensus emerged within political 
science about the role of business in the politics of liberal democracies. Prior to the 
late 1970s, the pluralist, elitist and Marxist traditions held three irreconcilably 
different positions, contending that the role of business in politics was best 
understood as, respectively, either one of many 'interest groups,' one of several elites, 
or as part of the 'ruling class'. New empirical research, together with broader societal 
changes, led to a substantial rethinking of the role of business in politics in the 1970s. 
Lindblom, a leading pluralist, argued that the role of business was more than that of 
one interest group amongst many. Instead, business holds a "privileged position in 
government and politics" because in a market system governments must "induce" 
business to perform in order to allow the most basic functions of society to continue, 
such as investment, growth and job creation. To "induce" business to function, he 
argued, governments often defer to business when making important decisions, or, at 
least, weight very heavily the opinions of business on a whole range of policy issues 
(Lindblom 1977: 172-5). Higley and Moore, leading scholars from the elitist school, 
undertook major quantitative studies of elites in the US and Australia, and found 
"empirical support for at least the thrust of the power elite and ruling class models," 
particularly "the centrality of business elites in both" the United States and Australian 
political systems. In Australia, the central role of business elites in politics was 
particularly striking: of the 100 most politically powerful individuals in Australia, 40 
were business leaders, and business leaders were the largest single category of elites in 
the 'top' 100 (Higley and Moore 1981). Within the Marxist tradition, the 1970s saw 
the elaboration of theories and debates about the politics of business (Poulantzas 
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1978; Miliband 1973; Domhoff 1967) within a tradition that had always assumed the 
central role of business to the politics of liberal democracies. 
The irony of the emergence of this consensus is that, while the major traditions 
within political sociology acknowledge the 'special' or 'privileged' role of business in 
the politics of liberal democracies, the discipline has been largely silent on the 
question of exactly what the major political divisions within the business community 
are and how these divisions manifest themselves as different, possibly competing, 
corporate political strategies. Where are the centres of influence and power within 
the business community? What are the major factions or political divisions within the 
business community? And what are the key social, economic and political forces that 
shape the political character of business in contemporary industrialised capitalist 
societies? 
This thesis attempts to provide an answer to these questions using the most 
comprehensive dataset on corporate political behaviour that is available today. 
Collected at the beginning of 2006, the most important feature of the dataset is its 
integration of three databases on corporate economic, social and political behaviour: 
IBISWorld Top 2000 Enterprises in Australia, Who '.r Who ef Australia, and the Australian 
Electoral Commission's political donations data. These databases have been 
supplemented with data on the boards and membership of business associations, 
think tanks, government committees, the list of the richest 200 persons, the 
National Schools Database, club membership lists and more. 
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The thesis has seven sections: this introduction, five main chapters and then a 
conclusion. This is then followed by a series of supplementary appendices. This 
introduction contains a literature review and a justification for the writing of this 
thesis. Chapter 1: Methods and data first provides an overview of the data collection 
methods, particularly the two computer programs developed to extract network data 
from large biographical databases, and then provides an account of the data itself, 
particularly the measurement and operationalisation of the variables used in the 
analysis contained in later chapters. Chapter 2: Partisanship or hedging? Corporate strafe!!) 
and political donations focuses on an analysis of the political donation behaviour of 
corporations, and asks what this reveals about the social forces driving corporate 
political strategy. Chapter 3: The political leadership ef business examines corporations' 
representation in six major business political leadership groups: (1) government 
boards and committees, (2) the leadership of the Business Council of Australia, (3) 
the leadership of the other three national business associations (AIG, ACCI or 
ABLtd), (4) the boards of conservative think tanks, (5) the Takeovers Panel 
(government authorised body regulating mergers and acquisitions), and (6) the 
Australian-New Zealand Leadership Forum (ANZLF), an annual high level policy 
meeting of business leaders, ministers and senior public servants. This chapter asks 
which corporations form the political leadership of business. Who has 
representatives at the table? Who is excluded? Are there systematic patterns? Are 
there clear social, political or economic divisions within the business community? 
Chapters 4 and 5 move away from studying the political behaviour of corporations as 
an 'outcome' and instead study the social relations, particularly interlocking 
directorates, within the business community itself. Chapter4: An introduction to 
Exponential Random Graph (ERG) models and their application to the stucfy ef corporate elites 
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presents an introduction to one of the most promising classes of statistical models 
for studying social networks. Chapter 5: The Inner Circle revisited· An ERG model ef the 
politics ef interlocking directorates uses an exponential random graph model to study the 
social structure of the corporate directors network amongst the largest 250 
corporations. It investigates the main forces driving social cohesion, and hence 
social group formation, within the corporate community in Australia, and asks what 
this reveals about the politics of business. This is followed by a conclusion which 
draws together the main arguments of the thesis, discusses their implications, and 
suggests directions for future research. 
Many important parts of the work undertaken to complete this thesis do not fit 
neatly into its linear argument. Thus, in addition to these five main chapters, an 
introduction and a conclusion, the thesis contains a number of substantial 
appendices. Appendix A: Political Donations is a table providing a more detailed 
breakdown on the political donation information analysed in Chapter 2. Appendix B: 
VNABuilder is a chapter-length introduction to the computer program I built for 
extracting social network files from large databases. It also includes the code for 
VNABuilder. Appendix C: Code far Clean Up is the code for another computer 
program I wrote as part of this PhD. Clean Up transforms the formatting of large 
biographical databases so that they are in a format which is able to statistically 
analysed. Appendix D: PNet far Dummies is a handbook I wrote for the exponential 
random graph model software PNet. It is currently available on the University of 
Melbourne website, where it is used both for educating new users and as a reference 
tool for researchers when fitting models. Appendix E: Calculating Social Iefluence 
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Measures in UCINET is a protocol I wrote for calculating social influence measures 
using the social network package UCINET. While such extensive appendices are 
not usual for PhDs, it is appropriate that they are included as they represent major 
pieces of work completed as part of this PhD. 
0.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the title of this PhD implies, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the social 
and economic foundation of competing political strategies within the business 
community. The primary justification for this study is that business is an interest 
group like no other, with a privileged position in the politics of liberal democracies. 
However, while almost all writers on the politics of business acknowledge that 
business has ·a privileged role, they also overwhelmingly concede that the exact 
political orientation of either the business community as a whole, or any of it's 
constituent parts - business associations, firms, directors or owners - is a complex, 
multifaceted phenomenon. McEachem (1992) describes the relationship between 
business and politics as a "network of complexity" that requires some sort of 
"analytical map". Unfortunately, the major traditions of intellectual research on the 
politics of business are lacking precisely this type of map, particularly in Australia. 
This literature review outlines the four major traditions of research on business and 
politics that are engaged with in this thesis, and in the process of doing so illustrates 
the unique contribution that this thesis aims to make. The four traditions are: (1) the 
qualitative Australian business-government relations literature, (2) the conventional 
interlocking directorates literature, (3) the mixed methods interlocking directorates 
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literature, and (4) US, UK and Australian statistical analysis of business politics, 
which is primarily focused on political donations. 
0.1 QUALITATIVE AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
LITERATURE 
The research tradition which I term qualitative Australian business-government 
relations literature covers diverse topics from histories of class and ruling elites 
(Connell 1977; Connell and Irving 1980; Tsokhas 1984), studies of business 
associations (Matthews 1983; Matthew 1989; Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1998; Bell 
2006), think tanks (Marsh 1995; Marsh and Stone 2004; Cahill 2004), the wealthy 
(Gilding 1999) major transformations of the Australian political and economic 
structure, particularly the phase of privatisations, corporatisation, deregulation and 
the rolling back of union rights during the 1980s and early 1990s (Kelly 1994; Carey 
1997; Sawer 1982; Cahill 2004; Bell 1997), business-government relations (Bell and 
Wanna 1992; Stewart 1994), and a strong tradition of biographies ofleading 
businessmen primarily written by leading Australian journalists (Chenoweth 2007; 
Barry 1993: Barry 1991; Wilkinson 1996). 
While this literature has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the politics 
of business, what it lacks is an overarching conception of the relationship between 
the economic and social organisation of business and the differing political 
tendencies within the business community. To take a representative example: when 
McEachern (1992a and 1992b) asks "if there is any correspondence between the 
economic activities of business and the political positions taken", his finding was 
mostly negative: "there is no simple one to one correspondence between say, area of 
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activity, size of firm, affiliation to specific business organisation and political 
position" (McEachern 1992b: 98). The economic basis for political divisions he 
could identify were also quite limited in their scope. Discussing divisions within the 
business community in the mid 1980s, he states that the major business associations, 
at that time the Business Council of Australia (BCA) and Confederation of Australian 
Industry (CAI), were the business groups that tended to accommodate Labor 
governments and maintain relations with both major parties, while small business, 
mining and farming were more politically radical and supported the conservative 
parties strongly (1992: 98). This high level of generality and low level of specificity is 
characteristic of attempts by the qualitative Australian business-government relations 
literature to theorise about the economic and social foundations of different political 
tendencies within the business community. 
One of the main reasons that this literature lacks specificity about the social and 
economic foundations of political divisions within the business community is 
because of the inherent limits of qualitative research. Qualitative studies have 
contributed a great deal to the understanding of the politics of business: through 
interviews or documentary sources, the researcher is able to trace decision making 
processes in an almost direct fashion and often closely follow the mental processes 
of the actors involved. Few quantitative researchers could hope to achieve this. 
However, qualitative methods have clear methodological limitations: interviews with 
100 business leaders in Australia would be (and has been) a major research effort, yet 
100 business leaders would still only represent a sample of one percent of all 
directors of companies with a turnover of over $ASO million per year. Qualitative 
samples, particularly of business political leaders, also suffer from 'selection on the 
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dependent variable': we only see the actors who act, who get reported in newspaper 
articles, who undertake overt action, who agree to be interviewed, or who make the 
decision to act politically. While any study - quantitative or qualitative - can suffer 
from selection bias, in the case of qualitative research on elites, the bias is particularly 
strong. To take the case of conservative think tanks and their directors, in the 
analysis which follows in future chapters I show that in a population of 2,000 
corporations and just over 7,500 directors, there are only 21 directors of conservative 
think tanks. Such directors clearly represent a very particular segment of the business 
community, and while an important part of the story of business politics is how these 
21 think tank directors interact with the political system, a vitally important question 
is how these 21 members of think tank boards relate to and differ from the other 
99.9% of directors. 
The small sample size of most qualitative research also limits its ability to grasp 
relationships in which there are tendencies or patterns that are not absolute. \Vb.en 
McEachem writes "there is no simple one to one correspondence between say, area 
of activity, size of firm, affiliation to specific business organisation and political 
position taken" (1992b: 98) he is actually calling for perfect correlation: something 
which only exists in trivial and/ or self-evidence cases in most real social systems. 
Instead, social systems are inherently complex, with many different and counter-
acting forces existing at the same time. To take a simple example, a company may be 
located in a highly regulated industry, creating a tendency to donate to both major 
parties as a means of 'hedging bets'. But, the owner may have attended an exclusive 
private school and have many personal friends in the Liberal Party, creating a 
counter-veiling tendency towards conservatism. For qualitative researchers using 
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small samples, one example of a director who went to a private school but who 
donates to both major parties can be used in qualitative research - and often is - to 
discredit any claim to a trend of a relationship between schooling and political 
behaviour. It is only with larger numbers and a degree of certainty about sampling 
and measurement that we can hope to control for multiple effects that are talcing 
place simultaneously, and by doing this identify real tendencies and patterns.1 
One of the reasons why most research on business-government relations in Australia 
has been qualitative is because of the absence of quantitative sources. In 1992, 
McEachern cited three ways which businesses may influence political parties: 
donations, membership andlobbying (1992a: 84). At the time there was neither a 
reliable public record of political donations, lobbying or of party membership lists. 
The only quantitative evidence available at the time was the crossover in public 
officials between leading positions in the conservative parties and certain business 
organisations, and this was itself a rare phenomenon. 
In summary then, the majority of literature on business-government relations in 
Australia uses qualitative sources such as interviews, newspaper articles and archival 
sources. This literature has very little to say about the social and economic 
foundations of the political divisions within the business community. The main 
reason for this is that the small samples involved in qualitative research can only 
detect tendencies which are almost absolute or very obvious to subjects involved. In 
addition, there has been a lack of sources for more quantitative attempts, as, for 
example, rigorous political donation information has only been publicly available 
1 A counter argument was made a physical scientist who simply said "If I need to use statistics to 
interpret my results I need to repeat the experiment." 
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since 1996, and large scale business information databases have been similarly 
difficult to access. By taking advantages of recently available data, and subjecting it 
to statistical analysis so as to control for the complexity of business political relations 
I hope that this thesis will overcome many of the difficulties previous Australian 
research has faced in attempting to understand the social and economic foundations 
of the major political tendencies within the business community. 
0.2 THE CONVENTIONAL INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES LITERATURE 
The research traditions which I term the conventional interlocking directorates 
literature I define as that that body of literature which uses social network analysis 
to study the interlocking directorates - that is, the network of corporations formed 
by shared directors - with relatively little use of other dependent or independent 
variables, and with very little actual statistical (as against mathematical) analysis. 
Within this tradition the most well known work is that of John Scott in the UK, 
particularly Networks ef Corporate Power (Stokman, Ziegler and Scott 1985). In 
Australia, this tradition has been primarily pursued by Wheelwrigh (1957; 
Wheelwright and Miskelly 1967) and Rolfe (1967) in the 1950s and 1960s and more 
recently by Alexander (1998; 2003) and Murray (2001). I distinguish this school of 
conventional interlocking directorates research from those using mixed methods 
(such as in combination with qualitative data), which I deal with in the next section 
(Section 3), and also from those that use conventional statistical analysis, which also 
includes most of the US researchers within the interlocking directorates tradition. 
28 
The strength of this literature is that is actually a census of the largest corporations in 
the business community. Whereas qualitative research has the limitations of small 
samples, this literature has the advantage of not sampling at all: it looks at the entire 
population oflargest 30, 250 or even 1000 corporations and their directors. As a 
census of the largest corporations in the business community, it enables researchers 
to grasp the overall picture of the business community, seeing it in its totality. From 
this totality, using the methods of social network analysis, researchers are able to 
point to the most networked or most central directors and/ or corporations, and also, 
potentially, the division of the corporate community into groups. 
Unfortunately, however, pure interlocking directorates research has been of limited 
usefulness to understanding the political tendencies within a national or international 
business community, One of the major reasons for this is that, as one colleague 
expressed it, "it is a discipline in need of a dependent variable". Actually, it is a 
tradition of research remarkably lacking in both dependent and independent 
variables. Many pieces of early research were simply diagrams with numerical 
summary measures derived from social network measures. Part of this appears to 
have been a function of a lack of political, social and economic data to complement 
the interlocking directors data, but also part of this appears to be a function of 
interlocking directorates research being 'ghettoised' in the social networks 
community, and consequently rarely using multivariate statistics. For example, 
Stokman, Ziegler and Scott's (1985) edited collection is the result of an enormous 
international research effort, and contains a comparative analysis of the interlocking 
directorates of ten countries, yet it includes regressions in only one chapter on 
Belgium. 
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To understand this critique it is necessary to understand that social network analysis 
is not a branch of statistics, but rather a branch of mathematics, associated with 
graph theory. As a graph is not a sample, the measurements taken of a graph are not 
statistical, but rather numerical summary measures, such as the number of ties of an 
actor, or the average distance between any two actors in a particular network. The 
lack of use of statistics with social network measures in what I call the 'conventional 
interlocking directorates literature' has meant that as a tradition it has not benefited 
from some of the most basic and important tools for hypothesis testing in the social 
sciences. In particular, the failure to use multivariate statistics, such as linear and 
logistic regression, has meant that as a tradition of research it has not regularly tested 
its major theoretical claims - particularly about the importance of interlocks for 
social cohesion and coordination - against alternative hypotheses. I must emphasis 
that this critique is largely only true for the Australian, British and European 
traditions of interlocking directorates research, and considerably less true for the US 
traditions (such as Mizruchi 1992; Burris 1987; Burris 1991; Burris 2001; Burris 2005) 
which do combine interlocking directorates research with standard statistical 
methods. 
To address these limitations, this thesis improves upon the conventional interlocking 
directorates literature in three ways. Firstly, it uses many more variables, both 
dependent variables and independent variables. In the case of dependent variables, it 
focuses in two of the three major empirical chapters in this thesis on political 
dependent variables, such as to whom a political donation is made, or whether a 
corporation gains access to important government committees. It does this because 
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in many cases, the important questions, not only in this thesis, but also in most 
interlocking directorates research, are the political questions. In the case of 
independent variables, this thesis uses many relevant independent variables so as to 
credibly test alternative hypothesises about the nature of political action by 
corporations. For example, while interlocks may explain a particular pattern of 
donations behaviour, so too may firm size, location in a regulated industry, self-
interest of corporations who receive government contracts, the foreign ownership of 
a firm, whether a firm is publicly listed on the stock exchange, or whether the 
directors are members of a particular club or attended an exclusive private school. 
The second improvement this thesis makes on the conventional interlocking 
directorates literature is that it uses multivariate statistics to test multiple competing 
hypotheses and so as to include controls in the modelling. The third improvement 
made over the conventional interlock research is that in its final two chapters, I use a 
recently developed advanced modelling technique called exponential random graph 
(ERG) models to model interlocking directorate formation. This technique, which 
shares similarities to a logistic regression in the way its results are interpreted, allows 
the researcher to assess the impact of company and director characteristics on 
interlock formation. It allows the researcher to test, for example, whether large firms 
are more likely to form ties with large firms, or whether directors who serve on 
government committees are more likely to serve on multiple boards. By using these 
ERG models I am able to address many questions which were beyond the reach of 
previous generations of interlocking directorates researchers. 
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0.3 THE MIXED METHODS INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES LITERATURE 
The research traditions which I term the mixed-methods interlocking directorates 
literature I define as that body of literature which primarily combines qualitative 
research with some degree of social network analysis of interlocking directorates. In 
the United States the two clearest examples of this research are Domhoff's Who Rules 
America? (1967: 1" ed.; 2006: 5t1t ed.), and Useem's The Inner Circle (1984). In 
Australia, the two leading examples of this research are Higley, Deacon and Smart's 
Elites in Australia (1979) and Murray's Capitalist Networks and Social Power in Australia 
and New Zealand (2006). I will focus this section on discussing Useem and Murray's 
work, but before I do so it is necessary to briefly discuss Domhoff and Higley, et. al. 
Both Domhoff and Higley, et. al. share a concern with the nature of the overarching 
political system, but because of the importance of business in this political system 
they are led to devoting considerable effort studying the political organisation of 
business. The sections of Domhoffs work describing the various political 
tendencies within the business community in the US and the political expression of 
these tendencies through business associations, think tanks, and the political parties 
is an example of the type of final results that I am aiming at with this research. Much 
of Domhoffs work, however, is derived from secondary or historical sources, and 
for his major quantitative findings, he is either reliant on the results of researchers 
within the conventional interlocking directorates literature described earlier, or on the 
statistical politics of business literature which I will describe in the next section. As 
such, the quantitative elements within Domhoff's work share the limitations of these 
two traditions. 
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Higley et. al. remains the most important study of elites in Australia. Undertaken in 
1974-5, it essentially used a reputation snow ball sample of over 600 leading 
politicians, businessmen, non-government advocacy leaders, trade union leaders, 
journalists and other important persons. From this Higley et. al. were able to 
construct an essentially complete network of the entire Australian elite network at 
one point in time. The data they collected allowed them to measure various social 
network measures, including centrality and clustering within the network. In 
addition they undertook detailed interviews with each of these people, and so were 
able to combine their quantitative results with qualitative data. The research itself is 
very hard to fault. For the purposes of answering the questions posed by this thesis 
however, the study provides little. While it shows that business people are central to 
the system of politics and power in Australia, there is little detail about the political 
tendencies or political divisions within the Australian business community. This 
thesis aims to remedy this by directly focusing on the business network itself. 
Two of the most important books that have attempted to provide a detailed anatomy 
of the politics of business in the US and Australia, using both quantitative and 
qualitative sources, are those ofUseem (in the US) and Murray (in Australia). It is no 
accident that both of these pieces of research grew out of the interlocking 
directorates research tradition. However, both of these books went considerably 
beyond the interlocking directorates tradition by using both qualitative sources, such 
as interviews with business leaders, and also considerable alternative sources of semi-
quantitative data: such as lists of school attendance, social registers/Who'.r Who 
listings, academic and occupational background, and so forth. I will now discuss 
each of these books in turn. 
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Useem's Inner Circle is one of the most famous books on the political sociology of 
business, and because of this is a constant reference point in this thesis. Alongside 
interviews with 72 directors of large British companies and 57 executives of large 
American companies, U seem catalogues the numerous class, status, social and 
political connections of leading businessmen in both countries. His primary 
argument is that following capitalism's first stage, which was dominated by family-
owned companies, and capitalism's second stage, that of corporate dominance, 
capitalism is now entering a third stage, where the dominant business leaders and 
business corporations are those that are heavily interlocked with many other 
corporations. His purpose is to show that interlocked directors (and companies) -
whom he terms 'The Inner Circle' (the title of his book) - are at the apex of all the 
most important class, status, and, most importantly, social and political hierarchies 
within the business community in both the US and the UK (around 1980 when the 
study was undertaken). 
While Useem's marshalling of evidence and argument is impressive, it boils down to 
an argument about overrepresentation: interlocked directors and corporations are 
overrepresented amongst the political leaders of business, and hence, Useem 
concludes, interlocks are the source of power within the business community. The 
problem with this argument is that many different and unique characteristics are 
associated with the political leaders of business. Just to list a few: the super-wealthy 
owners of businesses, members of exclusive clubs, graduates of top universities and 
exclusive private schools, directors living in major cities, directors of large 
corporations, directors of corporations who are involved in government contracting, 
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and so forth. All of these unique characteristics are associated with the political 
leaders of business. Interlocking does not have a sole claim as the underlying 
characteristic that correlates with political influence. In sociological terms this can be 
understood as the hierarchies of status, class and politics coinciding at the peak of 
the business community. Useem points to one characteristic, interlocks, then shows 
that interlocks correlates with other characteristics and declares interlocks the cause. 
The problem is that he does this without first properly testing the alternative causes, 
certainly without testing them quantitatively: his quantitative data is basically 
supporting evidence, organised as simple cross tabulations and percentages. The 
decisive evidence for his assertion of the importance of interlocks is actually in his 
interviews, the qualitative data. However, if his study was to be genuinely 
quantitatively tested, the very least that needs to be done is multivariate statistical 
analysis where other possible theories are controlled for. Ironically, the strong 
correlations between the hierarchies of status, class and political power which Useem 
demonstrates actually shows the importance of including controls to test the theory 
of the importance of interlocks: with so many closely correlated variables it is 
necessary to model them properly to be sure which is the decisive effect. 
In the further chapters I outline exactly how I go about testing the various 
hypothesises which make up Useem's theory. I can, however, summarise the major 
contribute that this thesis attempts to make to assessing Useem's work: this thesis 
attempts to collect the same, and actually a greater breadth of data as U seem does, 
but attempts to test Useem's hypotheses against competing explanations using 
multivariate statistical analysis. In using multivariate statistical analysis this thesis also 
attempts to go beyond U seem' s attempt to show the sources of political unity within 
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the business community, and instead also attempts to show the political differentiation 
of the business community along social, economic and political lines. 
Murray's (2006) work is similar to Useem in that it uses a detailed combination of 
qualitative and quantitative sources. There is a strong emphasis in Murray's work on 
both interlocking directorates, and also on the close correlations of the hierarchies of 
status, class and political activity amongst the most important business elites. 
Murray makes numerous contributions to the literature on the politics of business, 
most of which cannot be dealt with here. From the perspective of the work 
undertaken in this thesis, much of Murray's work can be criticised either from a 
similar perspective to that criticising the straight interlocking directorates research or 
that criticising Useem. In particular, conventional social network research is central 
to Murray's research agenda, but Murray's interlock research involves too few 
variables and too little testing of alternative theories to draw the strong conclusions 
which Murray does. For example, two chapters of the book are based around a 
longitudinal study of the interlocks of the 30 largest companies in Australia and the 
30 largest companies in New Zealand. While such a longitudinal study is unique, the 
sample of only 30 companies is really too small from which to draw strong 
conclusions, especially when one considers that, for example, there were just seven 
interlocks between the largest 30 corporations in New Zealand in 2004. In Chapter 5 
of this thesis I present a graph of the interlocking directorates network of the largest 
250 corporations in Australia. While in my dataset of the largest 1575 corporations 
there are over 90 Coalition-only political donors, in my sample of top 250 companies 
which interlock there is only one Coalition-only donor. Clearly, if sampling the top 
250 companies creates a large bias, sampling only the largest 30 corporations is going 
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to introduce even greater bias and omissions. Other chapters provide a useful 
taxonomy of the ruling class, showing it's major trends over the decades (such as 
concentrations in various industries). Much of the work in Murray (2006) on 
contemporary accounts of business follow a similar overrepresentation argument to 
that ofUseem: showing the strong intersection hierarchies of status, class and 
political power amongst the leaders of business, and hence justifying calling them 
part of the ruling class. \V'hile this research is incredibly useful, the strong 
correlations of class, status and politics raises the question as to what is cause, what is 
effect, and what is incidental. It is the disentangling of these strong correlations that 
is one of the central purposes of this thesis. 
0.4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS POLITICS AND POLITICAL DONATIONS 
I define this fourth body of literature, which is primarily from the United States, as 
those studies of business politics, particularly of corporations, that use conventional 
statistical techniques to test their hypotheses. The vast majority of this literature is 
focused on corporate political donations, however, in recent years it has been 
substantially extended to include corporate lobbying (Andres 1985; Bond 2003; Bond 
2004; Burris 1987; Burris 1991; Burris 2001; Burris 2005; Snyder 1990; Clawson and 
Neustadtl 1989; Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986; Hansen, Mitchell and Drope 
2004;Jasney 2006; Lord 2000; Masters and Keim 1985; McMenamin 2008; Milyo, 
Primo and Groseclose 2000; Mitchell, Hansen and Jepsen 1997; Mizruchi and 
Stearns 1988; Mizruchi 1990; Mizruchi 1992). 
Before discussing the mostly US literature, I will make some points about the 
Australian political donations literature. As McMenamin (2007) notes, despite 
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Australia having had one of the most rigorous regimes for political donations (at least 
between 1996 and 2006), the majority of Australian work on political donations is 
legal and normative in nature (for example, Young and Tham 2006). There is very 
little quantitative work, and that which has been undertaken is essentially tabulations 
of donations against a small number of variables (Ramsay IM, Stapledon GP & 
Vernon 2001; Democracy4sale 2005). Thus, aside from McMenamin's one article on 
political donations and public opinion, there is a substantial gap in the Australian 
literature on corporate political donations, and a largely untapped data source for 
studying the political behaviour of corporations (i.e. the Australian Electoral 
Commission donation data). 
The main strengths of the primarily US tradition of statistical analysis of business 
politics is that it actually attempts to model corporate political behaviour, using 
sophisticated modelling and high quality data, and testing multiple competing 
hypotheses. This literature shares many of the strengths of the interlocking 
directorates literature, particularly its use of initial samples of the largest 200 or 500 
corporations in a country, and because of this these studies reach beyond simply elite 
actors which qualitative research accesses. 
The major limitation of this literature is that its focus on narrow hypothesis testing 
and so called 'middle range theorising' has meant that it lacks an overall topography 
of the business community with which to guide model building and research design. 
For example, there is a tendency in the literature to test one main hypotheses by 
'throwing in' two or three so called 'controls', such as industry (usually 1 digit 
standard industry codes) and firm size or firm revenue. The problem is that these 
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really are just 'straw men': industry is actually rarely significant in these models, and 
large firms tend to be more political active. These are weak controls. That leading 
literature can get away with using such weak controls in the business politics 
literature is testament to the lack of a broader conception of the most important 
variables driving business politics. One could not imagine such use of 'straw man' 
controls in more established quantitative fields of political and sociological research 
such as occupational mobility or public opinion studies. A second example of the 
problems which flow from this lack of overall topography of the political behaviour 
of the business community is the assumption that a sample of the largest 30, 250 or 
500 corporations captures the most important actors in the business community. 
The problem with such samples was starkly illustrated in the earlier example of there 
being only one Coalition-only donor with an interlock amongst the 250 largest 
companies in Australia. A further example to illustrate the limitations of such 
samples is the case of Robert Gerard. Gerard is one of the most important 
supporters and largest donors to the Liberal Party in Australia, and he has been 
appointed by the Howard Coalition Government to the Reserve Bank Board, the 
most prestigious government board appointment in Australia. However, Gerard is 
actually the owner and director of the 1922nd largest corporation in Australia, with a 
turnover of just $65 million. This is illustrative of a trend which I show in the 
Australian data towards smaller businesses being more political conservative. 
Traditional sample sizes in statistical studies of business politics would completely 
miss such individuals. A third illustration of the problems which flow from the lack 
of an overall conception of the political topography of the business community is the 
trend in this line of research to have a sample of on/y the largest public listed 
corporation, that is, those corporations that are listed on the stock exchange. In this 
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thesis, in which I use a sample of the 1575 largest corporations, including more that 
50% of which are private (that is, proprietary) corporations. I show that private 
corporations have a strong tendency towards being politically conservative (making 
approximately half the Coalition-only donors in the entire sample), and thus they 
display very different behaviour to the public listed corporations which make up the 
entire sample of many quantitative studies of business politics. A fourth and final 
example which illustrates the limitations of the existing statistical literature on the 
politics of corporations is that with a few notable exceptions (Burris 2001 on 
individuals and corporations) there is very little clear distinction between the role of 
corporations and their directors. Most studies are of corporations as actors, yet as I 
will show in this thesis, individual business people, such as the super wealthy, are 
often some of the most politically important actors in business community. 
Corporations as institutions do have their own interests, but it seems, especially when 
it comes to conservative political action, that individual businessmen acting as 
individuals or part of a broader class are more important actors than corporations. 
In summary then, while the statistical analysis of business politics, particularly 
political donations, overcomes many of the problems of other research traditions by 
using sophisticated modelling, high quality data, and testing multiple competing 
hypotheses, it is limited by its lack of an overall conception of the topography of the 
politics of the business community. The problems with a lack of an overall 
topography can be seen in the routine use of relatively empty or meaningless 
controls, the limited samples based on small sets of leading corporations or those 
only listed on the stock exchange, and also the lack of theoretical or analytical 
distinction between the political role of corporations and individuals. The aim of this 
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thesis is to remedy such limitations by developing, or at least contributing to the 
development of, such an overarching topography. 
0.5 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this literature review and introduction was to outline the four major 
traditions of research on business and politics that are engaged with in this thesis, to 
illustrate the limitations of existing work and to show how this thesis hopes to 
remedy this situation and make a unique contribution. The first tradition examined 
was the qualitative Australian business-government relations literature. While the 
qualitative nature of this literature has meant it has been able to follow closely the 
processes and behaviour of individual actors, this literature is limited by the small 
sample sizes that are necessarily involved in qualitative studies. Such small sample 
sizes and the complex nature of business politics has meant that the major political 
tendencies and trends which it has been able to detect have only been incredibly 
blunt or trivial. This in tum has meant that the literature has had very little to say 
about the social and economic foundation of the political divisions in the business 
community. 
The second tradition examined was the conventional interlocking directorates 
literature. While this literature has the advantage of being based on a complete 
network census of the largest corporations in a particular country, this research 
tradition has been limited by its failure to use additional variables, both dependent 
and independent. It has also been limited by its failure to use, especially in the UK 
and Australia, multivariate statistical modelling so as to undertake basic hypothesis 
testing and so as to control for the strong colinearity of effects. 
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The third tradition examined was the mixed methods interlocking directorates 
literature, typified by the work ofUseem (1984) and Murray (2006). As a form of 
social network analysis and interlocking directorates research, this tradition has 
tended to suffer from similar problems to that of the conventional interlocking 
directorates literature, with a lack of use of basic statistical modelling. As a 
quantitative body of research, its primary focus has been on the overrepresentation 
of various high status, upper class and/ or politically powerful groups within the 
upper echelons of the business community. While this tradition has successfully 
demonstrated a dramatic concentration of power, influence and privilege at the 
centres of the business community, it has failed to clearly separate the many strongly 
collinear features of this system of class, status and power. The aim of this thesis is 
to disentangle these many features and attempt to understand the multiple and 
competing political tendencies within the powerful group called the business 
community. 
The fourth tradition examined was the US, UK and Australian statistical analysis of 
business politics. While this tradition overcomes the major limitations of the other 
approaches by use of sophisticated modelling, high quality data, and testing multiple 
competing hypotheses, it is limited by its lack of an overall conception of the social 
and economic foundations of the different political tendencies within the business 
community. Such lack of overall conception of the politics of the business 
community has lead to the use of straw-man controls, datasets which leave out major 
political groups within the business community - such as small business, or privately 
owned (unlisted) corporations - or which neglect the special role placed by the 
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super-wealthy owners of businesses, and the difference between directors and 
corporations as political actors. 
In the chapters which follow, I attempt to rectify many of these limitations. The 
major tools which I use are a uniquely large and detailed dataset and sophisticated 
statistical modelling. These two developments are in no small part due to the 
fantastic development of computing power and the ubiquity of computers in the first 
world. The change over the last three decades, and even the last decade, has been 
extraordinary. I have been told anecdotally that Higley undertook the analysis for 
Elites in Australia using a punch card system. His dataset was large, even by today's 
standards, and included over 600 actors in a one mode (mean one type of actor) 
network. By comparison this study involves, at the centre of the dataset, a network 
of 2000 corporations and 7,500 directors. 
Being able to manipulate such large datasets requires a skill set of its own, which in 
the case of this thesis required an ability to both manipulate databases and also to 
undertake the building of not insubstantial computer programs to clean the data and 
build social networks from it. This is discussed in more detail, but still rather briefly, 
in Chapter 1. It is important to note that the development of such programs was not 
a small part of the work of this thesis, and that without them much of this thesis 
would not have been possible. Another anecdotal example will serve to illustrate 
this: two close colleagues who undertake similar research on interlocking 
directorates each separately built a dataset of interlocks, club and school ties between 
corporations (one was for the UK and the other for the US) a couple of years before 
I developed this dataset for Australia. In both cases the individuals manually entered 
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the matrix data into an excel spreadsheet, by hand, from paper business directors in 
public libraries. The painstaking work involved in such data collection is almost 
unimaginable. It is because I was able to gain access to pre-existing databases from 
business information providers, and because I developed computer programs to 
transform and manipulate databases, that I have been able to undertake a study using 
such a large dataset and thus overcome many of the limitations of previous research. 
The process by which I developed this dataset is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1: METHODS AND DATA 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The context of the data collection exercise undertaken in this thesis is the lack of 
quantitative data on the political, social and economic characteristics of corporations 
and their directors. While social scientists have access to large datasets on the 
political, social and economic behaviour of the general population (from sources 
such as political polling or social attitudes surveys), there is no similarly integrated 
datasets available for studying business. Most studies of business politics in 
Australia, therefore, are qualitative, built around interviews, as well as archival 
sources, such as newspaper articles, annual reports or minutes of meetings. This 
thesis is an attempt to place all previous studies in a much wider context by 
undertaking nothing less than a census of business politics in Australia. As will be 
shown, the dataset is the complete population of the 2000 largest enterprises and 
their 7 ,500 directors, and contains a considerable amount of detail on the social, 
political and economic behaviour and characteristics of both corporations and 
directors. Such a census, however, necessarily presents data collection problems. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to detail how these data collection problems were 
overcome, and then provide an introduction to the dataset itself. 
This chapter contains two sections: the first is on data handling, the second is an 
overview of the dataset. The section on data handling outlines the methods used in 
this thesis to overcome the problems of analysing large biographical databases. 
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These large datasets present a unique set of problems for social scientists, 
particularly social network analysts. I overview the techniques developed during the 
course of writing this thesis to 'clean' large datasets, match multiple large databases, 
and to transform these databases into social network data. The second section of 
this chapter provides an overview of the dataset used in this thesis. This section 
focuses on describing the sources, measurement issues and the basic descriptive 
statistics of the main variables used in analysis in later chapters. 
1.1 DATA HANDLING 
The last decade has seen substantial advances in the availability of large biographical 
and business information databases. Advances in computing power and the growth 
of the internet have seen businesses and governments provide increasing amounts 
of systematically collected corporate, biographical and political data in readily 
accessible formats. For this thesis, three databases have been particularly important: 
the IBISWorld Top 2000 Enterprises in Australia database, which also contains the 
7,500 directors of these enterprises; Crown Content's Who's Who ef Australia and 
Who '.r Who ef Australian Business, which contain biographical information on 33,000 
prominent Australians; and the Australian Electoral Commission's political donation 
database, which provides information on over 8,000 corporate donations over the 
last decade. 
~e these databases overcome many of the problems of data collection, they 
present the social scientist with new challenges. This chapter deals with the three 
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challenges that were the most taxing, and which consumed considerable resources. 
These challenges were: (1) cleaning imperfect data; (2) matching multiple databases 
from different sources; and (3) building social network data from these databases. 
All the data used in this thesis was obtained free of charge from either business 
information providers, such as IBISWor!d, Crown Content and Dun and Bradstreet, 
or from government or business websites. This data required substantial 
transformation before it could be used in statistical analysis. Figure 1.1 provides an 
overview of the data handling process used in this thesis. Beginning with raw data 
provided by various business information providers, the databases were cleaned 
using a piece of software I designed called Cleanup. These cleaned databases were 
then matched by hand. From the matched databases, network files were 
constructed using a piece of software I wrote called ~ABuilder. These network 
files were then imported into various network analysis software packages, such as 
UCINET, PNet, or into statistical packages such as Stata. 
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Figure 1.1: The data handling process used in this thesis. 
'Raw' 'Cleaned' Integrated 
Data ready 
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Sta ta 
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1.2 CLEANING DATA 
I 
Software designed as 
part of this thesis 
t 
The majority of data cleaning for this thesis was done by hand using Microsoft 
Exce~ Word and Notepad. However, for complex data manipulation on large 
databases these techniques face temporal limits. For very large databases, 
manipulation by hand is beyond the capacity of an individual human, and in any 
case the time it would take for one person (hundreds of years) makes the task 
impossible. In response to this situation, I designed a computer program I have 
called CleanUp. This program runs SQL (Structured Query Language) queries 
against a database, and then uses string manipulation and regular expression 
matching to clean and rearrange the data. The code for CleanUp is contained in 
AppendixC. 
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Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate a Who's Who entry 'before' and 'after' its processing by 
Cleanup. In simple terms, CleanUp takes selected fields for a particular person (or 
set of persons) from the Who's Who database (illustrated by Figure 1.2), and breaks 
these entries into their key elements (illustrated by Figure 1.3). In this example, the 
field that is cleaned is the 'career' field in Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.2, all the separate 
steps in Nicholas Minchin's career appear in one cell, while in Figure 1.3 each career 
step has it's own line, and the dates which Minchin held these positions have been 
separated from the career step and placed into their own cells in the columns 'Start 
Year' and 'Finish Year'. 
While in this example, CleanUp cleaned the career field of this Who's Who entry, it 
can equally be configured to clean any particular field, such as positions on 
committees, voluntary association positions, education, or membership of 
community organisations, political parties and clubs. 
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Figure 1.2: The Who's Who in Australia entry for Nicholas Minchin 
Sumame MIN CHIN 
GivenNames Nicholas Hugh 
Title The Hon. 
PostNominals BEc, LLB (ANU), CertLaw (NSW) 
Gender M 
BirthDetail Apr. 15, 1953, Epping, NSW 
Education Knox Gram. Sch. (NSW), Hawken Sch. (Cleveland, Ohio), ANU, Coll. of Law 
l!NSW) 
Occupation Federal Minister for Finance and Administration, since 2001; Deputy Leader of 
the Government in the Senate, since 2003; Vice-President of the Executive 
Council, since 2004; Senator (Lib.) for South Australia, since 1993 
Career Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources 1998-2001, Special Minr of State 1997-98, 
Minr Asstg PM 1997-98, Parity Sec. to the PM 1996-97, Parity Sec. to Ldr 
Opposition 1994-96, State Dir SA 1985-93, Dep. Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust. 
1983, Asst Fed. Dir 1981-82, Asst to the Fed Dir 1978-80, Res. Off. Fed 
Secretariat 1977; Solr NSW 1977; Memb. Zoological Socy (SA), Trees for Life 
(SA), Lib Party Aust. (SA Div.); British Cl Schol. 1991, American Field Schol. 
1970-71 
Clubs 
Committees 
Voluntarv 
AwardsMil recipient Centenarv Medal 2003 
Source: Who's Who in Australia (2005) 
Figure 1.3: The database table produced by Cleanup containing the career path 
information for Nicholas Minchin 
Name Career Step Start Year Finish Year 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Federal Minister for Finance and Administration 2001 continuing 
Nicholas Hucli MIN CHIN Deoutv Leader of the Government in the Senate 2003 continuing 
Nicholas Hu!!h MIN CHIN Vice-President of the Executive Council 2004 continuine: 
Nicholas Hu!!h MIN CHIN Senator (Lib.) for South Australia 1993 continuing 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources 1998 2001 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Special Minr of State 1997 1998 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Minr Asstg PM 1997 1998 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition 1994 1996 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN State Dir SA Lib Partv 1985 1993 
Nicholas Hu!!h MIN CHIN Deo. Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1983 1983 
Nicholas Huizh MIN CHIN Asst Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1981 1982 
Nicholas Hu!!h MIN CHIN Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1978 1980 
Nicholas Huizh MIN CHIN Res. Of£ Fed Secretariat Lib Partv Aust. 1977 1977 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN SolrNSW 1977 1977 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Memb. Zoological Socv (SA) 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Memb. Trees for Life (SA) 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Memb. Lib Party Aust. (SA Div.) 
Nicholas HU!!h MIN CHIN British Cl Schol. 1991 1991 
Nicholas Hu!!h MIN CHIN American Field Schol. 1970 1971 
1.3 MATCHING DATASETS 
The analysis in this thesis required the matching of several large databases. By 
'matching' I mean the joining of records of the same people or companies, across 
multiple databases. For example, I may have a database of directors of companies, 
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and a list of persons listed in Who's Who, and I need to 'match' the records of people 
who are listed in both so that I can build a complete profile of every director. 
Of particular note was the matching of 10,000 directors' positions in the IBISWorld 
dataset with 33,000 persons listed in Who '.r Who. All matching in this thesis was 
undertaken by hand, and confirmed by at least two matching fields (for example, 
both name and company). Thus, if there is a bias in the matching in the datasets, it 
will be towards false negative matches (persons being listed as two separate people 
when they really are the one person). 
While writing this thesis I explored possibilities for automating matching. The most 
promising software he found, at a reasonably affordable price, was DedupExpress 
produced by DQ Global. 
1.4 BUILDING SOCIAL NETWORK FILES 
A significant problem for the social network analysis oflarge databases is the 
transformation of this data into a form that is readable by social network software, 
such as UCINET, PNet, NetDraw or Pajek. While all social network packages 
have their own file formats, these formats are not always easy to generate from a 
database or Excel table, especially when the network is more complex. To 
overcome this problem, I developed a computer program called VNABuilder, with 
the express purpose of transforming biographical databases into social network files. 
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The decision to write a new computer program was not taken lightly. This decision 
was taken after significant research into and experimentation with a range of other 
options, as well as consultation with experts in network analysis, databases and 
computer programming. However, on the basis of this investigation it became clear 
that writing a new program was an essential step in allowing the manipulations of 
data required by this project. 
Research and informal consultation with leading social network analysts from 
Australia and overseas2 established that UCINET was the most widely used and 
highly regarded software for social network analysis. Communication with the 
designer of UCINET, Steve Borgatti, established that the ideal file format for 
storing network data was VNA - a file format that allows both direct importing into 
NetDraw (for visual representation of networks) and UCINET (for analysis of 
networks and also conversion of the data into other social network file formats). 
Experimentation with UCINET revealed substantial limitations for the importing of 
the data required for this thesis. The advice from Mark Cole, an expert in large-
scale social science databases from the Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Training (ACIRRT) at the University of Sydney informed the strategy 
behind the computer programming. As such, the program was (1) end-focused and 
2 Including appendix in Scott (2000), and also informal consultation with William Domhoff, Val Buris 
and Peter Chen. Scott describes UCINET as "the best of the currently available programs and the 
one that is most accessible for the novice user." (Scott, 2000: 178) 
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individually tailored to this very specific project (rather than all-purpose) and (2) 
built and maintained by the social scientist who uses it (thereby minimising the need 
for expensive consultation with professional computer programmers). 
The primary function of VNABuilder is to transform a database table into a VNA 
file. Figure 1.4 shows a VNA file built by VNABuilder from the table in Figure 1.2 
(the career path of Nicholas Minchin). Figure 1.5 shows the visualisation of this 
VNA file in NetDraw. In this example we have used the 'careerpath' function in 
VNABuilder, which builds an arc from each job a person has held to other jobs 
which were held at the same time or up to two years after that job. 
A complete introduction to VNABuilder is provided in Appendix B of this thesis. 
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Figure 1.4: VNA file of the career path of Nicholas Minchin 
*Tie data 
from 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources" 
"Federal Minister for Finance and Administration " 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
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Figure 1.5: Career path of Nicholas Minchin 
_____.....Dep. Fed. Dir lib Party Aust 
~sstFed.DirLibPartyAust 
st to the Fed. Dir Lib Party Al.Jst 
Res. Off Fed Secretoriat Lib Party Aust 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
British Cl Schol 
As I explain in more detail in Appendix B, VNABuilder can construct five types of 
networks: (1) career path networks, as illustrated in Figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5; (2) 
'organisation by organisation' networks and (3) 'person by person' networks, both 
of which involve the construction of one-mode networks from two-mode network 
data; (4) 'money flow' networks, which are two-mode networks with user-specified 
tie values; and (5) 'policy networks', which involves the construction of multiple 
networks, each network involving ties between organisations which hold the same 
political position on a policy issue. 
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1.4DATA 
A list of the largest 2000 Australian enterprises and their approximately 10,000 
directors' positions in February 2006 was obtained from IBISWorld (the company 
which compiles the yearly Business Review Week{y Top 1000 Entetprises). The directors 
in this list were then each individually checked and those directors who sat on 
multiple boards were matched with themselves. These approximately 7 ,500 unique 
directors were then matched against a database of the 33,000 persons in Who's Who 
ef Australia and Who's Who ef Australian Business (which was obtained from Crown 
Content). Each of the Top 2000 enterprises was matched against their 2004-2005 
financial year political donations, as recorded by the Australian Electoral 
Commission. Lists of the directors of 16 major think tanks3 were then matched 
against the list of directors of the Top 2000 corporations. A similar process was 
followed for the directors and council members of the four major national business 
associations.4 Individuals in the May 2005 Business Review Week{y Rich 200 list were 
matched with their directorships of Top 2000 enterprises. 
In much of this thesis the primary unit of analysis are the 1575 for-profit 
corporations which have headquarters in Australia. Excluded were 425 enterprises: 
3 The think tanks boards collected were: Whitlam Institute, Brisbane Institute, Bennelong Society, The 
Australia Institute, Sydney Institute, Quadrant Magazine, Menzies Research Centre, Lowy Institute, 
Lavoisier Group, Institute of Public Affairs, Evatt Foundation, Centre for Independent Studies, 
Chifley Research Centre, Australian Fabian Society, Australian Collaboration, and Australian Business 
Foundation. 
4 The business associations collected were: the Business Council of Australia; the Australian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry; the Australian Industry Group and Australian Business Limited. 
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284 government-owned enterprises, 86 non-profit corporations, 87 New Zealand-
based corporations and two Papua New Guinea-based corporations.5 It is 
important to note that foreign-owned corporations that have a headquarters in 
Australia are included in the analysis. 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 contain an overview of the main variables used in this thesis. 
They are intended to provide the reader with an initial sense of the scope of the 
dataset, and also as a reference which will facilitate later interpretation of the 
analysis. At the aggregate level it is useful to note that a significant number of the 
most important variables have a relatively small number of non-zero values: 75% of 
the variables listed have less than 300 non-zero cases. In the case of some variables, 
such as donations to the Australian Democrats (six companies), or companies who 
donated only to the Labor Party (six companies), the size of the sample group is too 
small for statistical analysis, and so these variables are excluded from the analysis in 
this thesis. However, many of the other variables with small numbers, such as 
defence contractors (15 companies), partnerships (21 companies) and companies 
with the super-wealthy on their boards (92 companies), remain in the analysis, and, 
as will be shown, have significant explanatory value. 
5 These do not add up to 425 as some corporations fit into two categories, eg. New Zealand-based, 
government-owned corporations. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of main variables 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Non-zero Obs. 
POLITICAL DONATIONS 
Donate Both Major Parties 1575 0.058 0.235 0 92 
Coalition-only Donors 1575 0.029 0.167 0 45 
Labor-only Donors 1575 0.004 0.062 0 6 
Donate Democrats 1575 0.004 0.062 0 6 
Total Donations (Dollars) 1575 5960 31378 0 496627.1 143 
Coalition Donations (Dollars) 1575 3540 18912.8 0 245718.6 137 
Labor Donations (Dollars) 1575 2319 14600.8 0 239408.5 98 
Democrat Donations (Dollars) 1575 17.36 382.71 0 13600 6 
Coalition Preference 1575 1221 13416.8 -208000 175000 102 
Normalised Coalition Preference 1575 0.03 0.21 -1 102 
INTEREST IN GOVT DECISIONS 
Govt. Boards 1575 0.086 0.281 0 136 
Regulated Industry 1575 0.171 0.377 0 270 
Defence Contractor (AIG) 1575 0.010 0.097 0 15 
Defence Income 1575 0.00 0.07 0 2.29 10 
SIZE OF CORPORATION 
Total Revenue ($bi!) 1575 0.745 2.631 0.05 40.85 1575 
Ln(Revenue) 1575 -1.36 1.17 -2.99 3.71 1573 
BCA Leadership 1575 0.023 0.152 0 37 
Other Business Assoc. Leadership 1575 0.027 0.163 0 43 
IDEOWGY: Cons. Think Tank 1575 0.013 0.115 0 21 
WEALTH: Rich200 1575 0.058 0.235 0 92 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned 1575 0.417 0.493 0 657 
CORPORATE FORM 
Australian Public Listed 1575 0.224 0.417 0 353 
Australian Private 1575 0.232 0.422 0 365 
Australian Partnership 1575 0.013 0.115 0 21 
Foreign Public Listed 1575 0.02 0.13 0 29 
Foreign Private 1575 0.29 0.46 0 463 
Foreign Partnership 1575 0.00 0.04 0 2 
CLASS & STATUS 
Who's Who Listing 1575 0.576 0.376 0 1250 
Oubs 1575 0.082 0.194 0 2 354 
Schools 1575 0.041 0.117 0 248 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE/SELECTION 
Ties to Conservative-only Donors 1575 0.009 0.049 0 0.56 66 
Ties to Bipartisan Donors 1575 0.043 0.135 0 2 238 
INTERLOCKS 
Total Interlocks 1575 2.062 3.664 0 25 706 
Non-Executives on other corporate boards 1575 0.214 0.417 0 4 533 
Executives on other corporate boards 1575 0.066 0.245 0 4 212 
Executives from other corporate boards 1575 0.052 0.185 0 3 234 
CONTROLS 
Number of Directors 1575 4.434 2.638 17 1575 
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1.5 VARIABLES 
PoEticalJJonations 
Political donation data was downloaded from the Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC) website on 3rd March 2006. Donation data is collated on the Australian 
financial year, so the most recent available data was the 2004/2005 financial year. In 
total 1260 donations were downloaded. These were based on donor (as opposed to 
party) declarations to the AEC.6 Donor corporations were matched against 
corporations in the IBISWorld 2000 La'l',est Enterprises list. In total there were 98 
companies who donated to the Labor Party (total donations $A3,654,834), 137 who 
donated to the Liberal or National Parties ($A5,575,835), and six who donated to 
the Australian Democrats ($A27,349). 
Table 1 contains 10 different variables to measure political donation behaviour. 
Total Major Party Donations, Coalition Donations, and Labor Donations are simply 
the dollar amount of donations from each particular corporation to the major 
political parties. Coalition Preference and Normalised Coalition Preference are 
measures which take account of the relative donations to the two major parties. 
The equation for Coalition Preference is given in Equation 2.1: 
6 This was not the ideal method. In retrospect the author wishes that they had coded the party 
declarations as they are marginally more accurate. 
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Coalition Preference = Coalition Donations - Labor Donations 
Coalition Preference is therefore measured in dollars, and gives a dollar amount that 
the corporation favours the Coalition (if positive) or the Labor Party (if negative). 
Normalised Coalition Preference is calculated as shown in Equation 2.2: 
N I. d C l"t" p 1: Coalition Donations - Labor Donations orma 1se oa 1 ion re1erence = -----------------
Coalition Donations+ Labor Donations 
Normalised Coalition Preference is the same as Coalition Preference but by dividing 
by the total major party donations by that corporation, it controls for the companies 
total level of donation, and places their relative preference on a bounded -1 to 1 
scale. 
In Chapter 2 I argue that the measures just outlined - traditional measures of 
political donation behaviour of corporations (as seen in Ramsay, Stapledon and 
Vernon 2001; McMenamin 2007) - are inadequate because they confuse the 
indicators of the two major political strategies of corporations. The two major 
strategies of corporations, I argue, are to either donate to the conservative political 
parties (the Coalition) as a deliberately politically partisan act, or to donate to both 
major parties7 as a deliberate strategy to foster stronger political relations with both 
7 'both major political parties' is slightly misleading in the Australian context. Australia has been 
characterised as having 2 1/2 political parties: The Australian Labor Party (ALP) and then two 
conservative parties in an alliance called 'The Coalition', The Liberal Party (which is the much larger, 
dominant partner) and The National Party (formerly The Country Party, representing rural and 
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(2.1) 
(2.2) 
sides. This decision is justified in detail in Chapter 2. Thus, the main variables I 
use in this thesis are binary variables: Coalition-only donors and donors to both 
major parties (also called bipartisan donors). When analysed as dependent variables, 
these binary donation variables are compared against those corporations who do 
not make a donation, thus providing a stable reference group against which these 
two strategies can be analysed. 
Interest in government decisions 
Three sets of variables were constructed to measure a firm's interest in government 
decision making. 
Firms located in highly regulated industries are coded as a binary variable. The 
regulated industries were coded using Burris's classification (1987) and matched 
against the two digit Standard Industry Codes in the IBISWorldDataset. Industries 
classified as highly regulated were: 
• Air and Space Transport 
• Communication Services 
• Electricity and Gas Supply 
• Finance 
regional interests). Donating to 'both major parties' means donating to the ALP and either or both of 
the Liberal and/ or National Parties. 
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• Insurance 
• Other Transport 
• Rail Transport 
• Road Transport 
• Services to Finance and Insurance 
• Services to Transport 
• Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage Services, and Water Transport. 
As a shorthand for thinking about 'regulated industries' these industries can be 
reduced to four categories: transport (road, rail and air), communication, utilities 
(water, gas and electricity) and banking and insurance. 
Anti-regulation industries 
A visual overview of the ten largest Coalition-only donors is shown in Table 1.2. 
Two of the three largest Coalition-only donors are tobacco companies (Phillip 
Morris and British American Tabacco). Also amongst the ten largest Coalition-only 
donors is the largest woodchipping company in the southern hemisphere (Gunns 
Limited).8 
8 Another is well known for its attempt to de-unionise it's port operations in 1998 and provoking one 
of the most important industrial conflicts in recent decades (Patrick Corporation). 
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Table 1.2: The ten largest Coalition-only donors 
Company Donations Industry 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PTY LTD $159,267 FOOD, BEV. AND TOBACCO 
MANUF. 
GERARD CORPORATION PTY LTD $151,265 MACH. AND EQUIP. MANUF. 
PHILIP MORRIS LIMITED $139,200 FOOD, BEV. AND TOBACCO 
MANUF. 
PAUL RAMSAY HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED $112,646 HEALTH SERVICES 
PATRICK CORPORATION LIMITED $102,950 SERVICES TO TRANSPORT 
J P MORGAN AUSTRALIA GROUP PTY $93,500 FINANCE 
LIMITED 
GUNNS LIMITED $70,000 WOOD AND PAPER MANUF. 
SERVCORP LIMITED $67,360 BUSINESS SERVICES 
J J RICHARDS & SONS PTY LTD $60,000 OTHER SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA 
RESMED HOLDINGS LIMITED $60,000 MACH. AND EQUIP. MANUF. 
These three companies are all located in industries which I will call 'anti-regulation' 
industries. The definition of these industries is taken from Burris (1987).9 In this 
paper he coded three types of firms: firms located in 'regulated' industries were 
coded with a '1 ', firms located in industries ''with a high frequency of labour and 
environmental regulation violations" (1987: 736) were coded with a "-1", and firms 
located in any other industry coded with a "O". In my analysis I have separated 
these variables, as it is not clear that they can or should be considered part of a 
linear continuum, particularly in their relationship to the dependent variables in this 
thesis. 'Anti-regulation' industries can be broadly characterised as industries in 
9 It is interesting to note that Burris drops this theory in his later analysis (2001; 2005), coding only for 
regulated industries. My feeling is that he dropped this because he found it problematic - badly 
behaved - for the reasons I will demonstrate in this thesis. 
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which (1) there is an attempt by the government, by other social groups or by one 
or more political parties, to regulate the industry and (2) the companies in the 
industry oppose this regulation. Burris uses environmental and labour violations as 
his basis for choice of industries, and classifies the following industries as anti-
regulation: chemical, petroleum refining, paper and wood, metal manufacturing, 
electrical equipment, motor vehicle manufacture, mining and textiles (Burris 1987: 
736). Burris suggests that companies in these industries will preferentially support 
conservative parties in the hope of rolling-back existing regulation and/ or 
preventing further regulation. 
I attempted to recode Burris's original classification (which was calculated for the 
1980 elections in the United States), and included this new variable in my analysis. 
To keep my analysis as closely comparable as possible I made minimal changes to 
Burris's classification. The major change I made was to reclassify the textile industry 
as not anti-regulation in Australia. The textile industry received this classification by 
Burris because of its strong anti-union practices in the US. This does not 
correspond to the position of the industry in Australia. I did not include tobacco in 
the changed classification system as it was not in Burris's original classification. I 
coded '1' for anti-regulation industry, 'O' otherwise. The 'anti-regulation' industries 
in my final classification system were (using 2 digit SIC codes) the following: 
• Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
• Metal Product Manufacturing 
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• Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing 
• Oil and Gas Extraction 
• Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Manufacturing 
• Coal Mining 
• Metal Ore Mining 
• Other Mining 
• Services to Mining. 
As will be seen in later analysis, there are a number of limitations of this coding 
system for anti-regulation industries. To compensate and to explore this issue in 
greater depth, I make fine-grained distinctions between the major industries which 
are considered anti-regulation by Burris. I modify these categories slightly, adding 
tobacco as its own industry, and placing Forestry and Logging into one 
category /industry with Paper and Wood Manufacturing. The final categories of 
industry I analyse are the following: 
(1) Mining 
(2) Petroleum, Coal and Chemical Manufacturing 
(3) Oil and Gas Extraction 
(4) Forestry, Logging, and Paper and Wood Manufacturing 
(5) Tobacco. 
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Such fine-grained distinctions are susceptible to biases. The small size of categories 
means that decisions of one or two companies could change the results of these 
industries significantly. In addition, the choice of which categories to analyse is very 
reliant on the researcher's judgement. However, I believe that going into this level 
of detail is justified, first, because of the large partisan donations made by some of 
these corporations (such as the two tobacco corporations who provide more than 
6% of all Coalition donations from the top 2000), and, second, because of the 
political importance of the industries in which these companies are based. Clear 
examples of this include the mining industry with its highly controversial 
environmental effects, and the oil and gas industry with its interest in greenhouse 
gas regulation. 
Defence contractors 
Defence contracting was measured in two ways. The first is based on the budget 
estimate for 2006-07 spending on the Top 30 Projects of the Australian Defence 
Force (Department of Defence 2006). For each contractor listed in the IBISWorld 
largest 2000 companies, I divided the total value of their share of the 2006-07 
defence contracts by their total revenue. The measure takes a maximum value of 1 
and a minimum of 0. A limitation of this measure is that it includes only 
contractors for major new investments, and not contractors for other activities 
(such as supplying services). To compensate, a second measure of defence 
contractors was used. It is based on the Australian Industry Group (AIG - one of 
the four national business associations) Defence Industry Council. It is composed 
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of a director from each of the AIG member corporations who are defence 
contractors. AIG Defence Industry Council was generally the preferred measure in 
most of the analysis in this thesis as it includes 9 of the 10 companies involved in 
the Top 30 Projects measure, but also includes another six companies not included 
in that measure. 
Government-owned enterprises, boards and committees 
A direct measure of the corporation's involvement in government decision-making 
was constructed by calculating the number of directorship of government-owned 
corporations which were held by the directors of each corporation. The 
government-owned corporations were the 284 listed in the IBISWorldlargest 2000 
enterprises. More detail on this variable is provided in Chapter 3. 
Measures ef compa'!Y size 
To control and test for the effect of the size of firm on its political behaviour, the 
revenue of each firm (measured in $A billions) was included as a variable. The 
highly skewed distribution of revenues can be seen in Figure 1.9. Just over 1300 of 
the firms in the dataset have revenues of less than $1 billion per year. While these 
are still enormous firms, they are dwarfed by the revenues of the very largest firms. 
The largest firm in the dataset is BHP Billiton with an annual revenue of $40.8 
billion. 
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Figure 1.6: Histogram of count of firms by total revenue ($'000). 
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Business associations and conservative think tanks 
While it is difficult to obtain membership lists for all major business associations, 
and impossible to gain access to membership lists for think tanks, the board of 
directors and national councils provide an insight into the political allegiances and 
social composition of these associations and their member corporations. I 
measured affiliations to business associations and think tanks by studying the 
governing bodies of business associations and think tanks. I counted the number of 
directors from each corporation serving on these governing bodies. In the case of 
business associations, the count of directors on a business association board was 
transformed into a binary variable and so companies with one or more director on a 
particular business association were coded "1 ". For think tanks, the governing body 
measured was always the board of directors. For business associations, the 
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measured governing body varied somewhat: Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (ACCI), the Australian Industry Group (AIG) and Australian Business 
Limited (ABLtd) were measured by examining the membership of their national 
board of directors and their national council. The Business Council of Australia 
(BCA) was measured by examining the board of directors and members of their 
policy committees. Further information on business associations and the 
measurement of these variables is provided in Chapter 3 (p.176). 
Class and status 
Who's Who in Australia was used as a source of information on the school attendance 
and club memberships of directors. While several important studies of the effects 
of clubs, schools and status groups have used clustering and latent class analysis to 
analyse clubs and schools networks (Bond 2003; Bond 2004; Bond, Glouharova and 
Harrigan 2006a; Domhoff & Bonacich 1981) I was unable to find any meaningful 
results from the use of clustering analysis on the clubs and schools data. Instead I 
have reduced the measure of clubs and schools to two variables. For schools, I 
measured the number of directors of the corporation who had been educated at one 
of 15 exclusive private schools. This list was obtained by comparing the 3,000 
secondary schools in Australia on a range of socio-economic and status measures, 
including the socio-economic status of parents, school fees, listing in Who's Who, 
and the percentage of ex-student who were members of the most exclusive 
businessmen's clubs. For clubs, I measured the number of club memberships of a 
select group of businessmen's clubs held by the directors of each corporation. The 
list of clubs was obtained by a similar method to that of schools. Secondary 
sources, such as studies of upper class clubs, reciprocal membership arrangements, 
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and membership procedures were compared, and a list of 11 businessmen's clubs 
was isolated. Unless stated otherwise, all analysis in this thesis utilised the variables 
'number of exclusive school graduates/number of directors' and 'number of 
businessmen's club memberships/number of directors'. "While the schools variable 
varies between zero and one, the clubs variable can be higher than one as some 
directors have membership of more than one club. 
As a control, and also as a general measure of status, a variable was included that 
measures the proportion of directors who were listed in Who's Who ef Australia and 
Who's Who ef Australian Business. 
Super wealth 
A dummy variable was created to represent corporations with one or more directors 
listed in the Business Review Weekfy Rich 200 (May 2005). 91 corporations had a 
director who was listed in the Rich 200. 
Social networks 
I use a modified version of Bond's (2004) measure of interlocking directorship. A 
corporation's 'non-executive ties' are measured by dividing the number of non-
executive directors' external non-executive board positions by the total number of 
directors on the board. 'Outward executive ties' are measured by dividing the 
number of board positions held by executive directors of a corporation by the total 
number of executive directors of the corporation. 'Inward executive ties' are 
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measured by dividing the number of board positions of the corporation held by 
executive directors of other corporations. 
I use two variables to measure the social influence and selection effects of 
interlocking directorates on political behaviour. Equation 2.3 provides the formula 
for calculating the measure of social influence/ selection effect of ties to Coalition-
only donors. 
. C 1. . n1 d board positions on Coalition- only donors Ties to oa 1t1on-o y onors = -----------------
numberof directors 
(2.3) 
T. b. . d board positions on bipartisan donors 1es to 1part1san onors = ----------------
number of directors 
(2.4) 
In words, Equation 2.3 says that the variable 'Ties to Coalition-only donors' is equal 
to the number of board positions on companies which donated only to the 
Coalition held by the directors of a corporation, divided by the number of directors 
of the corporation. Equation 2.4 provides a similar equation for 'ties to bipartisan 
donors'. This formulation of the equation may seem counterintuitive. The 
numerator of Equation 2.3 / 2.4 (board positions on Coalition-only /bipartisan 
donors) is self-evident. However, it may not be immediately obvious why the 
denominator has been chosen. The purpose of the denominator is to control for 
the different potential to form ties to Coalition-only /bipartisan donors that exists 
across the spectrum of corporations. Clearly some corporations will have more 
interlocks, and/ or larger boards, and thus these corporations will have a greater 
potential to form ties with donors even if no donor specific effect is taking place. 
The most obvious candidate for the denominator was total number of board 
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positions on other corporations (i.e. total interlocks). The problem with using total 
interlocks as the denominator is that it is a relatively rare event, and so when 
included as the denominator it can cause wide variability in the final measure (Ties 
to Coalition-only /bipartisan donors). Instead, it was felt that a more stable control 
was simply number of directors. The number of directors varies much more 
smoothly across the corporations, and still gives the final measures of ties to donors 
an intuitively logical interpretation: the variables 'ties to Coalition-only /bipartisan 
donors' are measures of the number of ties to donors, divided by the number of 
directors so as to control for the increased likelihood of ties to donors inherent in 
larger boards simply because they have more directors. 
The variables 'ties to donors' should detect any social influence effect, whereby the 
decisions of one corporation influence corporations they share a director with. 
They may also detect any underlying latent groups or classes - selection effects -
where corporations with similar political beliefs share directors. 
Number ef directors 
A variable was included to measure for board size. This was a count of the total 
number of directors on the board. In some analyses this was divided into separate 
counts of non-executive directors (NEDs) and executive directors (Chapter 5). 
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Industry, compa1!Ji rypes and geograpf?Jl / localiry 
As mentioned, a modified version of Burris's division of corporations into regulated 
and anti-regulation industries was used as the major measure of industry in the 
regression. However, in certain models I have included dummy variables for either 
the one digit or two digit Standard Industry Codes (SICs). 
The IBISWorld database classified all corporations into one of eleven types: Public 
Listed Industrial; Proprietary Company; Partnership; Non-Listed Public; Listed 
Trust; Foreign Owned Public Listed Industrial; Foreign Owned Proprietary 
Company; Foreign Owned Partnership; Foreign Owned Non-Listed Public and 
Foreign Owned Listed Trust. In most models, this was simplified by creating a 
variable "Foreign-owned" and then including the three major company types: Public 
Listed is a combination of Public Listed Industrial and Foreign Owned Public 
Listed Industrial; Private is a combination of Proprietary Company and Foreign 
Owned Proprietary Company; and Partnership is a combination of Partnerships and 
Foreign Owned Partnership. This was done because the remaining categories have 
so few corporations in their categories, and also because the exact meaning of these 
remaining categories is unclear. 
Geography was measured using two sets of variables. The first was the dummy 
variable for 'Foreign-owned' mentioned earlier. The second was a set of dummy 
variables for the state or territory in which their headquarters are located. The states 
and territories of Australia are: New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), South 
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Australia (SA), Western Australia (WA), Queensland (QLD), Tasmania (TAS), the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory (NT). 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with a problem that faces researchers of business political 
behaviour: a lack of serious quantitative data. While I was able to gain access to 
three large databases and a range of supplementary information, there was a 
substantial challenge involved in transforming these databases into datasets that 
could be meaningfully analysed. This chapter has discussed the methods I used to 
overcome these challenges, and provided an overview and a justification for the 
variables chosen In the chapter which follows (Chapter 2) I will analysis this dataset 
and use it to understand the major political division within the business community 
in Australia: the division between conservative partisan corporations and bipartisan 
hedging corporations. 
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Table 1.3: Correlation coefficients (pearson's r) for relationships between major variables 
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Donate Both Major Parties 
Donate Democrats 
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BCA Leadership 
Other Business Assoc. Leadership 
Cons. Think Tank 
Rich200 
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CHAPTER2: 
PARTISANSHIP OR HEDGING? 
CORPORATE STRATEGY AND POLITICAL 
DONATIONS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Most traditions within political sociology have long acknowledged the 'central', 
'privileged' or even 'dominant' position of business in the politics of liberal 
democracies. However, the discipline is largely silent on the question of what 
constitutes the major political tendencies within the business community and how 
they manifest themselves as different, possibly competing, corporate political 
strategies. This chapter examines one dimension of business politics, political 
partisanship, and does so by modelling the political donation behaviour of large 
corporations in Australia. 
This chapter has eight sections: it begins with an introduction to corporate political 
donations in Australia and a comparison to political donations in the US and UK 
. (Section 2.1). It then looks in detail at the donation patterns of Australian 
corporations (section 2.2) and argues that there are two dominant and opposed 
strategies which corporations pursue ((1) donate to both major parties and (2) 
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donate to the Coalition parties only). In the third and fourth sections it outlines the 
major existing theories of corporate political partisanship. These sections focus on 
debates concerning the relationship between cohesion and corporate donation 
behaviour (section 2.3) and more general theories of corporate political partisanship 
(section 2.4). The rest of the chapter presents the results (section 2.5) of statistical 
modelling of donation strategies, discusses the competing theories in light of these 
results (sections 2.6 and 2.7), and draws the analysis together in a conclusion 
(section 2.8). 
2.1 CORPORATE DONATIONS AND AUSTRALIAN POLITICS 
Australia is an industrialised liberal democracy of just over 21 million people, with 
the 17th largest national economy in the world. There are a number of unique 
characteristics of the Australian political system that make corporate donations in 
Australia a useful case study. Australia has a strong two-party system, with the two 
major parties being the Australian Labor Party and the Coalition. The Coalition is a 
near-permanent alliance between the major centre-right party, the Liberal Party, and 
the traditionally rural National Party. The major parties are characterised by party 
discipline, in the form of strong parliamentary whips, internal preselection of 
candidates and party supervision of political donations. Many elements of this 
strong party system stem from Australia's adoption of the Westminster system, 
which encourages executive dominance of the legislature, and therefore, party 
dominance of candidates. However, even within the spectrum of Westminster 
systems, Australia appears to be an outlier, with a strong party discipline operating 
in all major parties. 
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During the period of this study, the laws regulating political donations were among 
the strongest in the world. They include a requirement for donors and recipients to 
report separately all donations to, and other transactions with, political parties, 
candidates and associated entities over $A1,500. The strong party system means 
that the salient divisions in the political system are between the parties, not between 
candidates or individual representatives within the parties. Thus, in Australia, 
donations to a political party represent donations to the party qua party, and thus tap 
underlying partisan political tendencies. The strong electoral laws mean that we can 
be relatively confident that the corporate donations under analysis here reflect most 
or all of the actual financial transactions between corporations and political parties. 
Corporate donations are an important source of income for Australian political 
parties, providing between one third and half of their income. The two other 
funding sources for the major parties are government funding and returns on the 
parties' own investments. Thus, donations are far from token income for the major 
political parties. 
Corporate political donations in Australia represent a unique and important case 
study which combines elements of both the British and US cases. Table 2.1 shows a 
simple two by three classification table. In this table Australia is compared to the 
United States and United Kingdom on two dimensions: the strength of their 
political parties, and whether significant corporate donations are made to both 
major parties. The UK and Australia display the characteristics of a strong party 
system vis-a-vis the United States (Bond 2004). However, corporate donations in 
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Australia are very different to the UK in one crucial respect: in the UK, there are 
virtually no donations from business to the Labour Party. Only 5.3% of British 
Labour Party funding came from business in 2007 (£1.1 million of £20.9 million 
total donations) (Rowbottom 2008). In Australia, the Labor Party receives nearly 
$A6 billion per year from the 2000 largest companies alone, which is equal to 
approximately 70% of the donations received by the Coalition from big business. 
In this respect, the Australian system is much more like the US, with large corporate 
donations made to both major parties. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of strength of political parties and donation behaviour of 
corporations across the US, UK and Australia 
Strong political Significant corporate donations to both parties 
Earties 
United States No Yes 
United Kingdom Yes No 
Australia Yes Yes 
The interaction of these two elements makes for a useful case study: the tradition of 
corporations giving to either political party means that we have a much more 
complex system of dependent variables - donation strategies - than we do in the 
UK However, the strong party system in Australia presents a constraint on choice 
for corporations, at least in comparison to the US system. In the United States, 
corporations generally donate to individual candidates in separate congressional 
races, and thus - in game theory terms - they are engaged in multiple 'donation 
games'. The effect of this is that one corporation can often be found supporting 
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democrats in certain districts and republicans in others. In many cases, the 
important underlying characteristic of these candidates is simply incumbency, and 
thus the party affiliation of candidates is of little meaningful importance. In 
Australia, by way of contrast, the strong party system means that individual 
candidates have relatively little power, and so corporations' donation strategies are 
inherently 'partisan' in nature: there is only one game, everyone is playing, and each 
corporation can only choose whether to donate and how much to give to each 
party.10 
2.2 Two COMPETING STRATEGIES 
The strong party system in Australia and existence of significant corporate 
donations to both major parties constrains corporations donation to three choices: 
(1) whether to donate, (2) how much to donate, (3) which party /ies to donate to? 
While these three choices appear to create a system with multiple dimensions and 
numerous potential strategies that corporations could pursue, in the next section I 
will show that corporations who donate pursue only one of two strategies. 
Previous studies have almost universally assumed that donation strategies are best 
modelled using one or another version of a continuous choice model. Different 
corporate donations are treated as part of a continuous spectrum of possible 
actions: a dollar amount of 'total donation', the size of donation to a particular 
party, or some type of index of 'relative preference' for one party or the other. 
10 The strong party system also means that the centres of power in the party system are at it's apex, 
and so it seems fair to assume that to the extent that corporate donations are aimed at influencing 
policy outcomes, they are aimed at influencing the highest level of the party leadership, particular 
ministers and shadow ministers who have large discretionary power. 
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Previous studies have generally assumed two types of continuous dimensions of 
political action: the first is size of donation, the second is the 'bias' or 'partisanship' 
of donations. I will treat each of these assumptions in turn and show their 
limitations. 
Continuous vs discrete choice models I: size of donation 
For corporations, political donations represent an almost negligible expense, 
particularly for the largest corporations (Milyo, Primo and Groseclose 2000; 
Ansolabehere and de Figueiredo 2003). In 2005/ 6, of those Top 2000 corporations 
(IBIS World 2006) who made a donation, the average total donation to the Coalition 
was $A40,999, while the average donation to the Labour Party was $A37,269 
(Australian Electoral Commission 2006). The largest donor to both major parties 
was Macquarie Bank (a major investment bank), which donated $A245,719 to the 
Coalition and $A239,408 to the Labor Party. There is substantial evidence that 
these sums represent almost no significant financial cost to major corporations, and 
that these sums are tiny in comparison to their capacity to pay. For the average Top 
2000 corporation, the mean donation of those corporations that donated, represents 
approximately 0.005% or 1/20,000th of their annual turnover. $A40,000 is close to 
the average male salary, and is less than the actual cost of one low-to-medium skilled 
employee. 
The insignificance of the dollar value of corporate donations for the corporations 
themselves can be understood by comparing the cost of donations with the other 
political expenses corporations finance on a regular basis. Twice the average 
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corporate donation - $A80,000 - would not be enough to hire one proficient full-
time lobbyist or government relations manager. Even the $ASOO,OOO spent by 
Macquarie Bank on political donations is only equal to the yearly salary which they 
nominally pay to the former Labor Premier of New South Wales Bob Carr to work 
for them (Mitchell 200S). The financial power corporations are willing to leverage 
for political gain was most dramatically demonstrated inthe recent revelations of 
massive bribes paid by Australia's largest corporations as part of the United Nations 
Iraq Oil for Food program. A WB Limited, the sole exporter of Australian wheat 
and the 40th largest corporation in Australia, paid over $US220 million dollars in 
'kick backs' to the regime of Sadam Hussein in just 4 years between 1999 and 2003 
(Wood 2006). In 2006 it was also revealed that Australia's largest corporation, BHP 
Billiton made a $AS million 'gift' to the Iraq regime in 1996, and considered making 
a $A13S million 'loan' with the hope of securing favourable treatment by the Iraqi 
regime (Grattan and Schubert 2006). Email records and testimony of BHP 
executives brought before a Royal Commission showed that the $AS million 'gift' to 
the Iraqi regime was a completely insignificant sum of money to the management of 
BHP, and that the major reason the $13S million 'loan' was not made was not out of 
consideration of the financial cost but rather because of fears that it would appear to 
the public or to courts as a bribe (Grattan and Schubert 2006). In relation to the 
$AS million 'gift', one commentator pointed out that this 'tiny' gift was equal O.OS% 
of the $A10 billion annual profit of BHP Billiton in 2006 (McCrann 2006). In 
comparison to the 'tiny' $AS million gift, the average corporation donation of 
$A40,000 to each major party appears almost infinitesimally small. 
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Given this evidence, do corporate donations matter at all? For political parties they 
definitely do: they provide a vital source of funding, and without it political parties 
would struggle to remain competitive. For corporations, it seems clear that 
donations are an almost insignificant .financial cost. They do, however, have a cost 
which is not often discussed: a legitimary cost to the corporation because of the 
appearance of corruption and the threat this may pose to other corporate priorities. 
I would suggest that it is this reason - the legitimacy cost - which explains why 
donations are small, and distributed within a relatively narrow range. It is for these 
reasons that I believe that a discrete model of donation behaviour - one based on 
simple measures such as whether a corporation made a donation, and to whom they 
made it - may be more powerful at explaining donation behaviour, particularly since 
the sum involved are so insignificant for the corporations making them and clearly 
upwardly bounded by cultural concerns. 
Continuous vs discrete choice models II: partisan bias 
The second dimension of strategic choice is the 'bias' or 'partisanship' of donations, 
which previous studies have almost universally modelled as a continuous variable. 
Partisan bias is generally measured by examining the division of each corporation's 
donations between the major parties (such as between Democrat and Republican) 
or between types of candidates (such as between incumbents and radical-
conservatives) (for example: Burris 1987: 738; Snyder 1990; Ramsay, Stapledon & 
Vernon 2001; McMenamin 2008; Mizruchi 1992; Clawson and Neustadtl 1989). But 
is a continuous dependent variable the best model of a corporation's strategic 
behaviour? In the Australian case, at least, I believe this may not be an accurate 
model for corporate political strategy. 
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This can be best illustrated by comparing Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. Figure 2.1 is 
reproduced from McMenamin (2008). Figure 2.1 has been simulated based on an 
OLS regression of the continuous variable McMenamin calls 'bias' (approximating 
the percentage of donations going to the Coalition). We can see in Figure 2.1 that 
95% of donations are made by corporations who share their donations fairly evenly 
between the two major parties, with a bias towards the Coalition. Figure 2.2 is a 
histogram of the actual donation patterns of the corporations examined in this 
thesis: the corporations of the Top 2000 companies who made a donation in 
2004/ 5. Figure 2.2 shows the same clumping in the centre of the graph that is 
found in Figure 2.1 and created by the donations made by corporations giving to 
both major parties in approximately even amounts. However, Figure 2.2 also shows 
a second peak amongst corporations who give almost exclusively to the Coalition 
(90-100% Coalition). 
Figure 2.1: Simulated partisanship of business contributions (McMenamin 2008) 
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of percentage of all donations made in 2004/5 grouped by the 
partisanship of donating corporations 
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Figure 2.2 shows that the donation behaviour of corporations is bounded and 
discrete: over 75% of all donations are made by corporations in just two regions. If 
we include the tails of these two regions (30-40% Coalition and 80-90% Coalition), 
then over 90% of donations are accounted for by these two strategies: (1) donating 
approximately equally to both parties, and (2) donating all or almost all donations to 
the Coalition-only. 
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Just as important for this discrete model of corporate donations are (1) the trough 
between the two peaks and (2) the lack of donations to Labor-only. These nearly 
empty areas of the histogram show that certain donation strategies are clearly 
proscribed. Negligible numbers of corporations give to Labor-only. Even fewer 
corporations divide their donations 20/80 or 80/20 (either in favour of the 
Coalition or in favour of Labor). These donation patterns provide further evidence 
that some form of discrete decision-making model may be more appropriate than 
the conventional continuous models used in existing studies. 
In the place of these traditional continuous measures of political donation strategy I 
substitute a new set of variables. These variables distinguish between two major 
strategies of corporations: to donate to the Coalition parties only, or to donate to 
both major parties. For completeness the variable Donate Labor Only (Binary) and 
Donate Democrat (Binary) were calculated, but the small number of these types of 
donors makes any statistical analysis of these variables meaningless. In general, 
when modelled these binary variables are contrasted/ compared to those 
corporations who do not make a donation, thus providing a stable reference group 
against which these two corporate donation strategies (Donate Coalition-Only and 
Donate Both Major Parties) can be compared. 
Mobilisation vs bias 
To summarise the argument so far: the benefits to political parties from corporate 
donations are considerable, and they therefore represent a potential avenue for 
corporate political influence. For corporations, the major limit to the use of this 
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avenue of influence is one of legitimacy rather than financial cost. The party 
preferences of corporations are extremely 'lumpy', and form two distinct groups of 
donor corporations: those corporations who donate to both major parties in 
approximately equal proportions, and those who donate all, or almost all, to the 
Coalition-only. These observations are the empirical basis of the decision to model 
donation behaviour as simply one of three possible choices (a 'trichotomous' 
variable): to donate to Coalition-only, to donate to both major parties, or to not 
make a donation at all. 
To foreshadow the methodology section: the method I choose to use to model this 
trichotomous variable involves two paired logit models. This method is very similar 
to a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable in one logit model is 'donate 
to both major parties', and the dependent variable in the other logit model is 'donate 
to the Coalition-only'. What makes it similar to a multinomial logit model is that the 
reference category in both regressions is the set of corporations who do not make 
any donations at all. Ordinarily one would employ a multinomial logit for this type 
of data, however, separate logistic regressions were used in this thesis so that 
independent backwards selection11 models could be run on each dependent variable. 
Backwards selection was used so that significant relationships were not masked by: 
(1) the large number of independent variables, (2) the small number of positive 
cases of both the dependent and independent variables, or (3) colinearity between 
variables. 
11 Backward selection involves the repeated estimation of the model, each time excluding an additional 
variable. The variable excluded is the one with the least significance. Gradually the model has fewer 
and fewer parameters, and eventually the only parameters left in the model are those with significance 
ofp<0.20. 
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This trichotomous variable, by measuring two mutually exclusive donation 
strategies, allows us to distinguish between what I call mobilisation and bias. 
Mobilisation measures whether a donation is like to be made, bias measures to whom 
the donation is made. More precisely, (1) mobilisation is whether a corporation 
decides make a donation, whereas (2) bias is which particular party /ies the 
corporation decides to donate to. 
Using the methodology outlined (the paired logit models), the means of 
distinguishing between a mobilisation effect and a bias effect of a particular variable 
involves the interpretation and comparison of the coefficients for that variable in 
each of the paired logit models. For example, if a variable increases the likelihood 
of making both a Coalition-only donation (as represented by a positive and 
significant coefficient for the variable in the Coalition-only donation logit model) 
and making a bipartisan donation (as represented by a positive and significant 
coefficient for the variable in the bipartisan donation logit model), and both 
coefficients are of similar magnitude, then we can say that this variable has a 
mobilisation effect. This is because corporations with this variable are more likely to 
make a donation, irrespective of to whom the donation was made. In contrast, if a 
variable increases the likelihood of making a Coalition-only donation, and not a 
bipartisan donation, then this variable has what I call a bias effect, and this particular 
case, the variable is associated with Coalition-only donation bias. 
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An attempt to systematise the interpretation of the logit coefficients for each 
possible combination of effects is illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: The interpretation the logit coefficients based on a comparison of the 
two models of donation behaviour 
EXAMPLE 
VARIABLE 
Legal firm 
Firm revenue 
COEFFICIENT DIRECTION AND 
SIGNIFICANCE IN EACH MODEL 
DONATE 
BOTH 
DONATE 
COALITION-
ONLY 
LOGIT MODEL LOGIT MODEL INTERPRETATION 
Mobilisation effect 
Bipartisan donation bias 
Regulated Industry ./ Strong bipartisan donation bias 
Cons. think tank 
Tobacco Industry 
Headquarters. in 
NSW 
Foreign-owned 
Key: 
./ Positive and significant relationship 
x Negative and significant relationship 
No significant relationship 
Conservative partisan bias 
Strong conservative partisan bias 
No effect 
Demobilisation effect 
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2.3 THEORIES OF COHESION AND PARTISANSHIP 
My concern in this chapter is to model corporate political donations as a proxy for 
underlying political preferences. The division of corporations into two broad classes 
of donors, bipartisan donors and Coalition-only donors, appears at first sight to 
mirror the divisions found in much of the US and UK literature: Clawson et. al.'s 
distinction between 'pragmatic' and 'ideological' corporations (Clawson, Neustadtl 
and Bearden 1986), Useem's distinction between 'company' and 'classwide' 
rationality (Useem 1984), Bond's game theory distinction between those 
corporations who 'defect' and those who 'cooperate' to support the Conservative 
Party (Bond 2004); Burris's 'partisan' and 'hedging' corporations (Burris 2001), and 
even Olson's distinction between the small atomised, uncoordinated members of a 
group, and the large members of a group who bear disproportionate costs for public 
goods (Olson 1971: 29, 35). While the corporations in our data may appear to 
mirror those found in the existing literature, this literature is not internally 
consistent, and is actually comprised of competing theoretical frameworks for 
understanding corporate partisanship. 
I divide this theoretical discussion of the question of corporate partisanship into 
two broad sets of theories: the first set of theories centres on the relationship 
between cohesion (as against atomisation) and conservative-partisanship (as against 
bipartisan support). The second set of theories attempts to draw together the full 
range of specific hypotheses that have been used to explain corporate political 
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partisan behaviour. In effect, our first question is a classic middle-range theory 
(Merton 1957), while our second set of questions sit somewhere between 'minor 
working hypotheses' (to use Merton's words), and a series of middle-range theories 
of their own. 
The role of cohesion amongst corporate elites is one the major themes in literature 
on corporate donations. While superficially much of the literature appears 
consistent, I believe that an important distinction can be drawn between two broad 
theories of the relationship between corporate cohesion and partisan political 
outcomes. I believe that, at root, these two theoretical positions can be treated as 
basic public good dilemmas and traces of these theoretical distinctions found in 
tensions within Olson's classic The Logic ef Co/lective Action (1971). 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the debate on the relationship between cohesion and 
partisanship. Table 2.3 outlines two main examples of theories of cohesion leading 
to bipartisan donation behaviour. According to Useem's (1984) view, directors 
serving on multiple boards (the 'Inner Circle') develop 'classwide' rationality arising 
from their contact with other directors of major corporations. Useem argues that 
this 'classwide' rationality leads to more reformist and moderate politics.12 In 
12 "Since members of the inner group occupy similar institutional positions and, if the social cohesion 
hypothesis is correct, are in frequent contact, it is likely that the inner group will evolve a distinct 
political consciousness in two respects. First, interaction and shared roles generate similar outlooks, 
and the inner group should therefore have a more uniform perspective on political issues than other 
members of the capitalist class (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). Second, the inner group should tend to 
have a high level of concern for the larger and long-range interests of corporations. The inner group is 
likely to hold an opinion differing from the remainder of the class on the appropriate role for 
government. Since welfare, labor, and other forms of government managed reforms can be costly to 
individual firms but valuable to all if the reforms maintain societal stability, inner group members are 
likely to be less opposed to state intervention in these realms than will be other capitalists (Weinstein, 
1968; Kolko, 1963). The inner group is prone to embrace what Monsen and Cannon term a 
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contrast, Useem argues that 'corporate' rationality- arising from isolated directors 
and corporations who only perceive their own individual interests - leads to partisan 
conservative politics. Olson's argument (1971: 141-48) is that corporations who are 
large are better organised, and therefore large corporations are better organised they 
are better able to pressure for their individual special interests. If we assume that 
bipartisan donations are a form of action taken to achieve the 'special interests' of a 
particular individual corporation or group of corporations, then, according to 
Olson, the larger and more socially cohesive corporations should be in a better 
position to take this action. Thus, while Olson's argument sees the aim of 
bipartisan donations as different to Useem ('special interests' vs 'classwide 
rationality'), the direction of causation is the same: cohesion leads to bipartisan 
behaviour. 
"managerial ideology" whose proponents are "convinced of the necessity of the expanded role of 
government to prevent deep depressions and possible radicalism" (1965:47)." (Useem 1978: 228) 
Also: "Historians of American business have often noted that large corporation leaders, or some 
fraction of them, have frequently adopted a more "progressive" attitude towards unions, labor 
legislation, and social reform. Sometimes termed "corporate liberalism," this attitude is rooted not in 
commitment to reform, nor an enlightened acceptance oflabor and government opponents, but 
rather in the recognition that the entire business community and the future of the private economy 
will best prosper if it assumes a posture of compromise. It is this rejection of a rigid opposition to 
everything that organized labor and government programs represent, and embracing of that complex 
of attitudes perhaps best termed "corporate liberalism'', that distinguishes the inner circle's views." 
(Useem 1984: 114) 
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Table 2.3: Theories of cohesion driving bipartisan donations 
DONATION BEHAVIOUR 
BIPARTISAN (AUST); 
INCUMBENT (US); 
NONE(UK) 
COALITION-ONLY (AUST); 
RADICAL CONSERVATIVE (US); 
CONSERVATIVE (UK) 
z 
0 
USEEM (1978; 
1984) 
'Classwide' rationality 
arises from interlocks 
with other corporations 
and leads to reformist/ 
moderate politics. 
'Corporate' rationality 
arises from lack of social 
contact with other corporations 
and leads to conservative 
politics. 
I OLSON (1971: 
141-48) 
'Special interests': 
Large are better 
organised, and better 
organised can pressure 
for their special 
interests. Organised 
corporations extract 
special concession from 
state. 
Table 2.4 outlines three examples of theories of cohesion leading to partisan 
conservative donation behaviour. Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden (1986) and 
Burris (2001) argue that non-partisan donation strategies (such as supporting 
incumbents in the US, or donating to both major parties in Australia) are the result 
of 'pragmatic', short-term corporate interests. Conservative partisan donation 
behaviour is, for them, 'ideological' behaviour, which is necessarily rooted in social 
ties and ideological commitments. Bond (2004) makes a similar argument, couched 
in game theory terminology, when he describes non-partisan behaviour (in the UK 
93 
case this means corporations 'not donating' but in the Australian case I translate it 
as bipartisan donations) as 'defection' in a prisoner dilemma game. Like Burris, he 
Table 2.4: Theories of cohesion driving partisan-conservative donations 
CLAWSON, 
NEUSTADTL 
AND 
BEARDEN 
(1986); 
BURRIS (2001) 
z BOND (2004) 
0 
-~ ~ 
OLSON (1971: 
29,35) 
DONATION BEHAVIOUR 
BIPARTISAN (AUST); 
INCUMBENT (US); 
NONE(UK) 
'pragmatic' behaviour is 
driven by short-term 
corporate interests. 
'defection' 
from Conservative 
politics by atomised, 
asocial corporate 
interests 
COALITION-ONLY (AUST); 
RADICAL CONSERVATIVE (US); 
CONSERVATIVE (UK) 
'ideological' behaviour 
is driven by social ties and 
ideological commitment. 
'cooperation' 
with Conservative Party comes 
from social ties: clubs, schools 
and interlocks 
'The great' bear the costs of 
'public goods'. 
Large corporations better 
organised and gain more from 
public goods (conservative 
government) and thus 
contribute more. The small 
and atomised are free-riders. 
"[T]he 'exploitation' of the 
great by the small". 
sees 'defection' as an atomised, asocial act made in the short term interests of an 
individual corporation. In contrast, partisan behaviour is seen by Bond as the 
equivalent of 'cooperation' in a Prisoners' Dilemma game, with this cooperation 
94 
only possible because of cohesive social ties provided by extra-corporate 
organisation: clubs, schools and corporate interlocks. In Olson's work (1971: 29, 
35) there is a similar line of argument in which he argues that 'the great' will provide 
more public goods than 'the small'. By 'the great' he generally means the larger 
members of a group. These members gain more from public goods, and because 
they are larger are better able to provide public goods. In the case of corporations, 
we can conceive, like Bond (2004), that conservative partisan donations are a public 
(more accurately a 'collective') good for the general business community. According 
to this line of Olson's argument we should expect the large and the organised 
(cohesive) to provide greater quantities of the public good - conservative partisan 
donations - than smaller, atomised corporations. 
2.4 OTHER THEORIES OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP 
Cohesion is just one of many potential forces driving partisan (or bipartisan) 
donation behaviour. This chapter attempts to evaluate numerous potential 
mechanisms that have thus far only been studied in relative isolation. The major 
theories of partisanship that will be evaluated are discussed below, in the following 
order: regulation, defence contracts, ties to government, exclusive club membership, 
school attendance, listing in social registers, director wealth, multiple directorships 
(interlocks), business associations, think tanks, industry, company type, and 
geography. 
95 
Regulation, defence contracts, ties to government 
One of the most important theories of corporate partisanship is the theory that 
exposure to the effects of government decisions results in corporations adopting a 
'pragmatic' or 'hedging' political strategy (Burris 1991: 548; Burris 2001: 362-3; 
Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986). Corporations that are regularly affected by 
government decisions, such as defence contractors, or corporations located in 
highly regulated industries, such as utilities, transport and banking, are much more 
likely to engage in a pragmatic political strategy such as 'hedging their bets' by 
supporting both major parties, or making large donations to incumbent candidates 
or probable winners (Burris 1991: 548; Burris 2001: 362-3). In the United States, 
Burris found that support for incumbents and for Democratic candidates was highly 
correlated with high levels of government regulation of the corporation's industry 
and high levels of defence contracts (Burris 2001: 371). For these corporations, 
hedging and support for incumbents is a form of political insurance ensuring that 
they are in favour with whichever party holds government. 
Burris argues that adoption of the hedging strategy by highly regulated corporations 
reflects the opportunity structure facing these corporations: they not only have the 
potential to capture the benefits of any government decisions (given the industries 
they are located in, such as defence contracts), but they "have the resources and the 
connections that enable them to reap specific benefits from such pragmatic 
campaign contributions" (Burris 1991: 547). In contrast, corporations outside of 
these industries face fewer constraints on their behaviour and their "ideological 
conservatism is less likely to be tempered by the pragmatic concern for maintaining 
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access". Less regulated corporations are therefore more likely to adopt a partisan 
political strategy, supporting conservative political candidates (Burris 1991: 548) 
Club membership, school attendance, listing in social registers, director wealth 
There are three measures of class and social status that theories of class, status and 
partisanship centre on: (1) the attendance of directors at particular clubs and 
schools, (2) directors' listings in 'social registers' such as Who's Who, and (3) 
directors' personal or family wealth. 
In the United Kingdom, Bond found that 50 percent of corporate donations to the 
Conservative Party came from a small subset of corporations that were defined by 
their directors' schooling at Eton College (the secondary school of the Royal Family, 
amongst others) and membership of a small number of exclusive private 
gentlemen's clubs, particularly W'hites, Pratts and Boodles (Bond 2003; Bond 2007; 
Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan 2006a). In the United States, Domhoff and Useem 
have shown that amongst the most central corporate directors in the United States, 
there is an overrepresentation those educated at a small subset of private schools, 
and members of a range of upper class clubs (Domhoff 2006; U seem 1984). 
Domhoff and Bonacich have shown that the social and geographic divisions within 
upper class clubs in the United States are strongly related to political divisions 
between policy planning organisations such as business associations and think tanks 
(Domhoff & Bonacich 1981). 
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In the United States, Burris (2001: 373) found that listing in the Social Register had a 
strong pro-Republican partisan effect on corporate directors. In the United 
Kingdom, Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan (2006b) found that listing in Who's Who 
was strongly correlated with a director's membership of the conservative Business 
for Sterling group. 
Two previous studies suggest that wealth, especially old wealth, may have a 
politically conservatising effect. Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan (2006b) found 
that directors who are also extremely rich individuals (from the Sundqy Times Rich 
1000) are more likely to affiliate to Business for Sterling. Burris's (2000) 
examination of the wealthy in the US has found that those wealthy individuals 
whose wealth is 'old wealth' (defined as those who inherited their fortunes from 
their parents) are associated with considerably greater donations to the Republican 
Party, where as the 'new wealthy' have a greater propensity than the average 
member of the rich list to make donations to the Democratic Party. Burris suggests 
that the effects of wealth are a class socialising effect: those who have held great 
wealth for a long time have been subject to greater socialising influences, which tend 
to be conservative within wealthy communities, whereas those with new wealth are 
subject to competing socialising pressures, such as their childhood, parents 
experiences, and friends made prior to gaining wealth. 
Multiple directorships (interlocks) 
Many scholars have observed the correlation between a corporation or individual 
holding a large number of outside directorships and increased (or decreased) levels 
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of political activity and political partisanship (U seem 1984; Burris 1991; 
Wheelwright 1957; Rolfe 1967; Murray 2001; Alexander 1998; Carroll and 
Alexander 1999; Alexander 2003, Bond 2004). The most consistent finding has 
been that those directors who hold multiple directorships and corporations with 
directors who sit on multiple boards are more likely to engage in, and be successful 
at, political activity. 
A number of scholars (most notably Useem 1978; 1984) have argued that the most 
central and interlocked corporations and directors tend to be less politically 
conservative because their centrality and increased interaction give them a more 
long-term and class-wide perspective on issues. Burris has modified this argument. 
He found that while the most interlocked corporations tend to be more bipartisan in 
their political donations, the most interlocked directors are actually more conservative 
that the average director in their political donations (Burris 2001). Burris shows that 
for certain central corporations in the United States, political donations made by the 
corporations and those made by the directors can run in almost opposite political 
directions. He found that interlocked corporations that make bipartisan donations 
also tend to be those located in highly regulated industries (such as banking and 
transport) or corporations that receive a high proportion of government defence 
contracts (as described earlier). In contrast, the conservative political donations by 
individual centrally-located directors, Burris argues, tends to reflect the increased 
class consciousness of these central directors who face increased socialisation from 
their central social role in the business class. When these centrally located directors 
are acting as individuals who are members of a class and not corporations 
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concerned with maximising a corporation's profits, they are freed from the 
constraints of the corporate form and do not modify their class preferences in light 
of more pragmatic considerations about damaging the reputation of their company 
in the eyes of potential members of a Democrat government. 
Bond has extended the study of interlocking directorships by differentiating 
between the networks formed by executive directors (full-time executives of the 
corporation) and non-executive directors (part-time, outside directors) (Bond 2004). 
His major finding was that UK corporations whose executive directors sit on a large 
number of external boards tend to be more likely to donate to the Conservative 
Party, while those corporations whose boards contain a large number of executives 
from other corporations have a decreased propensity to donate to the Conservative 
Party. Since Bond's study was only of Conservative Party donations, it is difficult to 
establish whether these are mobilisation effects (i.e. they reflect simply the 
increased/ decreased tendency of these corporations to be politically active in 
general) or partisanship effects (i.e. they reflect an increased/ decreased tendency to 
support the Conservative Party in particular). 
Social Selection/ social iefluence: ties to other donors 
A number of authors have found that corporations sharing a director are 
significantly more likely to engage in similar political donations CT asny 2006; Burris 
2005; Mizruchi 1992). Although it has been generally assumed that this has been a 
social influence effect (that corporations who share directors act similarly because of 
the influence of one corporation on the political actions of the other), this effect 
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may be a social selection effect, where two corporations who have similar political 
preferences are more likely to share directors because they desire to be tied to 
corporations that are politically similar to themselves. 
Business associations, think tanks 
Business associations and think tanks have been found to represent the 
organisational congealing of many underlying political or social divisions within the 
business community (eg. Domhoff & Bonacich 1981). In Australia, there is, 
however, no agreement about what social forces and political divisions exist 
between the various business associations. For example, Cahill argues that in the 
1980s and early 1990s, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) engaged in a 
"relatively pragmatic political strategy", characterised by it being "loath to alienate 
the Labor government" (Cahill 2004: 223-4), while Sheldon and Thornthwiate note 
that at the end of the 1990s the BCA put forward some of the most extreme 
proposals for radical industrial relations change (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 
69). Amongst think tanks, there is a clearer conception of the broad political 
divisions between more 'progressive' and 'conservative' think tanks (Cahill 2004; 
Marsh and Stone 2004; Marsh 1995). Qualitative studies have argued that think 
tanks have been a crucial site for the coming together of leading business executives 
to implement radical neoliberal policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s in 
Australia, the US and UK (Coghill 1987; Carey 1997; Cahill 2004; Sawer 1982; 
Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986). 
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Industry, compa1!)1 type and geograpl?J 
Many writers - from pluralists to Marxists - have emphasised differences within the 
corporate community based on industry. Pluralists such as Dahl have pointed to 
industry differences between corporations as a reason for rejecting any possibility of 
corporate political unity (Dahl 1961). Marxists have tended to focus on industry as 
one of the underlying structural basis of class fractions within the capitalist class (in 
the case of Australia see Tsokhas 1984). As already mentioned, Burris found that 
one of the three major determinants of business class fractions (based on political 
donations) within the US system was location in a regulated or anti-regulation 
industry (Burris 1987). This same study found that many of the other classical neo-
Marxist theories of capitalist class fractions did not have an impact on political 
donations, such as capital intensity of industry or degree of monopolisation within 
the industry. In Australia more qualitative studies have tended to identify particular 
industries that are more closely aligned with the Coalition Parties. Cahill argues that 
the corporations which supported the rise of neo-liberal think tanks (which have 
been more closely associated with the conservative parties) tended to be located in 
industries which were threatened by environmental, indigenous rights, and health 
and safety laws, including the nllning industry and the tobacco industry (Cahill 
2004). 
Research by Ramsay, Stapledon and Vernon (2001) found that there was a 
difference in the donation patterns of corporations based on their company type: 
Public Listed corporations (those listed on the stock exchange) tended to be 
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relatively more bipartisan in their donations (71 % to the Coalition), while 
Proprietary Companies (private companies whose shares are owned by a small 
number of people and whose shares are not traded) tended to make larger 
proportion of their donations to the Coalition parties (83.4% of donations to the 
Coalition). Research by Alexander and Murray found that both proprietary 
companies and foreign-owned corporations had fewer directors sitting on other 
corporation boards, and thus were more peripheral in the corporate network 
(Alexander 1998: 117). Useem has argued that corporations more central to the 
network tend to be more politically moderate (Useem 1984), and so it could be 
expected that proprietary companies and foreign-owned corporations will be more 
politically conservative than their public listed equivalents. 
Studies of US political donations have found strong geographic differences in 
political partisanship. The 'yankee/ cowboy' divide is the most well known, referring 
to the tendency of corporations located in the North-East of the United States 
('yankees') to be more supportive of the Democrats, while those corporations 
located in the West and Mid-West ('cowboys') are likely to be more strongly 
Republican (Burris 2001) 
In Australia, the literature on business politics does not clearly identify any regions 
where the business classes tend to be more relatively supportive of Labor 
governments. Instead the pattern seems to be one of a general preference for 
conservative governments by business in all states. There are, however, other 
significant differences between the business communities of each state and its 
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capital city which have the potential to be the source of political differences. For 
example, Melbourne is seen to be the traditional city of 'old money' and 
conservative political power, hosting many of the most exclusive private schools in 
the country, the most extensive private club network, including the (in)famous 
Melbourne Club, almost all Coalition Prime Ministers of the 20th Century, and, until 
recently, the headquarters of most national business associations. 
As can be seen from this overview, there are numerous competing theories of 
political donations and political partisanship of corporations. In the next section, 
these theories and competing accounts will be tested against the results of empirical 
modelling of the Australian corporate community. 
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2.SR.ESULTS 
The main results of the modelling are summarised in Tables 2.7-2.10. Each 'model' 
(i.e. Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, etc.) is composed of two separate logistic 
regressions. These approximate the results of a multinomial logit, with the 
reference category in all regressions being the corporations who do not make any 
donations. This is one of the reasons for the difference in the number of cases (n) 
in each regression. 13 Separate logistic regressions were used so that independent 
backwards selection models could be run on each dependent variable. Backward 
selection was used so that significant relationships were not masked by: (1) the large 
number of independent variables, (2) the small number of positive cases of both the 
dependent and independent variables, and (3) colinearity between variables. The 
cut-off point for backward selection was p<0.20. If 0.10<p<0.20 then the 
coefficient was reported but found to not be significant. 
Model 1: Baseline model 
Model 1 shows that all three of the four variables measuring exposure to 
government decisions have a strong, significant and positive effect on the 
probability that a corporation will make a donation to both major parties, and no 
significant effect on the probability a corporation will donate to the Coalition-only. 
The size of these effects are substantial: if a corporation has a director on a 
government board its odds of making a donation to both major parties are 2. 714 
times higher. If a corporation is located in a regulated industry, the odds it will 
13 The other reason is the removal of cases where independent variables perfectly predict failure or 
success of the dependent variable. 
14 2.69 is the exponential of 0.99. 
105 
donate to both major parties is 2.1 times higher. If a corporation is a defence 
contractor its odds of being a bipartisan donor are 8. 7 times higher. 
The effects of location in an anti-regulation industry on propensity to donate to 
both major parties are on the cusp of significance (p<0.10). If a corporation is 
located in an anti-regulation industry, the odds it will donate to both major parties is 
1.6 times higher. The relationship between anti-regulation industry and Coalition-
only donations is only a very weak trend (p<0.20), remaining in the model but not 
significant. 
Variables associated with large corporations - revenue, number of directors and 
BCA leadership - all have a positive and significant effect on the propensity to 
donate to both major parties. For every $A10 billion in additional revenue, the odds 
that a corporation will donate to both major parties increases by a factor of 1.5. For 
every four extra directors, the odds that a corporation will donate to both major 
parties increase by the same factor: 1.5. If a corporation has a member of the 
leadership of the Business Council of Australia on their board, the odds of them 
donating to both major parties is 4.1 times higher. Revenue and number of 
directors have no significant effect on the propensity of a corporation to donate to 
the coalition-only. Not one corporation with a member of the leadership of the 
BCA made a donation to the Coalition-only. This is the meaning of the 'p.p.f.' 
(perfectly predicts failure) in Table 2.7. This may mean a very significant and 
negative relationship (which would be consistent with our theory), but as there is no 
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variation in the dependent-independent variable relationship, it is not possible to 
analyse this statistically. 
Corporations who have directors that serve on the leadership of Other Business 
Associations (ACCI, AIG and ABLtd) have no significant difference in their 
propensity to donate to both major parties, while the odds that they will make a 
donation to the Coalition-only is 2.5 times higher. 
If a corporation has a director of a conservative think tank on its board, it is no 
more or less likely to donate to both major parties, but its odds of engaging in a 
Coalition-only donation strategy is 3.8 times higher. Corporations with a super-
wealthy individual on their board (Rich 200), have a 2.1 times higher odds of making 
a donation to both major parties, and a 2. 7 times higher odds of donating to the 
Coalition-only. Foreign-owned corporations are significantly less likely to be either 
type of donor. 
The model for Donating to Both Major Parties explains a lot more of the behaviour 
of corporations than the model of Coalition-only donors. This can be seen by 
comparing the Pseudo R2 of the two halves of each model. The Pseudo R2 of the 
regression model for Donating to Both Major Parties is significantly larger (0.16) 
than the Pseudo R2 of the regression model for Donating to the Coalition-Only 
(0.05) in Model 1. This trend continues across all models in this chapter. 
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AN ASIDE: 
p, ODDS, AND PROBABILITY 
For sake of brevity, from this 
point forward results will, 1n 
most part, be reported as 
parameter estimates ([3), not 
odds. Figure 2.3 provides the 
reader with an indicative sense of 
the relationship between 
parameter estimates and odds. 
In addition, the corresponding 
probability for each odds is 
given. The (*) next to 
probability indicates that the 
probabilities are not an exact 
substitute for the parameters or 
odds, as any change 1n the 
probability of an effect caused 
by a change in f3 (the coefficient) 
will be dependent on the relative 
strengths of other effects in the 
model. 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between logit 
parameter estimates (13), odds and probability. 
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Model 2: Corporate farm 
Model 2 includes effects of various corporate forms, in particular: publicly listed 
industrial corporations, proprietary companies (private companies), and 
partnerships. 
Donors to both major parties are significantly more likely to be publicly listed 
companies(~ = 0.85). Partnerships (which are mostly legal and accounting firms) 
are significantly more likely to engage in either form of donation strategy(~ = 2.91 
& 2.24). 
Table 2.5: Baseline model of political donations (Model 1) and the effect of 
corporate form on donation behaviour (Model 2) 
MODEL 1: BASELINE MODEL MODEL 2: CORPORATE FORM 
DONATE DONATE DONATE DONATE 
BOTH COALITION- BOTH COALITION-
PARTIES ONLY PARTIES ONLY 
EXPOSURE TO GOVT DECISIONS: 
Govt. Boards 0.99 *** 1.02 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.73 *** 0.89 *** 
Anti-regulation Industry 0.48 * O.SOns. 0.45ns. 0.57 ns. 
Defence Contractor 2.16 *** 2.51 *** 
SIZE OF CORPORATION: 
Revenue 0.041 * 
Business Council (BCA) 1.40 *** p.p.f. 1.20 *** p.p.f. 
Other Business Assocs. 0.93 * 0.99 * 
IDEOLOGY: Cons. Think Tank 1.34 * 1.42 * 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.75 ** 0.99 ** 0.76 ** 1.08 ** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned -0.71 ** -0.91 ** -0.84 ** 
CORPORATE FORM: 
Public Listed 0.85 *** 
Private 
Partnership 2.91 *** 2.24 *** 
CONTROLS: 
Directors 0.10 ** 0.13 *** 
CONSTANT -3.78 *** -3.41 *** -4.55 *** -3.54 *** 
PSEUDOR2 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.07 
N 1530 1459 1530 1459 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. = not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 
level. 
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Model 3: Class and status 
Model 3 (in Table 2.6) is a simplified model using only the class and status variables 
and a control for the number of directors. This simplified model is used because 
there are likely to be strong correlations between these variables and other variables 
in the dataset. The reason for this is that variables measuring status (such as Whos 
Who listing) are likely to be a function of many of the other variables: persons on 
government boards, think tanks, business associations, large corporations, etc. are 
all more likely to be listed in Who's Who. There are three major results of Model 3: if 
a corporation has directors who attended exclusive private schools, then they show 
a trend towards engaging in a Coalition-only donation strategy(~ = 1.57, p<0.10). 
The most exclusive businessmen's clubs, however, are associated with a 2.8 times 
higher odds of engaging in a bipartisan donation strategy, and no significant 
difference in the likelihood of engaging in a Coalition-only donation strategy. 
Corporations with proportionally more directors listed in Whos Who are significantly 
more likely to engage in both donation strategies, with a 8.6 times higher odds of 
engaging in a bipartisan donation strategy, and a 3.4 times higher odds of engaging 
in a Coalition-only donation strategy. 
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Table 2.6: Class and status model of political donations (Model 3) and the effect 
of corporate interlocks on donation behaviour (Model 4) 
MODEL 3: CLASS & STATUS MODEL 4: INTERLOCKS 
DONATE DONATE DONATE DONATE 
BOTH COALITION- BOTH COALITION-
PARTIES ONLY PARTIES ONLY 
EXPOSURE TO GOVT DECISIONS 
Govt Boards 0.95 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.84 *** 
Anti-regulation Industry 0.47ns. 
Defence Contractor 2.47 *** 
SIZE OF CORPORATION 
Revenue 
Business Council (BCA) 1.10 *** p.p.£ 
Other Business Assocs. 0.92ns. 
IDEOLOGY: Cons. Think Tank 1.33 * 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.72** 1.10 *** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned -0.72 * 
CORPORATE FORM 
Public Listed 0.70 ** 
Private 
Partnership 2.93 *** 2.39 *** 
CLASS & STATUS 
Directors 0.17*** 0.12 ** 
Who's Who Listing 2.16*** 1.13 ** 
Oubs 1.05 ** 
Schools 1.57 * 
INTERLOCKS 
Non-Executives on other corporate boards 0.41 * 0.52 * 
Executives on other corporate boards 
Executives from other corporate boards -3.04ns. 
CONSTANT -5.35 *** -4.27 *** -4.57 *** -3.61 *** 
PSEUDOR2 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.08 
N 1530 1459 1530 1459 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. = not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 
level. 
Model 4: Interlocks 
Model 4 (Table 2.6) is the same as Model 2 except that it includes measures of 
board interlocks (similar to those used in Bond (2004)). The effect of interlocks on 
donation behaviour appears to be weak: there are no significant effects of executive 
interlocks (either from or to other corporate boards), and there is a positive, though 
only marginally significant (p<0.10) effect of non-executive director interlocks. This 
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appears to be a mobilisation effect, as it is in the same direction and of similar 
magnitude (~ = 0.41 & 0.52) for both donation strategies. One possible exception 
to this rule is the very weak trend (p<0.20) of companies with executives from other 
corporate boards not engaging in a Coalition-only donation strategy. While the 
significance of this effect is marginal (p<0.20), the size of the effect is large (~ = -
3.04, which means the odds of engaging in this strategy are 5 times less likely if ha!f 
of the directors are executives from other company boards). In addition this effect 
will be seen again in Chapter 3 when we examine business political leadership. 
Model 5: Ties to political donors 
Model 5 (Table 2.7) is the same as Model 2 but also includes social influence/ social 
selection effects. Corporations who share directors (i.e. have an interlock) with 
bipartisan donors have no significant effect on either type of donation behaviour. 
Ties to Coalition-only donors have a positive effect on the propensity of a 
corporation to engage in a Coalition-only donation strategy (~ = 0.63, p< 0.05) . If 
a corporation has 50% of it's directors serving on the boards of other corporations 
who make donations to the Coalition-only, then the odds of that corporation 
engaging in a Coalition-only donation strategy is 1.4 times higher. 
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Table 2.7: The effect of ties to other political donators (Model 5) and the 
relationship between anti-regulation industry location and donation behaviour 
(Model 6) 
MODEL 5: TIES TO 
POLITICAL DONORS 
MODEL 6: ANTI-
REGULATION INDUSTRIES 
EXPOSURE TO GOVT DECISIONS 
Govt. Boards 
Regulated Industry 
Anti-regulation Industry 
Defence Contractor 
SIZE OF CORPORATION 
Revenue 
Business Council (BCA) 
Other Business Assocs. 
IDEOLOGY: Cons. Think Tank 
WEALTH: Rich 200 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned 
CORPORATE FORM 
Public Listed 
Private 
Partnership 
CONTROL 
Directors 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE/SELECTION 
Total Interlocks 
Ties to Bipartisan Donors 
Ties to Coalition-only Donors 
ANTI-REGULATION INDUSTRIES 
Forest, Paper, Pulp 
Petroleum & Chemical 
Oil and Gas 
Mining 
CONSTANT 
PSEUDOR2 
N 
DONATE DONATE 
BOTH COALITION-
PARTIES 
0.92 *** 
0.81 *** 
0.49ns. 
2.40 *** 
1.00 ** 
0.71 ** 
0.64 ** 
2.92 *** 
0.89 * 
0.09 *** 
-4.44 *** 
0.19 
1530 
ONLY 
0.56ns. 
p.p.f. 
0.93ns. 
1.48 * 
1.07 ** 
-0.81 ** 
2.26 *** 
-035 ns. (c) 
0.63 ** 
-3.55 *** 
0.07 
1459 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. =not significant 
DONATE DONATE 
BOTH COALITION-
PARTIES ONLY 
0.99 *** 
0.87 *** 
2.66 *** 
0.04ns. 
1.03 ** p.p.f. 
1.21 * 
1.28ns. 
0.82 ** 1.14** 
-0.99 ** 
0.80 *** 
2.90 *** 2.29 *** 
0.12 ** 
1.85 ** 
0.87 * 
2.18 ** p.p.f. 
-4.47 *** -3.57 *** 
0.20 0.10 
1530 1459 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 
level. 
(c): p > 0.20 but kept in regression as a control for another variable 
Model 6: Anti-regulation industries 
Model 6 (Table 2. 7) is the same as Model 2, but it also includes anti-regulation 
corporations broken into their constituent industries. Companies in the mining 
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industry have donation patterns that are not significantly different from the average 
donation patters of other industries. Model 6 shows that petroleum and chemical, 
and oil and gas exploration companies are significantly more likely to engage in a 
bipartisan donation strategy (petroleum and chemical: ~ = 0.87, p<0.10; oil and gas: 
~ = 2.18, p<0.05). No corporations in the oil and gas industry engage in a 
Coalition-only donation strategy, while the petroleum and chemical industry has no 
significant different propensity to engage in a Coalition-only donation strategy. 
Model 6 confirms our suspicion that companies located in the forestry, logging, and 
paper and wood manufacturing industries (~ = 1.85, p<0.05) are pursuing a 
Coalition-only, partisan political strategy. 
Model 7: Industry 
Table 2.8 exists to satisfy the reader that I have not left out the important effects of 
industry or geography in the main models in this thesis. To prevent 'death by 
variables', I have not included dummies for industries or states and territories in the 
rest of the models. Model 7 (Table 2.8) illustrates the effect of industry (based on 
Australian-New Zealand Standard Industry Codes (1993 version) divisions). I have 
included revenue as a control variable. As can be seen, several smaller categories 
are dropped from the regression because these divisions have no donors in them, 
and of those that remain, the only significant industry divisions are 
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Table 2.8: Donation behaviour and the effect of industry (Model 7) and 
state/territory (Model 8) 
MODEL 7: INDUSTRY MODEL 8: STATE 
DONATE DONATE DONATE DONATE 
BOTH COALITION- BOTH COALITION-
PARTIES ONLY PARTIES ONLY 
CONTROL 
Revenue 0.10 *** 0.13 *** 
INDUSTRY (ANZSIC93 DIVISIONS) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (A) 
Mining (B) 
Manufacturing (C) 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (D) p.p.f. 
Construction (E) 
Wholesale Trade (F) -3.17 *** -3.14 *** 
Retail Trade (G) -2.60 ** 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants (H) p.p.f. p.p.f. 
Transport and Storage (!) 
Communication Services 0) p.p.f. 
Finance and Insurance (K) 
Property and Business Services (L) 
Government Administration and Defence (M) 
Education (N) p.p.f. p.p.f. 
Health and Community Services (0) 
Cultural and Recreational Services (P) p.p.f. 
Personal and Other Services (Q) p.p.f. 
STATES & TERRITORIES 
ACT p.p.f. 
NSW 
QLD 
SA 
VIC 
WA 
NT p.p.f. p.p.f. 
CONSTANT 
-1.69 *** -2.55 ** -2.66 ** -2.64 *** 
PSEUDOR2 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.03 
N 1500 1459 1530 1476 
Models 7 and 8 are standard logistic regressions without backward selection. 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. = not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 
level. 
Wholesale Trade (F) and Retail Trade (G). Wholesale Trade has a significantly 
lower propensity to engage in either donation strategy, and retail trade has a 
significantly lower propensity to engage in the bipartisan donation strategy. There is 
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no immediately apparent reason why these industries should be particularly prone to 
this behaviour. 
Model 8: State or territory 
Model 8 (Table 2.8) illustrates the effect of geographic region on donation 
behaviour. As can be seen there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the state or territory of a company's headquarters and its donation behaviour. 
2.6 DISCUSSION 
In discussing the results I will begin by examining their implications for each of the 
single variable theories, and end by addressing their significance for theories of 
cohesions and partisanship. 
Exposure to government decisions 
The models found that exposure to government decisions had consistently strong 
effects the propensity to engage in a bipartisan donation strategy: this is in keeping 
with the literature on 'pragmatic' and 'hedging' corporate strategy. The strong 
positive effects that having a director on a government board, being located in a 
regulated industry, or being a defence contractor on a corporation's propensity to 
donate to both major parties were amongst the strongest and most consistent 
effects in the models of Chapter 2. The strength of this relationship can be seen in 
the raw cross-tabulations (in Tables 2.9-2.11): for example, while there is virtually no 
difference in the propensity of companies with directors on government boards to 
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donate to the Coalition-only (3.77%vs. 2.98% for the rest of the population), there 
is a dramatic difference in the propensity of such companies to donate to both 
major parties (22.73% vs. 4.43%) 
Table 2.9: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company has 
a director on a government board 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Director on Govt. Board? 
No Yes 
1,336 102 
95.57 77.27 
62 30 
4.43 22.73 
Director on Govt. Board? 
No Yes 
1,336 102 
97.02 96.23 
41 4 
2.98 3.77 
Figure 2.4: A graphical representation of Table 2.9 
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Table 2.10: Tabulation of company donation strategy by location in regulated 
industry 
Firmin re ? 
No Yes 
Not Donate (n) 1,204 234 
Donate to Both col.% 95.18 88.30 
Parties Donate (n) 61 31 
col.% 4.82 11.70 
Firm in reeulated industrv? 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
No 
1,204 
96.78 
40 
3.22 
Figure 2.5: A graphical representation of Table 2.10 
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Table 2.11: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the firm is a 
defence contractor 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Firm is defence contractor? 
No Yes 
1,428 10 
94.20 71.43 
88 4 
5.80 28.57 
Firm is defence contractor? 
No Yes 
1,428 10 
97.01 90.91 
44 1 
2.99 9.09 
Figure 2.6: A graphical representation of Table 2.11 
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This strong relationship, however, is not a mechanism in itself. The main question 
left unanswered is: does this relationship between exposure to government and 
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donation strategy reflect corporations responding to an opportunity or responding 
to a constraint? Corporations may be engaging in a bipartisan donation strategy 
because they have the opportunity to extract profits - that is, economic rents -
from the state: they may seek the opportunity to win a government contract, or to 
change a particular law. Alternatively, corporations may engage in a bipartisan 
donation strategy because if they do not donate, they may be punished by the 
parties who control the state. Thus we have two possible mechanisms - hope of 
rents or fear of punishment - which may be driving the observed behaviour. 
The lack of any relationship between exposure to government decisions and 
Coalition-only donation strategy would suggest some type of positive inducement -
an attempt to extract economic rents - as the mechanism driving government 
exposed corporations to engage in a bipartisan donation strategy.15 
Anti-regulation industries 
The results of the modelling of anti-regulation industries in Model 1 (Table 2.5) are 
contrary to the intuition of Burris's theory. Anti-regulation industries actually show 
a weak effect on both types of donation behaviour. It is on the cusp of significance 
(p = 0.114 for Donate Both, and p= 0.173 for Coalition-Only), and has a positive 
and very similar effect on both types of donation behaviours: anti-regulation 
industries are nearly twice as likely to make either type of donation (odds are 1.6 
15 It is important to note that as most of our dependent and independent variables are relatively rare 
events - perhaps 1-10% of corporations are positive cases - it is inherently difficult to find a 
statistically significant negative relationship. 
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times higher). This suggests, if anything, a mobilisation effect for this variable, but 
with corporations divided over the strategy they pursue. 
Table 2.12 gives an indication of the extent to which companies which are 
supposedly located in anti-regulation industries actually engage in a bipartisan 
donation strategy. Twenty companies in 'anti-regulation' industries donate to both 
major parties. Of particular note are the three oil and gas extraction companies, five 
petroleum, coal or chemical companies16 and four mining corporations. The 
donation rates for these industries are approximately equal to, or slightly higher (as 
shown in the earlier regressions) than, that of the average corporation, but there is 
no clear Coalition-Only bias in the behaviour of corporations in these anti-
regulation industries. The lack of a strong consistent trend may also be seen in the 
raw cross tabulations in Table 2.13. 
!6 It is worth noting that.two of these are the drug companies Merck Sharp & Dohme and Pfizer. 
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Table 2.12: Companies supposedly located in anti-regulation industries which 
donate to both major political parties 
Company 
Pratt Holdings Proprietary Limited 
Tenix Pty Limited 
Pfizer Australia Pty Limited 
Consolidated Minerals Limited 
GRDLimited 
Santos Ltd 
Smorgon Steel Group Ltd 
United Group Limited 
Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd 
Portman Limited 
Coogee Chemicals Pty Ltd 
ARC Energy Limited 
Sally Malay Mining Limited 
Hills Industries Limited 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Pty Limited 
Tap Oil Limited 
Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd 
Millennium Inorganic Chemicals Ltd 
Woodside Petroleum Ltd 
Bridgestone Australia Ltd 
Total 
Donations 
$341,380 
$242,405 
$159,935 
$110,000 
$48,100 
$47,970 
$41,150 
$39,300 
$35,200 
$26,000 
$22,350 
$20,200 
$15,000 
$13,755 
$13,015 
$12,500 
$10,250 
$10,000 
$6,100 
$4,000 
Industry 
Wood and Paper Product Manuf. 
Machinery and Equip. Manuf. 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
Metal Ore Mining 
Metal Ore Mining 
Oil and Gas Extraction 
MetalProductManuf. 
Machinery and Equip. Manuf. 
Machinery and Equip. Manuf. 
Metal Ore Mining 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
Metal Ore Mining 
Metal Product Manuf. 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
Oil and Gas Extraction 
Machinery and Equip. Manuf. 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
Oil and Gas Extraction 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical 
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Table 2.13: Tabulation of company donation strategy by location in an anti-
regulation industry 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Firm in anti-regulation industry? 
No Yes 
1,164 274 
94.17 93.20 
72 20 
5.83 6.80 
Firm in anti-regulation industry? 
No Yes 
1,164 274 
97.16 96.14 
34 11 
2.84 3.86 
Figure 2.7: A graphical representation of Table 2.13 
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The breakdown of anti-regulation industries into constituent industries in Model 6 
(fable 2.7) shows that different anti-regulation industries were engaged in very 
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different political donation strategies: paper and pulp, was pursuing a Coalition-only 
strategy, while another two, oil and gas and petroleum and chemical, were pursing a 
bipartisan donation strategy, while mining had no significant propensity to pursue 
either donation strategy. Note that the tobacco industry is a special case of 
Coalition-only donors, because in 2004 the Labor Party made a decision to refuse to 
accept donations from tobacco companies. Prior to this tobacco companies had 
given money to Labor, but sometimes just 10 or 20% of the amount that they gave 
to the Coalition. As tobacco companies were effectively banned from donating to 
Labor in the year of this study, I do not separately analyse tobacco companies 
behaviour in relation to political donations. 
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Table 2.14: Tabulation of company donation strategy by location in various anti-
regulation industries 
Table 2.14a: Tobacco industry 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Table 2.14b: Paper and pulp industry 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Table 2.14c: Oil and gas industry 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Table 2.14d: Petroleum and chemical industry 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Tb "d o acco tn ustrv 
No Yes 
1,437 1 
97.09 33.33 
43 2 
2.91 66.67 
p d ul . d p· lp tn ustrv aper an m. 
No Yes 
1,425 13 
97.07 86.67 
43 2 
2.93 13.33 
Oil d an "d gas tn ustrv 
No Yes 
1,434 4 
94.16 57.14 
89 3 
5.84 42.86 
Petroleum and chemical industry 
firm? 
No Yes 
1,364 74 
94.07 92.50 
86 6 
5.93 7.50 
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Figure 2.8: A graphical representation of Table 2.14 
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Figure 2.Sc: Oil and gas industry 
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Figure 2.Sd: Petroleum and chemical industry 
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One interpretation of these results is that companies located in anti-regulation 
industries adopt different strategies dependent upon their subjective assessment of 
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their strategic options. Companies facing hostile regulation may vary their 
subjective assessment of best strategy across time in response to changing 
circumstances. The results suggests that some companies may be pursuing an 'anti-
regulation' agenda by supporting conservative political parties while others are 
pursuing a bipartisan donation strategy similar to the strategy of 'regulated' 
corporations. Those companies pursuing a bipartisan donation strategy appear to 
be doing so because they have come to an accommodation with the state and have 
adopted a strategy of engagement, rather that outright opposition. As regulation 
becomes inevitable, the utility of oppositional strategies may become less, and the 
returns from a strategy of engagement with both parties may become higher. 
Kellow and Simms (2004) show that in the mining industry in Australia the last 10 
years has seen a marked transformation of the industry's tactics, which have moved 
from an initial position of active hostility to indigenous and environmental 
legislation to one of support for negotiation and the regulation of the industry. If 
this is the case, then one would expect a type of 'tipping-point' switching to take 
place in each industry when corporations view regulation of their industry as 
'inevitable'. They would therefore abandon a strategy of supporting conservative 
parties in the hope of preventing regulation, and instead adopt one of 
bipartisanship, with the hope of influencing regulation by remaining in favour with 
the government irrespective of which party is in office. 
This theory of anti-regulation industries introduces a subjective element into 
corporate political strategy which is frustrating for the quantitative researcher: 
corporate strategy, when faced with hostile legislation, does not flow automatically 
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from the structural position of a corporation. For defence contractors, or 
companies in industries that have been highly regulated for decades, the strategy of 
coopting the Labor Party and maintaining friendly relations with both major parties 
flows from their structural position. For foreign-owned corporations, the strategy 
of not donating ('doing nothing' in the above schema) flows from their position as 
foreign entities, which means that political donations have a high legitimacy cost. 
However, for corporations in newly regulated industries, where there is ongoing 
conflict with environmental, labour or health campaigners, the lack of a settled 
system of regulation provides a crucial subjective element to the choice of political 
strategy of corporations. Will strong support for the Coalition bring special returns 
and prevent higher levels of regulation? Or is it better to hedge donations, and 
maintain an opening to coopting Labor and thereby retaining a better chance of 
shaping or even stalling regulation under a future Labor government? As 
MacMenimin (2008) has shown, such decisions will be informed by which party 
hold government and how far away an election is. However, I would like to suggest 
that there is also a longer term, underlying dynamic, in keeping with the work of 
Kellow and Simms (2004): entire industries can change political strategy as social 
conflicts are transformed into laws, political battles are won or lost, and regulatory 
regimes become a fait accompli. 
Club membership, school attendance, listing in Who '.r Who 
The primary purpose of Model 3 (Table 2.6) was to assess the role of directors' 
clubs and schools on donation behaviour, and in doing so test theories of upper-
class influence on the political behaviour of corporations. The positive relationship 
between exclusive school attendance and donating to the Coalition-only appears to 
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confirm the theories of Bond, Burris and Domhoff that upper-class schools have a 
conservative socialising effect on directors, and as a result lead to conservative 
political behaviour by the corporations these directors serve on. However, the weak 
significance of the schools variable in Model 3 (p<0.10), combined with two other 
pieces of evidence suggests the need for a cautious interpretation of these results. 
This view is supported in the first instance by the results from my attempt to 
partition the Australian corporations using CONCOR and other clustering 
algorithms. This attempt provided results which differed from Bond's 2004 study, 
and did not retrieve any of the stark school and club based conservative donor 
grouping which he found in the UK. Instead, I found that the CONCOR analysis 
more closely mirrored the behaviour of the clubs variable (discussed in the next 
paragraph), that is, a strong significant relationship between upper-class club 
membership and donations to both major parties. The second piece of information 
is shown below in Table 2.15. This is a tabulation of company donation strategy 
arranged according to whether or not one or more company directors attended a 
top private school. This table shows that the relationship between top private 
schools and Coalition-only donation is nearly imperceptible in the raw data: 3.8% of 
companies with top private school directors engage in a Coalition-only donation 
strategy, while 2.9% of companies without a director from a top private school 
engage in the strategy. While controls, and also a scaled measurement (school 
attendees/number of directors) may modify this, the trend is very weak. This is 
particularly so when compared to the percentage of companies with top private 
school directors who donate to both major parties: 15% of companies with 
exclusive private school-educated directors engage in a bipartisan donation strategy. 
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For these reasons I tend towards considering the relationship in Model 3 between 
schools and coalition-only donation as a statistical anomaly. 
Table 2.15: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
directors attended a top private school 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more directors attended top 
. h p pnvate sc 00. 
No Yes 
1,234 204 
95.66 85.00 
56 36 
4.34 15.00 
One or more director attended top 
. h p pnvate sc 00. 
No Yes 
1,234 204 
97.09 96.23 
37 8 
2.91 3.77 
Figure 2.9: A graphical representation of Table 2.15 
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The strong relationship between businessmen's/upper class clubs and donating to 
both major parties suggest that in terms of their role in the politics of business, 
these clubs are primarily serving the role of bringing together directors from 
corporations engaged in hedging behaviour. The strength of this relationship can 
be seen in the raw tabulations in Table 2.16: more than half of all companies who 
engage in a bipartisan donation strategy have a director who is a member of one of 
these clubs. 
The direction of the mechanism underlying this relationship is unclear. I would 
suggest causality could run in both directions: directors from important 
corporations - large, regulated, publicly-listed, with many directors - tend to engage 
in a bipartisan donation strategy and it is precisely these directors who join the 
exclusive businessmen's clubs. Thus, while the directors of bipartisan donors join 
clubs, they do so because of other latent variables. However, the clubs may also 
play a role in reinforcing particular patterns of behaviour: they are a social 
environment, in which norms and strategies can be transferred. If bipartisan 
donation becomes either a social norm amongst members of the clubs, or becomes 
known as a successful business strategy amongst members, then clubs may actually 
play a causal role - more precisely a reinforcing role - in the development of a 
culture of bipartisan donation strategies. 
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Table 2.16: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
directors attended an exclusive businessmen's club 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more directors member of 
exclusive businessmen's club? 
No Yes 
1,147 291 
96.39 85.59 
43 49 
3.61 14.41 
One or more directors member of 
exclusive businessmen's club? 
No Yes 
1,147 291 
97.37 95.41 
31 14 
2.63 4.59 
Figure 2.10: A graphical representation of Table 2.16 
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Listing in Who's Who is one of the strongest variables in the dataset, but it is also 
very unclear what it represents. In Model 3 the proportion of directors listed in 
Who'.r Who has two effects. The first is a significant mobilisation effect, seen in the 
increased propensity of corporations with directors in Who'.r Who to engage in either 
donation strategy. The most likely explanation for this is that listing in Who'.r Who 
reflects a level of public prominence. Causality between public prominence and 
politicisation will run in both directions: the more political a person is, the more 
prominent they are likely to become, and the more prominent a person is the more 
likely they are to be drawn into political activity. The second effect of a corporation 
having a large number of directors listed in Who's Who is a tendency towards being a 
bipartisan donor. One possible explanation of this association is that there is a 
correlation between two different strategies employed by corporations which are 
exposed to political risk and political opportunities. One of these strategies is 
bipartisan political donations. Another strategy may be the recruitment of 
prominent persons to a company's board of directors. Prominent persons bring 
significant amounts of social and political capital to the corporation. It may be the 
case that increased bipartisan donations and having a large number of directors in 
Who '.r Who are two different strategies pursued by corporations seeking political 
influence, and thus we find a correlation between the two. 
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Table 2.17: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether more than half of 
the directors are listed in Who's Who 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
More than half of the directors are 
listed in Who :r Who? 
No Yes 
696 742 
98.31 90.27 
12 80 
1.69 9.73 
More than half of the directors are 
listed in Who's Who? 
No Yes 
696 742 
98.03 95.99 
14 31 
1.97 4.01 
Figure 2.11: A graphical representation of Table 2.17 
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Director wealth: the Rich 200 
The effects of director wealth in all models contradicts the findings in both the US 
(Burris 2001: 373) and UK (Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan 2006b) that wealth has 
a politically conservatising effect. Instead I find that wealthy directors are associated 
with a mobilisation effect: directors with members of the Rich 200 on their board 
are more likely to engage in either type of donation strategy. This effect is not a 
statistical aberration, as can be seen in Table 2.18 below: 16% of the companies on 
which the super-wealthy served made donation to both major parties, and 9% made 
donations to the Coalition-only. 
As with the situation of companies in anti-regulation industries, the super-wealthy 
face a strategic choice which has a crucial subjective component. The division is 
essentially between those wealthy individuals who are ideologically committed to 
conservative parties winning government, and wealthy individuals who are more 
interested in maintaining relations with both parties, and extracting rents for their 
own corporation from the state itself. 
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Table 2.18: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
directors is listed in the Rich 200 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more directors listed in Rich 
200? 
No Yes 
1,367 71 
94.60 83.53 
78 14 
5.40 16.47 
One or more directors listed in Rich 
200? 
No Yes 
1,467 71 
97.30 91.03 
38 7 
2.70 8.97 
Figure 2.12: A graphical representation of Table 2.18 
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The strength of both trends can be seen in a closer examination of the data: The 
three richest men in Australia in 2005 were Kerry Packer (Publishing and 
Broadcasting), Richard Pratt (Pratt Holdings) and Frank Lowy (Westfield) . All 
three engaged in a bipartisan donation strategy, and their companies donated 
$49,550, $341,380 and $241,600 to the major parties in 2004/5. The most 
prominent super-wealthy individual whose corporation was a Coalition-only donor 
is Robert Gerard. In 2004/5 Gerard Corporation donated $151,265 to the 
Coalition. He is a long time Liberal party member. In 2003 he was appointed by 
the then Coalition Federal Government to the Reserve Bank of Australia (Ramsey 
2005). These seems to clearly illustrate a trend towards high levels of political 
activity by super-wealth directors. 
The question remains, however, why are the super wealthy able to engage in both 
strategies? Large corporations certainly do not seem to have the same ability to do 
so. It seems likely that the super-wealthy are able to because they have greater 
autonomy and also greater power than the average corporation. Independently 
wealthy owner-directors of a corporation free a corporation from the traditional 
constraints of the corporate form. This allows some, such as Robert Gerard's 
corporation, to engage in more ideological behaviour than the average corporation. 
\Vb.en making donations they do not have to worry about shareholders or directors 
duties, and if they are willing to suffer the consequences of any donation they do 
not need to convince anyone else of the value of this strategy. Ultimately, however, 
the increased propensity to engage in bipartisan donation strategies may have its 
roots more in power than in autonomy: it is clear from anecdotal evidence that for 
138 
some reason the super-wealthy play a prominent individual role in policies in 
capitalist democracies. They gain individual meetings with Prime Ministers, and can 
make private submissions to government. It seems likely that the power that comes 
with super-wealth leads a substantial number of these individuals to choose a 
'hedging' or 'pragmatic' strategy of bipartisan donation, most probably out of a 
belief that through this they can extract the maximum profit (economic rent) from 
the state for their corporations. 
The importance of the super wealthy for conservative political party fund raising 
across the Western world may be an issue of enduring, and possibly growing 
importance. In the UK, Lord Michael Ashcroff, the 14th richest man in the UK, has 
provided 10 percent of all donations to the Conservative Party in recent years 
(Hyland 1999). In October 2007, The Guardian (UK) revealed the internal staffing 
layout of the Conservative Party (UK) election 'war room'. It demonstrated the 
centrality of Lord Ashcroft to the Conservative Party, and the fact he had "more 
staff than the party chairman and party leader combined." (Woodward, 2007). This 
prominence of the super-wealthy in conservative party policies, it has been 
suggested, is a consequence of the Labo(u)r Party in the UK and Australia 
increasing their political acceptability to business, resulting in the conservative 
parties losing one of their major funding advantages. It is argued that in response to 
losing the support of the central business community, conservative parties have had 
to rely more and more on the ideologically committed super-rich for party funding 
(Hyland 1999). In the UK this certainly seems to be the case with Lord Ashcroft, 
but in Australia the only clear example is Robert Gerard, with Chris Corrigan 
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(Patrick's Corporation) and Paul Ramsey (Paul Ramsay Holdings) as other possible 
candidates. 
Directors 
The strong effect of the number of directors on the propensity to make bipartisan 
donations appears to be similar to the association between bipartisan donations and 
listing in Who '.r Who. Corporations which are exposed to political opportunities and 
risks pursue multiple strategies for political influence, and one such strategy is 
having many directors. Directors confer legitimacy to a corporation, and they can 
bring social capital which may assist the corporation in achieving political influence. 
The practice of bipartisan donations is another strategy designed to garner political 
influence, and what we are measuring is the correlation between those two 
strategies. 
Clearly there is a strong relationship between public listed industrial corporations 
and the variable 'number of directors', as they have legislative requirements and 
legitimacy pressures which encourage a large board of directors. This is similarly the 
case with large corporations in general. However, one of the effects which the 
'number of directors' may be tapping is independent of these two effects. There is 
another set of influential corporations which have a different corporate form - such 
as private firms or very small public firms formed by prominent individuals as start-
up companies - but which are actually highly prominent corporations. These 
companies often have large boards - something that would distinguish them from 
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the normal small or private firm - and are also be more likely to also be more 
politically active. 
Multiple directorships (interlocks) and ties to other donors 
Model 4 appears to demonstrate that non-executive interlocks have a general 
mobilisation effect: corporations with more non-executive interlocks have an 
equally greater propensity to engage in both bipartisan and conservative partisan 
donation behaviour, and both effects are of similar magnitude (~ = 0.41 and 0.52 
respectively). However, the results in Model 5 (ties to political donors) place this 
interpretation in doubt and suggest another possible explanation. Model 5 shows 
that when social influence/ selection effects of ties to donors are taken into account, 
total interlocks (which is a very similar measure to non-executive interlocks) has a 
significant positive effect on the propensity of corporations to donate to both major 
parties but has no effect on the propensity to donate to the Coalition-only (if 
anything it is a negative relationship). Instead, Coalition-only donation is only 
significantly associated with ties to other Coalition-only donors. 
This division between the effect of total interlocks and the effect of ties to donors 
corresponds to Davis's (1991: 597) distinction between number of interlocks and 
ties to adopters in his famous Poison Pill article. Davis conceptualised the number 
of interlocks as a general measure of social capital, status and generalised sources of 
information, while he conceptualised ties to adopters as evidence of social contagion 
through direct contact. It seems that a similar interpretation of the role of 
interlocks and ties to donors on donation behaviour is appropriate in this study: 
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bipartisan donation is increased by the general number of interlocks because the 
number of interlocks is associated with social capital, status and perhaps a very 
generalised social influence effect. Coalition-only donation is affected by direct ties 
to Coalition-only donors, suggesting a genuine social contagion/ social selection 
effect. In Davis's study, he found evidence of both processes influencing the 
propensity of a corporation to take up a new innovation (poison pills). In this study 
I find a bifurcation: total interlocks only effects bipartisan donation, and ties to 
donors only effects Coalition-only donations. This provides us with stronger 
evidence about the general mechanisms driving each process: bipartisan donation 
does not show social contagion effects, and thus the general 'number of interlocks' 
variable appears to be a product of having social capital and status in general, even 
though there is no evidence of mimicking or contagion. Thus bipartisan donation is 
associated with corporations who are highly socialised, but in itself, the process of 
adopting this strategy appears to be asocial or, at the very least, driven by a very 
diffuse socialisation process. In contrast, Coalition-only donation is not affected by 
general interlocks, suggesting that status, general levels of social capital, and so on 
are not important, but instead direct contact with Coalition-only donors is 
important in adopting this behaviour. Thus while Coalition-only donation is 
undertaken by corporations who may be 'outsiders' from the general social network 
- they certainly are not high status corporations - there is a genuine social element 
to their donation behaviour: they are influenced by the behaviour of their 
neighbours (or they select them because of their behaviour). 
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Table 2.19 reinforced the weak finding (p<0.20) in Model 4 that there is a negative 
relationship between the number of outside directors and Coalition-only donation. 
Table 2.19 also shows a substantial positive relationship between outside executive 
directors and a bipartisan donation strategy. Chapter 3 also provides further 
evidence for this effect in other contexts. The negative effect of outside directors 
on the likelihood of adopting a Coalition-only donation strategy follows a pattern 
identified by Bond (2004) in the United Kingdom. Bond argues that outside 
directors represent external influence over a board, and also reduce the political 
autonomy of the board. This reduced political autonomy lessens the chance that 
they will be able to undertake partisan political action. A complementary 
explanation is that corporations which are considered politically or economically 
important, such as those corporations at the centre of the economy like banks or 
airlines, are likely to provide the best opportunities for executives of other 
corporation to engage in what Useem calls 'business scan'. By this he refers to an 
ability to gain a sense of the behaviour of the economy and the attitudes of other 
business leaders (Useem 1984). These corporations, therefore, have higher numbers 
of external executive directors. However, these corporations are also likely to be 
corporations requiring ongoing engagement with the state, irrespective of which 
political party holds office, and thus have a lower propensity to be Coalition-only 
donors. 
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Figure 2.13: A graph of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
executive is also a director of another company 
- Bipartisan donors 
- Coalition-only donors 
0 
No executive on another company One or more executive on another company 
n._ = the number of positive cases 
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Table 2.19: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
director is an executive of another company 
One or more director is an 
executive fr h ; om anot ercompanv. 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
No Yes 
1,234 204 
94.85 89.08 
67 25 
5.15 10.92 
One or more director is an 
executive fr h ; om anot ercompanv. 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
No 
1,234 
96.86 
40 
3.14 
Figure 2.14: A graphical representation of Table 2.19 
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Table 2.20: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company has 
one or more ties to Coalition-only donors 
One or more ties to Coalition-
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
No 
1,389 
94.49 
81 
5.51 
only donors? 
Yes 
49 
81.67 
11 
18.33 
One or more ties to Coalition-
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
No 
1,389 
97.27 
39 
2.73 
Figure 2.15: A graphical representation of Table 2.20 
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Table 2.21: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company has 
one or more ties to Bipartisan donors 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more ties to Bipartisan 
donors? 
No Yes 
1,252 186 
96.38 80.52 
47 45 
3.62 19.48 
One or more ties to Bipartisan 
donors? 
No Yes 
1,252 186 
97.05 96.37 
38 7 
2.95 3.63 
Figure 2.16: A graphical representation of Table 2.21 
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Figure 2.17: A graph of company donation strategy by whether the company has 
one or more interlocks 
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n._ = the number of positive cases 
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Conseroative think tanks 
The relationship between conservative think tanks and Coalition-only donation 
strategy has a weakly significant positive relationship (p<0.10) in Models 1-5. Table 
2.22 illustrates why this is the case: there are only 21 corporations which have a 
director from a conservative think tank on their board, and only 2 of those 
companies are Coalition-only donors. This is still a high percentage of donors, but 
it is a very small number. 
Table 2.22 shows another important relationship, which is the strong relationship 
between conservative think tanks and bipartisan donors: nearly 25% of corporations 
with a director of a conservative think tank on its board make a donation to both 
major parties. The multivariate regression models show that these directors do not 
have a significant effect on the propensity of their corporations to engage in a 
bipartisan donation strategy once other factors are taken into account, but 
nonetheless this fact demonstrates that conservative think tank directors are not 
ghettoised in a Coalition-only pocket of the corporate community. 
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Table 2.22: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether one or more 
directors is on the board of a Conservative Think Tank 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more director is on the 
board of a Conservative Think 
Tank? 
No Yes 
1,424 14 
94.24 73.68 
87 5 
5.76 26.32 
One or more director is on the 
board of a Conservative Think 
Tank.? 
No Yes 
1,424 14 
97.07 87.50 
43 2 
2.93 12.50 
Figure 2.18: A graphical representation of Table 2.22 
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Business associations 
Models 1 and 2 appear to show that the leadership of business associations is 
divided in its donation strategies: corporations who have a director who is part of 
the leadership of the Business Council of Australia (BCA) have a significantly 
greater propensity to engage in a bipartisan donation strategy (~ = 1.40; p<0.05), 
while there is a weakly significant relationship between having a director in the 
leadership of one of the other three business associations (AIG, ABLtd and ACCI) 
and a Coalition-only donation strategy(~= 0.93; p<0.10). In addition there are no 
corporations which both have directors from the leadership of the BCA and who 
donate to the Coalition-only. 
Table 2.23 shows that the relationship between Other Business Association 
Leaderships and Coalition-only donation is driven by just three corporations. Note, 
however, that this does correspond to a nearly 3 times higher percentage donating 
to the Coalition-only (2.9% vs 8.1 %) Table 2.24 shows the same relationship for 
the leadership of the Business Council of Australia and bipartisan donors. In this 
case the relationship is very strong: over a third of all corporations with a director in 
the leadership of the BCA are bipartisan donors, corresponding to a nearly 7 times 
higher percentage donating to both major parties (5.3% vs 35.1 %). 
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Table 2.23: Tabulation of Coalition-only donors by companies with one or more 
directors in the leadership of other business associations 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more directors in the 
leadership of 'Other' business 
associations? 
No Yes 
1,404 34 
97.10 91.89 
42 3 
2.90 8.11 
Figure 2.19: A graphical representation of Table 2.23 
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n._ =the number of positive cases 
The association ofBCA membership with a bipartisan donation strategy confirms 
analysis of the BCA as a more 'moderate' political force within the business 
community (Cahill 2004). The exact mechanism underlying this relationship, 
however, is not entirely clear. The BCA is supposedly composed of CEOs of the 
largest 100 corporations in Australia. However, in practice, there are some large 
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corporations which are notable exceptions and not members of the BCA. These 
include the corporations owned by two of the richest Australian families: the 
Packers (Publishing and Broadcasting Limited) and the Lowys (Westfield). In 
addition, a number of smaller corporations are members of the BCA, for example, 
certain foreign investment banks and also large legal and accounting firms. The 
BCA seems to represent the very largest publicly-listed industrial corporations and 
the financial, legal and accountancy firms which support these corporations. It has 
been called the "CEO club", and this seems reasonable: it is comprised of CEOs of 
very large firms, who have a large amount of institution power because of their 
position; however, it does not include the super-rich CEOs who have power 
autonomous from their institutional position. In addition, this variable measures 
the corporations whose directors hold leadership positions in the BCA : directors 
who are active in the policy committees and board of directors of the BCA. These 
directors, on the basis of their decision to volunteer for these policy positions can 
clearly be considered as political people. A plausible mechanism for the process at 
work here is that the BCA leadership represents the apex of the most central 
corporations in the Australian economy, many of whom have the precise 
characteristics of bipartisan donors: large, public-listed industrials, with connections 
to government boards, and many of whom are in regulated industries. As such, 
their role as the political leadership of a business association is associated with their 
greater propensity to donate and their role as leaders of a bipartisan donation 
constituency (large, public-listed corporations) leads them to adhere to strict norms 
about bipartisan donation. 
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Table 2.24: Tabulation of bipartisan donors by companies with one or more 
directors in the leadership of the Business Council of Australia 
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- Coalition-only donors 
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Not BCA leadership BCA leadership 
n._ =the number of positive cases 
Figure 2.20: A graphical representation of Table 2.24 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
One or more directors in the 
leadership of the Business 
Council of Australia 
No Yes 
1,414 24 
94.71 64.86 
79 13 
5.29 35.14 
The relationship between the leadership of other business associations and 
Coalition-only donation seems to be driven by the same processes, but for a 
different constituency of corporations. The constituency in this case is smaller, 
generally privately owned, and generally consists of outsider corporations. The 
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exact composition of these three business associations is mixed, and as other writers 
have noted (Domhoff 2006), within business associations, small businesses tend to 
be dominated by larger businesses, and thus even business associations such as the 
ACCI, which ostensibly represent all business, have an over representative sample 
of large businesses on their boards. The 'outsider' constituency does still seem to 
make a difference. These smaller, private, poorly networked corporations have 
much less ability to extract rents from the state through a bipartisan donation 
strategy: they are generally neither large enough to make an impact, nor located in 
industries which might potentially gain from state patronage (as, for example, 
defence contractors might). Thus, the political interests of these corporations 
correspond much more closely to the classical conservative political agenda: lower 
taxes, introduce restrictions on unions, etc. While this may be too much to read 
into a correlation based on just 3 corporations, I believe that other results, such as 
those for the proportion of Coalition-only donors who are proprietary (private) 
companies (42% vs 24% for bipartisan donors), and the proportion of Coalition-
only donors who are small companies with less than $1 billion in revenue (85% vs 
56% for bipartisan donors), suggest a general trend of Coalition-only donors being 
smaller, private, outsider corporations. 
Compaf!Y form 
The strong mobilisation effect of partnerships reflects the greater politicisation of 
large accounting and legal firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Clayton Utz, Allens Arthur Robinson, and Corrs Chambers Westgarth. 
The degree of this generalised increased propensity to donate is striking: of the 23 
partnerships in the dataset, 9 gave donations in 2004/5. The mechanism behind 
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this is not immediately obvious. Many of these firms provide legal and constancy 
services to the state, and one could imagine that this would encourage a bipartisan 
donation strategy in the hope of increasing the chance of security contracts and 
influencing policy. However, the increased conservative partisanship of some large 
legal and accounting firms is less easily explained. One possible hypothesis is that 
the institutional form of the partnership and the strong professional credentials and 
status of partners provides partnerships with a degree of political autonomy similar 
to that exercised by the super-wealthy. 
Table 2.25: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company is a 
partnership 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
I h s t e company a partners tp. 
No Yes 
1,424 14 
94.30 70.00 
86 6 
5.70 30.00 
I h s t e company a partners tp. 
No Yes 
1,424 14 
97.14 82.35 
42 3 
2.86 17.65 
The other major effect of company form is the dramatic difference in the donation 
behaviour of public-listed industrial corporations and proprietary (private) 
corporations. Model 2 shows a clear relationship between publicly-listed industrial 
corporations and support for bipartisan donation strategy. This can also be seen in 
Table 2.26. The raw tabulation shows publicly-listed industrial companies have an 
almost 4 times higher odds ratio of donating (the controlled figure in Model 2 is 
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closer to 2.4), and 53% of all bipartisan donors are publicly-listed industrials. 
Public-listed industrials tend to be large, high-status, well-networked corporations 
that are the centre of the economy. Many are located in industries that are highly 
concentrated and also perform important roles in the national economy and even in 
the national consciousness. It seems plausible that such corporations would have an 
interest in maintaining close relations with both major parties, hoping to ensure they 
have a 'place at the table' or an 'ear to listen to them' if they need it. 
In contrast, as can be seen in Table 2.27, only 24% of bipartisan donors are 
proprietary (private) companies, while 42% of all Coalition-only donors were private 
companies (42%). While the percentage of Coalition-only donors which are private 
companies is still lower than the average for the entire dataset (52.5%), the contrast 
between the donor company types for Coalition-only donors and bipartisan donors 
is striking. One explanation, alluded to earlier, is that proprietary (private) 
companies tend to be smaller (their mean revenue is $0.33 billion while it is $1.2 
billion for rest of the Top 2000), less well networked corporations (1.5% of private 
companies have a director on a government board while the figure is 16.5% for the 
rest of the population), and in less government regulated industries (9% vs. 25% are 
located in regulated industries). They are also subject to a legal requirement to be 
held by a small number of owners, making them less vulnerable to public 
perceptions than public-listed corporations. These results appear to paint a picture 
of private corporations as small, 'outsider' corporations. As outsiders, these 
corporations have less interest in state patronage, and more interest in a generalised 
conservative agenda. In addition, the autonomy that comes from the ownership 
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structure seems to provide private corporations with the type of freedom of action 
that Conservative-only donors require. 
Table 2.26: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company is a 
publicly listed industrial 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Is the company a publicly listed 
industrial? 
No Yes 
1,120 318 
97.30 86.65 
43 49 
3.70 13.35 
Is the company a publicly listed 
industrial? 
No Yes 
1,120 318 
97.39 95.50 
30 15 
2.61 4.50 
Table 2.27: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company is a 
proprietary (i.e. private) company 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Is the company a proprietary (i.e. 
private• company? 
No Yes 
651 787 
90.29 97.28 
70 22 
9.71 2.72 
Is the company a proprietary (i.e. 
private' company? 
No Yes 
651 787 
96.16 97.64 
26 19 
3.84 2.36 
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Table 2.28: Tabulation of company donation strategy by whether the company is 
an 'other' corporate form (Listed Trust or Non-Listed Public) 
Donate to Both 
Parties 
Coalition-only 
Donor 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Not Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
Donate (n) 
(col.%) 
2. 7 COHESION AND PARTISANSHIP 
Is the company an 'other' 
corporate form (Listed Trust or 
Non-Listed Public)? 
No Yes 
1119 319 
93.56 95.51 
77 15 
6.44 4.49 
Is the company an 'other' 
corporate form (Listed Trust or 
Non-Listed Public)? 
No Yes 
1119 319 
96.80 97.55 
37 8 
3.20 2.45 
At the beginning of this chapter I outlined two broad theoretical perspectives on the 
relationship between cohesion and partisanship. On one side were those, like 
Useem (1984), who argue that social cohesion and social structure lead to bipartisan 
donation strategies; while on the other side were writers, such as Bond (2004) and 
Burris (2001), who argue that social cohesion and social structure are primarily 
related to conservative partisanship. While the results are mixed and require 
qualification, I believe that they generally support the perspective of Bond and 
Burris. The major variables which explain bipartisan donation strategy appear to be 
asocial, attribute-based variables associated with clear incentives and constraints on 
individual corporations: location in regulated industries, ties to government boards, 
defence contracts, company size, super-wealthy directors, and company form 
(publicly-listed industrial). In contrast, Coalition-only donors showed several 
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indicators that their behaviour was the outcome of socially cohesive processes 
within the corporate community. The strongest evidence was from the social 
contagion/ selection finding of corporations being more likely to be Coalition-only 
donors if they shared a tie with a Coalition-only donor. In addition, the weak but 
still mildly significant (p<0.10) effect of ties to Conservative Think Tanks shows 
possible effects of social ties to conservative ideological organisations. 
It could be argued that certain results, such as the relationship between school and 
club attendance and director bipartisan donation behaviour, demonstrate a social 
cohesion process taking place amongst bipartisan donors. Similarly, the effect of 
total interlocks on propensity to be a bipartisan donor could show a general social 
influence process taking place. The problem with such conclusions is that I also 
found no direct effect of ties to bipartisan donors on donation behaviour. This 
tends to point away from a strong selection/influence effect, and point towards, at 
best, school, club and interlocks diffusing general norms. However, given the 
strong effects of corporate self-interest variables on bipartisan donation behaviour, 
it seems likely that this norm is little more than a norm of 'self-interested rationality 
through bipartisan hedging', and not the high ideals ofUseem's 'classwide' 
rationality acquired through deep social contact with large sections of the corporate 
community. 
Explained variance: R2 
There is a notable difference in the explanatory power of the models of bipartisan 
donation and Coalition-only donation. In Model 6, the pseudo R2 of the bipartisan 
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donation model is 0.20 (approximating an explained variation of 20%), while the 
pseudo R2 of the Coalition-only donation model is 0.10. This is a general trend 
across all of the models, with the Coalition-only donation models only explaining 
approximately V2 to% (and even less) of the variation explained by the bipartisan 
donation models. In part, this reflects the limits of our models, data and our 
understanding of the dynamics of conservative-partisan corporations. We have a 
much better understanding of the attributes driving bipartisan 'hedging' type 
behaviour, and because these are measurable patterns of material incentives and 
constraints we are more easily able to include them in a model. In contrast, 
conservative-partisan behaviour is exhibited by corporations largely on the 
peripheries of, or outside of, the constraints of the core corporate network and 
government-decision making. Such outsider status frees corporations from many 
structural constraints, allowing the more ideological amongst them to act out their 
political preferences. However, this ideology is not easily predicted by the variables 
I have been able to measure, and at present conservative-partisanship appears in the 
models - with some notable exceptions - as idiosyncratic behaviour that is difficult 
to capture. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has two purposes: (1) to test the competing theories of the relationship 
between cohesion and partisanship, and (2) to test multiple competing and parallel 
theories of partisanship in a comprehensive model. 
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On the cohesion and partisanship question, the results seem to favour the 'cohesion 
produces conservative-partisan' theories of Bond (2004), Burris (2001), and 
Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden (1986). While Bond and Burris's specific findings 
on the role of conservative schooling and club membership were not found -
indeed, the opposite was found - the contagiousness of ties to Coalition-only 
donors and conservative think tanks, along with the failure to find any similar 
effects for bipartisan donors suggests that social cohesion was associated with 
conservative partisanship. It also suggests that bipartisan donation, in contrast, is 
largely an asocial phenomenon, driven by a corporate rationality based on clear 
incentives and constraints and an atomised conception of self-interest. 
Neither of Olson's theories fit the observed findings. The theory of special interests 
(Olson 1971: 141-8) and bipartisan donation overemphasises the social and 
coordination benefits of large corporations in the organisation of business special 
interests: "The high degree of organisation of business interests ... must be due in 
large part to the fact that the business community is divided into a series of 
(generally oligopolistic) "industries", each of which contains only a fairly small 
number of ~arge] firms." (Olson 1971: 143) Our findings show a relationship 
between large firms and special interest (bipartisan) behaviour, but provide no 
evidence for organisation as an intermediate variable. Large firms are bipartisan out 
of individualistic corporate interests. 
Olson's theory of "the great" providing more of public goods does not adequately 
capture the dynamics of our observed data on conservative-partisan donations 
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either. Conservative-partisan donations do appear to have the qualities of a 
"public" or "collective" good from which all business would benefit, regardless of 
who contributes to providing it. However, rather than large corporations - who 
would gain more of the benefits (Olson 1971: 29, 31) and be more easily organised 
to provide the public good - being more likely to make Coalition-only donations, 
the opposite seems to take place. Large corporations are associated with 'defecting' 
(bipartisan donation) and donating to gain access to the state as a 'private' good 
(economic rents), while the corporations who do 'cooperate' (Coalition-only 
donors) tend to be smaller corporations, that donate to help provide a public or 
collective good to all corporations (a Coalition government). Thus it is the "small" 
not the "great" who provide the public good in our model, and this is because of 
the alignment of collective and individual interests for "small" corporations: the 
only political interests of these "small" corporations are the general interests of 
business as a whole. 
The second challenge of this chapter was to test the multiple competing and parallel 
theories of partisanship in the hope of forming a general model of the political 
partisanship of business. The findings can be broadly categorised according to their 
effects on: (1) mobilisation, (2) bipartisan donations and (3) conservative-partisan 
donations. 
Three variables (anti-regulation, super-wealth and partnership) had strong 
mobilisation effects, and one (foreign-owned) had a strong 'demobilisation' effect. 
Anti-regulation industries showed greater levels of politicisation because of their 
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character as the subjects of new regulation. The response of business to this hostile 
regulation depended upon the exact industry and the strategic and tactical 
judgements of businesses within that industry. Industries such as forestry, paper 
and pulp have adopted a combative, conservative-partisan strategy, while industries 
such as petroleum and chemical, and oil and gas appear to have adopted a cooption 
strategy of deep engagement with both major parties (bipartisan donation). The 
super-wealthy have greater autonomy to act ideologically, and thus an increased 
potential to engage in a conservative-partisan donation strategy, but also possess 
increased political power which facilitates a successful 'rent-seeking' bipartisan 
donation strategy. Like firms in the anti-regulation industries, the choice of strategy 
is dependent on the ideological disposition and strategic judgements of the 
businessmen and companies involved. Thirdly, partnerships, particularly large 
accounting and legal firms, appear to engage in both donation strategies at a very 
significantly greater rate than the rest of the population of firms. The exact reason 
for this behaviour is not known. Finally, foreign firms have a decreased propensity 
to engage in either donation strategy. This is a case of what Hansen, Mitchell and 
Drape (2004) have called the 'legitimacy tariff': foreign firms are less likely to engage 
in political behaviour which is easily observed, such as political donations. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. As Hansen, et. al. show this political inactivity of foreign 
firms is more a case of appearance than reality. When Hansen, et. al. measured 
types of political behaviour that is less easily observed by the public - such as 
lobbying - foreign firms have the same degree of political activity as their local 
counter parts. 
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Figure 2.21: The Legitimacy Tariff: The proportion of Australian-owned and foreign-
owned corporations which engage in each donation strategy 
~ 
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Bipartisan donations were associated with three groups of corporations: 
corporations with special interests, corporations who form the core-corporate 
community, and corporations with directors with upper-class status. Corporations 
who have 'special interests' are more likely to engage in a bipartisan donation 
strategy: examples include defence contractors, those in regulated industries, those 
with connections to government committees and corporations, and corporations in 
some (petroleum and chemical, and oil and gas) industries facing hostile regulation 
(anti-regulation industries). The second finding was that the corporations who form 
the core-corporate community are more likely to engage in a bipartisan donation 
strategy. This includes large corporations, those with connections to the Business 
Council of Australia, public-listed industrial corporations, those with greater 
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numbers of directors and greater numbers of interlocks with other corporations, 
corporations with high status directors listed in Who's Who, and, as already 
mentioned, corporations with connections to government committees and boards, 
and the largest legal and accounting firms. The third finding was that the traditional 
upper-class networks of directors who attended exclusive private schools and who 
were members of businessmen's clubs were actually more likely to be directors of 
bipartisan donor corporations. This is of similar meaning to finding that the core-
corporate community is engaging in a bipartisan donation strategy, suggesting that a 
bipartisan donation strategy has become a norm amongst the central business 
community in Australia, and that this norm has overwhelmed any tendency within 
the core business community and the upper-classes to donate to the Coalition-only. 
Models of conservative-partisan donors had a poorer model fit than those of 
bipartisan donors. This suggests that not only were the models and data inadequate 
for capturing this behaviour, but also, potentially, that conservative-partisan 
behaviour is associated with more idiosyncratic individual level decision making that 
is difficult to capture in large scale models. There were associations between a 
Coalition-only donation strategy and ties to conservative think tanks and also to the 
leadership of those business associations who predominantly represent smaller 
corporations. Bivariate analysis (cross-tabulations) showed associations between 
location in regulated industries and not engaging a conservative partisan strategy, 
and also a considerably higher proportion of private corporations amongst 
Coalition-only donors than amongst bipartisan donors. Certain industries hostile to 
government regulation, forestry, paper and pulp corporations, were more likely to 
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be Coalition-only donors. Coalition-only donation behaviour was more likely 
amongst corporations who shared directors with other Coalition-only donors. In 
addition, a range of variables that would have been expected to have a mobilising 
effect had either no effect on the propensity to be a Coalition-only donor (company 
size, number of interlocks), had a negative effect (no BCA directors companies gave 
to the Coalition-only), or a weaker positive effect than they did for bipartisan 
donors (listing in Who's Who). 
These results point to three broad trends in the Coalition-only donation behaviour. 
First, Coalition-only donation behaviour is a more social and ideological process 
than bipartisan donation, as evidenced by the effects of ties to conservative think 
thanks and ties to other coalition-only donors. Second, it is the behaviour of 
'outsiders' who are not part of, or at least less likely to be part of, the core-corporate 
community. Third, conservative partisan donation strategies only appear to be in 
the egoistic 'rational' self-interest of corporations in two particular circumstances: 
(1) when they face hostile legislation that they hope to oppose through a strong 
alliance with the conservative political party, and (2) when as an individual 
corporation they either do not have the resources or industry location to extract 
rents from the state (or to be exposed to punishment by the state), and thus their 
individual corporate interests are in alignment with the general interests of 
corporations in the election of a conservative government. 
I will end this chapter with some brief observations about the implications of these 
developments in donation behaviour for our understanding of the 'funding 
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constituency' for the major political parties. For the Labor Party these 
developments have two implications. First, there are large amounts of political 
donations available for the Labor Party from corporations. However, the second 
implication is that these donations are almost all 'bad money'. It is 'bad money' in 
the sense that there is virtually no 'ideological' money for Labor from genuine 
Labor Party supporters within business. In our models this is seen in the finding 
that there are virtually no "Labor-only donors". Instead, almost all money for 
Labor comes from corporations who are 'hedging', and who seem to have a clear 
self-interest in hedging behaviour: extraction of rents for their individual 
corporation from the state. 
For the Coalition parties, the adoption of bipartisan donation strategy by the 
majority of donor corporations represents a major challenge. The Coalition have 
lost one of their traditional mechanisms for consolidating business support, that is, 
upper-class social networks: the graduates of exclusive schools, and the members of 
top businessmen's clubs primarily work in the corporations of the core-corporate 
community who engage in a bipartisan donation strategy. The Coalition appears to 
have a distinct advantage over Labor in four areas: (1) the super-wealthy, who 
appear to retain the autonomy to act ideologically, (2) corporations tied to 
conservative think tanks (although this is a weak, uncertain finding), (3) certain anti.-
regulation industries who are hostile to further government regulation (such as 
forestry), and (4) small, private corporations and their business associations. This 
fourth group seems to be a group of corporations, who, because of their industry 
location, their small size, and their lack of social ties, do not have the interest or the 
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ability to extract rents from the state. Instead, their own political interests are the 
same as the general interests of the corporate community and the Coalition parties: 
the election of a Coalition Government and the implementation of general policies 
to benefit business, such as lower taxes and industrial relations 'reform'. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF 
BUSINESS 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Political donations are just one of the many possible indicators of the political 
preferences and political strategies of corporations. The purpose of this chapter is 
twofold: first and primarily, this chapter is aimed at checking the generalisability and 
the limitations of the theoretical findings of Chapter 2 by testing them against 
models of the recruitment of directors to political leadership positions in business. 
The second, and secondary, purpose of this chapter is to explore the notion of an 
insider-outsider divide within the political organisation of business. This insider-
outsider division, I hypothesis will share many parallels with the pragmatic-
ideological/ defect-cooperate/hedging-partisan divide explored in Chapter 2. 
However, I hypothesis that this insider-outsider division will not be entirely 
synonymous with this divide and in the contrast between these dimensions 
important insights will be gained. 
The methodology and theoretical framework for this chapter is almost identical to 
that used in Chapter 2. In the theoretical framework of this current chapter, the 
theories of political donation strategies used in Chapter 2 are replaced by almost 
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identical theories of political leadership positions: the theoretical hypotheses related 
to 'pragmatic' /bipartisan donor corporations are largely recast as hypotheses about 
corporations with 'insider' positions (that is, directors in business political leadership 
positions), and hypotheses relating to conservative-partisan corporations largely 
recast as hypotheses about 'outsider' corporations. 
This chapter analyses the companies of directors who serve on one of six business 
political leadership groups: (1) directors of government boards or enterprises, (2) 
the leadership of the Business Council of Australia, (3) the leaderships of the other 
three major business association (ACCI, ABLtd and AIG) (4) directors of 
conservative think tanks, (5) members of the Takeovers Panel, and (6) invitees to 
the Australia -New Zealand Leadership Forum (ANZLF). 
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, the nature of each of these business political 
leadership positions is reviewed; second, an initial schema of the relationship 
between partisanship and the 'insider/ outsider' divide (based on results from 
Chapter 2) is elaborated; third, the recruitment to business political leadership 
positions is modelled; fourth, the results and their implications are discussed; and 
fifth, the schema is revised and concluding remarks are made. 
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3.1 THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF BUSINESS 
Directors ef government board or enterprises 
The IBISWorld's Largest 2000 Enterprises includes for-profit, government-owned and 
non-profit enterprises. 136 of the for-profit corporations have one or more 
directors who serve on the board of one of the 284 government boards or 
government-owned enterprises listed in the IBISWorld's Largest 2000 Enterprises. The 
list of government boards and government-owned enterprises includes 32 federal 
government bodies, 143 state government bodies, and 75 local government bodies. 
While the federal and state bodies are mostly government-owned enterprises or 
important semi-independent regulatory authorities, the local government bodies are 
almost exclusively local councils. Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 provide an indicator of 
the types of government-owned enterprises. Table 3.1 contains a list of the 20 
largest federal government bodies in the IBISWorldlist. Note that it includes postal, 
taxation and scientific boards, the Reserve Bank, the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, the Export Finance Corporation and the Australian Trade 
Commission, as well as several major superannuation funds. Table 3.2 contains a 
list of the 20 largest state government bodies in the IBISWorld list. Note that it 
includes health, road, workers' compensation insurance, energy, rail and water 
authorities, as well as several superannuation funds. Table 3.3 contains the ten 
largest local government bodies in the IBISWorld dataset, all of which are local 
councils. There are relatively few overlapping memberships of these local councils 
and the directorships of the for-profit corporations in our dataset. As showing in 
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Figure 3.1, the mean revenue of the 136 for-profit corporations who have a director 
on a government committee is $A2.4 billion (95% c.i. $A1.4-3.5 billion). 
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Table 3.1: The 20 largest federal government bodies in the 18/SWorld dataset 
Enterprise Rank State Revenue ($'000) 
Australian Postal Corporation 50 VIC 4323500 
Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme 69 ACT 3499353 
Australian Taxation Office 95 ACT 2434987 
Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency 105 ACT 2156704 
Public Sector Superannuation Scheme 120 ACT 1903292 
Reserve Bank of Australia 146 NSW 1549000 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 262 NSW 966551 
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation 287 ACT 903931 
Defence Housing Authority 334 ACT 777856 
Airservices Australia 422 ACT 615459 
Australian National University 431 ACT 607715 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 806 ACT 290783 
Com care 854 ACT 267817 
National Archives of Australia 872 ACT 255734 
Bureau of Meteorology 982 VIC 214043 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 1042 NSW 198100 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 1069 VIC 191338 
Australian Trade Commission 1080 NSW 188642 
Special Broadcasting Service Corporation 1082 NSW 188081 
Table 3.2: The 20 largest state government bodies in the 18/SWorld Dataset 
Enterprise Rank State Revenue ($'000) 
Queensland Health 41 QLD 4980403 
Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales 79 NSW 2886417 
Victorian WorkCover Authority 84 VIC 2760430 
First State Superannuation Fund 90 NSW 2589925 
Energy Australia 92 NSW 2558700 
Queensland Rail 94 QLD 2502675 
New South Wales Treasury Corporation 108 NSW 2129766 
Western Power Corporation 115 WA 1973527 
Country Energy 138 NSW 1643837 
Roads Corporation 175 VIC 1355410 
Integral Energy Australia 176 NSW 1342043 
Water Corporation 180 WA 1325850 
Victorian Rail Track 197 VIC 1233248 
South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service 199 NSW 1227285 
University of Melbourne 205 VIC 1164079 
Transport Accident Commission 209 VIC 1160369 
Western Sydney Area Health Service 245 NSW 1014340 
Superannuation Funds Management Corporation of South Austral 248 SA 1012207 
WorkCover Queensland 254 QLD 996062 
Rail Corporation New South Wales 255 NSW 990596 
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Table 3.3: The 10 largest local government bodies in the 18/SWorld Dataset 
Enterprise Rank State Revenue ($'000) 
Brisbane City Council 161 QLD. 1451598 
Council of the City of Gold Coast 415 QLD 625135 
City of Sydney 663 NSW 368024 
Melbourne City Council 779 VIC 305953 
Maroochy Shire Council 945 QLD 226690 
Greater Geelong City Council 1066 VIC 191762 
Logan City Council 1099 QLD 184961 
Ipswich City Council 1112 QLD 181101 
Townsville City Council 1130 QLD 175175 
Blacktown City Council 1161 NSW 166388 
Figure 3.1: The mean revenue of corporations with one or more directors serving 
on particular business association leaderships, compared to the mean of all 
corporations in the 18/SWorld dataset, with standard errors (indicated by error 
bars) 
All corporations + 
ABLtd ~ 
AIG 
ACCI 
Other Bus. Ass. 
(ACCI, AIG, ABLtd) 
BCA 
Govt. Board 
Cons. Think Tanks 
Takeovers Panel 
ANZLF 
$0 $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000 $4,000,000 $5,000,000 $6,000,000 $7,000,000 $8,000,000 $9,000,000 $10,000,00 
Mean revenue ($A'OOO) and 95% confidence interval 0 
Mean Revenue 
($bi!) 
(95% CI) 
0.75 (0.62-0.87) 
0.86 (0.37-1.36) 
0.86 (0.25-1.47) 
3.53 (0.39-6.67) 
1.79 (0.62-2.96) 
5.9 (2.71-9.09) 
2.44 (1.42-3.46) 
5.04 (1.08-9.00) 
3.11 (1.64-4.59) 
4.84 (1.53-8.14) 
Sources: Revenues from IBISW orld (2006), leadership figures from annual reports and websites of respective organisations (see 
Bibliography for more details). 
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Business association leaders: the BCA and others business associations. 
This measure is identical to that used in other sections of this thesis, with the 
exception that as a dependent variable it is coded as a binary variable so that it can 
be analysed using logistic regression. 
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) "is an association of CEOs of 100 of 
Australia's leading corporations, which together have a combined national 
workforce of almost one million people" (BCA 2008). According to the BCA, it 
was established "to provide a forum for Australian business leadership to contribute 
directly to public policy debates" (BCA 2008). It has a council composed of all 
members of the BCA which meets five times each year. Between council meetings 
the Secretariat of six directors administer and advocate for the organisation. The 
majority of detailed policy work of the BCA is developed in one of approximately 
five Task Forces comprised of member CEOs and other experts in an advisory 
capacity. (BCA 2008). I classify the leadership of the BCA as those CEOs who 
serve in the Secretariat or in one of the BCA Task Forces. 
'Other Business Association Leadership' is comprised of the leadership of the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), the Australian Industry 
Group (AIG) and Australian Business Llmited (ABL). These business associations 
represent a wider spectrum of corporations than the BCA. The Australian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) describes itself as "the peak council of 
Australian business associations" (ACCI 2008). It is an association of associations, 
176 
and the members of ACCI are said to have over 350,000 member businesses (ACCI 
2008). The member associations of ACCI include the Chambers of Commerce 
from each state and territory, as well as national industry specific associations. 
ACCI argues that it is "the largest and most representative business association in 
Australia" (ACCI 2008). For the purposes of this thesis, the leadership of ACCI is 
said to consist of the members of the General Council, which meets several times 
each year, and the members of the governing Board. The Australian Industry 
Group (AIG or Ai Group) describes itself as "Australia's leading industry 
organisation representing 10,000 employers" (Ai Group 2008). While the AIG says 
that it has members in "manufacturing, construction, automotive, 
telecommunications, IT & call centres, transport, labour hire and other industries" 
(Ai Group 2008), its primary membership base appears to be in manufacturing and 
construction. The AIG represents businesses from NSW, Victoria and 
Queensland, and has close relations with business associations in both South and 
Western Australia (Ai Group 2008). Australian Business Limited (ABLtd)17 was a 
predominantly New South Wales-based business representative organisation, with 
close to 30,000 members (5,500 full member companies and 25,000 associate 
members) (Australian Business Limited 2006: 8). For the purposes of this study, the 
ABLtd and AIG leadership is understood to be comprised of members of the 
Council and Board of the ABLtd/ AIG, and not members of their various policy 
committees.18 
17 In 2006 the ABLtd merged with the State Chamber of Commerce (NSW) to form the NSW 
Business Chamber (NSW Business Chamber 2006). 
18 This was partly done so as to avoid overlap between this and one of our measure of defence 
contractors (the Defence Industry Council of the AIG). 
177 
Figure 3.1 gives a sense of the relative size of the corporations whose directors serve 
in the leadership of each of the major business associations. The first row of Figure 
3.1 contains the mean of the revenue of all profit-making corporations ("All 
corporations" in the figure) in the IBISWorld dataset. Note that the average revenue 
(which is equivalent to turn-over or sales) is approximately $A800 million per year. 
The table has error bars (whiskers) representing the 95% confidence interval of 
these mean estimates. In row one (All corporations) the error bars are so small as 
to be barely visible, illustrating that the there are a large number of corporations in 
the dataset that are located around this size. In contrast, the mean revenue of a 
corporation of a director in the BCA leadership is approximately $A6 billion; for an 
ACCI leader the average corporation they serve on is almost half that size, with a 
mean revenue of $A3.5 billion. The AIG and ABLtd leadership's directors tend to 
serve on corporations that are considerably smaller again, and have remarkably 
similar revenue to the average corporation in our dataset: approximately $A800 
million per year. On average, the combined leadership for the ACCI, AIG and 
ABLtd represent corporations with an average revenue of approximately $A1.8 
billion per year, which is less than one third the size of the average BCA leader's 
corporation's revenue. 
Directors ef conseroative think tanks 
In total 21 corporations had directors who served on the boards of one of three 
conservative think tanks: the Sydney Institute, the Institute of Public Affairs and the 
Centre for Independent Studies. The Sydney Institute describes itself as "a privately 
funded not-for-profit current affairs forum devoted to encouraging debate and 
discussion" (Sydney Institute 2008). It explicitly claims to be non-partisan, however 
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it has a number of connections to the conservative side of Australian politics. Its 
director, Gerard Henderson, is a former parliamentary staffer to the then leader of 
the Liberal Party John Howard (who later became Prime Minister). He is known 
for, amongst other things, his strong anti-communism, his opposition to left-wing 
bias in the press and his academic writings on the history of the Liberal Party and 
other conservative movements in Australia. The Institute's board enjoys the 
patronage of several prominent directors of Australia's largest corporations. 
The Institute of Public Affairs describes itself as "an independent, non-profit public 
policy think tank dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of 
economic and political freedom." (IPA 2008) It claims to support "the free market 
of ideas, the free flow of capital, a limited and efficient government, evidence-based 
public policy, the rule of law, and representative democracy'' (IP A 2008). It was 
formed in 1943 and has always maintained close ties to the Liberal and National 
Parties. 
The Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) is the largest of the three major 
conservative think tanks in Australia. It describes itself as "actively engaged in 
support of a free enterprise economy and a free society under limited government 
where individuals can prosper and fully develop their talents" (CIS 2008). The CIS 
is the most explicitly neo-liberal of the three think tanks, and has more Top 2000 
company directors on its board than the other two think tanks. 
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The mean revenue of companies with one or more directors on the board of a 
conservative think tank is $AS billion - comparable to that of the BCA - although 
the 95% confidence interval for this mean is from $Al billion to $A9 billion, 
suggesting significant variation in size of companies with directors affiliated to these 
think tanks. 
Members ef the takeovers panel 
The Takeovers Panel is a government appointed board that is "the primary forum 
for resolving disputes about a takeover bid" (Takeovers Panel website 2007). The 
panel has wide powers to make orders to ensure that mergers and takeovers are 
carried out in accordance with the law. All members are part-time, and are said to 
be "active members of Australia's takeovers and business communities". In many 
ways it plays a role as both a court and an industry self-regulatory body. 
At the time of the collection of data there were 43 members of the Takeover Panel. 
It includes many prominent directors and senior legal counsels of several of the 
largest firms (Askew 2005). Since these panel members serve in a part-time 
capacity, they continue to serve in their roles as directors, counsels, etc. 
35 corporations in the IBISWorld dataset had one or more directors serving on the 
Takeovers Panel. The mean revenue of these corporations was $A3.1 billion (95% 
c.i: $A1.6-4.6 billion). 
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Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum 
The sixth business leadership group examined is the Australia-New Zealand 
Leadership Forum (ANZLF). The purpose of the Forum is to facilitate policy 
discussion between prominent business leaders, high-level public servants and 
ministers from both sides of the Tasman.19 It has met annually since 2004, and the 
dataset used in this thesis is based on the attendance list of the 2006 meeting. More 
than half the delegates to the Forum are business representatives, with the 
remainder from government departments, policy institutes and academic and 
cultural areas. Representation from both governments was at the highest level and 
included the foreign ministers. The Forums included briefing papers outlining issues 
for discussion and economic statistics, presentations, and specialist committees and 
working parties on particular issues. Between Forums, a number of working 
committees were formed to develop issues further - such as 23 working groups 
between the 2004 and 2005 conference. Despite attempts to broaden the discussion, 
the agenda was one that favoured business and economic issues, and provided 
broad support for moves towards a single market and general harmonization, albeit 
with some reservations by New Zealand representatives regarding sovereignty issues 
(Hempenstal, 2006).20 
t9 The Tasman Sea is the sea which separates Australia and New Zealand. 
20 For further details on the ANZLF see an article I co-authored on this topic: Harrigan and 
Goldfinch (2007), which is also included as an appendix to this thesis. 
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25 corporations in the IBISWor!d dataset have one or more directors who attended 
the 2006 ANZLF. The mean revenue of these corporations was $A4.8 billion (95% 
c.i.: $A1.4-8.3 billion). 
3.2 AN INITIAL SCHEMA 
At the end of Chapter 2 I developed two concepts that were intimately related: the 
idea of a 'core-corporate community', and the notion of 'outsider corporations' who 
were less well integrated with this core-corporate community. I suggested that this 
division was one of the important differences between bipartisan donors - who 
tended to be part of the core-corporate community - and Coalition-only donors, 
who tended to have the characteristics of outsider corporations. These two groups 
have indistinct boundaries. However, I believe we can broadly characterise the types 
of corporations that are likely to be located in each of these groups. In the schema I 
put forward at the end of Chapter 2, corporations are more likely to be members of 
the core-corporate community and also bipartisan donors if they are (1) large, (2) 
publicly-listed industrial, (3) Australian-owned corporations with high levels of 
integration with the rest of the business community through a (4) large board of 
directors and (5) greater than normal numbers interlocks with other corporations, 
(6) directors who are members of exclusive businessmen's clubs, and (7) directors in 
the leadership of the BCA. They are also more likely to be part of the core-
corporate community if they (8) have higher status directors, as measured by a large 
portion of the board listed in Who '.r Who, and they have (9) considerable 
connections to government through directors who serve on government 
committees and government boards. In addition, corporations are more likely to be 
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part of the core-corporate community if they are one of (10) the large legal and 
accounting firms who service the largest public-listed industrial corporations. 
In contrast, a corporation is more likely to be an outsider corporation and a 
Coalition-only donor if they are (1) smaller, (2) private, (3) foreign-owned 
corporations, and/ or ( 4) not in industries subject to heavy government regulation. 
They are also more likely to be outsider corporations if they have fewer social 
connections to the rest of business through, for example (5) fewer interlocks with 
other corporations (6) fewer directors who are members of exclusive businessmen's 
clubs, (7) few connections to the leadership of the BCA. They also appear to have 
(8) fewer high.status directors, as measured by the number of directors listed in 
Who'.r Who. They appear to be associated with (9) the leadership of the other 
business associations (ACCI, AIG, ABLtd) who represent smaller corporations. In 
addition, my exploration of Coalition-only donation behaviour suggested that (10) 
conservative think tanks, and (11) companies in industries hostile to government 
regulation (anti-regulation industries) may be associated with 'outsider' status, but 
this is a very tentative finding because conservative partisanship is not the same as 
being outside of the core-corporate community. 
According to this schema I can categorise the six business leadership groups into 
those expected to be 'insiders' (core-corporate community) and 'outsiders'. I expect 
that the corporations broadly fitting the characteristics of the core-corporate 
community will have directors on: (1) government boards, (2) the BCA leadership, 
(3) the Takeovers Panel, and (4) the ANZLF. We expect outsider corporations to 
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have directors serving (5) in the other business association leadership, and (6) on the 
boards of the conservative think tanks. 
3.2: MODELLING AND RESULTS 
Tables 3.4 to 3. 7 present the results of a series of models of the characteristics of 
corporations who had directors recruited to the six business political leadership 
groups. They are labelled Model 1 through 7, though each 'Model' contains 6 
separate logistic regression models: one for each of the six business political 
leadership groups. The models were logistic regression, using backward selection 
with an exclusion criteria of p>0.20. The cases in the models were those Australian 
headquartered, for-profit corporations that featured in the IBISWorldlist. The 
dependent variable was a '1' if the corporations had one or more director serving 
the business leadership group being modelled, and zero otherwise. 
Government boards 
Companies with directors on government boards were more likely to have directors 
serving in two of the five leadership groups (excluding government boards, since it 
cannot be regressed against itself). Companies with directors on government 
boards were more likely to also have directors on the boards of conservative think 
tanks, and on the Takeovers Panel (~=1.40, p<0.01 and ~=1.47, p<0.01 
respectively). Given the strength of the relationship between bipartisan donators 
and companies with directors on government boards, it is surprising to find no 
effect on the recruitment of directors to the BCA leadership or to the ANZLF. 
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&gulated industries 
Companies based in regulated industries were more likely to be recruited to three of 
the six leadership groups: government boards (~=0.96, p<0.05), the BCA leadership 
(~=0.82, p<0.05) and the Takeovers Panel (~=1.09, p<0.01). 
Anti-regulation industries 
Anti-regulation industries, as a single variable in Model 1, had only a weak overall 
relationship with recruitment of directors to business leadership positions. The only 
business leadership group to which directors of companies in anti-regulation 
industries were more likely to be recruited to was other business association leaders 
(~=0.75, p<0.01). 
Defence contractors 
Defence contractors were more likely to have a director attending the ANZLF 
(~=2.83, p<0.01). However, what is more notable about the relationship between 
defence contractors and the business leadership groups is that defence contractors 
were not represented at all in four of the six business leadership groups, as can be 
seen in the models by the four perfectly predicts failure (p.p.f.) next to defence 
contractors in all of the models. Defence contractors did not have one director 
serving on a government board, in the leadership of the BCA, on the board of a 
conservative think tank or on the Takeovers Panel. One could argue that this is a 
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function of the small number of defence contractor corporations. There are only 15 
in the dataset, and so simply by chance there is a relatively high likelihood of no 
overlap of companies who are defence contractors and in business political 
leadership positions. However, this argument does not stand up because, first, 
other types of corporations that are only small in number (such as the 21 
corporations who have representation on conservative think tanks) have at least 
some representation in all political leadership groups, and, second, the absence of 
any representation is considerably more notable for defence contractors as they are 
particularly political corporations (as seen in their bipartisan donation behaviour). 
Revenue 
Revenue has a particularly strong correlation with recruitment to all business 
leadership groups in Model 1. This effect became more muted once directors and 
interlocks were included in the models (for example in Model 4). The strongest 
effect of revenue on recruitment was on membership of the BCA leadership and the 
weakest effect was on recruitment to other business association leaderships. 
Business associations 
The two business association leader types (BCA and other business associations) 
were positively related to each other, suggesting that, in part, their leaderships are 
drawn from the same firms. The companies of BCA leadership were strongly 
represented on the Takeovers Panel (~=1.49, p<0.01), and the companies of both 
business association leadership groups were represented at the ANZLF (~=2.43 for 
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BCA, and ~=1.27 for the other businesses associations), however the relationship 
between the ANZLF and other business association leaders was only significant at 
the p<0.10 level. 
Conservative think tanks 
The companies directed by board members of conservative think tanks were 
strongly represented on government boards (~=1.38, p<0.01), the Takeovers Panel 
(~=1.70, p<0.01), and there was a trend towards their overrepresentation at the 
ANZLF (~=1.38, p<0.10). 
The super wealthy (Rich 200) 
The companies of the super-wealthy were represented in the same leadership groups 
as conservative think tanks: on government boards (~=0.52, p<0.10), the Takeovers 
Panel (~=1.52, p<0.01), and at the ANZLF (~=1.87, p<0.01). 
Foreign-owned companies 
Model 1 appears to demonstrate that foreign-owned companies were less likely to 
have directors serve on government boards, other business association leaderships, 
and the ANZLF. However, Model 2 shows that once company form is taken into 
account, this difference disappears for all leadership groups except government 
boards. 
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Corporate Form 
Private (proprietary) companies were much less likely to serve on three of the six 
leadership groups (government boards, other business association leaders and 
conservative think tank directors). Directors of public listed industrial corporations 
were significantly more likely to be BCA leaders (~=0.91, p<0.05). An examination 
of the raw data seems to suggest that in large part, these four leadership groups are 
showing the same pattern - a tendency towards directors serving on public 
corporations and not serving on private corporations - and that it is largely arbitrary 
whether the regressions have ended up loading positively on the public-listed 
variable or loading negatively on the private company variable.21 
Both BCA leaders and members of the ANZLF were more likely to be drawn from 
partnerships, namely large accounting and legal firms. 
21 See for example the model of BCA leadership in Model 5 where there is no effect for public 
corporations and a negative coefficient for private corporations. 
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Table 3.4: A logistic regression of a range of measures of political leadership against a set of independent variables 
MODEL 1: BASELINE MODEL MODEL 2: CORPORATE FORM 
GOVT BUSINESS OTHER CONS. TAKE- GOV'f BUSINESS OTHER CONS. TAKE-COUNCIL Bus.Ass. THINK OVERS ANZLF COUNCIL Bus.Ass. THINK OVERS ANZLF BOARDS (BCA) LEADERS TANK PANEL BOARDS (BCA) LEADERS TANK PANEL 
EXPOSURE TO GOV'f DECISIONS: 
Govt. Boards ns. ns. 1.40 *** 1.47 *** ns. ns. ns. 1.28 ** 1.06 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.96 *** 0.82 ** ns. ns. 1.09 *** ns. 0.66 *** 0.93 *** ns. ns. 0.85 ** 
Anti-regulation Industry 0.40ns. ns. 0.75 ** ns. ns. ns. ns. ns. 0.64 ** 
Defence Contractor p.p.£ p.p.£ ns. p.p.f. p.p.£ 2.83 *** p.p.£ p.p.£ ns. p.p.£ p.p.£ 3.59 *** 
SIZE OF CORPORATION: 
Ln(Revenue) 0.40 *** 0.88 *** 0.31 *** 0.56 *** 0.40 *** 0.51 *** 0.30 *** 0.81 *** 0.20 * 0.46 *** 0.33 *** 0.51 *** 
Business Council (BCA) ns. 1.03 * ns. 1.49 *** 2.43 *** ns. 1.04 * ns. 1.33 *** 2.13 *** 
Other Business Assocs. ns. 1.17 ** ns. ns. 1.27 * ns. 1.08 * ns. ns. 1.41 * 
IDEOLOGY: Cons. Think Tank 1.38 *** ns. ns. 1.70 *** 1.38 * 1.15 ** ns. ns. 1.43 ** 1.36 * 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.52 * ns. ns. ns. 1.52 *** 1.87 *** 0.51 * ns. ns. ns. 1.28 *** 2.08 *** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned -2.22 *** ns. -0.57 * -0.97 ns. ns. -1.50 ** -1.79 *** ns. ns. ns. ns. -1.16ns. 
CORPORATE FORM: 
Public Listed ns. 0.91 ** 
Private -1.77 *** ns. -1.28 *** -2.36 ** p.p.f. -1.16 ns. 
Partnership ns. 2.85 *** p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 2.09** 
CLASS & STATUS: 
Directors 
Who's Who Listing 
Clubs 
Schools 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE/SELECTION: 
Ties to Bipartisan Donors 
Ties to Conservative-only 
Donors 
CONSTANT -1.78 *** -3.53 *** -3.28 *** -3.92 *** -4.59 *** -4.40 *** -1.35 *** -4.08 *** -3.09 *** -3.72 *** -3.86 *** -4.36 *** 
PSEUDOR2 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.38 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. = not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 level. 
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Directors 
The number of directors of a corporation was positively related to the chance of 
having a director in all six leadership groups. This, however, may simply be an 
autocorrelation that arises because the more directors a corporation has the more 
directors it has who have a chance of serving in a corporate political leadership 
position. This variable is largely included in order to control for this. 
Who's Who listing 
The greater the proportion of directors listed in Whos Who, the greater the 
likelihood of the recruitment of a director into all six leadership groups. Again there 
is likely to be a large autocorrelation problem with this variable: serving in any of 
these leadership positions is likely to increase the chance of a director being listed in 
Whos Who, and thus increasing the proportion of directors listed in Who's Who 
serving on their corporate board. The large size of this effect, and the existence of 
the effect in models such as those of political donations in Chapter 2, suggests it is 
not just autocorrelation with the dependent variables. However, the problem of 
autocorrelation with the other independent variables is difficult to control for. 
Clubs and schools 
Corporation with a high proportion of directors who are members of exclusive 
businessmen's clubs have a significantly elevated chance of having a director who 
serves on a government board (~=1.19, p<0.01), the BCA leadership (~=2.70, 
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p<0.01), the Takeovers Panel (~=1.97, p<0.01), or the ANZLF (~=1.50, p<0.10). 
Corporations with a high proportion of directors who were educated at exclusive 
private schools have a greater likelihood of having a director who serves on a 
government board (~=1.19, p<0.01) or a conservative think tank (~=3.61, p<0.01). 
Interlocks 
Non-executive interlocks were positively associated with recruitment to leadership 
positions in four of the groups: government boards, other business association 
leaders, the Takeovers Panel, and the ANZLF. There was a weakly significant and 
negative relationship between having an executive on the board of another 
corporation (executive outdegree) and having a director on a government board 
(~=-1.40, p<0.10). The number of executives from other corporate boards serving 
as directors had a positive and significant relationship with having a director as part 
of the other business association leadership (~=1.34, p<0.01) and the ANZLF 
(~=1.18, p<0.10). 
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Table 3.5: A logistic regression of measures of political leadership against a set of independent variables 
MODEL 3: CLASS & STATUS MODEL 4: INTERLOCKS 
Govr BUSINESS OTHER BUS. CONS. THINK TAKE-OVERS ANZLF GoVTBoARDS BUSINESS OTHER BUS. CONS.THINK TAKE-OVERS BOARDS COUNCIL Ass. LEADERS TANK PANEL COUNCIL Ass. LEADERS TANK PANEL 
EXPOSURE TO GOVf DECISIONS 
Govt Boards ns. ns. 0.99 ** 0.73 * 
Regulated Industry 0.65 *** 1.01 ** 
"'· 
ns. 1.00 ** 
Anti-regulation Industry ns. 0.76 ns. 0.82 ** 
Defence Contractor p.p.£ p.p.£ ns. ns. p.p.£ 
SIZE Of CORPORATION 
Ln(Revenue) 0.13ns. 0.72 *** ns. 0.39 *** 
Business Council (BCA) ns. 1.05** ns. 1.23 ** 
Other Business Assocs. ns. 1.11 * 
IDEOWGY: Cons. Think Tank 0.91 * ns. ns. 1.60 *** 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.60 ** ns. ns. ns. 1.39 *** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned 
-1.23 *** 
CORPORATE FORM 
Public Listed 
Private 
-0.93 *** ns. -0.87 ** -1.93 * p.p.£ 
Partnership ns. 3.42 *** p.p.£ p.p.£ p.p.£ 
CLASS & STATUS 
Directors 0.33 *** 0.26 *** 0.12 ** 0.31 *** 0.35 *** 0.20 *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.05ns. 0.16 * 0.21 *** 
Who's Who Listing 1.80 *** 3.54 *** 2.08 *** 2.67 ** 2.84 *** 2.93 *** 
Clubs 1.19 *** 2.70 *** ns. ns. 1.97 *** 1.50 * 
Schools 1.53 ** ns. ns. 3.61 *** 
INTERLOCKS 
Non-Executives on other corporate boards 0.59 *** ns. 0.82 *** ns. 1.18 *** 
Executives on other corporate boards -1.40 * 
Executives from other corporate boards ns. ns. 1.34 *** 
CONSTANT -5.81 *** -8.59 *** -5.65 *** -8.59 *** -8.49 *** -8.00 *** -3.29 *** -5.41 -4.20 *** -4.75 *** -6.05 *** 
PSUEDOR2 0.23 0.23 O.D7 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.22 0.26 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. - not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 level. 
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Political donations 
Model 5 shows that companies who were bipartisan donors were significantly more 
likely to have directors who served on government boards (~=1.01, p<0.01) and in 
the leadership of the BCA (~=0.92, p<0.05). Model 5 also shows (as did the models 
in Chapter 2) a weakly significant relationship between Coalition-only donation and 
having a director who serves in either the leadership of the other business 
associations (~=0.97, p<0.10) or a conservative think tank (~=1.49, p<0.10). 
Interlocks with political donors 
Ties to bipartisan donors show a positive and significant correlation with having a 
director in the leadership of the BCA (~=2.33, p<0.01) and the ANZLF (~=2.53, 
p<0.01). Ties to Coalition-only donors has a strong, but weakly significant, negative 
relationship with having a director on a government board (~=-2.29, p<0.10). 
There was also a very strong but only weakly significant negative relationship 
between ties to bipartisan donors and serving on the board of a conservative think 
tank (~=-3.46, p<0.10). This is surprising given that 10 of the 21 companies which 
have directors who are on the boards of conservative think tanks also have ties to 
bipartisan donors. However, having rerun the regressions with multiple different 
models, I believe that this relationship is a stable one that exists in the data. If one 
looks at a simple model of the effect of ties to bipartisan donors on the likelihood 
of having director on the board of a conservative think tank, then we find a 
significant positive relationship between the two variables. However, as soon as we 
add one or more variables associated with having a director serving on a 
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conservative think tank (such as revenue, having a director on a government board, 
etc.) then we find that the relationship between the two variables becomes negative. 
This suggests that while companies of directors of conservative think tanks do have 
a greater number of ties to bipartisan donors, they have considerably fewer than 
would be expected given the other characteristics of these corporations. 
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Table 3.6: A logistic regression of measures of political leadership against a set of independent variables 
MODEL 5: POLITICAL DONATIONS MODEL 6: TIES TO POLITICAL DONORS 
GOVT BUSINESS OTHER CONS. TAKE- GOVT BUSINESS OTHER CONS. TAKE-
BOARDS COUNCIL Bus.Ass. THINK OVERS ANZLF BOARDS COUNCIL Bus.Ass. THINK OVERS ANZLF (BCA) LEADERS TANK PANEL (BCA) LEADERS TANK PANEL 
EXPOSURE TO GOVT DECISIONS 
Govt. Boards ns. ns. 1.29 *** 1.06 *** ns. ns. 
"'· 
1.18 ** 0.77 ** 
Regulated Industry 0.63 *** 0.68 * ns. 
"'· 
0.85 ** ns. 0.63 *** 0.91 ** ns. "'· 0.81 ** 
Anti-regulation Industry ns. ns. 0.63 * ns. ns. ns. 0.41 ns. 0.75 ns. 0.84 *** 
Defence Contractor p.p.f. p.p.f. ns. p.p.f. p.p.f. 3.60 *** p.p.f. ns. ns. p.p.f. p.p.f. 3.09 *** 
SIZE OF CORPORATION 
Ln(Revenue) 0.24 *** 0.77 *** 0.19 * 0.40 *** 0.33 *** 0.52 *** ns. 0.68 *** "'· 0.35 ** ns. 0.39 *** 
Business Council (BCA) ns. 1.10 * 0.89ns. 1.28 ** 2.14 *** ns. 0.86ns. 1.15 * 1.35 *** 1.81 *** 
Other Business Assocs. ns. 0.97ns. ns. ns. 1.42 * ns. 0.98 ns. ns. ns. 1.13 ns. 
IDEOLOGY: Cons. Think Tank 1.10 ** ns. ns. 1.45 ** 1.36 * 1.00 * ns. ns. 1.53 *** 1.37 * 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.48 * ns. ns. ns. 1.32 *** 2.09 *** 0.60 * ns. ns. ns. 1.28 *** 2.08 *** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned -1.74 *** ns. ns. ns. ns. -1.17 ns. -1.53 *** 
CORPORATE FORM 
Public Listed ns. ns. ns. ns. ns. ns. -0.38 ns. 
Private -1.75 *** -1.13 ** -1.27 *** -2.33 ** p.p.f. -1.17 ns. -1.42 *** -0.93 ns. -0.81 ** -2.18 ** p.p.£ -1.31 ns. 
Partnership ns. 1.98 *** p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 2.10 ** ns. 2.35 *** p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 2.53 *** 
POLITICAL DONATIONS 
Bipartisan Donors 1.01 *** 0.92 ** ns. ns. ns. ns. 0.84 *** 0.86 ** 
Conservative-only Donors ns. p.p.f. 0.97 * 1.49 * ns. ns. ns. p.p.f. 0.93ns. 1.32 * p.p.f. 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE/SELECTION 
Total Interlocks 0.17 *** 0.002ns. 0.13 *** 0.09* 0.12 *** 0.046 ns. 
Ties to Bipartisan Donors ns. 2.33 *** ns. -3.46 * ns. 2.53 *** 
Ties to Conservative-only 
-2.29 * Donors 
CONSTANT -1.54 *** -3.42 *** -3.15 *** -3.93 *** -3.82 *** -4.36 *** -2.46 *** -4.03 *** -4.05 *** -4.15 *** -4.60 *** -5.18 *** 
PSUEDOR2 0.24 0.29 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.39 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.25 0.22 0.42 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. = not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 level. 
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Anti-regulation industries as separate industries 
Model 7 shows anti-regulation industries divided into their constituent industries. 
There is only one statistically significant relationship, and that is a weakly significant 
negative effect of being located in the mining industry and having a director as 
member of the leadership of other business associations. One other potentially 
important results of Model 7 is that both tobacco, and forest, paper and pulp 
corporations have virtually no directors in any of the leadership groups22• Given the 
very small size of the samples (tobacco has only 3 companies, Forest, Paper and 
Pulp has 21) this may not be entirely surprising. However, these were significantly 
more politically active corporations in terms of Coalition-only donation behaviour, 
as seen in Chapter 2. Given this, the lack of any significant (or even non significant) 
presence in the political leadership of business is notable. 
22 With the exception of forest, paper and pulp having several directors on the boards of conservative 
think tanks and also on the Takeovers Panel 
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Table 3.7: A logistic regression of a range of measures of political leadership against a set of independent variables 
MODEL 7: ANTI-REGULATION INDUSTRIES 
GoVT BUSINESS OTHER CONS. TAKE-
BOARDS COUNCIL Bus.Ass. THINK OVERS ANZLF (BCA) LEADERS TANK PANEL 
EXPOSURE TO GOVT DECISIONS 
Govt. Boards ns. ns. 1.34 *** 1.11 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.68 *** 1.12 *** ns. ns. 0.80 ** 
Anti-regulation Industry ns. ns. 1.06 *** 
Defence Contractor p.p.f. p.p.f. ns. p.p.f. p.p.f .• 3.51 *** 
SIZE 01' CORPORATION 
Ln(Revenue) 0.32 *** 0.81 *** 0.20 * 0.46 *** 0.32 *** 0.56 *** 
Business Council (BCA) ns. 1.02 * ns. 1.45 *** 2.12 *** 
Other Business Assocs. ns. 1.06 * ns. ns. 1.32 * 
IDEOWGY: Cons. Think Tank 1.33 *** ns. ns. 1.61 *** 1.31 * 
WEALTH: Rich 200 0.48 * ns. ns. ns. 1.25 *** 2.04 *** 
NATIONALITY: Foreign Owned -1.82 *** ns. ns. ns. ns. -1.21 ns. 
CORPORATE FORM 
Public Listed ns. 0.92 ** 
Private -1.72 *** ns. -1.38 *** -2.33 ** p.p.f. -1.13ns. 
Partnership ns. 3.01 *** p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 2.02 ** 
INDUSTRIES 
Tobacco p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 
Forest, Paper, Pulp p.p.f. p.p.f. p.p.f. 1.51 ns. ns. p.p.f. 
Petroleum & Chemical ns. ns. ns. p.p.f. 
Oil and Gas ns. ns. p.p.f. 1.67ns. p.p.£ 
Mining 0.61 ns. ns. -1.82 * p.p.f. ns. p.p.f. 
CONSTANT -1.37*** -4.28 *** -3.07 *** -3.70 *** -3.86 *** -4.25 *** 
PSUEDOR2 0.23 0.28 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.39 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 ns. =not significant 
Terms with 'ns.' and no parameter estimate were included in the original model but dropped in a backwards selection process. 
Terms with both a parameter and 'ns.' remained in the model after backwards selection but were not significant at the p > 0.10 level. 
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3.2: DISCUSSION 
The results of the models in this Chapter (Chapter 3) suggest that our initial schema 
derived from Chapter 2 needs to be modified considerably. A model where the 
'core-corporate community' is synonymous with bipartisan donors, and 'outsider 
corporations' synonymous with Coalition-only donors does not adequately capture 
the political and social dynamics found. I will attempt to systematically treat each of 
the major issues separately, and then draw the narrative and argument together in 
the conclusion. 
Government boards 
Given the strong effects of government boards on bipartisan donation, it is 
surprising to find that, as an independent variable, government boards only have 
limited importance in the likelihood of a corporation's directors serving in a 
business political leadership position. Corporations who had directors who served 
on government boards had a significantly higher likelihood of having a director on 
the board of a conservative think tank directors or serving on the Takeovers Panel. 
Thus, of the three core-corporate community leadership positions (since we had to 
exclude the fourth, government boards, as it is our independent variable in this 
case), only one had a significant relationship with corporations who have a director 
on a government board. This is only weak evidence of a relationship between 
government boards and the core-corporate community. 
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The relationship between conservative think tanks and government boards 
contradicts our conception of a distinction between the core corporate leadership 
and outsider corporations. It is also particularly surprising given that conservative 
think tanks are one of the key groups pursuing an anti-regulation, free-market 
agenda. The 'interlocking' of the boards of conservative think tanks and 
government boards appears ironic and perplexing. 
Regulated industries 
The results obtained by our modelling of the effect of location in a regulated 
industry was consistent with our expectations. Companies located in a regulated 
industry showed a greater likelihood of having a director serve in three of the four 
core-corporate community business leadership positions. Companies in regulated 
industries are both important to political decision makers and they have an inherent 
interest in political decisions. Thus we would expect them to have directors who 
are more actively involved in core-corporate community's business political 
leadership. 
Anti-regulation industries 
The lack of a significant positive relationship between anti-regulation industries and 
the four core-corporate community business leadership positions is consistent with 
our expectations. The strong and significantly increased likelihood of a corporation 
which is located in an anti-regulation industry of having a director serving in the 
leadership of the other business associations was also consistent with our 
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expectations that there would be a degree of organisation and common interests of 
'outsider corporations'. The size of this effect is interesting: while only 20% of all 
corporations (and 20% ofBCA leaders' "home" corporations) are located in anti-
regulation industries, 33% of the corporations of the leadership of the other 
business associations are located in anti-regulation industries. A more detailed 
decomposition of this result shows that the association between anti-regulation 
industry and other business association leadership is primarily driven by medium 
sized metal and machinery manufacturing firms such as automotive components 
manufacturers. (I\1etal and machinery manufacturing are the anti-regulation industry 
which I have not modelled separately, and so in Model 7 this is captured by the anti-
regulation industry variable.) One possible interpretation is that while these are 
generally highly unionised companies, they are in a competitive market providing 
components to very large firms such as car manufacturers, and therefore squeezed 
by both labour and big business. 
Analysis of the other separate component anti-regulation industries (in Model 7) 
shows that none of them have significant overrepresentation amongst any of the 
business leadership groups, and that the opposite is actually true for both tobacco, 
and forestry, paper and pulp. These two industries have virtually no directors at all 
in the business political leadership groups, and so their propensity to have directors 
in these groups is not subject to statistical analysis. It could be argued that this is 
not surprising given that there are only three companies in the tobacco industry, 
while there are 21 companies in the forestry, paper and pulp industry. However, 
given the significantly higher propensity of these corporations to engage in a 
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Coalition-only partisan donation strategy, it is notable that they have virtually no 
representation amongst the political leadership of business. 
I interpret these results as pointing towards two main findings. First, one of the 
groups which other business associations represent strongly is medium sized metal 
and machinery manufacturing companies. While these are still large corporations, 
they are dwarfed by the type of corporations that make up the BCA. This is one of 
the components of the 'outsider corporations' identified in Chapter 2. Second, the 
strongly conservative partisan donors among the anti-regulation industries have no 
representation among the business political leadership, suggesting an 'outsider' 
status. This suggests that political donations may be a mechanism for compensating 
for outsider status. 
Defence contractors 
The models of defence contractors and business political leadership positions 
suggest that defence contracts, too, may be excluded from the core corporate 
political leadership. While there was a significant relationship between being a 
defence contractor and gaining representation at the ANZLF, defence contractors 
had no additional directors in any of the other three core corporate leadership 
groups (this variable "perfectly predicted failure" in the models). However, as we 
found in Chapter 2, defence contractor was one of the strongest variables for 
predicting the likelihood of engaging in bipartisan donation strategy. One potential 
explanation of this stark difference between engaging in donation behaviour and 
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involvement in leadership positions may be that defence contractors are actually 
outsiders and less than full members of the core-corporate community. This 
outsider status gives rise to the lack of business political leadership positions. In 
this context, bipartisan political donations may be one of the mechanism by which 
defence contractors attempt to both compensate for their outsider status and gain 
access to the government and opposition parties. 23 
R.evenue 
This was significant for all of the leadership groups in Model 1, but in later models 
became very weak or not significant for the leadership of other business 
associations, suggesting that there were two counteracting pressures acting on the 
corporations who had leadership positions in the other business associations. 
Larger corporations were more likely to be represented because of their general 
importance and preponderance, even in organisations predominately made up of 
smaller corporations. However, the actual membership of the three other business 
associations is largely comprised of smaller corporations, and thus the effect of 
company size on likelihood of having a director in this leadership group was weaker. 
23 A second potential explanation is that defence contractors are members of the core business 
community, but that controversial nature of their business - both as government contractors and 
manufacturers of weapons - means that their directors tend to not be recruited to public business 
leadership positions for purely cosmetic reasons (making profits from helping to kill people while 
being subsidised by the government is not the kind of image many organisations are keen to adopt). 
Thus, in this model the donation.behaviour is a reflection of core corporate leadership membership, 
but the lack of business political leadership positions is a reflection of cosmetic concerns about 
public perception. 
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Business associations 
The corporations who had a director in the BCA leadership were more likely to 
have a director in two of the three other core-corporate community business 
political leadership positions (Takeovers Panel and ANZLF). There was also 
significant overlap in the corporations who had directors serving in the BCA and 
the other business association leaderships. This points towards the BCA leadership 
as an important core component within the core-corporate community, having 
significant influence on policy, while also maintaining significant ties to the other 
business associations who represent smaller 'outsider' corporations. 
Conservative think tanks 
Companies who have directors who are also directors of conservative think tanks 
have a significant and substantially increased likelihood of having a director in 3 of 
the 4 core-corporate community business political leadership positions (government 
boards, the Takeovers Panel and the ANZLF). This is a departure from the 
original schema and suggests that the corporations of conservative think tank 
directors are both 'insiders' and conservative-partisans donors. 
The super-wealtf!y (Rich 200) 
The companies of the Rich 200 show almost identical patterns of recruitment as the 
conservative think tanks, with a strong and significant overrepresentation in three of 
the four core-corporate community business political leadership positions 
(government boards, the Takeovers Panel and the ANZLF). This suggests that at 
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least a significant portion of the corporations of the super-wealthy are part of the 
core-corporate community with significant political influence over policy 
development. 
Foreign-ownership 
The results of foreign-ownership suggest that foreign-owned corporations 
participate as equals with domestic corporations in all business political leadership 
groups except government boards (once company type is taken into account: see 
Model 2). This may be because appointments to government boards are similar to 
political donations: they are seen as public actions that are subject to scrutiny by the 
media and political elites for signs of impropriety. In line with Hansen, Mitchell and 
Drope's (2004) theory of the 'legitimacy tariff', I believe that this shows that 
government board appointments are subject to the 'legitimacy tariff', and thus 
under-represent the political power and political resources of foreign corporations. 
In contrast, it seems that foreign firms seeking the placement of their directors in 
the other five business political leadership groups face no such 'legitimacy tariffs'. 
This may be because these leadership positions are subjected to considerably less 
public scrutiny. 
This finding suggests that there is a greater level of public scrutiny of government 
board positions. It also implies that, as these positions are essentially unavailable to 
a group which appears to have equal power in other arenas, perhaps government 
board positions are more token or public status acts than actually politically 
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powerful business leadership positions. This would also explain the failure to find 
significant relationships between government board positions and many of the other 
business political leadership positions. Such reasoning suggests a general 
methodology for testing the 'real power' of any given political leadership sample: if 
it significantly excludes foreign corporations then we know that it is likely to (1) be 
publicly measurable and sensitive to anti-nationalist accusations, and (2) play a 
limited role in policy-making as it excludes an important segment of the business 
community. Thus, as part of a more general tool kit for analysis of business politics 
we can say that the effect of foreign-ownership on political behaviour is a proxy for 
(1) public scrutiny (very similar to the notion of elites being 'politically correct'), 
and/ or (2) an element of tokenism in the political behaviour. 
Corporate form 
The corporate form of corporations is strongly related to the likelihood of the 
corporation gaining access to business political leadership positions. The 
relationship is straightforward and largely revolves around the under-representation 
of private corporations in virtually all political leadership groupings. This is 
inversely related to representation of publicly-listed industrials, who are generally 
overrepresented. The other major finding is that partnerships - large legal and 
accountancy firms - are strongly represented in 2 of the 4 core-corporate 
community political leadership groups: the BCA leadership and the ANZLF. They 
also have no directors in either the leadership of the other business associations or 
on the boards of conservative think tanks (this variable perfectly predicts failure). 
These results suggest that these partnerships are an important part of the core-
205 
corporate community. It also suggest that the propensity of partnerships to be 
Coalition-only donors (as well as bipartisan donors) does not arise from any 
outsider status, but that perhaps, like the super-wealthy, it is an inclination which 
arises from a greater political autonomy or politicisation. Domhoff (2006) argues 
that lawyers are overrepresented in political roles both because of their role as 
communicators and also because of their daily roles as lawyers in resolving conflicts 
in capitalist society. It also seems plausible to hypothesise that lawyers and 
accountants are involved in the political work of assisting corporations to comply 
with legal requirements while also lobbying to modify the law, and so have a deep 
ongoing involvement in the political strategising of business. 
Who's Who 
The proportion of directors listed in Who '.r Who is included in Model 3 largely as a 
control, however it is a powerful variable and strongly associated with a company's 
directors being members of all six business leadership groups. 
Schools and clubs 
The proportion of directors with membership of exclusive businessmen's clubs 
shows a very strong correlation with the four core-corporate community business 
political leadership groups, and no significant relationship with the other two 
business leadership groups. This confirms our conjecture in Chapter 2 that these 
clubs are an important part of the core-corporate community. 
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Companies which have a high proportion of directors who attended exclusive 
private schools seem to show a weak tendency towards higher integration into 
business leadership groups, but the only core corporate leadership group that shows 
this tendency is government boards. (Conservative think tanks also show this 
tendency.) While this shows that schools are less significant than clubs as markers 
of the status and importance of corporations and their directors, it is important to 
note that for all six leadership groups approximately half of all members of the 
leadership groups are from companies where one or more directors attended an 
exclusive school. To restate this: graduates of 15 exclusive boys' private schools are 
present on the boards of 15% of all corporations in our dataset, but they are present 
on the boards of approximately 50% of the corporations from which each of the six 
leadership groups draws its members. Thus, while upper-class schools may not be 
significant in our regressions, they certainly have a considerable integration within 
the core-corporate community. 
Multiple directorships (interlocks) 
Companies who have non-executive directors who serve on other company boards 
(i.e. who have non-executive interlocks) are more likely to have directors who serve 
on three of the four core-corporate community leadership positions (all except the 
BCA leadership) and also in the leadership of the other business associations. This 
suggests an 'Inner Circle' type effect (Useem 1984) and is inline with the schema 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
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The effects of executive ties are more mixed and less clear. Companies whose 
executives serve on the boards of other companies are less likely to have a director 
serving on a government board, but otherwise these companies behave no 
differently from other corporations. This suggests, if anything, there is a negative 
activity effect, which is contrary to Bond's (2004) findings for conservative party 
donors. 
The evidence of a 'popularity' type effect is greater: companies which have many 
executives from other corporations serving on their boards as non-executive 
directors (what Bond calls "executive indegree") are associated with a greater chance 
of having a director serve on the board of 'other business association leaderships', as 
well as the ANZLF. This points towards the presence of important companies, like 
Qantas, whose boards are served by the executives of other large companies as well 
as directors who are members of business political leadership groups. 
Donation behaviour and ties to donors 
Political donations behaved as expected. Bipartisan donor corporations showed a 
greater likelihood of having a director on a government board or in the leadership 
of the BCA. Coalition-only donors had a greater likelihood, but only on the cusp of 
significance, of having a director serve in the leadership of the other business 
associations or on the board of a conservative think tank. The results for the ties to 
donor models (Model 6) are consistent with the pattern of donation behaviour: ties 
to bipartisan donors is positively associated with having a director in the leadership 
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of the BCA or attending the ANZLF, and is negatively correlated with the chance 
of having a director on the board of a conservative think tank. Ties to Coalition-
only donors are negatively correlated with the chance of having a director on a 
government board. 
The negative relationship between ties to bipartisan donors and directors serving on 
conservative think tanks suggests an ideological effect of conservative think tanks 
that reaches beyond the question of which board the director serves on and the fact 
that they are actually associated with reduced labour party donations across the 
business community. The relationship, however, is only weakly significant and so 
we should not read too much into it. The negative relationship between ties to 
Coalition-only donors and directors who serve on government boards is most likely 
driven by an unobserved tendency for these corporations to prioritise political 
access and/ or status and legitimacy at the expense of conservative partisanship: 
corporations who prioritise access to government boards may see ties to 
conservative donors as a liability, and thus attempt to avoid them. This would also 
be consistent with the inherently public interpretation of government boards - and 
therefore their scrutiny and potential liability to sanction - that I discussed earlier in 
the foreign-ownership section. 
3.4: CONCLUSION: IMPROVING THE SCHEMA 
At the end of Chapter 2 and more explicitly at the beginning of this chapter 
(Chapter 3) I have put forward the idea that the partisanship divide between 
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conservative partisan and bipartisan corporations was mirrored by - and largely one 
and the same as - a division of the corporate community between a group of 
'outsider corporations' and the core-corporate community. The models of Chapter 
3 suggest several serious revisions of this schema are needed. 
Table 3.8 is an attempt to revise the schema utilising two dimensions: a partisan-
bipartisan dimension and an insider-outsider dimension. The top-right and bottom-
left quadrants of this table are largely consistent with my earlier specifications and 
also it is these quadrants in which most of the characteristics of corporations reside. 
Thus, the majority of characteristics obey a relatively positive linear relationship 
between bipartisanship and insider status: the more of an insider a corporation is, 
the more likely it is to be politically bipartisan, and vice-versa. 
There are, however, some important exceptions to this rule which are located in the 
top-left quadrant and the bottom-right quadrant: conservative think tanks are clearly 
deeply embedded in the upper echelons of the core-corporate community, but they 
also display a systematic tendency towards conservative partisanship. On the other 
extreme, defence contractors display strong bipartisan donation behaviour, but they 
have virtually no representation amongst the political leadership of business, and 
thus appear to be outsiders. 
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Table 3.8: A schema for classifying the characteristics of corporations on two 
dimensions: Political Partisanship and Insider/Outsider status 
Partisan - Bipartisan Dimension 
Conservative Politically Politically Bipartisan 
partisans Inactive Mobilised donors 
(LESS (GREATER 
ENGAGEMENT ENGAGEMENT 
IN BOTH IN BOTH 
PARTISAN AND PARTISAN AND 
BIPARTISAN BIPARTISAN 
BEHAVIOUR) BEHAVIOUR) 
•Interlocks 
•Number of 
directors 
•Who's Who •Large (revenue) 
Core-
corporate 
community 
•Conservative •Partnerships •Public corporations 
Think Tanks •Super- •BCA 
wealthy (Rich •Government boards 
200) •Clubs/Schools 
•Regulated Industry 
•Exec directors from 
other companies 
•Foreign-
owned (for 
Dispersed political 
donations and •Oil& Gas 
(DISTRIBUTED government •Petroleum & 
ACROSS BOTH committees Chemical 
GROUPS) only, 
otherwise no 
effect) 
•Other Business 
Associations 
Outsider 
Corporations 
•Private 
•Anti-Companies 
regulation •Defence 
•Tobacco Contractors 
•Forest, Paper, industries 
Pulp. 
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There are three other important groupings which do not behave as would be 
expected located towards the centre of Table 3.8. First, foreign-owned corporations 
appear to be outsiders in our political donation modelling. The modelling of 
political leadership positions reveals that foreign-owned corporations are not 
systematically excluded from most business political leadership positions (with the 
exception of government committees). I believe that this is a case of the 'legitimacy 
tariff, which prevents foreign corporations from being seen to be involved in 
domestic political activity. In reality, in less public arenas no such tariff exists and 
foreign corporations are just like domestic corporations, with some part of the core-
corporate community and others outsiders, but no systematic bias. Second, there is 
a group of three characteristics associated with both insider (core-corporate 
community) status and generally increase political mobilisation: listing in Who'.r Who, 
partnership firms (legal and accounting firms) and the corporations with the super-
wealthy (Rich 200) on their board. The exact mechanisms behind each of these 
characteristics has been discussed at length earlier in this chapter. \V'hat is 
important to note about corporations with these characteristics is that they are 
sometimes associated with conservative-only donation, and thus represent a part of 
the core-corporate community who sometime break with the norm of bipartisan 
donation and engage in a conservative partisan strategy. Third, companies in anti.-
regulation industries appear to have the characteristics both of generally increased 
political mobilisation (i.e. who engage in both partisan and bipartisan strategies) and 
outsider status. Thus there are some corporations in this category who will be 
outsiders who engage in bipartisan donation behaviour. 
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The two-dimensional classification system in Table 3.8 is the product of numerous 
individual models and a significant amount of interpretation. One way of testing 
whether these hypothesised underlying dimensions actually exist in the data as a 
whole is to run a multidimensional scaling (MDS) model on the data, and test for 
the existence of both these underlying dimensions and the groupings which I have 
hypothesised exist. I ran an MDS model on the correlation matrix of the major 
variables in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1. It was a classic metric multidimensional scaling 
model, computing I<arl Pearson distance (Euclidian distance based on standardised 
variables) on the correlation matrix of 21 variables. 
Table 3.9: Multidimensional scaling model of the correlation matrix of 21 variables 
N=21 
Eigenvalues > 0 = 20 
Retained dimensions = 2 
Mardia fit measure 1 = 0.4141 
Mardia fit measure 2 = 0.8082 
Dimension Eigenvalue % Cumul. % Cumul. % % 
1 131.5 31.31 31.31 73.19 73.19 
2 42.5 10.11 41.41 7.63 80.82 
UO -HO UH Ho ~·-- ... ''"' •ilO HO•o . ., ___ .... ~.. . ..,_ ~ ..... - '"'" -~ ... ~· 
3 28.9 6.89 48.31 3.55 84.37 
4 26.3 6.27 54.57 2.93 87.30 
5 23.2 5.52 60.10 2.28 89.58 
6 21.4 5.09 65.19 1.93 91.52 
7 21.0 5.01 70.19 1.87 93.39 
8 19.1 4.55 74.75 1.55 94.94 
9 16.0 3.82 78.56 1.09 96.02 
10 14.8 3.52 82.08 0.92 96.95 
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Figure 3.2: Visualisation of the first two dimensions of the multidimensional 
scaling model (with axes relabelled with my interpretation of their approximate 
meaning) 
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Figure 3.2 is a visualisation of the first two dimensions of the MDS model of the 
data. The two most important elements of this visualisation are: (1) the top-right 
comer, which contains a large cluster of variables, all of which correspond to the 
variables which I have identified as the characteristics the core-corporate 
community, (2) the bottom-left quadrant, which contains most of the characteristics 
I have identified as being associated with outsiders: private companies, Coalition-
only donors, ties to Coalition-only donors, defence contractors, and also, on the 
periphery of the core-corporate community, other business associations. I have 
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characterised the underlying dimensions which this MDS has generated as 'Status' 
(dimension 1) and 'Influence' (dimension 2). The first dimension is named 'Status' 
because (1) of the variables most important for defining the core-corporate 
community, the variables which were highest on this dimension were the status 
variables (interlocks, number of directors, Who'.r Who, government boards, clubs and 
schools) and not the more industrial and financial dimension of the core-corporate 
community (such as revenue and location in a regulated industry). Also important 
for defining this dimension as Status is that each of the 'ties to donor' variables was 
higher on this dimension than it's corresponding 'donor' variable. Finally, low on 
this dimension were private companies and foreign-owned corporations, who vary 
considerably in size from each other, but which have the common characteristic of 
lacking substantial status characteristics (listing in Who'.r Who, interlocks, etc.). I 
labelled the second dimension 'Influence' because it seemed to rank the variables 
according to their real importance, discounting characteristics which seemed to be 
more 'token'. Thus revenue was rated highly on this dimension, as was the BCA, 
while schools, listing in Who '.r Who and being a public listed company were the 
lowest of the core-corporate community variables in this dimension. In addition, 
foreign-owned corporations, which we know are not systematically excluded from 
'real' business political positions, rated very highly on this scale, while groups that 
we know are systematically excluded from leadership positions, such as private 
companies, Coalition-only donors, and defence contractors, rated poorly on this 
dimension. 
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Four other elements of this MDS visualisation are worth noting. First, the variables 
of the core-corporate community seem to be in two groups: one high on the 
influence dimension (BCA, revenue, regulated, conservative think tanks, and 
bipartisan donors), the other high on the status dimension (number of directors, 
government boards, clubs, schools, interlocks, ties to bipartisan donors, Who '.r Who, 
and public company). The status grouping of variables within the core-corporate 
community seems to be associated with director characteristics, while the 'Influence' 
grouping of variables seems to be associated with company characteristics. It is 
notable that the government boards variable is part of the 'Status' grouping, 
providing some additional evidence of the semi-token nature of these positions I 
had hypothesised in earlier discussion. Second, foreign-owned corporations are 
very low on the status dimension, while very high on the influence dimension. The 
high position on the influence dimension is a little surprising, and suggests that this 
dimension may also be tapping some other underlying Australian-foreign element of 
the data. Third, partnerships are low on the status dimension, but towards the 
middle of the core-corporate community on the influence dimension. This is 
because as partnerships they lack interlocks with corporations, but they still have 
considerable influence in the core-corporate community. Finally, the position of the 
super wealthy ("Rich 200') in this MDS visualisation is an anomaly. They are situated 
half way along the status dimension, but are low on the second dimension. I think 
that this reflects several elements. Firstly, many of the "Rich 200 new rich are 
associated with relatively small private corporations. For example, Gerard 
Corporation, owned by the Liberal Party donor Robert Gerard is the 1922nd largest 
enterprise in the Top 2000 with a turnover of only $65 million per year. It is nearly 
1000 times smaller than BHP, and one-tenth the size of the mean Top 2000 
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corporation. Secondly, the position of the super-wealthy on the MDS visualisation 
could also be driven by their propensity to donate to the Coalition, as they are 
closely located to Coalition-only donors. Finally, this second dimension does tap an 
element of Australian-foreign division within the data, and this severely penalises 
the super wealthy: while 42% of the corporations in the dataset are foreign-owned, 
only 2% of the corporations which have a super-rich CRich 200) directors are 
foreign-owned. 
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CHAPTER4 
AN INTRODUCTION TO EXPONENTIAL 
RANDOM GRAPH (ERG) MODELS AND 
THEIR APPLICATION TO THE STUDY OF 
CORPORATE ELITES 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Exponential random graph models (also called ERGMs, ERG models or p* models) 
are the most promising class of statistical models for capturing the structural 
properties of those observed social networks which are measured at only one point 
in time (Snijders et al 2005: 1). These models are relatively new and are not yet 
widely understood in the broader academic community. In Chapter 5, I use ERG 
models to study the social and political networks of Australia's largest corporations. 
This chapter (Chapter 4) is intended to provide the necessary statistical background 
for the study in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 is divided into five sections: (1) an explanation of why ERG models are 
potentially useful for studying corporate networks; (2) an introduction to estimating 
ERG models for observed data and the role of configurations and parameters in 
these estimations; (3) an introduction to simulating networks and testing the 
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'goodness of fit' of ERG models; and ( 4) an overview of recent developments in 
ERG models, particularly the development of attribute parameters and the so called 
'new specifications'. 
4.1 WHY USE ERG MODELS TO STUDY CORPORATE NETWORKS? 
ERG models have been developed over the last 20 years as a method of directly 
modelling the underlying forces which create social networks. ERG models differ 
substantially from most traditional social network approaches because, first, they are 
a statistical model of social networks, and second, they attempt to measure the actual 
forces that directly generate the formation of the network (and/ or actor attributes) 
(Robins, Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 6-8). The difference between the 
traditional and ERG model approaches can be understood by examining two 
paradigmatic measurements from each approach. One paradigmatic measure in the 
case of standard social network approaches is the measure of 'mean geodesic' of a 
network. The mean geodesic is one of the main measures used for determining if a 
network is a 'small world' network. It measures the average shortest distance of 
each actor from all other actors in a network. This measure produces a numeric 
summary measure, which we can use to compare different networks. A paradigmatic 
measure in the case of ERG models is the measure of 'transitivity'. This measures 
the probability of a triangular mini-graph, that is, three actors each tied to one 
another, occurring in an observed network. This measure gives us a parameter 
value and a standard error of this parameter value. If the parameter value is positive 
and statistically significant then we can be reasonably confident that there is a higher 
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than chance probability that actors who are each tied to a common actor will 
themselves be tied to each other (in common parlance, "friends of friends will be 
friends"). Notice the two different characteristics of these measures: 'mean 
geodesic' is a direct measurement of the property of a network, whereas 'transitivity' 
is a statistical measurement, providing us with a measurement of the level of 
confidence that what we are observing did not happen by chance, and - as we will 
learn later - allowing us to control for other effects. More importantly, notice that 
'transitivity' is conceptualised as a force which drives the formation of the network 
itself (i.e. the fact that the friends of our friends are more likely to be our friends), 
whereas 'mean geodesic' is a property of the network. That the mean geodesic is of 
some particular size does not necessary tell us about the generative mechanism that 
brought this about. In contrast, with transitive closure we have a measure that, at 
least potentially, is a fundamental mechanism which generates the observed 
network. 
ERG models have been described as a hybrid of traditional generalised linear 
models and agent based modelling, but with substantial advantages over both 
(Morris, 2006). Their main advantage over traditional generalised linear models is 
that observations may be dependent, allowing modelling of complex, 
interdependent systems. The main advantages of ERG models over agent-based 
models are that, first, model parameters can be estimated from observed data, and, 
second, model goodness of fit can be tested (Morris, 2006). 
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There are two main classes of ERG models: 'social selection models' and 'social 
influence models' (Robins, Elliott and Pattison: 2001; Robins, Pattison and Elliot: 
2001).24 These two classes of models are differentiated by their dependent variable. 
In social selection models the dependent variable is the formation of a tie between 
two actors, for example, a friendship between two people or an interlock between 
two companies. In social influence models, the dependent variable is one of the 
attributes of the actors; for example, being a smoker (if the actors are school 
children) or making a political donation (if the actors are corporations). In both 
types of models the aim is to measure the effects of a range of explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable. In both classes of models explanatory variables include 
the ties in the network, the attributes of the actors, and various measures of 
interactions between ties and attributes. 
ERG models are built around three core assumptions about how a social network 
forms. First, ERG models assume that social networks are created from a generative 
process. Macro-level structure is assumed to be generated by micro-level mechanisms. 
ERG models attempt to estimate the micro-level mechanisms that are most likely to 
generate an observed social network. Second, ERG models assume that the micro-
level mechanisms generating observed social networks are small sub-graphs called 
coefigurations (Robins, Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 8). The most common 
configurations used on ERG models are listed in Table 4.1. As can be seen in Table 
4.1, these sub-graphs (configurations) can be as simple as a tie between two nodes 
24 Unfortunately, social influence ERG models are not yet available in existing ERG model software. 
The specifications for these models exist (Robins, Elliott and Pattison: 2001), and trial programs for 
estimating models have been built (iPNet Trial Version, 2007), but they are not adequate for real world 
data analysis. 
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(an 'edge') or more complex, such as three ties between three actors (a 'triangle'). 
1bird, ERG models assume that the contribution of a particular configuration 
(micro-structure) to the process of generating an observed graph (macro-structure) 
can be estimated and expressed as a parameter with a standard error (Robins, 
Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 6-9; Robins, Lusher, Pattison and Kremer 2006, 
7-8). Configurations with a positive parameter value have (conditional upon the 
other parameters in the model) a greater than chance probability of being present in 
any graph, while configurations with a negative parameter value have a less than 
chance probability of being present. 
4.2 AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFIGURATIONS AND PARAMETERS 
A social selection ERG model assumes that the pattern of ties in a given network is 
explained by the relative prevalence of a range of overlapping 'sub-graphs' (Robins, 
Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 8). These sub-graphs are called 'configurations'. 
Each configuration is assumed to have a particular probability of being expressed in 
an observed network. Configurations with a high probability of being expressed 
will be expressed more often than would be expected by chance. For example, if 
the 'triangle' configuration had a higher than chance probability of being expressed 
in a network then we could expect the network to include many triangles (or at least 
more than if the ties formed at random) (Robins, Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 
9-10; Robins, Lusher, Pattison and Kremer 2006, 7-8). 
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It is assumed that the probability of each particular configuration reflects some 
underlying structural tendency in the network. For example, a higher than chance 
number of triangles in a network is assumed to reflect a general tendency of actors 
to "be friends with the friends of their friends". A list of the most common 
configurations and an explanation of the standard interpretation of the structural 
tendencies embodied in these configurations are listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: The most common configurations used in ERG models 
Configuration Common Image Interpretation 
name 
edge Activity • • A tendency to form ties. 
reciprocity Reciprocity •• ~ . 
A tendency to reciprocate ties 
received from other actors. 
2-star Popularity < A tendency to form ties with those actors who already have a tie. 
3-star Popularity ~ A tendency to form ties with those actors who already have two ties. 
Transitivity/ A tendency to form ties between p actors who are both tied to a triangle Triangulation/ common third actor (i.e. a friend of Clustering/ a friend is a friend; a tendency for Closure forming triads/ triangles/ clusters) 
isolates Isolation • A tendency to not form ties. 
The probability of a configuration being present in a network is expressed in an 
ERG model in the form of a 'parameter' for each configuration (Robins, Pattison, 
Kalish and Lusher 2005: 6-9; Robins, Lusher, Pattison and Kremer 2006, 7-8). 
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Together, the two elements - the configurations and the parameter values -
constitute the core of an ERG model. For social science researchers who wish to 
apply ERG models to a particular problem, the challenge of estimating an ERG 
model for observed data revolves around these two elements. First they must 
choose the most appropriate configurations to include in their model, and second, 
they must (using a computer program such as PNet, SIENA or StatNet) attempt to 
find estimates for the probability- that is, the parameters - for each configuration, 
such that the overall model is a good fit for the data. 
The challenge of estimating an ERG model for a particular set of data involves, 
first, selecting the optimum configurations to include in a model, and, second, 
estimating the optimum parameters for these configurations so that the overall 
model is a good fit for the data. Figure 4.1 shows the three steps in the process of 
estimating and testing an ERG model for an observed graph: (1) estimation, (2) 
simulation, and (3) testing the goodness of fit. Before and after each step, it can be 
seen that there is a different method of measuring the set of configurations. 
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Figure 4.1: The three steps of estimating and testing the goodness of fit of an ERG 
model for an observed network 
Observed Network 
Measurement: 
'graph statistic' (GS) 
(or 'count') for each 
configuration 
Step 1: 
Estimation of 
Parameters 
Method: 
Monte Carlo Markov 
Chain Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation 
(MCMCMLE) 
ERG Model 
Measurement: 
'parameter' and 'standard 
error of parameter' for 
each configuration 
Step 3: 
Test Goodness of Fit 
Method: 
Compare observed and simulated graphs 
Goodness of Fit 
Measurement: 
t-statistic for each configuration 
= 
Step 2: 
Simulation of 
network 
Method: 
Generate 500-1000 
graphs using 
estimated 
parameters. 
observed GS - mean simulated GS 
standard error of mean simulated GS 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the process of estimating a model starts with an 
Simulated Networks 
Measurement: 
'mean graph statistic' 
(mean GS) and 'standard 
error of graph statistic' for 
each configuration 
across a sample of 500 
or 1000 graphs. 
observed network. This observed network is assumed to be one instance of a set of 
many possible networks that could have been formed by the same underlying 
structural processes (Robins, Patti.son, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 7). The aim of the 
ERG model estimation is to as accurately as possible estimate the parameters of a 
set of configurations, so that the observed graph would have the highest possible 
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likelihood of being replicated if the model were used to simulate a network (Robins, 
Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2005: 7). 
The first step of producing an estimation is to measure the observed network using 
a set of 'counts' or 'graph statistics'. It is these measurements that an ERG model 
aims to be able to replicate in simulations. In simpler (Markov) versions of ERG 
models, an observed network is measured by 'counting' the number of occurrences 
of each configuration in the model. For example, an observed graph may have 120 
edges (that is, 120 ties from one actor to another actor), and thus the 'edge' 
configuration has a 'count' of 120. Similarly, if there are 7 triangles in the same 
graph, then the 'count' for triangles is 7. When counting configurations, one edge 
can be part of multiple configurations.25 For more complex configurations, such as 
those involving attributes or the 'new parameters', 'counts' are replaced by 'graph 
statistics'. When a tie is present, a 'graph statistic' for the individual tie is calculated -
such as the sum of the attributes on the two actors sharing a tie - and then these 
individual 'graph statistics' are summed across the entire graph to give the 'graph 
statistic' for the whole network. 
The graph statistics of the observed network are used to estimate the parameter 
values for each configuration in the ERG model. The meaning of parameter values 
25 An important effect of characterising graphs by their graph statistics is that it treats all occurrences 
of a particular configuration in a graph as essentially equal, irrespective of where they occur in the 
graph and what other configurations they are associated with. This is called the 'homogeneity 
constraint' (Robins, Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2006: 9-10). It means, for example, that all triangles 
are treated as examples of the configuration 'triangle', all edges are simply examples of the 
configuration 'edge', and a graph is simply characterised or measured by the number of these 
occurring the graph. 
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are most clearly illustrated by examining the mathematical form of the ERG model. 
In this case the mathematical formula for an ERG model will be illustrated using an 
example model which includes just three configurations: edge, two-star and triangle. 
A graph is the mathematical representation of a network. In any ERG model there a 
fixed number of actors. Y denotes the random graph generated by the ERG model 
andy denotes the observed graph (Snijders 2005: 6-8). Y# denotes a network tie (in 
the random graph Y) between actors i and j, with Y# = 1 if there is a tie between the 
two actors, and Yii = 0 if there is no tie. The form of our ERG model can be 
expressed mathematically as: 
where: 
Pr{Y = y} 
K 
the probability that the ERG model generated graph (Y) is 
identical to the observed graph (y). 
the normalising constant, which ensures that the equation is 
a proper probability distribution (that is, that it sums to 1). 
Kis dependent on the values of the parameters in the 
model, and so, strictly speaking, K should be written as 
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Zedge (y) 
Stwo-star (y) 
S triangle (y) 
Bedge 
Btwo -star 
Btriangle 
K(Oec1g"' Otwo-stad OmangiJ.26 K is generally thought to be very 
large and intractable to calculate. 
graph statistic for the edge configuration (the count of 
edges in the observed graph (y)) 
graph statistic for the two-star configuration: the count of 
two stars in the observed graph (y). 
graph statistic for the triangle configuration: the count of 
triangles in the observed graph (y). 
parameter for the edge configuration 
parameter for the two-star configuration 
parameter for the triangle configuration 
Expressed in words, equation (1) states that the probability that an ERG model 
generated graph is identical to an observed graph is equal to a constant (generally 
very small but intractable to calculate) multiplied by the exponent of the sum of the 
parameters multiplied by the graph statistics (count) of all the components in the 
model (Robins, Lusher, Pattison and Kremer 2006: 10; Snijders, et. al. 2005: 10). 
26 1 / K is also exactly equal to the probability of an empty graph (a graph with no ties). 
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The aim when attempting to generate an ERG model is to find the set of 
parameters which maximise the probability that any random graph generated by 
simulating the ERG model will be identical to the observed network. 
In practice, the solution for the ERG model for any observed network with more 
than a few actors is impossible to calculate analytically. Instead the parameters are 
determined through estimation and simulation. The most advanced method used to 
estimate the parameters of an ERG model implemented in current software is the 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMCMLE) 
procedure. The specifications for MCMCMLE for ERG models are detailed in 
Snijders (2002). The method of the MCMCML estimation of parameters for ERG 
models involves the simulation of a set of random graphs27 from a starting set of 
estimated parameter values, and then the refinement of the parameter values by 
comparing the simulated graphs with the observed graph. A computer program 
using the MCMCMLE procedure generally repeats this process until the parameter 
estimates stabilise (Robins, Pattison, Kalish & Lusher 2005: 24). 
The result of the MCMCMLE procedure is a set of 'parameter values' and 'standard 
errors of parameter values' for the ERG model. The parameter values and standard 
errors can (with caution, since we are assuming a normal distribution, but cannot 
prove this) be interpreted in a similar fashion to the interpretation of the parameter 
values and standard errors of a logistic regression. 
27 The simulation of graphs for the MCMCMLE procedure generally involves the selection of a pair of 
nodes at random, calculating the probability of a tie forming/ disappearing between these nodes, 
generating or not generating the tie is, and then repeating the procedure. 
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The parameter values estimated by the MCMCMLE procedure are tested through 
the generation, by means of simulation, of a set of sample graphs based on the 
parameter values and the comparison of the graph statistics of these sample graphs 
with the graph statistics of the observed graph. The sample graphs are characterised 
by the mean and standard error of the mean of the graph statistics for each 
configuration. By comparing the graphs statistics of the original observed graph 
with the mean and standard error of the mean of the graph statistics of the 
simulated graphs it is possible to assess the goodness of fit of the ERG model. This 
comparison is measured using a t-statistic.28 
. . fi fi . (graph statistic of observed graph) - (mean of graph statistic for simulated sample graphs) t - statistics or con gurat ion = -=--"---------"-""'"--"--'"---"--"-----------''---'=---=--'--
(standard error of graph statistic for simulated sample graphs) 
Configurations that are included in the ERG model are said to have a good fit if 
they have t-statistics of 0.1 or lower. Models are generally also tested by comparing 
the observed and simulated graphs on a range of other measures, including the 
mean geodesic, global clustering coefficients, triad census and skewness of indegree 
and outdegree. Models are said to be a 'good-fit' if the t-statistics for these 
28 It is important to note that this t-statistic is not at-statistic measuring the significance of the 
parameter value. For those more familiar with traditional statistics, the juxtaposition of this t-statistic 
next to the parameter value and standard error in an ERG model results table can be misleading. 
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measures are 1 or less, and said to be a 'bad fit' if the t-statistics for any of these 
measures is above 2.29 
The method used to simulate random graphs varies, but one common technique is 
(1) start by choosing a tie at random, (2) calculate the probability of that tie forming 
(or disappearing) given the ties and attributes of the nodes involved in the tie and 
the parameter values of the various configurations in the model, (3) determine 
whether the tie is formed or not, and then ( 4) repeat this process hundreds or 
thousands of times. So, for example, if the formation of a tie will complete a 2-star, 
and 2-stars have a positive parameter, then this tie will normally have higher than 
chance probability of forming. If the tie will form both a 2-star and a 3-star (as the 
formation of all 3-stars do) then the probability of the tie forming will be based on 
the net probability given the values of the 2-star and 3-star parameters. 
The standard error has the same meaning as it does in a traditional logistic 
regression. The standard error can be used as a measure of the significance of the 
parameter value. From traditional statistics we know that if the parameter value is 
normally distributed (that is, its values are distributed with the same frequency as the 
normal curve) then 95% of the time, the actual parameter value will be within two 
(or actually 1.96) standard errors of either side of the parameter estimated by our 
model. Thus, the general rule of thumb for interpreting the significance of a 
parameter value with given the standard error applies equally to the parameter 
29 Robins, Pattison and Wang (2006: 12-14) provide an array of 51 configurations and statistics that 
they recommend using to test the GoF of an ERG model. 
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estimates of ERG Ms: if the parameter value is greater than 1. 96 times larger than 
the standard error, then we can assume that it is statistically significant (at the p < 
0.05 level). In the case of this table, we can see that all four configurations have 
statistically significant parameter values (as the parameter values are more than twice 
their standard errors). Significance is also symbolised by the asterisk(*) character at 
the end of the rows. 
Table 4.2: Example of hypothetical ERG model results 
Confi2Uration Parameter Standard Error of Parameter t-statistic Sienificance 
edge - 4.567 1.143 0.03 * 
2-star + 2.113 0.574 0.01 * 
3-star - 0.543 0.195 0.07 * 
triangle + 1.190 0.273 0.11 * 
* p < 0.05 
4.3 SIMULATING NETWORKS AND TESTING GOODNESS OF FIT 
There are two types of goodness of fit (GoF) statistics in most ERG model 
programs. In PNet, there are (1) GoF statistics (t-statistics for each configuration) 
included in the results of each estimation of parameter values. These are generally 
not referred to as GoF statistics but rather as 'convergence statistics for effects in 
the model'. There are also (2) GoF statistics in a separate GoFprocedures in most 
ERG model software such as PNet. This GoF procedure includes both 
'convergence statistics'/ GoF statistics for effects in the model as well as GoF 
statistics for effects not in the model. The difference between these is largely just a 
difference in the comprehensiveness of the GoF test. The first set of GoF statistics 
(for effects in the model) are more rudimentary. They are designed to give the 
researcher an immediate sense of the adequacy of the parameter estimates they have 
232 
derived from the estimation. They are generally based on a much smaller number 
of iterations in the simulation procedure and a smaller sample of simulated graphs. 
The second set of GoF statistics (for effects both in and not in the model) are 
designed for comprehensive testing of an ERG model, and are only used once a 
researcher believes that their model is already a close fit to the observed data. This 
set of GoF statistics generally includes t-statistics for aU measurable 
configurations contained in the observed graph. This means that configurations 
that are not included in the ERG model (that is, where there is no parameter 
estimate for the configurations) are actually still tested to see if they are similar in 
the observed and simulated graphs. For example, an ERG model may not have a 
parameter estimate for 4-cliques (that is, when four actors are all tied to each other), 
but when calculating GoF statistics the number of 4-clique configurations in the 
model would still be 'counted' in the observed graph and in the simulated graphs, 
and at-statistic calculated for this configuration. In addition to t-statistics for all 
configurations, the more comprehensive GoF procedure includes a range of other 
GoF statistics (for example, the mean geodesic, global clustering coefficients, triad 
census and skewness of indegree and outdegree) which test the degree to which the 
simulated graphs fit the observed graph. 
The more comprehensive GoF procedure has slightly different protocols for 
interpreting the t-statistics of different configurations (Robins, Pattison and Wang 
2006: 12-13). Configurations that are included in the ERG model require t-statistics 
of 0.1 or lower to be said to be a good fit. Other configurations and statistics not 
directly modelled in the ERG model require t-statistics of 1 or less to be said to be a 
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'good fit', and if they are above 2 they are said to be a 'bad fit'. Robins, Pattison and 
Wang (2006: 12-14) provide an array of 51 configurations and statistics that they 
recommend using to test the GoF of an ERG model. 
4.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ERG MODELS 
The last decade has seen several important developments in ERG models. The use 
of MCMCML estimation is one such development, as has already been mentioned. 
Two further developments are the incorporation of attribute configurations into 
ERG models and the development of the so-called 'new parameters'. 
ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATIONS 
While we have briefly touched on the incorporation of attributes into ERG models 
in the discussion of the difference between social selection and social influence 
models, we have not discussed specifically the form of attribute configurations. In 
social selection models, we include attributes because we want to test whether 
network ties are being formed as a result of these attributes (Robins, Lusher, 
Pattison and Kremer 2006: 10-12). An important difference between attribute 
configurations and standard (Markov) 'structural configurations' is that the attribute 
configurations often have more complicated graph statistics. The graph statistic for 
standard (Markov) structural configurations - meaning configurations such as edges, 
triangles, 2-stars and 3-stars - can be easily calculated by counting the number of 
occurrences of the configuration in a graph. However, with attribute parameters, 
more complicated 'counts' must often be undertaken, particularly with attributes 
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that are continuous variables. For example, the graph statistic for the effect of 
outgoing ties from actors with a continuous variable is measured across a network 
by summing the value of that variable across all actors who have an outgoing tie. 
Considerably more complex graph statistics are needed for configurations that 
measure, for example, the 'product of a continuous attribute' in a non-directed 
network. 
When discussing attributes in ERG models, it is useful to draw a distinction 
between two types of configurations: endogenous or structural configurations, and 
exogenous or attribute-based configurations (Lomi, et. al. 2007: 9-11). This 
distinction is between those effects which impact upon all nodes in the network 
(structural effects) and those that only influence nodes with particular attributes 
(attribute effects). This distinction is useful because, first, the structural 
configurations represent the existence of network-wide tendencies, such as a general 
tendency towards reciprocity (where if an actor sends a tie to another actor, that 
actor is more likely to send a tie back to the original actor), and second, because the 
structural configurations act as 'controls' in an ERGM, allowing the researcher to be 
sure that any attribute-based association is above and beyond any structural effects. 
A list of attribute configurations and how they can be interpreted for corporate 
networks can be found in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
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4.5 THE NEW SPECIFICATIONS 
Until recently, the most common form of the ERG model was that of Frank and 
Strauss (1986). Also called the 'Markov parameters', these were based on the idea 
that edges of a graph were independent unless they potentially shared a node. This 
is called the Markov dependence assumption (Snijders et al 2005: 7). In effect, this 
dependence assumption meant that the types of configurations were limited to 
those configurations where all edges were potentially adjacent to all other edges, or 
to put it in another way, "two possible social ties are dependent only if a common 
actor is involved in both" (Snijders et al. 2005: 7). The standard Markov 
parameters/ configurations for directed and non-directed graphs are listed in Figure 
4.2, along with the symbol for the parameter (in brackets). 
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Figure 4.2: Configurations and parameters for Markov random graph models 
Directed Networks Non-directed networks 
Density ( i: 1,i) 0-0 
Reciprocity (T11) <2=:;0 Density or edge (9) 0-0 
~ Two-star ( a 2) ~ Two-in-stars (T1,) ~ Two-mixed-stars (i;0 ) ~ Three-star (OJ) 'O 
Two-out-stars ('t 11) ~ Triangle (T) cq 
<5 And higher order star configurations Cyclic triads (Tm) 
Transitive triads ('t9) <5 
And higher order su1r a11d triadic co'1fig11ratio11s 
SOURCE: Robins, Pattison, Kalish and Lusher 2006: 28. 
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The problem with ERGMs based on Markov parameters was that they tended to 
produce 'degenerate' models or 'non-convergent' parameter estimates (Robins, 
Pattison & Wang 2006; Snijders et al 2005: 12). Degenerate models are models that 
have a 'parameter space' (meaning a range of possible parameter values for all of the 
configurations in the model) that contains either almost complete graphs (that is, 
where almost all the possible ties exist) or almost empty graphs (with very few ties). 
Since most observed graphs are neither complete nor empty graphs, Markov 
parameters have been generally seen as inadequate parameters for model building. 
The graphs that are most likely to show degeneracy with Markov parameters are 
those that contain either dense areas of triangles, or a number of high degree nodes. 
The reason for the degeneracy of Markov parameters in these conditions is that if 
the triangle parameter is above a very low threshold value, there is a tendency for a 
simulation to cascade towards a complete graph. This is because, when simulated, a 
model with a moderate tendency towards triangulation, with a region of triangles, 
has a strong tendency to form more triangles in that region, and with each new 
triangle, the probability of forming another triangle increases. It is a simple forward 
feeding system leading to a situation where most Markov graphs either have a 
triangle parameter so low that virtually no triangulation occurs, or, once the 
parameter passes a tipping point, a parameter value that creates a cascade of 
triangles which form an almost complete graph. 
In the last five years, a very promising solution to the degeneracy of the Markov 
parameters has emerged (Snijders et al 2005). Called the 'new specifications', this set 
of configurations attempt to represent similar structural properties to the Markov 
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parameters, such as transitivity, stars and two-paths, but in a more complex way that 
avoids the degeneracy problems of earlier models. These 'new specifications' have 
been highly successful in modelling observed data that were difficult or impossible 
to model with Markov parameters (see Robin, Pattison and Wang 2006 for 
examples). At the heart of the success of the new parameters are two 
developments: the introduction of the four-cycle, and the introduction of 
parameters with what we might call 'rubbery ceilings' for higher order 
configurations. 
Figure 4.3: The formation of a four-cycle under Markov dependence assumptions 
and partial conditional independence assumptions 
(a) The formation of a four-cycle in a simulation. 
:c~ 
(b) The difference between the two types of dependence assumptions. 
Markov dependence 
assumptions 
k 
D j l 
•••••••• = potential tie 
New Parameters: 
partial conditional independence 
assumptions 
k jol 
= ties which effect the formation of the potential tie 
= ties with no effect on the potential tie 
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The four-cycle is based on the idea of 'partial conditional independence' of ties in 
the model (Snijders 2005: 30-35). Under Markov dependence assumptions, 
potential ties need to share an actor to be dependent (that is, for one ties to have an 
effect on the other tie's formation). Under partial conditional independence 
assumptions, potential ties are conditionally dependent on ties with which either (1) 
they share an actor, and/ or (2) if they existed they would form a four-cycle 
(Snijders, et. al. 2005: 11, 30). The difference between these two types of 
dependence are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Part (a) of Figure 4.3 shows the formation 
of a four-cycle by the formation of a tie Yk,. Part (b) of Figure 4.3 shows the two 
types of dependence assumptions. Under the Markov dependence assumptions, it 
can be seen that the formation (or non-formation) of potential tie Yk/is dependent 
on the effects of ties Yki and Y9• Under the partial conditional independence 
assumptions, the formation of Yklis dependent on not only on ties Yki and Y9 but 
also on tie Y!l" In practice, the main effect of the partial conditional independence 
assumptions is that it allows additional configurations to effect the formation of ties. 
In our example from Figure 4.3, this would mean that in a simulation under Markov 
dependence assumptions, the formation of tie Ykt would be affected by the value of 
the (1) the edge parameter and (2) the 2-star parameter (since it would be forming 
two 2-stars, one with each of the adjacent ties). Under partial conditional 
independence assumptions, the formation of tie Ykt would be dependent on both of 
these effects, as well as the value of (3) an parameter that include a four-cycle (such 
as a k-2-path, which is discussed later). 
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The second development contained in the 'new parameters' is the building of a type 
of ceiling - a 'rubbery ceiling' - which means that there can be a strong tendency 
towards low density triangulation or star effects, but with a smaller but still positive 
probability of tightly packed triangles, or very high degree star effects. By limiting 
the number of adjacent triangles and high degree stars these 'new specifications' 
avoid the problems of degeneracy which plagued the Markov parameters. 
There are three major configurations in the new specifications: altemating-k-
triangles; altemating-k-stars and altemating-k-two-paths (for a more complete 
overview of the new specifications see Snijders et al 2005 and Robins, Pattison and 
Wang 2006). The meaning of the new specifications can be best understood by 
exploring an example: the altemating-k-stars configuration (in a non-directed 
network). 
alternating-k-stars 
A diagram of the altemating-k-star (non-directed) can be seen in Figure 3.4. There 
are three main features of the altemating-k-star configuration: First, all star effects 
within the model are incorporated within the one configuration/parameter (Snijders 
2005: 21). In the Markov parameters it was generally the case that 2-stars were one 
configuration, 3-stars another configuration, and 4-stars another. In the new 
specifications, the propensity to form stars is incorporated into one configuration -
the altemating-k-stars configuration. Second, there is a special weighting of the 
probabilities of each 'order' of star (order' referring to the number of partners: that 
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is, 2-stars are nodes with two partners, 3-stars nodes with three partners, etc., with 
each being one order higher than the last.). The weighting specifies that there is a 
lower likelihood of higher order stars (which means that there is, for example, a 
lower likelihood of 4-stars than 2-stars for any positive parameter value for the 
altemating-k-star parameter). The probability of a star of a particular order is 
approximately inversely proportional to its order.30 However, to understand this 
weighting it is important to note that 'the lower likelihood of 4-stars' refers to the 
lower 'additional' likelihood contributed by the 4-star parameter itself to the 
formation of a 4-star. In a simulation, the likelihood of a tie forming to create a 4-
star is determined not only by the 4-star parameter, but also by the 3-star parameter 
(since a tie forming a 4-star also forms three 3-star configurations, and three 2-star 
configurations and an edge). Thus, the probability of forming a tie to form a four 
star is actually dependent on the parameter values for at least three other 
configurations, and because higher order stars include multiple lower order stars, 
this actually makes ties that form a higher-order star generally more likely to form 
than other ties in the network (in the presence of a positive parameter value for an 
altemating-k-star effect). 
The third feature of the altemating-k-star configuration is that the configuration has 
a special 'alternating' aspect relating to how it weights different orders of stars: the 
sign (positive(+) or negative(-)) of the probability for higher order stars is 
sequentially alternated for each higher order star. So 2-star configurations have a 
positive probability, 3-stars have a negative probability, 4-stars a positive probability, 
30 As is shown in equation (2) the weighting of star effects of order 'k' is actually 1/2k-2 (when A.= 2) 
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5-stars a negative probability, and so on. This alternating characteristic of the new 
specifications adds a further tendency against the existence of large numbers of 
higher-order configurations (stars, triangles, etcetera). The combined effect of the 
three features of the altemating-k-star configuration is to create a parameter that, if 
positive, can be interpreted as a tendency towards a large number of small stars, 
and, over and above this, a more moderate, but nonetheless positive, tendency 
towards higher order stars. 
243 
Figure 4.4: Alternating-k-star configuration (non-directed) 
k-partners 
For the sake of completeness, the mathematical formula for the altemacing-k-star 
graph statistic is presented (Snijders et al 2005: 24; Robins, Pattison and Wang 
2006). 
s 
= ~)-1f-A:k-2 (2) 
k=2 
Where: 
s = the graph statistic for the altemating-k-star configuration. 
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k the order of the star configuration in the equation (so a 2-star is order 
2 and k = 2; a 3-star is order 3 and k = 3; etcetera). 
I 
k=2 the sum of the equation for all values of k greater than or equal to 2. 
In other words, repeat the calculation of the equation for each star 
configuration with an order equal to 2 or greater, and then add 
together the values for all orders of stars. 
(-1)" 
minus one to the power ofk. For even values ofk (2, 4, 6 ... ) this 
will equal 1, for odd values of k (3, 5, 7 ... ) this will be negative. This 
gives rise to the 'alternating' character of the statistic. 
Graph statistic for star configuration of order k. This is a 'count' of 
the number of stars of order k in the graph. 
A is a constant, typically set to A= 2 (Robins, Pattison and Wang 
2006). A.k-2 increases at an increasing rate for higher order stars. 
Since A.k-2 is a denominator in the equation, higher order stars have 
much lower impact on the graph statistic s. This has the effect of 
producing fewer higher order stars in simulations. 
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alternating-k-triangles 
The non-directed version of the altemating-k-triangle configuration is illustrated in 
Figure 5. The altemating-k-triangle has a similar logic to the alternating-k-star 
configuration. Note, however, that the altemating-k-triangle includes four-cycles, 
whereas the altemating-k-star does not, and thus the alternating-k-triangle is reliant 
on the development of partial conditional independence (as illustrated in Figure 4.3) 
while the altemating-k-star is not. The k refers to the number of triangles which 
share the same base, so, for example, a 2-triangle is comprised of two triangles 
which share the same base. Like the altemating-k-star configuration, the 
altemating-k-triangle has three major properties: 
First, all triangle effects in the model are incorporated within one statistic in the case 
of a non-directed graph, or in the case of a directed graph are grouped into sets of 
statistics that incorporate all orders of one type of triangle into one statistic (see 
Robins, Pattison and Wang (2006) for examples of the specifications for alternating-
k-star configurations for directed networks). 
Second, the contribution of higher order triangle configurations to the probability of 
a tie that forms a higher order triangle is in approximately inverse proportion to its 
order (actually in proportion to 1/2k-~· 
Third, the sign of the contribution of higher order triangles to the likelihood of ties 
to form that triangle is sequentially alternated for each higher order of triangle. 
The effect of these three properties is a configuration (or set of configurations for 
directed graphs), which, if the parameter is positive, can be interpreted as a tendency 
towards forming a large number oflower-order triangles (for example, 2-triangles), 
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and a smaller, but still significantly more than chance, number of higher-order 
triangles. 
Figure 4.5: Alternating k-triangle configuration (non-directed) 
i 
SOURCE: Robins, Pattison and Wang 2006. 
j 
kshared 
partners 
For the sake of completeness, the mathematical formula for the alternating-k-
triangle statistic is presented (Robins, Pattison and Wang 2006). 
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t= ~)-11'-}-k-2 (3) 
k=2 
Where: 
t the graph statistic for the altemating-k-triangle configuration 
k the order of the triangle configuration in the equation (so a 2-triangle is 
order 2 and k = 2; a 3-triangle is order 3 and k = 3; etcetera). 
I 
k=2 the sum of the equation for all values of k greater than or equal to 2. In 
other words, repeat the calculation of the equation for each triangle 
configuration with an order equal to 2 or greater, and then add together the 
values for all orders of triangles. 
(-1)" 
minus one to the power ofk. For even values ofk (2, 4, 6 ... ) this will equal 
1, for odd values of k (3, 5, 7 ... ) this will be negative. This gives rise to the 
'alternating' character of the statistic. 
Graph statistic for triangle configuration of order k. This is a 'count' of the 
number of triangles of order k in the graph. 
A. is a constant, typically set to A. = 2 (Robins, Pattison and Wang 2006). 
J.k-2 increases at an increasing rate for higher order triangles. Since A.k-2 is a 
denominator in the equation, higher order triangles have much lower 
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impact on the graph statistic t. This has the effect of producing fewer higher 
order triangles in simulations. 
alternating-k-two-paths 
The altemating-k-two-path configuration is almost identical to the altemating-k-
triangle configuration, except that the edge at the base of the k-triangle is optional in 
the altemating-k-two:..path. The altemating-k-two-path (non-directed network) is 
represented in Figure 6. The mathematics for calculating the graph statistic for 
altemating-k-two-path parameter is almost identical to that of the other two 
alternating-k parameters presented, and so will not be repeated. The most common 
occasion when the altemating-k-two-path parameter is interpreted is when it is 
combined with the k-triangle parameter. If the alternating-k-triangle parameter is 
positive in models that include the altemating-k-two-path parameter, then it means 
that the transitivity (triangulation) in the network occurs because of the formation 
of the base of the triangles, and not because of the formation of the sides (Robins, 
Pattison and Wang 2006). To express the same idea more simply: if the altemating-
k-triangle parameter is positive in the presence of the altemating-k-two-path 
parameter, then it means that the formation of multiple paths between two nodes 
increases the likelihood that those two nodes will themselves be connected. 
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Figure 4.6: Alternating-k-two-paths (non-directed) 
i j 
SOURCE: Robins, Pattison and Wang 2006. 
4. 7 CONCLUSION 
kshared 
partners 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an introduction to Exponential 
Random graphs, and provide the initial specifications for their use in analysis of 
corporate networks. ERG models provide a unique method for analysing networks 
that captures the underlying structural forces which generate the networks 
themselves. These structural forces are modelled as configurations (mini-graphs), 
and the probability that these configurations appear in a particular network is 
expressed in ERG models in the form of a parameter value. The process of 
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modelling a social network begins with an observed network, which is used to 
estimate an ERG model. The ERG model is in turn used to simulate a set of graphs 
which are compared with the original observed network. Through this process of 
simulation and estimation researchers attempt to find the ERG model that most 
closely fits their observed data. 
Several recent developments have greatly improved the usefulness and applicability 
of ERG models. The use of attribute configurations allows ERG models to model 
the effects of individual characteristics of actors on the formation of ties. The so 
called 'new specification' for the alternating-k class of configurations have solved 
many of the problems of degenerate models and non-convergent parameter 
estimates that plagued models using Markov configurations. These configurations 
incorporate more complex dependency assumptions and measures to reduce the 
prevalence of higher-order stars and triangles in simulated networks, and result in 
models which are much better fits of observed social networks. 
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CHAPTERS: 
THE INNER CIRCLE REVISITED: 
AN ERG MODEL OF THE POLITICS OF 
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Michael Useem's The Inner Circle (1984) remains a key reference in the study of 
business politics. Useem studied the social backgrounds and political activities of 
the most central directors in the American and British interlocking directorates 
networks.31 He found that central directors were overrepresented in a range of 
social and political fields, from appearances in the media to representation on the 
boards of policy planning organisations. 
The amount of trust that can be placed in Useem's findings are limited for both 
methodological and substantive reasons. First, Useem's conclusions are based 
almost entirely on bivariate cross-tabulations. In the absence of multivariate 
modelling of the data, there is no guarantee that his findings are not spurious. In 
this chapter, I attempt to outline and demonstrate a way of untangling Useem's 
correlations. I do this by modelling interlock formation among the 250 largest 
Australian corporations with a social selection exponential random graph (p*) 
31 This is the network created between firms that share (or do not share) directors on their boards. 
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model. A second reason to be cautious about Useem's findings lies in the fact that 
his central substantive contention is that corporate political behaviour varies with 
the structure of the corporate network. He outlines a range of mechanisms by 
which this takes place, but if the microsociological forces generating the corporate 
network are observed to be systematically different from those claimed by Useem, 
then doubt is necessarily cast on his broader interpretation of corporate political 
behaviour. I use the Australian case (one that is not institutionally so different from 
the British and American cases) to explore these matters, which have such 
important implications for our understanding of business politics in liberal 
democracies. 
Chapters 2 and 3 presented evidence that the microsociological forces which Useem 
hypothesised may not operate as he suggested. In particular these chapters found 
that the mechanism he hypothesised for the development of 'class wide' logic from 
interlocking directorates, did not seem to operate in Australia. This evidence came 
from the examination of the effect of interlocks on the donation behaviour of 
individual corporations (Chapter 2) and also the effect of the 'ties to donors' 
variable on access to business political leadership positions (Chapter 3). These 
studies found that there was no evidence of direct social influence taking place at 
the centre of the network amongst bipartisan donors (the group Useem would claim 
display 'class wide' logic). However, our modelling of the effects of interlocking 
directorates was limited to only studying the effects of three variables (total 
interlocks, and ties to the two types of donors). This chapter, Chapter 5, makes a 
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much closer study of the effects of interlocks on the political strategy of business, 
with the hope of drawing much stronger conclusions. 
In this chapter I analyse a subset of the 1575 corporations analysed in previous 
chapters. The observed network has two important characteristics. It is (1) the 
non-directed network of the ties formed by the non-executive directors serving on 
two or more boards of the (2) largest 250 for-profit corporations in Australia in 
2006. The non-executive network was studied because it was significantly denser 
and provided greater cohesion to the network overall, and the largest 250 for-profit 
corporations were analysed because existing exponential random graph model 
software cannot easily analyse networks of a larger size. 
5.1 THEORY 
When it was formulated, the theory of the Inner Circle ran counter to prevailing 
theories of corporate interlocks. The vast majority of prior work emphasised the 
role of multiple directorships as instruments of corporate collusion (Burt 1983; 
Pennings 1980), indicators of power or influence over other corporations (Mariolis 
1975 and later Mintz and Schwartz 1985) or the attempt at the cooptation of 
powerful allies by vulnerable corporations to stabilise their business environment 
(Selznick 1949; Thompson and McEwen 1958; Dooley 1969; Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Instead, Useem argued the vast majority of interlocks were 
driven by corporations' desire for general information via the mechanism of the 
'business scan'. Based on his interviews with leading directors in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, he concluded that for the vast majority of 
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corporations, one of the best methods of gaining information about the general 
business environment was to have a director serve on the board of another 
corporation. The information acquired by serving on another board did not 
facilitate the oligopolistic extraction of market rents, he argued. Instead, the 
information was more general, including information on the business environment, 
trends in the economy, management techniques for large firms, and emerging 
political issues. 
According to U seem, however, interlocks have consequences beyond their effects 
on individual corporations and their desire for business scan. Directors who served 
on multiple boards gain what he called a 'class wide' perspective (Useem 1984: 3-4). 
By this he meant that these directors (and, concomitantly, their corporations) 
develop a view of business interests that reaches beyond the parochial concerns of 
the individual firm. Rather, directors develop a sense of the needs and interests of 
the entire business community: the corporate class. In addition, multiple 
directorships bring their holders status and prestige that enables them to assume 
leadership roles within the business community (Useem 1983: 3-4). Useem 
designated these directors 'The Inner Circle'. 
To be precise, Useem defined the Inner Circle as directors serving on multiple 
boards. However, Useem's research was novel because he claimed serving on 
multiple boards was a mechanism for obtaining influence in non-business spheres 
ranging from media to politics. U seem found that the Inner Circle were more likely 
to make political donations, more likely to be leaders of business associations, and 
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were overrepresented on the boards of cultural organisations such as orchestras and 
museums. 
While entry into the Inner Circle was dependent on a director serving on multiple 
corporate boards, affiliation to various upper class social institutions increased the 
odds of entry into the Inner Circle. (Useem 1984: 14-15). Individuals educated at a 
small number of exclusive private schools were considerably overrepresented 
amongst the Inner Circle, as were members of a small number of exclusive 
businessmen's clubs. In addition, Useem argued that wealth- either through 
inherited fortunes or new money - significantly increased the likelihood of a 
director serving on multiple boards and thus entering the Inner Circle. 
As I mentioned in the introduction the primary aim of this chapter is to test 
Useem's theory of the Inner Circle. The reason for doing this, in the context of the 
entire thesis, is because interlocks present a major potential source of social and 
political cohesion and hierarchy within the business community, and are thus a 
strong potential source of information about the major underlying patterns of social, 
economic and political tendencies operating within the business community as a 
whole. Useem's is the most substantive, fully articulated and widely accepted theory 
of the relationship between interlocks and social and political organisation of 
business, and thus acts as a benchmark against which other work on this topic is 
judged. I test Useem's theory of the Inner Circle by examining the characteristics of 
the directors and corporations who form the interlocks between corporations. To 
do this I use a social selection model: the dependent variable is the presence or 
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absence of an interlock between two corporations. The set of 'cases' is all possible 
ties between those corporations. However, the last 24 years (since the publication of 
The Inner Circle (Useem 1984)) has seen considerable scholarship on the causes and 
consequences of interlock formation, and thus it is necessary, as a secondary aim, to 
review and test a broader range of theories of interlock formation and their related 
hypotheses. I place Useem's major theories in the context of recent developments, 
and divide the major theories of interlock formation into five groups based on: (1) 
political activity, (2) class or status, (3) corporate exposure to government 
regulation, ( 4) geographic or national differences, and (5) corporate size and 
structure. 
Homophify and activity 
Before discussing theories of interlock formation, the theory of the effects of 
attributes on interlock formation will be systematised. Social selection models 
attempt to understand the forces which determine why actors 'select' the other 
actors with whom they form ties. Modellers of social selection processes make a 
useful distinction between the two ways in which attributes - that is, characteristics 
of actors - drive tie formation. These two mechanisms are activity and homophify. An 
'activity effect' of an attribute increases (or decreases) the likelihood of corporations 
with that attribute forming interlocks in general. For example, large corporations 
may have, on average, more interlocks. This is an activity effect. A 'homophily 
effect' increases the likelihood of corporations forming links to others with similar 
attributes. For example, large corporations may be more likely to form ties with 
other large corporations. This is an homophily effect. The opposite of homophily 
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is heterophily, and this occurs when 'opposites attract', such as in marriage networks 
(where heterosexuality is the norm), or in a corporate network where large 
corporations preferentially shared directors with smaller corporations. In the 
discussion of theory, and then later in the modelling, each of the attributes of 
corporations will be hypothesised to have a potential 'activity effect' and a potential 
'homophily effect'. 
Political activity 
Previous studies have found three main relationships between the political activity 
and corporate interlocking of firms. First, firms with greater numbers of interlocks 
have a tendency to be more politically active (Useem 1984; Koenig et. al. 1979; 
Dreiling 2000; Bond 2004; Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan 2006b). This takes the 
form of a greater propensity to make political donations, involvement in lobbying 
for free trade (Dreiling 2000), greater political consciousness on the part of their 
directors (Useem 1984), and greater representation on the boards of policy 
planning associations, business associations and government boards (Useem 1979, 
1984). Several possible mechanisms may create this relationship. Highly 
interlocked directors may gain prominence, status and class consciousness leading 
them to volunteer for and be recruited to political positions within business, thereby 
giving their firms an appearance of both interlocking and political activity (U seem 
1984). Alternatively, firms which have strong interests in political outcomes, 
because, for example, they are involved in government contracting, may both 
interlock - as a mechanism of gaining social capital and influence - and also be 
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more politically active (Burris 1991 ).32 This first relationship is systematised in our 
study as Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Political!J active firms will have greater interlocking. 
The second relationship between interlocks and political activity found in the 
literature is the relationship between a greater numbers of interlocks and politically 
moderate firm behaviour (Useem 1984; Burris 1987, 1991, 2001; Burris and Salt 
1990; Clawson and Neustadtl 1989). This was found in Chapter 2, where interlocks 
were associated with greater bipartisan donations. Politically moderate behaviour is 
indicated by a greater propensity to make political donations to incumbent 
candidates, a tendency to donate to both major parties,' and involvement in more 
politically moderate policy planning organisations. Two possible mechanisms may 
be driving this relationship. Interlocks may foster a class consciousness amongst 
interlocked directors that is sympathetic to sacrifices of short term corporate 
interests for long term stability, a "class-wide logic" (Useem 1984). Alternatively, 
firms which face significant regulation by the government may have a strong interest 
in maintaining relations with whichever party holds political power, regardless of 
their broader ideology (Burris 1991: 547). These corporations will also have greater 
interlocking, either because they are corporations which are economically central 
and so a focus for other firms interlocking, or because they have their own interests 
32 A third possible mechanism is the existence of a latent, unmeasured variable that is causing both 
greater interlocking and greater political activity. For example, large firms may (and do) have a 
tendency towards greater interlocking and greater political activity. In the models in this chapter, I 
have included controls for the most important potential latent variables (such as firm size and number 
of directors on the board). 
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in maintaining social capital through interlocking. The relationship between 
politically moderate behaviour and interlocking is expressed in Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Political/y moderate firms will have greater interlocking. 
The third relationship between politics and interlocking is that interlocked firms 
display political homophily (that is, a tendency towards similar political behaviour) 
(Mizruchi 1990, 1992; Burris 2005; Bond 2004; Harrigan 2007). Evidence of the 
effect of political homophily on interlocking is mixed. Mizruchi (1990,1992) found 
that political homophily only occurred through indirect interlocks through bank 
boards, but did find that interlocked firms were more likely to lobby on the same 
side of a political issue in Congressional hearings (Mizruchi 1992). Other studies of 
similarity of political donation behaviour of interlocked firms in the US and UK 
(Burris 2005; Bond 2004) have found effects of interlocks on similarity of 
donations. The evidence I presented on Australian donations in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, however, found the effect was only present for donors to the conservative 
political party. The mechanism underlying homophily is either a social influence 
process, whereby political corporations influence the corporations they are 
interlocked with, or a social selection process, whereby political corporations 
preferentially form interlocks with corporations with similar politics. The theory of 
political homophily is systematised in Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 3: Firms with similar political interests or similar political actions will displqy 
homophify. 
Class and status 
Four measures of class and status recur in studies of corporate interlocks: listings in 
public directories, attendance at exclusive schools, membership of businessmen's 
clubs, and director wealth. 
A director's inclusion in a public directory such as Who '.r Who (in the UK, Australia 
or the US) or the Social "Register (in the US) is an indicator that he/ she is in the 
highest level of a country's status structure. It is a general and inclusive measure of 
status placing individuals from across a range of institutional spheres into the same 
dichotomous (in/ out) ranking. \Xlhile several recent studies have shown a 
systematic relationship between director listing in public directories and political 
behaviour (Burris 2001: 373; Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan 2006b), only Useem 
(1984) found a systematic relationship between listing in public directories and 
interlocking. The mechanism driving a relationship between interlocking and listing 
in public directories may be the result of either (1) that fact that directors who 
interlock are more likely to be listed in public directories, or (2) that directors who 
are listed in public directories - because of status acquired elsewhere - are more 
likely to be appointed to multiple boards. 
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As well as testing the effect of listing in public directories on interlocking in general, 
I test the hypothesis that companies with high status directors are more likely to 
interlock with other companies that have high status directors. These are outlined 
in Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms with high status directors will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms with high status directors will display homophi!J. 
Numerous scholars have found evidence that directors who are graduates of 
exclusive private schools and members of businessmen's clubs are more likely to 
serve on multiple corporate boards (Domhoff 1967; Useem 1984; Bond 2003, 2007; 
Bond Glouharova and Harrigan 2006a). Two separate mechanisms have been 
hypothesised to explain this trend. The dominant tradition has explained the 
overrepresentation of members of upper class institutions amongst interlocking 
directors as reflective of the general power and influence of the upper classes. These 
institutions provide their members with additional resources - social capital - which 
enable them to more easily rise to leadership positions within business (U seem 
1984; Domhoff 1967). More recently, Burris (2001: 375) and Bond (2003) have 
interpreted schools and clubs as markers of 'factional' or 'group' alignment within 
the business community. They have shown that directors who attended particular 
schools or clubs, or corporations on which these schools and clubs are represented 
are significantly more likely to engage in partisan support for conservative political 
parties. The interlocks formed by directors with upper class status markers are, 
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therefore, seen as representing 'factional' or 'group' ties. These two theories are 
directly tested by our model. Hypotheses Sa and 6a state that firms with upper class 
affiliations will have a greater propensity to interlock, while Hypotheses Sb and 6b 
test for homophily amongst firms with upper class affiliations. 
Hypothesis 5a: Firms with directors from exclusive private schools will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 5b: Firms with directors.from exclusive private schools will display homophi/y. 
Hypothesis 6a: Firms with directors who are members ef top businessmen's clubs will have greater 
interlocking. 
Hypothesis 6b: Firms with directors who are members ef top businessmen's clubs will displqy 
homophi/y. 
Several recent authors have explored the role of wealthy individuals in corporate 
networks (e.g. Burris 2000). A key finding is that having a wealthy individual on the 
board of corporations has a significant effect on political behaviour. Useem (1984) 
hypothesised that wealth would give directors an increased chance of entering the 
'Inner Circle', and thus corporations with wealthy directors should show greater 
interlocking. Burris (2000) and Bond, Glouharova and Harrigan (2006b) found that 
wealthy owners and directors tend to be politically conservative, and this may be a 
basis for homophily between corporations with wealthy directors. The two 
potential relationships between wealthy directors and interlocking are detailed in 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b. 
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Hypothesis 7 a: Firms with directors who are extreme/y wealtl?Ji will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 7b: Firms with directors who are extreme/y wealtl?Ji will display homophi!J. 
Evidence of geographically based regional class fractions of business have been 
found in the US (Domhoff 1969; Burris 2001: 374-5). In Canada, there is less 
evidence of regional fraction of business, but there is evidence of a division between 
domestically-oriented directors and corporations and globally-oriented directors and 
corporations (Clement 1975; Noisi 1978, 1981; Carroll 1982; Brym 1989). This 
chapter tests for both greater propensity to interlock (activity) and homophily 
between both corporations based in particular regions (in the Australian case, States 
and Territories) and also between Australian-owned and foreign-owned 
corporations. The related hypotheses are outlined below. 
Hypothesis 8a: Firms in particular geographic regions have signijicant!J greater or lesser 
interlocking. 
Hypothesis 8 b: Firms in particular geographic regions will display homophi!J. 
Hypothesis 9a: Australian-owned firms will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 9b: Australian-owned firms will display homophi!J. 
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Government regulation 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a consistent finding of studies of business politics 
is the effect of exposure to government regulation. Companies in industries that are 
highly regulated by the state - such as banking or transport - or in industries for 
which the major customer is the state - such as defence - have been shown to be 
(1) more politically active (2) more likely to donate to incumbent candidates in 
elections (3) more likely to hedge in their donation patterns by giving to both major 
parties and (4) to engage more resources in lobbying. 
One of the major reasons why this theory is so important for this Chapter is that the 
theory of government regulation is the major theory which challenges Useem's 
theory of 'class wide' logic. While Useen argues that interlocks generate a class wide 
consciousness amongst interlocked directors, and this leads to more moderate 
political behaviour, authors such as Burris argue that this correlation is spurious. 
Burris (1991: 546-8) argues that the lack of political conservatism of the most 
interlocked corporations derives from purely pragmatic considerations on the part 
of corporations who are highly subject to government regulation. Thus, in the 
United States, corporations which are subject to high levels of government 
regulation - such as banking or transport - tend to avoid political partisanship out 
of fear of falling out of favour with a current or future Democrat administration. 
Corporations which are subject to high levels of government regulation also have 
greater need to influence government policy, are more subject to the need to 
maintain legitimacy given their dealings with government and because of this they 
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may also tend towards greater interlocking. They also tend to be well connected 
with government and thus are corporations to which other directors and/ or 
corporations desire to be tied to. In short, corporations which are highly regulated 
by the state value high levels of social capital. Unfortunately, most existing studies 
of corporate networks and regulation have been studies of corporate political 
partisanship, and so the direct relationship between interlocking and regulation can 
only be assumed from these results (see for example Burris 2001 and my results 
from Chapter 2). The activity and homophily hypotheses for highly regulated firms 
are outlined in Hypotheses 10a and 10b. 
Hypothesis 1 Oa: Firms that are in high!J regulated industries will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 10b: Firms that are in high!J regulated industries will displqy homophi!J. 
Public Listed Industrials 
Firms listed on the stock exchange have legislative requirements to have non-
executive directors, and also face considerably greater requirements for public 
disclosure. Hypotheses 1 la and 1 lb state that public listed firms will have greater 
interlocking and will display homophily. 
Hypothesis 11 a: Public listed firms will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 11 b: Public listed firms will display homophi!J. 
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Firm size 
Almost all theories of interlocking have suggested that large firms have a greater 
propensity to interlock. Several possible mechanisms may lie behind such 
interlocking. Large firms may interlock simply because they have the ability to 
engage in greater interlocking, given their substantial resources. They may do so 
because it gives them social and political influence. They may also have a greater 
propensity to interlock because other corporations and directors see large 
corporations as desirable boards to serve on or to be interlocked with. Most 
theories of interlocks also conceptualise large firms as themselves preferring to be 
interlocked with other large firms, and so display homophily. These two theories of 
the effect of company size on interlocking are detailed in Hypotheses 12a and 12b. 
Hypothesis 12a: Laf!,er firms will have greater interlocking. 
Hypothesis 12b: Laf!,er firms will display homophi!J. 
Directors 
Companies with greater numbers of non-executive directors will clearly have a 
greater likelihood of interlocking. To control for this factor the number of non-
executive directors and also the number of executive directors on a corporation's 
board were included as firm attributes. 
Control 1: Number ef non-executive directors (NEDs) 
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Control 2: Number ef executive directors (ExDs) 
Executive directors' network 
Corporations also have executive directors who serve on the boards of other 
companies. To test whether there was any effect of this network either on 
increasing or decreasing the likelihood of non-executive interlocks, the executive 
directors' network was included in the model as a covariate network. The 
associated hypothesis is outlined below as Hypothesis 13. 
Hypothesis 13: Companies that interlock through executive directors are more like!J to interlock 
through non-executive directors. 
5.2 DATASET AND METHODS 
The observed network in this study was a non-directed network of the ties formed 
by the non-executive directors serving on two or more boards of the largest 250 
corporations in Australia in 2006.33 
ERG models distinguish between structural parameters and attribute parameters. 
Structural parameters measure network-wide tendencies which operate irrespective 
of the characteristics of individual actors, such as reciprocity or transitivity. 
Attribute parameters are those parameters which affect only actors with those 
33 A subset of the largest (as measured by revenue) 250 corporations was used for this analysis because 
existing computing power places sharp limitations on tbe size of networks that can be run on current 
ERG model computer programs. 
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particular attributes. For example, women may have a greater number of friends, or 
public listed corporations may form more ties with other public listed corporations. 
The ERG model in this chapter included five structural parameters: edges, isolates, 
alternating-k-stars, alternating-k-triangles, and alternating-k-two-paths. The 
structural parameters included in the model, and their traditional interpretation, are 
listed in Table 5.1. They include the so-called 'new parameters', such as alternating-
k-triangles. The key characteristic of these 'new parameters' is a decreased 
tendency for high degree nodes or tightly packed areas of triangles or two-paths. 
Models with positive parameter values for these configurations do still have some 
high degree nodes, or regions with large numbers of triangles, but they have fewer 
than would be found in models built with traditional 'Markov' graphs. In general, 
these 'new parameters' have little effect on the interpretation of ERG model results: 
a positive and significant parameter value for 'alternating-k-triangles' means that 
there is a tendency towards 'closure', that is, that 'friends of friends' will be friends. 
These new specifications do, however, have an important effect on model fit 
because they avoid the tendency towards degeneration from which Markov graphs 
suffered (Snijders et al 2005 ; Robins, Pattison and Wang 2006). 
Each corporation in the network has 23 attributes. Almost all attributes were 
included in the model through two separate configurations: one which measured the 
effect of the attribute on the general tendency to form interlocks (called an 'activity 
parameter') and one which measured the effect of the attribute on the tendency to 
form interlocks with other corporations with the same (or similar strength) attribute 
(call a 'homophily parameter'). These attribute parameters are illustrated in 
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Table 5.2. Several attributes were present in very small numbers and so not able to 
be statistically analysed. Several attributes were strongly correlated with other 
attributes in the model and so had to be excluded. In total, 41 attribute parameters 
were included in the model. 
A covariate network was included in the model. This was the executive directors' 
network, containing 88 directed ties from corporations on which directors served as 
executives, to corporations where the executives served as non-executive directors. 
The purpose of this was to test whether the executive directors' network had any 
effect on the formation of non-executive interlocks. 
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Table 5.1: Structural configurations (non-directed) for ERG models for the non-
executive directors' (NEDs) corporate networks 
PARAMETER 
COMMON 
IMAGE INTERPRETATION 
NAME 
Edge Interlocks • • 
A tendency for NEDs to serve on two 
boards. 
A tendency for NEDs to serve as 
~ NEDs on corporations on which alternating- Popularity NEDs from other corporations already k-stars serve. A tendency against NEDs 
serving on corporations who have few 
or no NEDs from other corporations. 
A tendency for a first corporation to 
~ 
form interlocks with a third corporation 
alternating- in a situation where both the first and Clustering third are both interlocked with one or k-triangle 
more other corporations (i.e. a friend of 
a friend is a friend; a tendency for 
forming triads/ triangles/ clusters) 
A tendency for a first corporation to 
alternating- Multiple ~ interlock with one or more corporations who are interlocked with a third k-two-path connectivity corporation (i.e. a tendency for forming 
four-cycles) 
isolates isolates • A tendency for no interlocks. 
9 Denotes actor's attribute not taken into account 
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Table 5.2: Attribute configurations (non-directed) for ERG models for the non-
executive directors' corporate networks 
PARAMETER 
COMMON 
NAME 
IMAGE INTERPRETATION 
Interaction A tendency for NEDs to serve on 
Rb (binary 
• • two corporations who both have attribute) the same (binary) attribute. 
Interlock A tendency for NEDs from a 
R (binary • • 
corporation with a (binary) 
attribute to serve on two 
attribute) 
corporations. 
Sum A tendency for NEDs to serve on 
A;+~ (continuous • • two corporations that have high 
attribute) values for an attribute (continuous) 
A tendency for NEDs to serve on 
-1 * Difference 
• • 
two corporations who have a low 
-1*/1'-~/ (continuous absolute difference for the 
attribute) continuous attribute (i.e. similar 
attract/homophily). 
e Denotes actor's attribute taken into account. 
• Denotes actor's attribute not taken into account 
Variables 
Almost all variables were calculated as described in Chapter 1. The exceptions were, 
first, Coalition-only donors. As there were only 7 Coalition-only donors amongst 
the Top 250 corporations and only one had an interlock, the Coalition-only donor 
variable had to be left out of the final ERG model 
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Second, as it was a smaller set of corporations, the business association leadership 
variables needed to be collapsed into one measure so that it could have enough 
cases to be included in the models. This measure was transformed into a binary 
variable, where boards with one or more director on the board of a particular 
business association were coded "1 ". Third, number of directors was measured for 
NEDs and EDs separately. 
5.3RESULTS 
Table 5 lists the results an ERG (p*) model of the network, including company and 
director attributes, and the dyadic covariate network of the executive director ties. 
Structural effects 
All of the structural parameters, except the 2-path parameter, were significant. The 
edge parameter was negative, meaning that interlocks were a rare phenomenon. 
The isolates parameter was positive, indicating a tendency towards isolated 
corporations remaining isolated: in other words 'the poor stay poor'. The k-star 
parameter was negative, indicating that popularity - 'the rich get richer' - was not an 
organising principle, and that the opposite mechanism was actually taking place: 
those corporations with an interlock were less like to receive another interlock. The 
k-triangle parameter was positive, indicating a tendency towards 'triadic closure' -
'friends of friends are friends' - and clustering. 
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Table 5.3: A p* model of the non-executive directors' network of the largest 250 
corporations in Australia in 2006 
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS 
Edge 
Isolates 
alt-k-Star 
alt-k-Triangle 
alt-k-2-Path 
Model 1 
PARAMETER ESTIMATE (p) 
-10.24*** 
1.67** 
-0.94* 
1.17 *** 
-0.11 
PARAMETER ESTIMATE (/J) 
FOR ACTIVITY EFFECTS 
PARAMETER ESTIMATE (/J) 
FOR HOMOPHILY EFFECTS34 
CONTROL ATTRIBUTES 
NEDs on Board 
ExDs on Board 
ExDs' covariate network 
COMPANY ATTRIBUTES 
Australian 
Listed 
Regulated 
Donate Both Parties 
Revenue ($bil) 
New South Wales (state) 
Victoria (state) 
Queensland (state) 
South Australia (state) 
Western Australia (state) 
DIRECTOR ATTRIBUTES 
Business Assoc. Execs. 
Rich200 
Think Tank 
Who's Who (ExDs) 
Who's Who (NEDs) 
Govt Boards (NEDs) 
Top School (ExDs) 
Top School (NEDs) 
Top Club (ExDs) 
Top Club (NEDs) 
0.15*** 
0.33 
0.04 
-0.72 
-0.61 
0.11 
-0.44** 
0.02* 
[a] 
-0.08 
-0.39 
-0.18 
0.49 
0.60** 
-0.46* 
O.Q7 
-0.83-
3.31 *** 
0.83 
0.57 
1.29** 
-0.10 
1.00*** 
[a) reference category of categorical variable 'state' lb] too few ties to analyse statistically 
0.18** 
-0.07 
1.02 
1.81 ** 
0.16 
0.09 
0.02 
0.59 
0.36 
[b] 
[b] 
[b] 
-0.41 
0.77 
[b] 
1.00 
-1.41 
1.53-
0.51 
2.84*** 
0.15 
0.24 
-p < 0.15 *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 
Note: p-values are only indicators of the relative significance of parameter estimates. They should not be interpreted literally as 
the underlying distribution is unknown. 
34 Technical note: PNet actually calculates heterophily parameters (absolute different of attributes). 
To make interpretation more intuitive and so that parameter estimates are expressed in terms of 
homophily, I have multiplied the parameter values by minus one (-1). However, for strict 
interpretation it is necessary to convert the coefficients back to heterophily parameters. 
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These four trends are readily observable in the visualisation of the network in Figure 
5.1. Note the large number of isolated nodes, a sample of which is listed down the 
left side of the figure (there were 153 isolated nodes in the network: only a sample is 
presented). The sparseness of the network is reflected in the negative edge 
parameter. The interaction of the negative k-star parameter and the positive k-
triangle parameter can be observed in the 'core' region of the network, where the 
majority of ties to most of the high centrality nodes are also part of a triangle 
configuration (three nodes tied by three ties). This reflects the role of triadic 
closure, as against popularity, in driving the formation of high centrality 
corporations, and the core-periphery structure of the network. 
Figure 5.1: Visualisation of the network of interlocked corporations . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• ~'jI • • • 
• 
• Z; • 
• 
• (;/ • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Note: The corporations listed down the left side are a sample of the isolated corporations (those without interlocks). In total 
there were 153 corporations without interlocks, and 97 with interlocks. 
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Attribute effects 
The only political attribute to have a positive and significant activity effect was the 
attribute measuring whether there was a member of the executive of a major 
business association on the board. There was no effect on propensity to interlock 
(activity) from having directors who on the board of a think tank, or serving on the 
board of a government-owned enterprise. Companies that made donations to both 
major political parties had a reduced propensity to participate in interlocks. 
Most status attributes had a significant and positive effect on interlocking. In 
particular, (1) the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) listed in Who:r 
Who, (2) the proportion of NEDs who attended top schools, and (3) the proportion 
of NEDs who were members of top businessmen's clubs all had strongly positive 
and highly significant effects on the propensity of a corporation to form interlocks. 
In addition, as expected, the control attribute - the number of non-executive 
directors on the board - had a positive and highly significant effect on the 
propensity to form interlocks. 
The trends can be seen in the visualisations of the network in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
Note that in Figure 8 there is a tendency for highly interlocked corporations to have 
a high proportion of directors who attended top schools. In Figure 5.2, note the 
relative absence of directors who attended top schools amongst the isolated nodes. 
In Figure 5.3, note that all the interlocked corporations have at least one director 
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listed in Who's Who, while more than half the sample of isolated corporations have 
no directors in Who's Who. 
Figure 5.2: Interlocked corporations with node size reflecting proportion of 
directors who attended top schools 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• \;. "". • 
• 
Z fl • 
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• 
• 
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• 
• 
Note: The corporations listed down the left side are a sample of the isolated corporations (those without interlocks). In total 
there were 153 corporations without interlocks, and 97 with interlocks. 
Only one of the executive director status and class attributes (executives listed in 
Who's Who) had any effect on the propensity of corporations to form interlocks, and 
this was negative and on the very margins of significance. As the network is the 
non-executive directors interlock network, the non-significance of executive director 
attributes was unsurprising. 
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Figure 5.3: Interlocked corporations with node size reflecting proportion of 
directors listed in Who's Who 
• 
• 
Note: The corporations listed down the left side are a sample of the isolated corporations (those without interlocks). In total 
there were 153 corporations without interlocks, and 97 with interlocks. 
One status and class attribute had a negative effect on interlocking: the presence of 
a wealthy director ('FJch 200'). Corporations with a director who was listed in the 
BRW "Rich 200 were considerably less likely to interlock with other corporations. 
None of the locality or nationality measures had a significant 'activity effect' on 
interlocking. Australian owned and foreign owned corporations showed no 
systematic difference in their propensity to form interlocks. Similarly, there was no 
significant difference in the propensity of corporations with headquarters in each of 
the different states to form interlocks. 
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Corporations in regulated industries were no more or less likely to form interlocks 
that other corporations. 
Revenue had a positive activity parameter that was on the cusp of significance. 
Large corporations were more likely to be interlocked with other corporations. This 
can be seen in Figure 10 where large corporations (symbolised by large nodes) can 
be seen to occupy several central positions in the network. Corporations listed on 
the stock exchange showed no greater or lesser propensity for interlocking than 
other corporations. 
Figure 5.4: Interlocked corporations with node size reflecting revenue of 
corporations 
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• 
Note: The corporations listed down the left side are a sample of the isolated corporations (those without interlocks). In total 
there were 153 corporations without interlocks, and 97 with interlocks. 
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Corporations listed on the stock exchange displayed a positive and significant 
homophily parameter. Listed corporations are more likely to form ties with other 
listed corporations and non-listed corporations (that is, private companies and 
partnerships) are more likely to form ties with other non-listed corporations. 
None of the locality and nationality attributes had significant homophily parameter 
estimates. Australian-owned corporations did not form a definable community, and 
neither did corporations from any particular state. 
There was no significant homophily effect for the majority of political attributes 
(Donate Both Major Parties, Business Association Executives and Think Tanks) or 
for the majority of status and class attributes (listing in Who '.r Who, membership of 
top clubs, all executive director characteristics). However, one political attribute 
(directors serving on government-owned enterprises), one status attribute 
(proportion of directors that had attended top schools) and one control attribute 
(number of non-executive directors) showed significant homophily. 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
Structural parameters 
In an ERG model, the edge parameter plays a role equivalent to that of the constant 
in a logistic regression. Its low value partly reflects the low density of the network 
and partly reflects a balancing of the effects of positive parameters in the model. 
The 'isolates' parameter reflects a tendency for corporations without ties to remain 
without ties, over and above the individual characteristics of the corporation. The 
failure of the k-2-path parameter to reach significance is unimportant as it is 
primarily included in the model as a control for the k-triangle parameter. 
The negative k-star parameter suggests that 'unpopularity' is an organising principle 
of the network. The fewer interlocks a corporation has, the more likely it is to gain 
interlocks. The presence of a negative k-star parameter and a positive k-triangle 
parameter suggests that the presence of high degree nodes and the core-periphery 
structure of the network - which is clearly observable in Figure S.1 - is a product of 
transitivity- friends of friends being friends - and not popularity. 
Transitivity in a 1-mode corporation-corporation network that has been produced 
from a 2-mode corporation-director network is most likely to have been produced 
by directors who sit on three or more boards. The creation of transitivity in the 
transformation from a 1-mode to a 2-mode network is demonstrated in Figure S.S. 
The key role of transitivity in the creation of high degree corporations and a core-
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periphery structure in the 1-mode corporation-corporation network - which we 
know from our ERG model results - means that the centralised structure of the 
network is actually the product of the interlocking created by a small number of 
highly networked directors who serve on three or more boards each. These are 
precisely the directors which Useem named the "Inner Circle". 
Figure 5.5: The creation of transitivity in the transformation from a 1-mode to a 2-
mode network 
2-mode 
corporation - director 
network 
e corporation 
• director 
Attribute parameters 
1-mode 
corporation - corporation 
network 
Before interpreting the attribute parameters it is important to clarify the general 
meaning of the homophily and activity configurations, particular for those attributes 
which are director-based. 
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Figure 5.6 attempts to illustrate (in the case of a binary attribute variable) that there 
are only three possible 2-mode configurations that can give rise to all possible 1-
mode homophily and activity configurations for director-based attributes. In the 2-
mode network, directors can only be in one of two positions in relation to the 1-
mode interlock: either the director makes the interlock themselves, or they are a 
director of only one of the firms. Homophily Configuration A (see Figure 5.6) 
occurs when a director has the attribute and is also an interlocking director. In this 
case, the attribute (if it is a binary attribute) will exist on both of the corporations in 
the 1-mode network. This will give rise to homophily in an ERG model. 
Homophily Configuration B occurs if the interlocking director does not have the 
attribute. In this case, homophily will arise in the 1-mode network because two 
separate directors of the two firms have the same attribute. The 'Only Activity 
Configuration' arises when an interlock is made and the attribute does not exist on 
the interlocking director, nor on any of the directors of one corporation, and the 
attribute does exist on one of the directors of the second corporation. This gives 
rise to the 'Only Activity Configuration', by which I mean the only activity 
configuration that will give rise to a positive and significant activity configuration 
parameter in a model if the model also includes a control for homophily on this 
attribute. 
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Figure 5.6: The 2-mode network configurations that can give rise to homophily and 
activity configurations for director-based attributes in a 1-mode network 
2-mode 
corporation - director 
network 
1-mode 
corporation - corporation 
network 
Homophily Configuration A 
[director with attribute is interlocker] 
Homophily Configuration B 
[directors with attribute are not interlocker] 
Only* Activity Configuration 
[director with attribute serves on a board with interlockers] 
• 
0 
e 
0 
* 
director with attribute 
director without attribute 
corporation in 2-mode (attributes are on directors) 
corporation in 1-mode with director attribute 
corporation in 1-mode without director attribute 
'only' if model controlled for homophily 
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So what does this mean? First, we can assert that a positive activity parameter (in 
the presence of a control for homophily) for a director-based attribute reflects the 
director/ s with this attribute NOT making the interlock themselves, but rather 
serving on a board with other directors who make the interlocks. Second, we know 
that when interpreting the homophily parameters we should be aware that there are 
two possible mechanisms underlying the observed homophily. 
The strong activity effect of business association leaderships on interlock formation 
tends to support Useem's theory of the Inner Circle. It shows that those directors 
who serve on multiple boards of the largest 250 Australian corporations are serving 
on the boards of companies with these business association executives. However, 
contrary to Useem's assertion that these business leaders are one of the interlocking 
groups, the lack of a significant homophily parameter for business association 
executives suggests that business association leaders, per se, are not providing those 
interlocks themselves. 
The strong activity effect of the major status and class attributes on interlocking 
illustrates several important issues. Since we are controlling for homophily (and 
therefore for the interlocked director having the relevant attribute) the very strong 
activity effect for non-executive directors listed in Who:r Who suggests that 
interlocks are associated with corporations who have a large number of other high 
status directors. A plausible explanation is that a particular set of corporations are 
seeking - and able to attract - significant social capital. Social capital, in this 
schema, comes in different forms, and interlocks and directors listed in Who :r Who 
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are two different forms of social capital which these corporations are accruing. 
Corporations which are seeking and able to attract directors who serve on multiple 
boards are presumably able to attract prominent persons from the leadership of 
other spheres of social, economic and political life, such as leading lawyers, 
accountants, merchant bankers or ex-politicians. 
The strong activity effect of the proportion of directors who attended exclusive 
private schools and are members of exclusive businessmen's clubs shows that upper 
class networks continue to play an important role in business in Australia. For 
corporations, individuals who are part of these upper class institutions provide the 
corporation with important social capital. For directors, participation in these upper 
class networks and institutions provides advantages for directors seeking 
recruitment to prominent corporations. In the case of schools, the strong 
homophily parameter suggests that either directors who attended exclusive schools 
have a much greater likelihood of being interlocking directors themselves, and/or 
there is a tendency for companies with directors from exclusive private schools to 
share an interlocked director. In either case, it suggests that this aspect of upper 
class identity still play a significant part in organising the upper echelons of 
Australian business. 
Large corporations have more interlocks. For large corporations, greater 
interlocking presumably represents greater ability to seek and attract high status 
directors with considerable social capital. For interlocked directors serving on large 
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corporations presumably brings both prestige and considerable 'business scan'; that 
is, information about the business environment. 
The model in Table 5.3 shows a negative activity effect of having a Rich 200 director 
on a board. This finding contradicts our hypothesis that wealthy individuals would 
be associated with greater interlocking as wealth provided a route to multiple 
directorship and membership of the 'Inner Circle'. I cross-referenced this result 
with raw British data obtained through correspondence with a collaborator35 and 
found a similar trend amongst British corporations. There are several possible 
explanations. One is that wealth - ownership of capital - is an independent source 
of political influence, and so for the wealthy interlocking is simply not necessary to 
gain greater social capital or influence. Another possible explanation is that 
interlocks in some way interfere with the interests of the wealthy, for example, the 
act of inviting highly interlocked directors onto the board of a company owned by a 
wealthy individual may bring a level of scrutiny of and/ or influence over a family 
controlled business. It may also complicate decision making, as highly interlocked 
directors will have multiple competing allegiances. A further possible explanation is 
that 'rich lists' are sensitive to new wealth, which may tend to be accrued by 
entrepreneurs in private corporations with few outside directors and few interlocks. 
The tendency for listed corporations to form ties with other listed corporations -
homophily - may indicate either the existence of a 'group' of corporations listed on 
the stock exchange, or it may reflect the existence of a set of directors with expertise 
35 Dr Matthew Bond 
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in serving as directors of listed corporations in particular, and ultimately a 
propensity for these directors to serve on multiple listed company boards. 
The lack of homophily on the basis of the geographic location of firm headquarters 
suggests that among the largest 250 corporations there are not substantial 
geographic class fractions or groupings. No significant effect of nationality was 
found. No effect for think tanks was found in the dataset. 
The executive directors' covariate network did not have a significant relationship 
with the non-executive directors' network. This is not particularly surprising as 
non-executive directors are not the agent of any particular corporation, while 
executive directors are the full-time employees and representatives of one firm. 
Level of regulation was the main method of incorporating a measure of company 
industry into these models. The lack of positive effect of regulation on a 
corporation's propensity to interlock was contrary to expectations. This failure to 
find a positive relationship between interlocking and all political attributes except 
business association executive membership means that there is only weak support 
for one of the main arguments of the Inner Circle theory. 
5.5 POLITICAL DONATIONS AND INTERLOCKS 
There is a negative relationship between interlocking and making a donation to both 
major political parties. This contradicts both Hypothesis 1 (that politically active 
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firms will have greater interlocking) and Hypothesis 2 (that political moderate firms 
would show greater interlocking). 
To understand this finding better I ran 18 different ERG models to test which 
parameters were generating this effect. I found that the 'null model' of edge plus 
bipartisan donor parameters (activity and homophily) showed a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between bipartisan donation and interlock 
formation (activity). However, I also found that all models that added just one 
status variable (such as school or club) or political/power variable (such as business 
association executives) or a structural network variable (such ask-stars or k-
triangles) moved the bipartisan donor activity parameter in a negative direction. 
The results of these models are listed in Table 5.4. The attributes which had the 
largest effect were 'listed company', and the number of non-executive directors 
(NEDs) on the board. As the earlier modelling showed, both of these attributes 
had strong homophily effects, as well as an activity effect for NEDs. There were 
also strong effects for the structural parameters and most of the status variables 
(Who's Who, clubs, schools, government boards). This modelling suggests that while 
bipartisan donation is associated with greater interlocking (as all our previous 
modelling in Chapters 2 and 3 has shown), once the level of interlocking that is 
associated with the other characteristics of companies - such as the greater 
propensity for public listed companies to interlock with each other - is taken into 
account, bipartisan donors actually have fewer interlocks. Thus, highly interlocked 
firms should make fewer donations. 
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Table 5.4: 18 ERG models of interlock formation and the effect of various 
parameters on the relationship between bipartisan donors and interlock formation 
PARAMETERS IN MODEL 
(BOTH ACTIVITY AND HOMOPHILY PARAMETERS 
INCLUDED FOR EACH ATTRIBUTE) 
1. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor (Null Model) 
2. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Listed 
3. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + NEDs 
4. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + k-star + k-triangle + k-2-path (ie. 
all structural effects except 'isolates') 
5. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + all structural parameters 
6. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Who '.r Who NEDs 
7. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Isolates 
8. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Club NEDs 
9. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ Top School NEDs 
10. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ Govt NEDs 
11. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Australian 
12. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Revenue 
13. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + Business Ass Execs 
14. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ Regulated 
15. Edge + Bipartisan Donor + FJch 200 
16. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ NEDs + Who'.r Who NED+ 
School NED 
17. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ Listed+ NEDs 
18. Edge+ Bipartisan Donor+ All 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
FOR 
BIPARTISAN 
DONOR 
ACTIVITY 
0.54 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.19 
0.21 
0.25 
0.26 
0.28 
0.29 
0.29 
0.35 
0.36 
0.42 
0.51 
0.55 
-0.07 
-0.18 
-0.47 
Given the results of the rest of this thesis, this is a very counter-intuitive finding, 
and seems to contradict the results of other chapters where bipartisan donations 
and membership of the core-corporate community were associated with greater 
interlocking. However, as Table 5.4 shows, this is a consistent effect, and the 
introduction of almost any single additional variable into a basic model has the 
effect of moving the bipartisan donor activity parameter in a negative direction. 
This suggests that this finding is not simply an anomaly driven by one or two cases 
or one or two variables. 
CHANGE IN 
BIPARTISAN 
DONOR 
PARAMETER 
FROM NULL 
MODEL. 
-0.56 
-0.51 
-0.35 
-0.33 
-0.29 
-0.27 
-0.26 
-0.25 
-0.24 
-0.18 
-0.17 
-0.12 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.61 
-0.72 
-1.00 
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To understand this process further, I visualised the interlocks and donation patterns 
in Netdraw (Borgatti 2002). The results of this are shown in Figure 5.7. Bipartisan 
donors are shown as black nodes, other corporations as white nodes. The one 
Coalition-only donor with an interlock is shown as a target symbol. The isolated 
corporations are excluded from this visualisation. What is striking is that at the 
absolute centre of the network - where I have shaded the graph grey - there is a 
group of approximately 20 corporations that make no donations at all. These 
central corporations are densely interlocked with each other, and form the centre of 
the entire network. Immediately outside this centre there are numerous donors, as 
there are among the rest of the corporations who have at least one interlock. 
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Figure 5.7: A visualisation of the interlocking directorate network and bipartisan 
donors 
Key: Bipartisan donors are black nodes. Coalition-only donors are marked with a 'target symbol' @ (there is only one). 
Other corporations are white nodes. Corporations without interlocks have been excluded from this visualisation. 
The grey shaded area highlights the central corporations who do not make any donations. 
Figure 5. 7 suggests that the negative relationship between donation and interlocks is 
driven by the fact that the very centre of the network does not engage in donation 
behaviour. While most of the corporations in this region have very high degrees, 
there seems to be more than just a negative correlation between degree (absolute 
number of interlocks) and donations, as there are some high degree nodes in other 
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parts of the network that are bipartisan donors, and there are also some low degree 
nodes in the centre of the network that do not make donations. Instead, the 
process appears to be one driven by either the absolute centrality of a firm in the 
overall network, or the degree of a firm's neighbours: it is not just whether a firm 
has a lot of interlocks, but whether are they interlocked with firms who are also 
interlocked with numerous other firms. 
To further test the hypothesis that either absolute centrality in the network, or a 
similar measure of centrality was the factor driving this effect, and also to confirm 
that this finding was not simply spurious, I used a number of different tests. In the 
first test, I partitioned the nodes into five groups based on their eigenvalue centrality 
(also called eigenvector centrality) (Hanneman and Riddle 2005: Chapter 10). 
Eigenvalue centrality uses factor analysis to calculate the first eigenvalue for the 
matrix of the shortest paths (geodesic distance) between all nodes in the network. 
This generally translates into a measure of centrality which captures not just the 
local network centrality of a node but also its absolute centrality in the global 
network. I partitioned the nodes in the network into five groups: those with an 
eigenvalue centrality of zero (181 nodes), and then four equal-sized, ranked quartiles 
of the rest of the nodes in the network (17-18 nodes in each quartile). For each 
group of corporations I calculated the proportion of bipartisan donors. The results 
are illustrated in Figure 5.8. Figure 5.8 shows that, as suspected, the negative 
relationship between bipartisan donors and interlocks is driven by the highly central 
nodes in the network. Only 23% of corporations with eigenvalues in the top 
quartile of eigenvalues are bipartisan donors, while 42% of corporation in the third 
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quartile make donations. The eigenvalue measurements also give an insight into 
why the results of Chapter 6 seem to contradict the results of Chapters 2 and 3, but 
in reality are consistent: Figure 5.8 shows that isolated corporations (zero 
eigenvalue) have the lowest chance of being a bipartisan donation. The proportion 
of donors rises as the eigenvalue increases in the fourth and again in the third 
quartile. It peaks at 42% in the third quartile, which is actually in the group of the 
52nd to 35th highest eigenvalues of the 250 corporations in the dataset. However, 
then at the very top of the eigenvalues, in the second and first quartiles, the 
proportion of donors decreases steadily to just 23% of corporations. The set of 
corporations in the top two quartiles is a very small group of corporations - the 35 
with the highest eigenvalues - and thus the relationship which they display, and 
which runs against the trend of other rest of the population of corporations, is 
inherently difficult to detect in a population of 250 corporations and even more so 
in a population of 1575. These differences, however, are important as these are the 
highest status and most politically important corporations in business community. 
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Figure 5.8: The proportion of bipartisan donors amongst the 250 largest 
corporations, categorised according to eigenvalue centrality 
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Figures 5. 9-5.11 show that this trend can be seen in the distribution of bipartisan 
donor behaviour across a range of characteristics in the larger corporate network of 
the entire IBISWorld Larg,est 2000 Companies dataset. For comparison, the Coalition-
only donations have been included in these figures. Figure 5.9 shows the steady 
increase in proportion of bipartisan donors, to a peak of 40% of corporations with 
15-18 interlocks with other corporations, and then shows a moderate decline in 
bipartisan donation behaviour for the corporations with greater than 18 interlocks. 
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Figure 5.9: The proportion of bipartisan donors and Coalition-only donors for 
corporations grouped according to the number of interlocks with other 
corporations in the IBISWorld dataset 
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Figure 5.10 shows a similar pattern in relation to the number of directors on the 
board of a corporation, with a peak in the proportion of donors for corporations 
with 11 to 14 directors, and a marked decline in the proportion of donors amongst 
the corporations with the very largest boards. 
Figure 5.10: The proportion of bipartisan donors and Coalition-only donors for 
corporations grouped according to the number of directors on their board 
0-2 directors 3-6 directors 7 -10 directors 11-14 directors 
1- Bipartisan donors - Coalition-only donors I 
0-2 directors (n. 61) 
3-6 directors (n. 1,040) 
7-10 directors (n. 400) 
11-14 directors (n. 64) 
15-18 directors (n. 10) 
15-18 directors 
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Figure 5.11 shows the pattern replicated for the total number of directors who have 
attended upper class private schools, or who are members of exclusive 
businessmen's clubs. For convenience, these have been designated as "upper class 
directors", and I have included a count of the number of upper class directors on 
each board. The pattern is of a steadily increasing propensity to donate to both 
major parties, and then a decline in propensity to donate to both major parties 
among the corporations with the very highest concentration of upper class 
directors. 
Figure 5.11: The proportion of bipartisan donors and Coalition-only donors for 
corporations grouped according to the number of directors on their board who 
attended upper class private school or who are members of the most exclusive 
businessmen's clubs 
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What mechanism could be driving the process of declining bipartisan donations 
amongst the most interlocked and central corporations in the Australian network? I 
suggest that what is at work is a 'status tariff'. Like the 'legitimacy tariff' facing 
foreign corporations, very high status corporations face a 'status tariff'. This 'status 
tariff' only begins to operate at the highest levels of the corporate network and it 
reflects the two strategies for gaining political influence - interlocking (social capital) 
and political donations (buying influence) - possess an inherent contradiction. The 
strategy of gaining influence through making a political donation - when that 
donation is required to be public as it is in Australia - either explicitly or implicitly 
involves the trade eff of (or at least the risk of trading off) reputation and legitimacy 
for the purchase of political influence. In contrast, the strategy of gaining influence 
through interlocking and developing social capital involves the development of 
influence through the development of reputation and legitimacy. The more a firm 
invests in interlocking and high status directors, the greater the risks, and the lower 
the total reward, from making a political donation. This investment in 'social 
capital', creates the 'status tariff': the firm's investment in status prevents it from 
risking that investment by making a political donation. In contrast, firms on the 
periphery of the interlocking directors network with less social capital face both a 
lower opportunity cost of making a donation and greater potential rewards. This 
has important parallels with the story of anti-regulation industries and defence 
contractors from Chapter 3: as outsiders, firms in these industries are more reliant 
on, and more willing to risk, engaging in a strategy of making political donations to 
gain political influence because they have less to loose in terms of reputation, and a 
lot more to gain from the political connections that may develop. 
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In a qualitative study, Andres (1985: 219) asks why some very large and important 
companies in the US do not make political donations. He argues that the choice to 
donate or not is a political strategy dependent on "senior management's perception 
of what is a politically effective". "Corporations have a multitude of potential 
avenues of influence open to them" and political donations can be a political 
liability. One government relations executive spoke of the "PR costs" of political 
donations in the following way: 
''With all the public relations problems in our industry, the management of 
this company believes the PR costs of having a PAC [political action 
committee] outweigh the benefits. We compensate for not having a PAC by 
getting involved politically in other ways. We have ... an effective lobbying 
effort in our government relations department; and our senior managers 
make a lot of personal contributions." (Andres 1985: 219) 
Andres (1985) quotes another government relations manager who argues that 
political donations are just one of the tools used by corporations to influence politics, 
and that actually, certain other tools, such as skilful lobbying are generally actually 
more important that donations: 
"A PAC simply makes my lobbying job easier; it's a tool, and only as good as 
my skill in using it. I'd rather have a couple of lobbyists who know how to 
work Capitol Hill or the state legislatures and no PAC, than a PAC with no 
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lobbyists to do the follow up work. I know of companies with a PAC that are 
worthless in terms of getting things done in legislatures and those without 
one that know which buttons to push and really get things done." (Andres 
1985: 219-220) 
Two recent examples from Australia further illustrate this trend. One of the largest 
donor corporations in Australia until recently was Manildra Milling, a company 
which produces 96% of Australia's ethanol (Ramsey 2003). It is the 356th largest 
company in Australia and with $1/2 billion in revenue a year it is 1/80th the size of 
BHP Billiton. This corporation had no interlocks, but was the beneficiary of a 
range of state subsidies worth $20 million dollars over just 10 months. The 
relationship between Manildra's political donations - over $300,000 to the Coalition 
and $60,000 to Labor in 14 months - and the state subsidies it received were the 
subject of a major public relations scandal, which proved incredibly damaging for 
the company and also for the politicians in receipt of its donations (Ramsey 2003). 
Labor used the issue to attack the Coalition, and scared motorists from buying 
petrol containing ethanol because they claimed it damaged car engines. In contrast, 
many of the largest and most interlocked corporations have decided not to make 
any political donations. Rhiannon and Thompson (2005) argue that in Australia: 
"Lend Lease, BHP Billiton, National Australia Bank, Rio Tinto and AMP 
have all decided to stop donating to political parties. Some of their CEOs 
are reported to have said that they have decided that giving political 
donations is just not worth the grief they were getting from shareholders 
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and the public ... In 2003 Malcolm Turnbull, who at that time was treasurer 
of the Liberal Party, stated that the new non-donation policies of many 
companies had cost the party $700,000 in potential donations during the 
previous year." 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
At the centre of the Australian corporate network are a small set of highly 
interlocked directors: in Useem's words, an 'Inner Circle'. Strong transitive closure 
around the most interlocked corporations shows that many of the most central 
directors serve on three or more boards. The boards on which these highly 
interlocked directors serve are the largest corporations in the corporate network. 
The boards of interlocked corporations contain considerable social capital. Aside 
from corporate interlocks they have a large number of non-executive directors on 
their boards, and the persons on these boards tend to be high status individuals, as 
shown by their listing in Who's Who. These boards intersect with upper class 
networks. There is an overrepresentation of directors from exclusive private 
schools and of directors who are members of the top businessmen's clubs. These 
interlocked boards also intersect with the centres of business political policy making, 
containing the executives of the most important four business associations. 
Interlocking is a form of social power which appears incompatible with, or at least 
in conflict with, the exercise of several other forms of corporate social and political 
302 
power. The most highly interlocked corporations tend to make fewer political 
donations. This may be because donations are a crude form of power that exposes 
corporations and their political supporters to accusations of corruption, or perhaps 
because corporations who have less ties resort to political donations more often due 
to a lack of any better means of influencing politics. 
Another form of social power which appears to be at odds with a propensity to 
interlock is director wealth. Corporations on which the super-wealthy serve tend to 
interlock less frequently. Perhaps wealth opens its own doors, and interlocking is 
less necessary for these corporations and their wealthy directors. Perhaps 
interlocking acts as a constraint on 'private' or 'family' businesses, opening them to 
unwanted outside scrutiny and influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overview 
This thesis began with a puzzle: We know that business is a privileged actor in the 
politics of liberal democracies, yet we know little about the major political 
tendencies within the business community, and in particular, little about the social 
and economic foundations of such divisions. Three dimensions of business political 
organisation were explored as potential sites of political cleavage: political 
partisanship (Chapter 2), political leadership (Chapter 3) and political cohesion 
(Chapters 4 and 5). 
Chapter 2 explored political partisanship through modelling political donations. An 
initial examination of the data showed that much of the previous literature on the 
subject had modelled political donations using measures that did not take account 
of a number of important factors. First, that donations have only symbolic cost for 
corporations (the average donation was only 0.005% of corporate revenue and less 
than the annual wages of one employee) and also, second, that donations are 
distinctly banded, broken into two groups. Indeed, nearly 90% of donations are 
made by corporations who either donate (1) approximately equally to both major 
parties, or (2) all, or almost all, to the Coalition-only. The modelling showed that 
these two bands of donation behaviour were actually two distinct political strategies 
associated with very different types of corporations. There were two major findings 
of Chapter 2: first, donation behaviour appeared to correlate with an 
insider/ outsider divide within the business community, and, second, Coalition-only 
304 
donations appeared to be driven by considerably more social and ideological 
influences than bipartisan donation behaviour. 
An insider/ outsider divide within the corporate community corresponded closely 
with a bipartisan/Coalition-only political divide. For example, bipartisan donation 
behaviour was more likely to be undertaken by companies who had directors who 
were: on a government board or enterprise (nearly 3 times higher odds), members 
of the BCA leadership (4 times higher odds), listed in Who'.r Who (9 times higher 
odds), and members of exclusive businessmen's clubs (2.8 times higher odds). 
Bipartisan donor companies themselves also tended to be: located in a regulated 
industry (2 times higher odds) or anti-regulation industry (1.6 times higher odds, 
particularly the petroleum and chemical, and oil and gas industries), defence 
contractors (9 times higher odds), large corporations (1.5 times higher odds for 
every $10 billion in revenue), public listed industrial corporations (2 times higher 
odds), with larger boards of directors (1.5 times higher odds for every four 
directors) and a greater number of interlocks with other corporations (1.5 times 
higher odds if directors serve on 5 other company boards). I argue in Chapter 2 
that this set of characteristics appears to delineate a 'core corporate community', a 
term which for convenience has been replaced with the word 'insiders'. 
In contrast, Coalition-only donors showed a tendency to be 'outsider' corporations. 
Coalition-only donors showed virtually none of the tendencies of bipartisan donors, 
and instead Coalition-only donations were more likely to be made by corporations 
whose directors served on the business associations representing smaller 
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corporations (2.7 times higher odds), and no companies which had directors in the 
leadership of the BCA made a Coalition-only donation. Bivariate analysis of 
Coalition-only donors found that they were less likely to be located in regulated 
industries than the average corporation (one in five of all Top 2000 corporations 
were located in regulated industries, while only one in eight Coalition-only donors 
were located in regulated industries). On average Coalition-only donors were 
smaller corporations (mean revenue of $747 million for all corporations versus a 
mean revenue of $665 million for Coalition-only donors), and more likely than 
bipartisan donors to be private (proprietary) corporations (24% of bipartisan donors 
were private companies versus 42% of Coalition-only donors). 
The second major finding of Chapter 2 was that Coalition-only donations were 
driven by considerably greater social and ideological influences than bipartisan 
donors. For example, Coalition-only donation behaviour was more likely to be 
observed amongst corporations who had directors that served on the boards of 
conservative think tanks (4.5 times higher odds), were educated at exclusive private 
schools (4.5 times higher odds) or who served on the boards of other Coalition-only 
donors (1.3 times higher odds if half of the directors serve on the boards of 
Coalition-only donors). None of these, or similar tendencies played a role in 
driving bipartisan donor behaviour. 
Together these two major findings suggest that, first, corporations within the core 
corporate community that engage in the strategy of donating to both major parties 
are motivated by an individualistic, atomistic, firm-specific rationality, which aims to 
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gain and maintain access to whichever political party holds government. For many 
firms, such as those in highly regulated industries or defence contractors, this 
displays all of the characteristics of rent-seeking behaviour. Second, it suggests that 
outsider corporations who are Coalition-only donors are motivated by either strong 
ideological and/or social commitments to conservative/Coalition political success, 
or by the material interests of small, outsider corporations. Such corporations 
cannot hope to extract economic rent from the state, and so adopt a rationally self-
interested strategy of supporting the Coalition in the hope that a Coalition 
Government will bring greater benefits for business as a whole (through policies 
such as lower business taxes or industrial relations reform). 
In addition to these primary findings of Chapter 2, a number of secondary 
observations were made. Both bipartisan donation behaviour and Coalition-only 
donation behaviour was more likely to be observed in corporations that had 
directors listed in the Rich 200 (2 and 2. 7 times higher odds respectively) and that 
were listed in Who'.r Who (9 and 2.8 times higher odds respectively), as well as in 
corporations which were legal or account partnerships (20 and 10 times higher odds 
respectively). The overrepresentation of the wealthy and of partnerships appears to 
arise from the considerable independent power provided by their wealth (the rich) 
or expertise (partnerships). In addition, the modelling in Chapter 2 found strong 
evidence for the operation of the so-called 'legitimacy tariff' on foreign-owned 
corporations, meaning that they make considerably fewer political donations 
because of the illegitimacy of foreign interference in Australian domestic politics 
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(approximately 2% of foreign-owned corporations made donations, while 6% of 
Australian-owned corporations made donations). 
Chapter 3 sought to focus on testing the theory of insider and outsider corporations 
by modelling the factors governing recruitment of corporations' directors to one of 
six political leadership groups. Overall, the general findings of Chapter 2 were 
further confirmed. There was a definite set of characteristics, similar to those for 
bipartisan donors, which defined the core corporate community. There was also a 
set of characteristics very similar to those of Coalition-only donors, which were 
associated with outsider status. There were also, however, some notable exceptions; 
and thus the schema derived from Chapter 2's modelling required refinement. 
Conservative think tanks were associated with both Coalition-only donations and 
strong ties to the core corporate community. Defence contractors displayed the 
opposite phenomena: they were bipartisan donors who showed few ties to the core 
corporate community, and thus appeared to be outsiders. Anti-regulation industries 
showed similar behaviour, donating to both major parties, but being excluded from 
the core corporate community and business political leadership positions. All three 
characteristics which were associated with both increased bipartisan and Coalition-
only donations - Who :r Who listing, partnerships and the Rich 200 - were all shown 
to be strongly represented in business political leadership positions and the core 
corporate community, and thus represented a set of corporations who were core 
corporate community members who potentially were Coalition-only donors. In 
addition, foreign-owned corporations were shown to be neither significantly 
included nor significantly excluded from most business political leadership 
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positions, thus further confirming the hypothesis that their failure to engage in 
political donations was because of a 'legitimacy tariff on the public participation of 
foreign corporations in Australian political life. In those forms of business politics 
not subject to significant public scrutiny, foreign-owned corporations showed little 
to no systematic exclusion. 
Chapters 4 and 5 sought to explore a third dimension of political and social 
organisation within the Australian business community: the network formed by 
shared directors of corporations, also called 'interlocking directorates' or simply 
'interlocks'. Directors who serve on multiple corporate boards, and corporations 
who have directors serving on other boards, have been seen as important political 
and social leaders within the business communities of many countries. In Chapter 4 
and 5 I attempted to study systematically the characteristics of corporations who 
shared directors with other major corporations, and by so doing gain insights into 
the most important social and political characteristics and groupings within the 
Australian business community. Because each shared director necessarily connects 
two corporations, this network had the potential to provide important insights into 
the underlying characteristics of both group formation and hierarchy within the 
corporate community. 
The most important findings of Chapters 4 and 5 were, first, that the centralised 
nature of the corporate network was actually driven by 'transitivity' - that is the 
tendency to form triangular interlocks between three corporations - and not by 
'popularity' (the tendency for the numerous ties from unpopular corporations to go 
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to a few important corporations). These triangular interlocks were interpreted as 
being formed by highly networked directors who served on three or more corporate 
boards, and thus, it was suggested that the centralised nature of the corporate 
network was driven by these very important directors. 
The second important finding was that there was very little subgroup formation 
within the corporate community. The evidence for this was that almost none of the 
attribute parameters displayed homophily (a preference for ties with similar others). 
The exceptions to this rule were listed corporations and upper class schools. The 
homophily of listed corporations suggests that there is a tendency for public listed 
industrial corporations to form a distinct community. The homophily of upper 
class schools suggests the continuance of an upper class network within the 
corporate community in Australia. The third important finding, which follows on 
from the failure to find 'subgroups', is that the general pattern of interlocking in the 
corporate community appeared to be organised according to a general preference to 
interlock with other 'high status' corporations. This 'status' could take many forms: 
large corporations, corporations with business association executives as directors, 
corporations with a large number of directors listed in Who's Who, and corporations 
with a large number of directors from upper class schools or businessmen's clubs, 
all showed a tendency towards greater interlocking. This suggests a degree of 
commensurability of these different forms of 'status' and political influence within 
and across the business community. The fourth important finding was that the 
corporations of the super-wealthy (F.ich 200 displayed a significantly lower 
propensity to interlock, which was interpreted as a sign that interlocking presented a 
310 
limit on the autonomy of the super-wealthy, and since the super-wealthy appear to 
already be insiders (as seen in Chapter 2 and 3), they do not need interlocking as a 
mechanism for gaining greater social or political influence. 
The fifth and final finding of Chapters 4 and 5 were that at the very centre of the 
corporate network there appeared to be a group of between 20 and 40 corporations 
who, because of their very high status in the business community, faced what I have 
termed a 'status tariff on their political donation behaviour. This manifested itself 
in modelling as a significant negative relationship between interlocking and 
bipartisan political donation. This relationship could be visualised as the complete 
absence of political donations by the 20 most central corporations in the interlocks 
network. It was also confirmed by alternative measures of high status within the 
corporate network, such as eigenvalue centrality, which showed a marked decrease 
in donation behaviour amongst the most central 36 corporations in the corporate 
network. In the 'real world' this status tariff manifests itself in the behaviour of 
corporations like the National Australia Bank (the largest bank and one of the most 
interlocked corporations in Australia), which has implemented a policy of not 
making any political donations. 
Implications 
One of the most important implications of this research is simply that a large-scale 
quantitative dissection of a national business community can yield meaningful 
results. I believe I have generated an overarching framework for characterising the 
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most important political divisions and political actors within the business 
community in Australia. I would argue that this framework makes sense of many 
seemingly paradoxical political dynamics within the business community. The utility 
is evident when we try to analyse a particular example. For instance, why was one 
of the largest donors to the Liberal Party is the 192znct largest enterprise in Australia, 
and why was it's owner, Robert Gerard, appointed to the Board of the Reserve 
Bank by the Howard Government even though his corporation had a turnover 
nearly 1000 times smaller that of BHP Billiton? Using the findings of this study, it 
can be inferred that rich individuals have an important political independence which 
appears to allow them to act ideologically and thus provide important partisan 
support to conservative governments. It is also the case that smaller corporations, 
because they do not have to fear reprisals from a Labor Government, are much 
freer to be Coalition partisan actors. Through this lens the Gerard example does 
not seem so unusual. 
Another seeming paradox is why was the Howard Government so hostile to the 
Business Council of Australia, and so close to Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, during its 11 years (1996 to 2007) of government? The findings of 
this thesis imply that large, regulated, public listed corporations of the BCA feared 
the consequences of alienating future Labor Governments (or Labor Governments 
in the states and territories), while the smaller 'outsider' corporations that make up 
the majority of the membership of the ACCI have much less to lose, and 
considerably more to gain, from partisan support for the Coalition. In a similar vein 
we can make sense of why the BCA employed the former advisor to Labor Prime 
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Minister Bob Hawke as its chief executive for 4 1/2 years (1996 to 2001)36, while the 
ACCI has seen no fewer than 6 transfers of senior staff between the it's office and 
the ministries and shadow ministries of the Federal Coalition over the last 8 years 
(Gluyas 2001: 18; Henderson 2000: 2; Kerr 2008).37 
Further research 
Fitting seemingly paradoxical behaviour into a meaningful schema is an 
achievement, but it does not necessarily prove the exact mechanisms driving the 
behaviour. One of the limitations of this thesis has been the cross-sectional nature 
(i.e. single time point) of the dataset. Cross-section data makes proof of causality 
inherently difficult. Thus, one major area of future research is the collection of 
another time point of data, possibly several, so as to be able to run longitudinal 
models and gain a better purchase over causality. Another limitation of this study is 
that many of the variables are inherently rare events. Multiple time points would 
provide a greater number of cases (though, clearly with limitations as many will be 
the same corporation/ director) and thus provide a larger sample upon which to test 
models. 
36 The BCA's employed David Buckingham, a former staffer to Labor Party Printe Minister Bob 
Hawke, as the BCA's Chief Executive from 1996 until 2001 (Gluyas 2001: 18). This attracted 
considerable criticism from the Howard Government. 
37 There has been the transfer of no less that six senior staff between the ACCI and the Liberal Party 
ministries in recent years: during the last years of the Howard Government, the ACCI Chief Executive 
(Peter Hendy), policy director (Peter Anderson) and communications director (Brett Hogan) all were 
former staffers from the office of the Howard Government's Workplace Relations Minister Peter 
Reith. After the fall of the Howard Government, the new Coalition Opposition Leader, Brendan 
Nelson, appointed ACCI Chief Executive (Hendy) as his Chief of Staff, ACCI director of economic 
(Michael Potter) as his chief economist, and another ACCI staff member (Nicolle Flint) as a policy 
advisor (Kerr 2008). 
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All of the research in this thesis has used corporations as the cases. There are vast 
quantities of untapped data to be explored if the directors themselves (all 7,500) are 
used as cases, or ideally, if a 2-mode (director-corporation) dataset could be analysed 
without any requirement to collapse the dataset into a 1-mode projection. 
There are some notable variables which could be incorporated into future analyses, 
including stockholding networks, industry input/ output tables, monopoly and 
industry concentration tables, and banking/ debt networks. I have personally 
already sourced a number of these. In addition, I have obtained the movements of 
over 300 former ministerial staff from both Labor and Coalition Governments, and 
the movement of these personnel into the corporate world could be used as an 
alternative test of the partisan/bipartisan divide. 
A comparative study involving the UK and/ or the US, collecting similar data for 
each country, would provide an invaluable test for the theories, models and findings 
of this thesis. Interviews with senior business people and politicians would also 
provide important insights into the mechanisms driving the observed findings. 
Finally, choosing a case study of a major political event, such as the recent conflict 
over industrial relations in the last 3 years of the Howard Government and the first 
year of the Rudd Labor Government, could be used to test the limits of the 
quantitative insights of this thesis, and also marry them with more easily digested 
qualitative material. 
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APPENDIX A: POLITICAL DONATIONS FOR 
COMPANIES WITH VARIO US 
CHARACTERISTICS. 
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% 
% Major % Donor Coalition Labor 
N Parties Coalition sTo Donations Donations Coalitio 
Donors 38 -only Both ($) ($) /ALP Donors Major 
Parties 
1575 8.4% 2.8% 5.6% $5,575,835 $3,652,334 1.53 
Exposure to government decisions 
Class & Status 
365 17.3% 3.8% 13.4% $3,053, 136 1.24 
**Rich200 2005 individual 93 22.6% 7.5% 15.1% $1,288,078 $768,728 1.68 
Network Effects 
1056 5.6% 2.3% 3.3% $1,998,990 2.05 
323 8.0% 3.7% 4.3% $1,058,252 1.76 
131 15.3% 3.1% 12.2% $707,456 1.30 
75 4.0% 18.7% $933,724 1.19 
$877,413 
38 excluding Labor-only donors 
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Business associations, think tanks and 
non-profit organisations 
Think Tanks 
Whitlam Institute 
Brisbane Institute 
S dne Institute 
Quadrant Ma azine 
Menzies Research Centre 
Lo Institute 
Lavoisier Grou 
Institute of Public Affairs 
Evatt Foundation 
Centre for lnde endent Studies 
Chifle Research Centre 
Australian Fabian Societ 
Australian Collaboration 
Australian Business Foundation 
Companll T)lpe 
Pro rieta Com an 
Partners hi 
Non-Listed Public 
Listed Trust 
Forei n Owned Public Listed Industrial 
Forei 
Forei 
Forei n Owned Non-Listed Public 
Forei n Owned Listed Trust 
lndust 
B: Minin 
C: Manufacturin 
D: Electricit , Gas and Water Su 
E: Construction 
F: Wholesale Trade 
G: Retail Trade 
J: Communication Services 
K: Finance and Insurance 
L: Pro e and Business Services 
M: Government Adminstration and Defence 
0 
4 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
3 
4 
0 
11 
0 
0 
0 
2 
394 
365 
21 
149 
35 
37 
463 
2 
162 
2 
18 
78 
402 
41 
89 
332 
147 
16 
69 
23 
155 
187 
0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 
33.3% 0.0% 33.3% $263,469 $254,408 1.04 
33.3% 0.0% 33.3% $13,300 $221,300 0.06 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 
45.5% 18.2% 27.3% $175,064 $123,150 1.42 
50.0% 0.0% 50.0% $245,719 $239,408 1.03 
15.5% 3.8% 11.7% $2,635,888 $1,751,565 1.50 
8.2% 4.1% 4.1% $1,345,210 $559,780 2.40 
42.9% 14.3% 28.6% $145,660 $193,874 0.75 
2.7% 1.3% 1.3% $33,620 $59,955 0.56 
17.1% 0.0% 17.1% $133,065 $430,914 0.31 
8.1% 0.0% 8.1% $184,700 $239,925 0.77 
2.4% 0.9% 1.5% $523,182 $164,560 3.18 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8.0% 3.7% 4.3% $574,511 $251,761 2.28 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
16.7% 5.6% 11.1% $41,500 $47,500 0.87 
11.5% 2.6% 9.0% $184,750 $143,520 1.29 
10.4% 5.0% 5.5% $1,740,985 $658,120 2.65 
2.4% 0.0% 2.4% $25,000 $20,000 1.25 
9.0% 3.4% 5.6% $292,913 $291,033 1.01 
0.9% 0.3% 0.6% $183,000 $45,000 4.07 
2.7% 1.4% 1.4% $120,500 $87,000 1.39 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 
10.1% 2.9% 7.2% $189,215 $113,682 1.66 
8.7% 0.0% 8.7% $56,535 $37,590 1.50 
16.8% 1.9% 14.8% $1,383,464 $937,959 1.47 
11.8% 4.3% 7.5% $544,481 $766,030 0.71 
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N: Education 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
0: Health and Community Services 21 9.5% 4.8% 4.8% $312,646 $25,000 12.51 
P: Cultural and Recreational Services 33 18.2% 0.0% 18.2% $430,846 $479,900 0.90 
Q: Personal and Other Services 16 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% $70,000 $0 -
lndust!Jl {2 Digit SIC}39 
Accommodation, Cates and Restaurants 16 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Aariculture 6 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% $3,500 $0 -
Air and Space Transport 5 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% $5,000 $35,000 0.14 
Basic Material Wholesalina 87 1.1% 0.0% 1.1% $140,000 $20,000 7.00 
Business Services 128 9.4% 3.9% 5.5% $241,870 $291,714 0.83 
Coal Minina 17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $25,000 0.00 
Commercial Fishina 5 40.0% 0.0% 40.0% $38,000 $47,500 0.80 
Communication Services 23 8.7% 0.0% 8.7% $56,535 $37,590 1.50 
Community Services 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Construction Trade Services 14 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Education 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Electricity and Gas Suooly 35 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% $25,000 $20,000 1.25 
Finance 84 17.9% 2.4% 15.5% $746,326 $455, 151 1.64 
Food Retailing 16 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% $110,500 $87,000 1.27 
Food, Beveraae and Tobacco Manufacturina 99 13.1% 8.1% 5.1% $752,830 $228,800 3.29 
Forestry and Locoing 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
General Construction 75 10.7% 4.0% 6.7% $292,913 $291,033 1.01 
Government Administration 0 - - - - - -
Health Services 14 14.3% 7.1% 7.1% $312,646 $25,000 12.51 
Insurance 40 10.0% 2.5% 7.5% $84,620 $31,706 2.67 
Libraries, Museums and the Arts 0 - - - - - -
Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 101 8.9% 5.0% 4.0% $401,715 $149,550 2.69 
Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesalina 131 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Metal Ore Mining 44 13.6% 4.5% 9.1% $147,600 $89,100 1.66 
Metal Product Manufacturing 33 9.1% 3.0% 6.1% $36,755 $23,150 1.59 
Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services 21 19.0% 0.0% 19.0% $379,346 $447,150 0.85 
Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services 63 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturina 20 20.0% 15.0% 5.0% $79,250 $35,000 2.26 
Oil and Gas Extraction 7 42.9% 0.0% 42.9% $37,150 $29,420 1.26 
Other Manufacturing 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Other Minina 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Other Services 11 18.2% 18.2% 0.0% $70,000 $0 -
Other Transoort 2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% $5,000 $5,000 1.00 
Personal and Household Good Retailina 68 2.9% 2.9% 0.0% $10,000 $0 -
Personal and Household Good Wholesaling 114 1.8% 0.9% 0.9% $43,000 $25,000 1.72 
Personal Services 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Petroleum, Coal, and Chemical Manufacturina 83 8.4% 1.2% 7.2% $119,835 $98,265 1.22 
Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media 26 3.8% 0.0% 3.8% $14,600 $5,025 2.91 
Prooertv Services 59 16.9% 5.1% 11.9% $302,611 $474,316 0.64 
Rail Transport 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Road Transport 17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Services to Aariculture, Huntina and Traooina 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Services to Finance and Insurance 31 22.6% 0.0% 22.6% $552,519 $451,102 1.22 
Services to Mining 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 
-
Services to Transport 36 13.9% 5.6% 8.3% $179,215 $73,682 2.43 
39 Some category names have been slightly abreviated for space. 
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Sport and Recreation 12 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% $51,500 $32,750 1.57 
Storage 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Textile, Clothing, and Footwear Manufacturing 18 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% $23,500 $9,450 2.49 
Water, Sewerage and Drainage Services 6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Water Transoort 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 -
Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing 18 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% $312,500 $108,880 2.87 
Locality: Australian States (abreviation, 
state capital) 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT, Canberra) 8 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% $34,000 $3,200 10.63 
New South Wales lNSW, Svdnev) 754 9.5% 2.7% 6.9% $3,376,484 $2,478,647 1.36 
Northern Territory (NT, Darwin) 3 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% $30,000 $40,000 0.75 
Queensland (QLD, Brisbane) 153 7.8% 5.9% 2.0% $168,950 $74,755 2.26 
South Australia (SA, Adelaide) 75 14.7% 6.7% 8.0% $246,170 $38,070 6.47 
Tasmania (TAS, Hobart) 12 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% $70,000 $0 -
Victoria (VIC, Melbourne) 450 4.4% 1.6% 2.9% $1, 157, 131 $802,462 1.44 
Western Australia (WA, Perth) 119 16.0% 2.5% 13.4% $493,100 $215,200 2.29 
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APPENDIX B: VN"A BUILDER - SOFTWARE 
TO BUILD SOCIAL NETWORKS FROM 
LARGE BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATABASES 
Introduction 
The network's contained in this PhD have been extracted from large databases. Some of 
these, such as the database Who's Who in Australia, are commercial databases containing 
over 10,000 entries. Other databases have been built by political organisations from 
publicly available sources, such as the NSW Greens' Democrary 4 Sale website database of 
political party funding, that has been compiled from Australian Electoral Commission 
data. This contains over 8,000 entries. 
For network analysts the large size of these databases presents a serious problem. The 
main difficulty is one of data entry. There is no simple method of transforming 
database-style data into a file format that can be imported into network analysis software. 
Instead, almost all file formats used for network analysis require laborious data-entry 
using a text editor. The manual for UCINET 6.0 exemplifies this when it says "The best, 
most general way ... is to enter the data into an ASCII file using a file editor or your 
favourite word processor." (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002b: 20) The UCINET 
manual "strongly" [bold and underline in original] suggests using "the DL filetype", 
which is a text file containing manually entered data, either in the form of a matrix or 
long lists of nodes and ties (Borgatti, et. al., 2002b: 20). For individuals without 
significant institutional financial support, who want to examine large databases, the 
burden of data entry either limits or totally excludes many potential research areas. 
To address this problem, approximately 1 month of work on this thesis was dedicated to 
building a computer program that would automate the process of building network 
analysis data from large databases. The result of this work was a novel computer 
program called VNA Builder.40 This appendix is an attempt to outline the rational 
behind VNA Builder, provide an overview of the process of its development, and an 
introduction to using the program. Thus, this appendix is divided into four sections: 
Section 1: Network analysis and the problem of data entry. 
Section 2: The development process behind VNA Builder. 
Section 3: An introduction to using VNA Builder. 
40 VN"A Builderwas written in Visual Basic .NET programming language. VNA is the preferred file type 
for network analysis and network drawing programs, particularly UCINET and NetDraw (contrary to the 
previously quoted words from the UCINET handbook). 
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Section 4: The code for VNA Builder (with comments). 
Section 1: Network analysis and the problem of data entry. 
One of the most common computerised data storage forms in the modem world is the 
database. Databases allow the storage of large amounts of standardized data in a series 
on interlinked tables. Much of the primary data for this PhD was either already stored in 
a database, or very easily entered into a database. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the kinds of 
tables that can be found in (or easily built to form) the databases used as primary sources 
for this thesis. 
Table 1: Donations to the Federal Liberal Party (2003/ 4) 
Source: Democracy4Sale (2005) 
Table 2: Career Path of The Hon. Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN, Federal Minister for Finance and 
Administration, Commonwealth Government of Australia. (Dec 2004) 
Name Career Step Start Year Finish 
Year 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Federal Minister for Finance and Administration 2001 continuing 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate 2003 continuing 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Vice-President of the Executive Council 2004 continuing 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Senator (Lib.) for South Australia 1993 continuing 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources 1998 2001 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Special Minr of State 1997 1998 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Minr Asstg PM 1997 1998 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Parity Sec. to Ldr Onnosition 1994 1996 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN State Dir SA Lib Partv 1985 1993 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Dep. Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1983 1983 
Nicholas Hueh MINCHIN Asst Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust. 1981 1982 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1978 1980 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Partv Aust. 1977 1977 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN SolrNSW 1977 1977 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Memb. Zoological Socv (SA) 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN Memb. Trees for Life (SA) 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN Memb. Lib Party Aust. (SA Div.) 
Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN British Cl Schol. 1991 1991 
Nicholas Hugh MIN CHIN American Field Schol. 1970 1971 
Source: Who's Who in Australia (2004) 
It is reasonably self-evident that both Table 1 and Table 2 contain network data. Figure 
1 (page 340) was drawn using the data contained in Table 1, and Figure 2 was drawn 
using the data in Table 2. 
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In Figure 1, the ties represent the flow of money (in the direction of the arrows), from 
corporate donors to the Federal Llberal Party. The size of the ties is indicative of the 
relative size of the flow of money. 
Figure 1: Donations to the Federal Liberal Party 
• Allianz Australia Limited l Adelaide Brighton Ltd 
.A.ustraland Holdings Ltd 
...... Austal Ships Ply Ltd 
.Australian Business Limited 
/ \ Austral Lock Ply Ltd 
"AGL Limited 
• Aussie Home Loans Limited 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
In Figure 2, the nodes represent organisations and/ or positions that Federal Liberal 
Minister for Finance and Administration, Nick Minchin, has passed through, while the 
ties and arrows represent the direction of movement from one position or organisation 
to the next. 
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Figure 2: Career Path of The Hon. Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
From Figures 1 and 2 we can see the network data contained within the databases 
illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. The problem for the social network analyst is how to 
transform these databases into 'network data' - network data which can be 'read' by 
social network software such as UCINET and NetDraw. 
The source of the problem: Matrix data 
The root source of this problem is that, for social network analysis software, network 
data is always ultimately matrix data. This means that social network analysis 
software needs the data in the form of a matrix, or in a form from which the program 
can build a matrix. Figure 3 and Figure 4 (on next two pages) are examples of the matrix 
data contained within Table 1/Figure 1 and Table 2/Figure 2 respectively. 
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Figure 3: Matrix of Donations to the Federal Liberal Party 
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AGL Limited 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13500 
ANZ Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150000 
Adelaide Brighton Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35000 
Allianz Australia Limited 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20000 
Arnold Block Leibler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8250 
Asia Pacific Democrat Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27475 
Aussie Home Loans Limited 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25000 
Austal Ships Ply Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10000 
Austral Lock Pty Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5000 
Australand Holdings Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25000 
Australian Business Limited 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6000 
Liberal Fed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Matrix constructed using UCINET 6.83 (Borgett:i, Everett, and Freeman 2002a) 
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Figure 4: Matrix of Career Path of The Hon. Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN 
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Asst Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
British Cl Schol. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dep. Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Deputy Leader of the Government iu the Senate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fed. Miur for Ind. Sc. and Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Federal Minister for Finance and Administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minr Asstg PM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Party Aust. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senator (Lib.) for South Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SolrNSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Special Minr of State 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State Dir SA Lib Party 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vice-President of the Executive Council 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Matrix constructed using UCINET 6.83 (Borgetti, Everett, and Freeman 2002a) 
Most social network software accepts data in this 'raw' matrix form: the network analyst 
simply types the matrix, in full, in a text editor, and then opens this in UCINET or 
another social network analysis program. 
The limitations of this method are relatively self evident: (a) data is almost never 
'naturally' found in matrix format when collected or stored, so creating matrices requires 
intensive data entry, (b) entering ls and Os into large spreadsheets or text files is 
incredibly tedious and prone to data entry problems which are difficult to check, and (c) 
the size of the data set increases at an exponential rate with the number of nodes. This 
last point is best illustrated with an example: while the dataset for Nick Minchin (Matrix 
2) is a 15-node data set with a (15x15) 225-cell matrix, a 100-node data set, has a 
(100x100) 10,000-cell matrix, and a 1000-node dataset would have a (1000~ 1 million-cell 
matrix. For elite networks, this problem is particularly profound, as a network of 1000 
persons may have, on average, 5 original organisations/positions per person, meaning 
that the number of cells in a matrix is actually (5 x 1000)2 or 25 million. 
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A Partial Solution: Modem File Formats (DL, VNA, etc.) 
Fortunately, moderately more user-friendly methods have been developed for importing 
data into social network analysis software. The DL filetype is one of these. Another is 
the VNA file format, which is used in this PhD. 
The advantage of these file formats is that they allow a simplification of the matrix data, 
so that instead of writing the entire matrix, the user only specifies 'node attributes' or 'tie 
data' or 'tie attributes'. These files are then imported into social network software such as 
UCINET or NetDraw, and the program itself builds the matrix from the data in the DL 
orVNA file. 
The advantage of this can be seen in Figure 5 and Figure 6. These are another way of 
representing the information in Table 1/Figure 1/Figure 3 and Table 2/Figure 2/Figure 
4 respectively. The information is represented as a series of ties, where only the ties 
which are present are listed (as against listing those that are not present, which are 
represented by a 'O' in matrices). 
Figure 5: VNA File of Donations to the Federal Liberal Party 
*tie data 
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1
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11 Aust.ra1and :Holdings Ltd" 
''Australian Business Limited" 
"etc." 
to 
"Liberal Fedu 
"Liberal Fed" 
"Liberal Ft:d11 
"Liberal Ft:d11 
"Liberal F'ed" 
"Liberal Fed" 
"Liberal Fed" 
"l.,lberal 'Fed" 
"Liberal Fed 11 
"Libernl Fcd 11 
''Liberal r:edt' 
"etc." 
money 
"35000" 
"13500" 
"20000" 
"150000" 
n8250't 
1127475 11 
"25000" 
"10000" 
11 500011 
"25000!1 
11 6000 11 
"etc." 
Figure 6: VNA File of Career Path of The Hon. Nicholas Hugh MINCHIN 
*Tie data 
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"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources" 
"Federal Minister for Finance and Administration" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Federal Minister for Finance and Administration" 
"Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"State Dir SA Lib Party" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Special Minr of State" 
"Minr Asstg PM" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Minr Asstg PM" 
"Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Special Minr of State" 
"Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"State Dir SA Lib Party" 
"Dep. Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Asst Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Party Aust." 
"SolrNSW" 
"SolrNSW" 
"Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Party Aust." 
"State Dir SA Lib Party" 
to 
"Federal Minister for Finance and Administration " 
"Federal Minister for Finance and Administration " 
"Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate" 
"Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate" 
"Vice-President of the Executive Council" 
"Vice-President of the Executive Council" 
"Vice-President of the Executive Council" 
"Senator (Lib.) for South Australia" 
"Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources" 
"Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources" 
"Fed. Minr for Ind. Sc. and Resources" 
"Special Minr of State" 
"Special Minr of State" 
"Special Minr of State" 
"Minr Asstg PM" 
"Minr Asstg PM" 
"Minr Asstg PM" 
"Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition" 
"Parity Sec. to Ldr Opposition" 
"State Dir SA Lib Party" 
"Dep. Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Asst Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Party Aust." 
"Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Party Aust." 
"SolrNSW" 
"British Cl Schol." 
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While these modern file formats reduce the data entry load, they are not practical for 
very large datasets, as they still require enormous amounts of hand entered data, which 
means prohibitive amounts of time and/ or money, they have problems with accuracy 
and no effective method of data checking, and the file formats are not useful for either 
data storage or data sorting.41 
The Full Solution: Automating the Extraction of Network Data from Databases 
These problems tend to point towards some form of simple automation of data entry, 
from a standardized source, such as a database (such as Microsoft Access, MySQL, SQL 
Server, Oracle) or a spreadsheet program (such as Excel). These, particularly databases, 
have the advantage of (a) being a data storage format that is widely used for most existing 
'elite data' (such as Who's Who), (b) having user-friendly data entry interfaces, for cases 
where the data is not already in database format, (c) having user-friendly sorting facilities 
(which facilitate checking data for accuracy), and (d) being purposed designed for 
running complicated queries against (through their inbuilt query language SQL). 
Two other factors also seem to favour the creation of automated extraction of network 
data from a database. First, databases provide a great deal of flexibility in data storage 
and manipulation. Large, complicated datasets can be entered into a database, and then 
sub-sets extracted quite simply. In contrast, when one types out a VNA or DL file, the 
data is essentially static, and not able to be aggregated into larger datasets or broken into 
sub-sets without great difficulty (if at all). Databases also have simple methods of data 
checking, such as sorting of columns, which allows an analyst to check for misspellings. 
In addition, so long as the software is working, there are zero data-entry mistakes when 
translating information from a database into a VNA/DL file. 
The second factor that favoured a system of automated extraction was the specific 
problem of compiling 'career path' data for this PhD. To analyse and visually represent 
the data of career paths requires building VNA files that show the ties that link each 
individual career step in each person's career. For Minister Minchin (Table 2), this 
involves specifying 27 ties that bind together 15 nodes (as can be seen in Figure 4). 
Specifying these links is not a simple matter, since it requires identifying which jobs a 
person was doing, or had just completed, when they started a new position. As 
mentioned, for just the one person used in this Appendix as an example, this involved 27 
ties. To do this for the small dataset of 120 or so Federal Parliamentarians would involve 
identifying something of the order of two to four thousand ties. However, the process 
of identifying these ties can be represented by a simple mathematical formula, and this 
mathematical formula can itself be transformed into a SQL query on a database to 
extract this information. Thus, in the case of building complicated ties from more 
elaborate data sets, the use of a database and a computer program to extract such data 
seems to be a necessity. 
41 A list of 1000 nodes with six links from each node, still requires the typing of a list six thousand lines 
long, with two nodes per line. It also requires all spelling for the 12,000 nodes in the list to be exactly 
correct, since any misspelling of a node which appears more than once, will result in the creation of a new 
node (rather than multiple links to the same node). 
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Section 2: The development process behind Vl\TA Builder. 
The decision to write a new computer program was not taken lightly, especially 
considering the author's lack of formal training in computer programming. Instead, this 
decision was taken after significant research and experimentation with a range of other 
options, as well as consultation with experts in network analysis, databases and computer 
programming. 
Research and informal consultation with leading social network analysts from Australia 
and overseas42 established that UCINET was the most widely used and highly regarded 
software for social network analysis. Communication with the designer of UCINET, 
Steve Borgatti, established that the ideal file format for storing network data was VNA -
a file format that allows both direct importing into both NetDraw (for visual 
representation of networks) and UCINET (for analysis of networks, and also conversion 
of the data into any other file format). 
Experimentation with UCINET revealed the sharp data-entry limitations of UCINET -
as outlined in section 1. The author sought advice from Mark Cole, an expert in large-
scale social science databases, from the Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Training (ACIRR1) at the University of Sydney. Cole's advice informed 
the strategy behind the computer programming for this thesis. Cole argued that social 
scientists tend to approach databases and computer programming with overly grandiose 
plans to build an all-purpose system. The problem with this approach is, as Cole put it, 
that the database, not the research, becomes the project, and social science risks 
becoming lost in the quest for the perfect database and computer program. 
Cole's advice boiled down to two positive principles for building social science databases 
and computer programs. The first was that building databases and computer programs 
should be end-focused, individually tailored to the very specific project. They should not 
aim at being user-friendly, and they should not aim at being universally applicable to any 
situation, dataset or problem. In Cole's words they should be "cheap and dirty" 
programs, built as one-off, simple, flexible programs, focused on getting data analysed as 
quickly and simply as possible. The second principle, which was in many ways a 
corollary of the first, was that the social scientist should have a basic set of programming 
and database skills to allow them to modify and adapt the computer program and 
database to meet the changing needs of their project. "Cheap and dirty" programs need 
to be modified as the project develops, and if the social scientist has some basic 
programming skills they can do much of the modifications themselves, thereby 
minimising the need for expensive consultation with professional computer 
programmers. 
Cole's advice paralleled similar advice given to builders of social network computer 
modelling at the Network Theory Working Group of the CSIRO in March 2005.43 At 
this, Associate Professor Janet Wiles from the University of Queensland argued that in 
network modelling, "the research questions evolve past the software - always!", and that 
this means that their modelling (in this case of gene regulatory networks) was based on 
building single-use systems, in small teams, with rapidly evolving models and short 
42 Including appendix in Scott (2000), and also informal consultation with William Domhoff, Val Buris and 
Peter Chen. Scott describes UCINET as "It is, in my opinion, the best of the currently available programs 
and the one that is most accessible for the novice user." (Scott, 2000: 178) 
43 Network Theory Working Group Meeting II, 3th_9th March 2005, Canberra. A Collaborative initiative of 
the CSIRO Centre for Complex Systems Science and the ARC Complex Open Systems Research Network 
(COSNet). 
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development cycles (Wiles 2005). The parallels between Wiles work and the work of my 
PhD are limited, since the computer programs behind computer modelling are 
considerably more complex that VN"A Builder. However, Wiles' experiences resonate 
with the broad principles behind Cole's advice to social scientists: computer 
programming for social sciences should ordinarily be single-use, end-focused, with the 
focus on flexibility to meet the rapidly evolving needs of research. 
The heavy use of basic computer programming skills in the majority of presentations at 
the Network Theory Working Group further reinforced the idea that computer 
programming was very important skill set for the social network analyst, especially for 
those in the cutting edges of the field. This suggested that development of some basic 
computer programming skills by the author, through the attempt to build a database 
extraction program, would not be a wasted investment of time. 
The author's initial attempts to automate the extraction of data from databases and 
transform them into files for importing into UCINET did not meet with success. Cole 
had suggested using MS Access (a database) only. Several weeks were spent attempting 
this, but did not succeed. Consultation with other computer programmers suggested that 
the type of data extraction needed for the thesis required 'loops' and 'variables', which are 
two programming procedures which could not be done with database software alone: 
they required a computer programming language. 
One of the computer programmers who advised the author, suggested that the computer 
program needed would not be difficult to build. He built a simplified working version in 
about a day, and sent the author the code. This programmer, Tim Roxborough, wrote 
the program in ColdFusion (this is contained at the end of the code ofVBA Builder). 
While Roxborough's program provided a working model, the language it was written in 
was a problem. ColdFusion is designed to be run on an internet server, and used for 
designing webpages. While it is user-friendly in these environments (hence why 
Roxborough used it to design a prototype of VNA Buildei'J, it was not a program that 
could be used for this thesis. For any computer to run a ColdFusion program it needs to 
downloaded and run a ColdFusion server, and this requires the user to purchase a copy 
of ColdFusion. Also, since ColdFusion is a product designed for building webpages, it is 
limited in its broader features as a computer program. 
Instead, the author used Roxborough's program as a model and built VNA Builder in the 
programming language Visual Basic .NET.44 Over the next three weeks the author 
taught himself Visual Basic .NET from library books, and built a fully working version of 
VN"A Builder. In the several weeks following this, the power and scope of VNA Builder 
was expanded so that it could build 5 different types of networks (as detailed in this 
appendix). 
44 I used Visual Basic .NET because it is one of the most widely used programming languages. It is 
flexible, scaleable, built for use with MS Access. It is also the programming language of preference for 
Mark Cole and his associates, who were possibly going to provide me with further programming and 
database assistance with my thesis. By using Visual Basic .NET I hoped to maximise the possibilities of 
support from them, train myself in the language which they were going to program software for me in, and 
also increase the chances that my program could work with anything they built for me in the future. 
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Section 3: An introduction to using VNA Builder. 
Introduction 
VNA Builder is a very basic computer program. It is essentially several hundred lines of 
code that are run inside a development environment- Visual Studio .NET.45 The aim of 
this is to keep the programming very simple, and the code easily modifiable by an 
amateur computer programmer (the author). The disadvantage is that it does not have 
the user-friendly interfaces of other computer programs (at least, not yet). 
To run VNA Builder, the user must: 
1. install a copy of Visual Studio .NET, 
2. install a copy of a compatible database (the default database for VNA Builder is 
MS Access), 
3. open the VNA Builder code in Visual Studio .NET and set the program's initial 
settings to run the analysis the user wants, 
4. formate the user's database so that its table names and column names are 
compatible with VNA Builder, 
5. run VNA Builder inside Visual Studio .NET, by pressing Ctrl+FS 
The first two steps are straightforward. Visual Studio .NET is a Microsoft product and 
can be bought as an academic edition for around $US100. MS Access is a Microsoft 
product as well and is generally packaged with MS Office, or can be bought separately 
for approximately $US230 (however, Access is not compulsory, VNA Builderwill work 
with almost any database, or even a simple MS Excel table). 
Working in Visual Studio .NET 
Visual Studio .NET is what is called a development environment, which means that it is 
a computer program, within which other computer programs are written. A 
development environment is in many ways like a workshop or tool shed for computer 
programmers. It has the computer programming equivalents of a workbench (the text 
editor where the code can be changes), and a broad range of tools and equipment that 
make light work of what would normally be difficult and tedious (such as keyboard 
shortcuts, and debugging software). 
The advantage of keeping VNA Builder as a program which only runs and operates in a 
development environment, at least at the moment, is that it is the best way to keep the 
programming work as simple as possible. Since VNA Builder is being constantly 
modified and updated by the user, it must be continually edited in Visual Studio .NET 
anyway, and if the program was to be turned into a stand alone program, it would require 
quite a significant amount of programming. This would be both time consuming, and 
also increase the complexity of the program itself, making any further modifications 
more difficult (since the more complicated a program, the more complicated it is to 
change). 
Once the user has installed their database program, and Visual Studio .NET, the user 
must open the VNA Builder file within Visual Studio .NET. 
To do this the user starts Visual Studio .NET and then on the 'Start Page' of Visual 
Studio, press 'open project' and open the VNA Builder file. 
45 
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of the file because if it is present it creates errors when attempting to import the VNA 
file into UCINET or NetDraw. 
Variable: v_testVariable = vbCrLf & "[insert text here)" & vbCrLf 
Example: v_testVariable = vbCrLf & "Hi. This is test message 1." & vbCrLf 
2. Display & Pause 
Overview: Display ON sends a range of messages and error checking information to a 
window on the users screen (the consol window) when the program runs. This is useful 
for checking that the data written to the VNA file is in the correct format. 
Pause ON generates a series of short (1 sec) pauses in the running of the program, and 
can make it (marginally) easier to read the messages send to the consol. The suggested 
setting for Display is ON, and for Pause is OFF. 
Variable: Display = insert classification code here 
(number only, no inverted commas"") 
Pause = insert classification code here 
(number only, no inverted commas"") 
Classification Codes: 
Example: 
On= 1 
Off=O 
Display= 1 
Pause= 0 
3. Database Name and Location 
Overview: This specifies the location of the database, and it's name. 
Variable: v_databaseLocation ="[insert database name and location here]" 
Example: v_databaseLocation = "C:\Temp\dbMoneyFlow-d4saleData.mdb" 
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4. Type of Network? 
Overview: This specifies what sort of network the program is to build. There are five 
broad categories of networks that V'BA Builder can design (these are explained in detail 
on pages 355-360): 
• A 'career path' network 
• An 'organisation by organisation' network 
• A 'person by person' network 
• A 'money flow' network 
• A 'policy networks' network 
Each type of network is different in subtle ways, such as the columns in the databases 
they access and the pattern of nodes and ties which they build. 
Variable: 
Classification Codes: 
Example: 
v_car_org_per ="[insert classification code here]" 
Career = "Career" 
Organisation by Organisation = "OrgByOrg" 
Person by Person = "PerByPer" 
Money Flow = "MoneyFlow" 
Policy Networks= "PolicyNetworks" 
v _car_org_per = "Career" 
5. All dates or range of years? 
Overview: 
This allows the user to specify where they want the network to include links and nodes 
from all dates, or a range of years. 
Variable: 
Classification Codes: 
Example: 
6. Range of years 
v_allDates_Now = "[insert classification code here]" 
All dates = "All" 
Range = "Range" 
v_allDates_Now ="All" 
Overview: This sets the range of years that the user wants included in the network 
Variable: v_range_start ="[insert classification code here]" 
v_range_finish ="[insert classification code here]" 
Classification Codes: These are generally simply a year number, enclosed in double 
inverted commas. For one year, set both variables as equal to that year. 
Example: 
7. File Name? 
v_range_start = "2005" 
v_range_finish = "2005" 
Overview: This allows the user to specify the file name. 
Variable: v_fileNameShort ="insert file name here" 
Example: v _fileNameShort = "Minchin#01" 
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Note: At the moment, the way the program is set-up, this would generate a file name and 
location of: "c:\temp\vna\Minchin#01.vna" or "c:\temp\dl\Minchin#01.dl" depending 
on whether the file was DL or VNA format. 
Running VlVA Builder 
Once these initial settings are entered, and the user's database has been configured46 the 
user presses Control and FS simultaneously (Ctrl+ FS) to run VNA Builder. 
When the program runs, a 'consol window' should open, and a range of output will be 
written to the screen if DISPLAY has been set to ON (otherwise only a few lines will be 
written to the consol window). When the program is completed, the screen should look 
similar to Figure 8 (below). 
Figure 8: The 'consol window' after a successful execution of the program. 
The Consol 
Window 
If the dataset being extracted is not particularly large, the following information should 
appear in the consol window (if the data set is particularly large, the output to the screen 
will be too large for the consol window to hold, and the top sections of this information 
will be cut off. This is not important, as the key information is contained in the last half-
dozen lines at the bottom of the consol window). 
The information written to the consol window allows the user to check the format and 
details of the information they have written to the VNA file. The information follows a 
standard format, and an example is ;ven in Figure 9. The information written to the 
consol window is written here in II 414111 while brief comments are written i~ 
Ion white !below it: 
46 see next section: "Formatting a Database for use with VN'A Builder' 
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Figure 9: An example of the contents of the consol window after a successful running of VN"A 
Builder 
This is the most important information. It contains all the contents of the file that has been written. It allows 
the user to quickly check the format of their DL or VNA file, and confirm that it is in the correct format for the 
matrix they wish to build. 
lhLL\llll j'llii'- I 1ll i llliL'-hl\l hLl1l<--\.l1h1Lll 
111d \\ 11\1L1l I 1 liiL 
l lllll]' \ll l \]11h_l1111~ j \Tl\ 
This repeats the information already given at the top of the screen, but does so again so that it is available if it is 
a large dataset and the information first outputted gets deleted from the consol window. 
This line is generated by the consol window itself. If you press any key while in this window, the window will 
close and you will return to Visual Studio .NET 
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Fonnatting a Database for use with VNA Builder 
To build a network with VNA Builder, the user must format their database so that the 
information is contained in a table named "tblGenericData", and that this table uses 
some or all of the following column headings: 
• clmnRowID 
• clmnPrimaryNode 
• clmnSecondaryNode 
• clmnDatel-0 R-StartYear 
• clmnDate2-0R-FinishYear 
• clmnTie_01 
• clmnTie_02 
• clmnTie_03 
• clmnTie_04 
• clmnTie_OS 
• clmnTie_06 
• clmnTie_07 
• clmnTie_08 
• clmnTie_09 
• clmnTie_10 
Which columns are necessary, and what information they must contain depends on what 
type of network/ matrix the user wishes to build. 
For example the data for Nick Minchin's career path (listed in Table 2 on page 339) 
would need to be reformatted to look like Table 3 (below) to be able to be used by VNA 
Builder. Note the changed column headings. 
Table 3: Restructure of Table 2 (page 339) so that it is able to be accessed by VN"A Builder. 
1 as nugn :MINO-UN 2001 c 
Administration 
2 Nicholas Hugh 1\fiNCHIN Deputy Leader of the Govemment in the 2003 continuing 
Senate 
3 Nicholas Hu~ MIN CHIN Vice-President of the Executive Cotmcil 2004 continuin2 
4 NicholasHUJi MIN CHIN Senator (Lib.) for South Austtalia 1993 continuing 
5 Nicholas Hu~ MIN CHIN Fed. Minr fur Ind Sc. and Resources 1998 2001 
6 Nicholas HWJ MIN CHIN Soecial Minr of State 1997 1998 
7 Nicholas Hu~ MINGIIN Minr Assm: PM 1997 1998 
8 Nicholas Hui:; MINGIIN Patltv Sec. to Ldr Opposition 1994 1996 
9 NicholasHUj! hMINGIIN State Dir SA Lib Partv 1985 1993 
10 Nicholas Hrn MINCFilN Deo. Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust 1983 1983 
11 Nicholas Rm MIN CHIN Asst Fed. Dir Lib Partv Aust. 1981 1982 
12 NicholasHUii MINGllN Asst to the Fed. Dir Lib Pattv Aust. 1978 1980 
13 Nicholas Hu~ hM!NCH!N Res. Off. Fed Secretariat Lib Partv Aust. 1977 1977 
14 Nicholas Hu MIN CHIN SolrNSW 1977 1977 
15 Nicholas Hw; MINGIIN Memb. Zoolotrical Socv (SA) 
16 Nicholas Hui: MINGllN Memb. Trees for Life (SA) 
17 Nicholas Hui: hMINCHIN Memb. Lib Partv Aust. (SA Div.) 
18 Nicholas Hull hMINCHIN British 0 Schol. 1991 1991 
19 Nicholas HUQ:h .MINCHIN American Field Schol. 1970 1971 
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An overview of VNA Builder's five types of networks 
Before describing which columns are necessary for each type of network (as listed in 
Table 6 on page 362), it is necessary to provide an overview of the types of networks 
which VNA Builder can construct. 
VNA Builder can construct five different types of networks: 
• 'Career path' networks 
• 'Organisation by organisation' networks 
• 'Person by person' networks 
• 'Money flow' networks 
• 'Policy networks' networks 
'Career path' networks 
An example of a career path network is that of Nick Minchin, as seen as a database in 
Table 2 and as a network diagram in Figure 2. Generally, however, career path networks 
are much larger, being comprised of the career paths of multiple persons, generally elites 
such as politicians or business people. An example of a visualisation of a career path 
network is Figure 10 (below). 
Figure 10: Career Paths to Federal Cabinet47 
RwalYOl.thOrg Eicec and/or Official 
AIJ$t. Diplomatic Service 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
'Organisation by organisation' networks and matrices 
One of the most common forms of 'organisation by organisation' networks in elite 
studies are maps of interlocking boards of corporations (often called 'interlocking 
directorates'). 
47 *!*!*[note that this will need to be updated and replaced in final version of this appendix. It has 
mistakes.] 
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The form of 'organisation by organisation' networks which VNA Builder builds is one 
which builds undirected ties between organisations that have shared a 
person/member/ director in a particular year or range of years. 
An example of an 'organisation by organisation' network is Figure 11 (below). 
Figure 11: An example of an 'organisation by organisation' network: 
Corporate interlocks among the major business entities of West Germany (1976) 
Key: Thicker ties/lines indicate more than one corporate interlock. 
Source: Ziegler, Bender and Biehler (1985) in Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman (2002b). 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
'Person by person' networks 
A 'person by person' network is in many ways an inversion of an 'organisation by 
organisation' network. Whereas in an 'organisation by organisation' network, each 
organisation is a node, and each person that two organisations hold in common forms a 
tie between those organisations, in a 'person by person' network, each person is a node, 
and any common organisations which two people share, form a tie between those two 
people. 
An example of the visualisation of a 'person by person' network is Figure 12 (below) 
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Figure 12: An example of a 'person by person' network: 
A partial map of Former Ministerial Staffers for the Howard Government48 
/KorenSmlh 
4(Marli>Tolar 
, Trev01Bums 
~GregHlllling 
Key: Ties represent either working for the same minister or in the same organization (generally company) after finishing 
work as a ministerial staffer. 
Source: Appleby (2005) 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
48 *!*!*[note that this will need to be updated and replaced in final version of this appendix. It is not 
complete, and probably not a good dataset to use anyway.] 
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'Money flow' networks 
A typical example of a 'money flow' network is that of political party funding, as seen in 
Table 1/Figure 1. Other examples of money flow networks can be funding of policy 
think tanks, or even patterns of company share ownership (where donors are owners of 
shares, and recipients are companies in whom the shares are owned). 
In general, the networks that are drawn are more complicated that that shown in Table 
1 /Figure 1. Figures 13 and 14 provide examples of 'money flow' networks. Figure 13 is a 
visualisation of all funding for the two major parties Federally and in NSW. Figure 14 is 
a visualisation of the same information, but only for donations over $30,000. In money 
flow networks, ties are directional, from donors to recipients (generally visualised as an 
arrow); and the ties have a strength equal to the size of the donation (generally visualised 
as the thickness of a tie/line between nodes). 
Figure 13: An example of a 'money flow' network: Funding for the two major parties federally and 
inNSW.49 
Source: Democracy4Sale (2005) 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
49 *!*!*[note that this will need to be updated and replaced in final version of this appendix. It has 
mistakes.] 
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Figure 14: Flows offunding over $30,000 for the two major parties federally and in NSw.so 
.,Oeloit•T~;JiheeriAG 
//di\ 
4fMedterranean SbiJ>pioo Cornpal1.' {Aust) Pt 1ruce Pty Ltd 
~ /F'o..J1:.V.-sP\llUd I I 
etcashTr~Ud 
J 'PublishingandBroadcasling~td 
'Macquarie Caporale T elecormuiications 
Source: Democrac_y4Sale (2005) 
Figure drawn using NetDraw 1.48 (Borgatti, 2002c) 
so *!*!*[note that this will need to be updated and replaced in final version of this appendix. It has 
mistakes.] 
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'Policy networks' networks and matrices 
A 'policy network' network is a network where the nodes are organisations or persons, 
and the ties between them represent policy positions that the organisations hold in 
common. An example of a 'policy network' network is one that is build from an analysis 
of the submissions to a Federal Senate committee of inquiry. 
Table 4 illustrates a table from which a 'policy network' network can be built. As can be 
seen in Table 4, the policy issues involved are the columns, and each row of the table 
represents an organisation (listed down the left hand side). 
Table 4: A table from which a 'policy network' can be built. 
''.< 
Business Council of Australia 2005 
IBCA) 
Australian Industrv Group (AIG) 2005 
Aust. Chamber of Commerce and 2005 
lndustrv (ACCI) 
Australian Council of Trade 2005 
Unions (ACTU) 
Aust. Manufacturing Workers 2005 
Union (AMWU) 
Key to Table 3: Support policy 
Neutral/No position 
Oppose policy 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
-1 
1 
0 
-1 
' 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
1 -1 
-1 -1 
1 -1 
-1 1 
-1 1 
From the information in Table 4, a further table of ties can be built. This table - as 
exemplified by Table 5 - lists all the possible combinations of organisations in the two 
columns on the left hand side, and on the right side lists whether these organisations 
agree on each particular issue. 
Table 5: Example of a table of the ties in a policy network. 
. 
' " Business Council of Australia Australian Industry Group 1 1 0 1 
Business Council of Australia ACCI 1 1 1 1 
Business Council of Australia ACTU 0 1 0 0 
Business Council of Australia AMWU 0 0 0 0 
Australian Industry Group ACCI 1 1 0 1 
etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. 
Key to Table 5: A '1' in columns 'Policy 1' to 'Policy 5' indicates that the organisations listed under columns 
'Organisation 1' and 'Organisation 2' either: 
both support Policy 1, Policy 2 ... Policy 5 (respectively), OR 
both oppose Policy 1, Policy 2 ... Policy 5 (respectively). 
Table 5 can then be visualised as Figure 15 
Figure 15: An illustration of an example of a 'policy network' network 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
'" 
ACCI ~ ~AMWU 
AIG 
Policy 1 
Policy 2 
Policy 3 
Policy 4 
Policy 5 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
etc. 
Building different networks with VNA Builder 
As already mentioned, for VNA Builder to construct a network from a database, the user 
must rename the table in their database to 'tblGenericData', and the columns in the table 
must be renamed so that they are in a format VNA Builder recognises. 
Table 6 provides an overview of what columns are necessary, optional and not used in 
each type of matrix. 
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Table 6: Contents of generic columns for each type of network/ matrix 
Generic Column Name I Data type 
I 
'II: 
II 
!:> 
~ 
" 
" " z 
chnnRowlD I Autonumber I # 
--
chnnPrimaryNode Text* # 
chnnSecondaryNode Text* # 
chnnDatel-OR-StartYear Text* # 
chnnDate2-0R-FinishYear Text* 
chnnTie_Ol Text* 
chnnTie 02 Text* 
chnnTie 03 Text* 
chnnTie_04 Text* 
chnnTie_OS Text* 
chnnTie_06 Text* 
chnnTie 07 Text* 
chnnTie 08 Text* 
chnnTie 09 Text* 
chnnTie_lO Text* 
* 255 characters 
'Career path' 
Contents 
Unique number, 
I automatically generated by 
database. 
I Name of person 
I 
Career step 
/organisation 
v .... ,.._ 
'Organisation by 
or!!'anisation' 
~i><lo 
II II 
!:>""-
= ~ ~ 
., :::> .5! 
8 0 c.. 
zZO 
# 
# 
# 
Contents 
Unique number, 
automatically 
generated by 
database. 
Name of person 
Career step 
'Person by person' 
'II: I>< 0 
II 11 II 
!:>"" .. ~ ~ = ~ ;:> .g 
u 0 Q. 8zo z 
# 
# 
# 
Contents 
Unique number, 
automatically 
generated by 
database. 
Name of person 
'Money flow' 
~i><lo 
II II 
!:>""-~ ~ ~ ~ :::! .g 
" 0 "" zZO 
# 
# 
Contents 
Unique number, 
automatically 
generated by 
database. 
Recipient of 
donation 
'Policy networks' 
'II: I>< 0 
II 11 II 
!:>""« ~ ~ = 
= ;:> .g "~ "" 8~o z 
# 
# 
Contents 
Unique number, 
automatically 
generated by 
database. 
Organisation or 
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Section 4: The code for VNA Builder (with comments): Version 1.11 
'VNABuilder- Version 1.12 
'CCRRENTWORK: 
'Attempt to undertake a money flow ana1ysis of Greens' Corporate Donation Data 
' while at the san1e time, rebuilding the (1ucries around generic table, column and 
1 variable names. 
'5/4/05: Used biiefly to build MINCHIN Files. ALL CHJ\NGES MARKED WITH'*!*!* 
'IMPORTS 
Imports System.Data 
Imports System.Data.DataTable 
Imports System.Data.OleDb 
Imports Microsoft.Data.Odbc 
Imports System.IO 
'DATABASE AND TABLE INFORM.ATION 
'Database Location= C:\Temp\dbEliteCarcers···[vcrsion].mdb 
1 Database N:unc = dhEliteCarcers-[vcrsion] 
'Table Name = tblGenericData 
'Columnl = dmnRowID 
1 Colunm2 = clrnnPrimaryNode 
' Colun1113 = clmnSecondaryNode 
'Column4 = clmnDatel-OR-StartYear 
'Columns= dmnDate2-0R-FinishYear 
1 Column6 = clinnTie_1 
1 Colum_n7 = clmnTie_2 
' OTHER SETTTNGS 
'Note that to run this code within Visual Studio .NET, you ha,;re to first 
' right clicked on 'references' 
, [which is in the 'solutfon explorer' window on your left] and then go to 1add reference' 
1 and then selected Microsoft.Data.Odbc, by double cl1ck.ing on it. 
Module Modulel 
Public start As Double 
Public performance_ v _elite_count As Integer 
'NOTE 
' Except for the 'Public Function Countl nStringQ' below, 
' the program is written without any user created classes or subroutines. 
1 I've just put the entire program in is one subroutine: Sub MainQ. 
'NOTE 
' This is a console application. 
' <O.i.> COUNTSTRING FUNCTION 
' For sections <4.iii> and <5.ii> 
, Part of routine to add duplicate ties, and clean up repeats. 
Public Function Count!nString(By Val StartingPoint As Integer, _ 
By Val SourceString As String,_ 
By Val CompareString As String) As Integer 
1 This ftU1ction counts the number of times a word is found in a sentence. 
1 If the word is found .. the function is called recursiveh· on 
' the remainder of the stri11g. . 
Dim strloc As Integer 
strloe = Strings.InStr(StartingPoint, SourceString, CompareString) 
If strloc < > 0 Then 
CountlnString += 1 
CountlnString += CountlnString(strloe + Strings.Len(CompareString), _ 
SoureeString, CompareString) 
End If 
End Function 
Public Sub PerformanceQ 
Dim finish As Double 
finish = Timer 
Dim total_time As Double = finish - start 
'total_timc = Dccimal.Round(total_time, 2) 
Console.WriteLine(vbCrLf & "Extraction time: " & Decimal.Round(total_time, 2) & "s") 
Console.WriteLine(vbCrLf & "Performance:" & Decimal.Round(performance_v_elite_count / total_time, 2) & " 
elites/ second") 
End Sub 
'Public c_soundPath = "c:" 
'Public Medial'layer = "C:\Program Files\ Windows Media Player\mplayer.exe" 
' Private Sub playMediaFile(ByVal mediaFileName As String) 
With Medial'layer 
.FileName = String.Concat _ 
'(c_soundPath, 11 \ 11 , _ 
'mediaFileName) 
' .PlayQ 
End \'hth 
' End Sub 
'Sound play constants 
Public Const SND_ASYNC = &Hl 'play asynchronously 
Public Const SND_LOOP = &HS' loop the sound until next sndPlaySound 
Public Const SND_NOSTOP = &HlO' do not stop any current:ly playing sound 
Public Const SND_NOWAIT = &H2000' do not wait if the driver is busy 
'Declare function for playing sounds 
Declare Function PlaySound Lib "winmm.dll" Alias "PlaySoundA" _ 
(ByVal lpszName As String, ByVal hModule As Long, ByVal dwFlags As Long) As Long 
Sub MainO 
start = Timer 
'<O.i.1> THE 6-7 KEY PARAMETERS 
Dim Display As Integer 
Dim Pause As Integer 
Dim v _databaseLocation As String 
Dim y As String 
Dim v_testVariable As String 
Dim v_fileNameShort As String 
Dim v_fileName As String 
Dim v _fileExtension As String 
Dim v_query_2 As String= "SELECT DISTINCT Name FROM tblCareerSteps" 'Default Value 
Dim v_query_3 As String= "SELECT DISTINCT CareerStep FROM tblCareerSteps"' Default Value 
'(1) TEST VARIABLE 
'v_testVariable = vbCrLf & "Hi .. " & vbCrLf 
' (2) DISPLAY /PAUSE 
Display= 1 
Pause= 0 
' (3) DATABASE 
v_databaseLocation = "C:\ Temp\DataSet-Sample-Access.mdb" '*!*!* 
'*!*!* v_databaseLocation = "C:\Temp \dbMoneyFlmv···d4saleData.mdb" 
'(4) QUERY 
Dim v _car_org_per As String 
Dim v _group_indiv As String 
Dim v_al!Dates_Now As String 
Dim v_now As String 
Dim v _check_message As String 
Dim v _ vna_dl As String 
Dim run_name As String 
Dim no_multi_ties As String 
'WHAT SORT OF M1\ TRIX? 
1 Question la: Career, Org by Org or Person by Person? 
' Career = Career, 
' Organisation by Organisation (without Exec Table layout) = OrgByOrg, 
'Person by Person = PerByPer, 
1 1v1oney flow = MoneyF1ow, 
'Policy Networks = PolicyNet\vorks, List of Tics = TieList 
'Executive Director "tvfatrix =Exec 
1 NonExecutive Director l\.fatrix = NonExec 
'.Incidence ]\-fatrix of Executive Directors = 'Incid 
' Valued TieList = "V aluedTieList" 
' OrgByOrg with the Exec Table Layout= "OrgByOrgWithExec" 
1 Executive Director Tics to their Non-Executive Positions = 11ExecsT0111eirNonExec" 
'*!*'.!* V? AS 11 J\.f.onevFlow 11 
v_car_org_per = 'iExecsToTheirNonExec" 
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'Question lb: FILE NAi'vlE 
' Question NEW (27 Feb 2006) 
run_name = "ExclusionMatrixTop250ProfNonNZPNG" 
' Question 2: One file of all persons, or individual fi1es for each person? 
' One file = OneFile, Individual files = lndivFiles 
v _group_indiv = "OneFile" 
1 Question 3: All dates or just for the present year? 
1 AU dates= 11 All", Now= "Now" 
v_allDates_Now = "All" 
' Question 4: \X/hat year is 'nmv'? 
'Y_now should equal this year (or 2005) 
v_now = "2003/4" 
' Question 5: DL vs VNA? 
' VNA = vna, DL = di 
v _ vna_dl = "vna" 
'(0) FILENAME 
v_fileNameShort = v_car_org_per & "_" & run_name 
Select Case v _ Yna_dl 
Case 1'vna" 
v_fileExtension = ".vna" 
Case "dl" 
v _fileExtension = ".dl" 
End Select 
v_fileName = "C:\Documents and Settings\Nick\My Documents\aaaVNA \" & v_fileNameShort & v_ftleExtension 
'NoMultiLincs NE\>/ (9th April 2006) 
1 No _r-,1fultiple Ties= "No1.fultiTies" 
' .tvfulriplc Ties = 1111 
no_multi_ties = "" 
If no_multi_ties = "NoMulriTies" Then 
Console.WriteLine("Multiple Ties Will NOT BE ADDED") 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(1000) 
Elself no_multi_ties <> "NoMultiTies" Then 
Console.WriteLine("Multiple Ties WILL BE ADDED") 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(1000) 
End If 
Select Case v _car_org_per 
Case "Exec" ' Executive Director 1V1atrix (Directed) 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljobl " & _ 
"INNERJOIN "&_ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljobl.Exec = 1 " & _ 
"AND tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljobl.CareerStep" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* Executive Director Matrix" & vbCrLf & 
"* Directed Matrix from the executives' home corporation " & vbCrLf & _ 
" to other corporations the executive sits on." & vbCrLf 
Case "ExecsToTheirNonExec"' ExecsToTheirNonE.x.ec 1'·fatr:ix (Directed) 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljobl " & _ 
"INNERJOIN "&_ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2" & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljobl.Exec = 1 " & _ 
"AND tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljobl.CareerStep" & _ 
"AND tbljob2.ExecsNonExec = 1" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrl.f & _ 
"* ExecsToTheirNonExec Matrix" & vbCrLf & 
"* Directed Matrix from the executives' home corporation " & vbCrLf & _ 
" to other corporations the executive holds a non-executive directorship on." & vbCrLf 
Case "NonExec"' Non-Executive Director lvfatrix 
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'(Excludes Incidental Ties of Executive Directors) 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNER JOIN " & _ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE (tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljob1.CareerStep) " & _ 
"AND (tbljob1.ExecsNonExec = 0 AND tbljob2.ExecsNonExec = 0) " & _ 
"AND (tbljob1.AllNonExec = 1 " & _ 
"OR tbljob2.AllNonExec = 1) " ' & _ 
'"AND (tbljob1.Exec <> 1 OR tbljob2.Exec <> 1)" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*Non-Executive Directors Matrix" & vbCrLf & 
" NB: Excludes Incidental Ties of Executive Directors" & vbCrLf & 
"*Non-directed (symettical) Matrix" & vbCrLf 
Case "Incid" ' Incidence _1'.vfatrix of N011-Executive positions 
' of ExecutiYe Directors 
y = "SELECT tbljob1.CareerStep as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNERJOIN "&_ 
"tb!CareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljob1.Exec <> 1 AND tbljob2.Exec <> 1" & _ 
"AND (tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljob1.CareerStep) " & _ 
"AND (tbljob1.ExecsNonExec = 1 AND tbljob2.ExecsNonExec = 1) " 
'Just added this (20.7.06): 
'tbljobl.Exec <> 1 AND tbljob2.Exec <> 1" & _ 
10AND 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*Incidence Matrix of Non-Executive positions" & vbCrLf & _ 
" of Executive Directors" & vbCrLf & 
"*Non-directed (symetrical) Mattix" & vbCrLf 
Case "Career" ' Career Step lvfatrix 
Select Case v _group_indiv 
Case "OneFile" ' One File, Career Step l\.1'atrix 
y = "SELECT tbljob1.CareerStep as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNER JOIN" & _ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name" & _ 
"WHERE(tbljob2.StartYear >= tbljobl.StartYear)" &_ 
"AND tbljob2.StartYear <= (tbljob1.FinishYear+1) " & _ 
"AND tbljob1.RowIDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" 
v_check_message = "MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* CAREER STEP" & vbCrLf & 
"* GROUP FILE" & vbCrLf 
Case "IndiviFile" ' Individual Files, Career Step .Matrix 
Console.WriteLine("This program doesnot yet have the functionality " & _ 
"to build individual files for each person.") 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* CAREER STEP" & vbCrLf & 
"*INDIVIDUAL FILES" & vbCrLf 
End 
'y = "SELECT tbljob1.CareerStep as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"tbljob2.C:.U'eerStep as clmnDestinarion '' & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljobl " & 
"INNER JOIN"&_ 
"tblCareerSteps tb1job2" & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name" &_ 
"WHERE(tbljob2.StartYear >= tbljob1.Sta1tYear) " & _ 
"AND tbljob2.StartYear <= (tbljobl.FinishYear+1)" & _ 
"AND tbljob1.RowlDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" & _ 
"/\ND jobl.Name = " & :x 
Case Else' No correct value for v_group_indiv 
Console.WriteLine("You must select whether you want your " & _ 
366 
"output as one group file or as individual files for each person 11 & _ 
"or organisation.") 
End Select 
Case "OrgByOrgWithExec" 'Organisation by Organisation :r-.,.fatri.x 
Select Case v _allDates_Now 
Case "All" 1 .i\ll Dates, Organisation by Ort_,P,tnisarion .1\'Iatrix 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination, " & _ 
"tbljob2.ExecsNonExec as clmnExecsNonExec " & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNER JOIN" & _ 
"tb!CareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljobl.CareerStep" 
'[27.3.06] "WHERE tbljobl.RowIDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* ORG by ORG" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*ALL DATES" & vbCrLf & 
"* GROUP FILE" & vbCrLf 
Case "Now" 'Now, Organisation by Organisation :Matrix 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination " & _ 
"FROM tblCareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNERJOIN"&_ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljobl.RowIDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" & _ 
"AND tbljobl.FinishYear = tbljob2.FinishYear" & _ 
"AND tbljobl.FinishYear = " & v_now 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* ORG by ORG" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*NOW (Year=" & v_now & ")" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*GROUP FILE" & vbCrLf 
Case Else ' No correct Yaluc for v_allDatcs_Now 
Console.WriteLine("You must select whether you want your " & _ 
"matrix to be for all dates or just for the present year.") 
End Select 
Case "OrgByOrg" 1 Organisation by Organ.isation J\.fatrix 
Select Case v_allDates_Now 
Case "All" 1 All Dates, Organisation by Organisation 1fatrix 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination " & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNERJOIN" & _ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljob2.CareerStep <> tbljobl.CareerStep " 
'[27.3.06] "\>/HERE tbljobl.Row!DCareer <> tbljob2.RowlDCareer" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* ORG by ORG" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*ALL DATES" & vbCrLf & 
"*GROUP FILE" & vbCrLf 
Case "Now"' Now, Organisation by Organisation Matrix 
y = "SELECT tbljobl.CareerStep as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNERJOIN " & _ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name " & _ 
"WHERE tbljobl.RowIDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" & _ 
"AND tbljob1.FinishYear = tbljob2.FinishYear" &_ 
"AND tbljob1.FinishYear =" & v_now 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* ORG by ORG" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*NOW (Year=" & v_now & ")" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* GROUP FILE" & vbCrLf 
Case Else 1 No correct value for v_allDates_Now 
Console.WriteLine('You must select whether you want your " & _ 
"matrix to be for all dates or just for the present year.") 
End Select 
Case "PerByPer" 1 Person by Person J\.fatrix 
Select Case v_allDates_Now 
Case "All" ' All Dates, Person by Person Matrix 
y = "SELECT tbljob1.Name as clmnOrigin," & _ 
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"tbljob2.Name as clmnDestination" & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps tbljobl " & _ 
"INNERJOIN" & _ 
"tb!CareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.CareerStep=tbljob2.CareerStep" & _ 
"WHERE tbljobl.RowIDCareer <> tbljob2.RowIDCareer" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*PERSON BY PERSON" & vbCrLf & 
"*ALL DATES" & vbCrLf 
Case "Now" 'Now, Person by Person Matrix 
Console.WriteLine('Not yet written: Person by Person Matrix, for 'Now"') 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"* PERSON BY PERSON" & vbCrLf & 
"*NOW (Year=" & v_now & ")" & vbCrLf 
End 
Case Else' No correct value for v_allDates_Now 
Console.WriteLine("You must select whether you want your 11 & _ 
"matrix to be for all dates or just for the present year.") 
End Select 
Case "TieList" 1 l'vloney Flow 1v1atrix 
y = "SELECT Name as clmnOrigin," & _ 
"CareerStep as clmnDestination 11 & _ 
"FROM tb!CareerSteps " 
v _check_message = "MA TRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*TIE LIST" & vbCrLf 
Case "MoneyFlow" '11oney flow Matrix 
Select Case v_allDates_Now 
Case "All" 
y = "SELECT clmnSecondaryNode as clmnOrigin, " & _ 
"clmnPrimaryNode as clmnDestination, " & _ 
11 clmnTie_3 as clmnTie_One," & _ 
"clmnTie_2 as clmnT1e_Two " & 
"FROM tb!GenericData" 
v_query_2 ="SELECT DISTINCT clmnSecondaryNode FROM tb!GenericData" 
v_query_3 ="SELECT DISTINCT clmnPrimaryNode FROM tb!GenericData" 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*MONEY FLOW' & vbCrLf & 
"*ALL DATES" & vbCrLf 
Case "Now" 
Console.WriteLine("Not yet written: Money F1ow Matrix, for 'Now"') 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*MONEY FLOW" & vbCrLf & 
"*NOW (Year=" & v_now & ")" & VbCrLf 
End 
End Select 
Case "PolicyNetworks" 'Policy Net\vorks i\1atrix 
Select Case v _allDates_Now 
Case "All" 'All Dates, Policy Networks :Matrix 
Console.WriteLine('Not yet written: Money Flow Matrix, for 'All Dates"') 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*POLICY NETWORKS" & vbCrLf & 
"*ALL DATES" & vbCrLf 
End 
Case "Now" ! All Dates, Policy Networks ~-fatrix 
Console.WriteLine('Not yet written: Money F1ow Matrix, for 'Now"') 
v_check_message ="MATRIX TYPE:" & vbCrLf & _ 
"*POLICY NETWORKS" & vbCrLf & 
"*NOW (Year=" & v_now & ")" & vbCrLf 
End 
End Select 
Case Else 
Console. W riteLine("Y ou must select whether you want a " & _ 
"Career Steps Matrix, an Organisation by Organisation Matrix, " & _ 
"a Person by Person Matrix, a Money F1ow Matrix, " & _ 
"or a Policy Networks Matrix.") 
End 
End Select 
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l **************************"****'!<****************** 
' INPUT PARA.METF,RS 1 and 2: Display and Pause 
I ************************·"t"***=i-·*****************·t:** 
' <O.ii.> SET DISPLAY VARIABLE 
1 These statements dedare and set the 'Display' variable. 
1 This is set to a Yalue of 1, to turn Display ON 
' This is set to :my other value (generally 0) to turn Display OFF 
' Display ON then generates a range of lines and checking being written to 
'the console. Display has three purposes: (I) to look pretty to friends and family 
' (2) to illustrate the basic work that is being done by the progratn on the console 
' (3) to act as a form of checking/ debugging. 
'SET PAUSE VARIABLE 
'This is just a toy. 
' Settings as for Display. 
' >>MOVED TO FRONT OF PROGRAJ\'!: KEY INPUTS<< 
'Dim Display As Integer 
'Display= I 
1D-im Pause As Inte,ger 
1Pausc = 0 
'CONSOLE DISPI.l\Y: STARTING PROGRAM 
System.Console.WriteLine("Starting program") 
' 1000ms PAUSE 
'This only displays IF Display is set to ON (i.e. Display= 1) 
' This is just a checking device, 
' plus a pause for effect 
If Display = 1 Then 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(lOOO) 
End If 
End If 
'<0.iii.> DATABASE CONNECTION SETTINGS 
' The first parameter sets the type of database engine to use (in this case JET). 
'T'he second sets the location and name of the database itself 
' INPUT PARAMETER 3: v _databaseI.ocation 
I ************************************************* 
'>>MOVED TO FRONT OF PROGILAlv!: KEY INPUTS<< 
'Dim v _databaseLocation As String 
'v _ databaseLocation = "C: \Temp\ dbElitcCarccrs· .. !fowardStaffcrs.mdb" 
Dim v _connect As New OleDbConnection( _ 
"Provider=Microsoft.J et.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v _databaseLocation) 
' <1 > EXTRACT Person JD 
'<1.i> SET FIRST QUERY: 
'SELECT DISTINCT Name FROM tb!CareerSteps 
1 This Querey asks the database to create a list of all the persons/elites 
' in the database. 
Dim v_command As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_2) 
'<I.ii> DATABASE GRUTWORK FOR FIRST QUERY 
' Tbe outputs of this query are: 
1 (1) 'v_elite_cotmt', a variable which contains a nutnber equal to the the 
'nuinber of rows in query result. 
' (2) 'ds_qPersonID', a DataSet which contains the results of the query. 
Dim da_qPerson!D As New OleDbDataAdapterO 
Dim ds_qPerson!D As New DataSetO 
v_command.Connection = v_connect 
da_qPersonID.SelectCommand = v_command 
v_connect.OpenO 
Dim v _elite_count As Integer 
v_elite_count = da_qPersonID.Fill(ds_qPersonID, "tblCareerSteps") 
'CONSOLE DISPLAY: COUNTING NUMBER OF ELITES IN YOUR DATABJ\SE 
'1000ms PAUSE 
If Display = 1 Then 
Console.WriteLine("Counting number of elites in your dataset.") 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(1000) 
End If 
End If 
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'CONSOLE DISPLl\.Y: THERE ARE "X" ELITES IN YOUR DATABASE 
' IOOOms PAUSE 
If Display = 1 Then 
Console.WriteLine("There are" & v_elite_count & "elites in your dataset.") 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System. Threading. Thread. CurrentThread.Sleep(l 000) 
End If 
End If 
'XML OUTPUT OF QUEREY RESULTS 
1 
.I 1vc left this next line in, but commented out, because it is usefuJ 
, if vou want to know what the Table Names, CoJumnN amcs, RowN runes, etc. 
' ar~ in your dataset 
' Systtm.Console.WriteLinc(ds_qPersonlD.GetXml) 
'</1> EXTR,\CTPersonID 
' <1B> EXTRACT UNIQUE CareerStep 
'<1B.i> SET FIRST QUERY: 
'SELECT DISTINCT Name FROM tblCareerSteps 
'This Q.uerey asks the database to create a list of all the persons/elites 
'in the database. 
Dim v_command_CountCareerStep As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_3) 
'<1.ii> DATABASE GRlJT \VORK FOR FIRST QUERY 
' The outputs of this query are: 
'(1) 'v-_eJite_count'~ a variable which contains a mm1ber equal to the the 
' number of rows in query result. 
1 (2) 'ds_qPersonID', a DataSct which contains the results of the query. 
Dim da_qCountCareerStep As New OleDbDataAdapterQ 
Dim ds_qCountCareerStep As New DataSetQ 
v_command_CountCareerStep.Connection = v_connect 
da_qCountCareerStep.SelectCommand = v _command_ CountCareerStep 
Dim v_CareerStep_count As Integer 
v_CareerStep_count = da_qCountCareerStep.Fill(ds_qCountCareerStep, "tblCountCareerSteps") 
' CONSOLE DISPLAY: COUNTING NUMBER OF ELITES IN YOUR DATABASE 
'1000ms PAUSE 
If Display = 1 Then 
Console.WriteLine("Counting number of Career Steps in your dataset.") 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(lOOO) 
End If. 
End If 
'CONSOLE DISPLAY: THERE ARE "X" ELITES IN YOUR DATABASE 
'1000ms PAUSE 
If Display = 1 Then 
Console.WriteLine('There are " & v_CareerStep_count & " Career Steps in your dataset.") 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(lOOO) 
End If 
End If 
'XML OUTPUT OF QUEREY RESULTS 
' Sys tern. Console. W riteLine(ds_ q PersonI D. GetXml) 
'</1> EXTRACT PersonID 
' <2> .EXTRACr CareerSteps 
' <2.i> SET VARIABLES 
1 These are the variables used to loop/cycle through the to\\7 S in the DataSets 
Dim row_ var As DataRow 
Dim col_ var As DataColumn 
Dim row_ var2 As DataRow 
Dim col_ var2 As DataColumn 
Dim row_ var3 As DataRow 
Dim col_ var3 As DataColumn 
'>>DELETED<< 
'FOR Et\ CH DISTIN Cf Person ID LOOP 
'This is tbe beginning of the main FOR EACH loop, which actually does not 
'have it's NEXT statement till the end of the program. 
' This means that all the rest of the operations in the program are written 
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' so that they art: _ALL performed on the first person ID before moving to the next. 
'>>DELETED<< 
'SETVAR!i\BLE 'x': CCRRENT_PERSONID 
''row_var(col_var)1 is the current field. 
'which in this case is the PersonID of one elite. 
'Dim x = row_var(col_var) 
'>>DELETED<< 
'TEST 'x': COMMENTED OUT 
'System.Console.WriteLine(x) 
'<2.iii> SET SECOND QUERY: 
1 SELECT Each Person's sd of career steps, 
'as a 'origin job' 'destination job' table. 
'This stat.ement declares a variable 'y' which is the 
' SQL Query we want to run. 
'EXPLAINING THE LOGIC OF THE SQL QUERY 
'BACKGROUND 
'A 'career step' is defined, for the purposes of this study 
'as a movement (represented by a link in network analysis) from 
'one job ('First Job' or 'Origin') to another job ('Second Job' 
'or 'Destination'), where the person begjns the 'Second Job' 
'while they arc still in the 'First job', 
'or no more that 1 year after they finish the First Job. 
' ************************************************* 
'INPUT PARA.ME1T;R 4: "l11e Query' or 'y' 
'****SETS: CAREER PATH vs Org-Org vs Per-Org vs Per-Org 
' **** SETS: lndi,~dual Files vs All 
I ***-********·*************··************************* 
'THEQl.1ERY 
1 The Query returns a table in which each to\V j5 a. 'career step1, 
' The table has three columns to code the necessary information 
1 for the 'career step': 
1 <Name> which is the PersonID of the person . 
' <clmnOrigin> \vhich is the 'origin' job in a 'career step' 
' <chnnDest:ination> which is the 'destination' job in a 'career step' 
'It returns these values by doing a SELECT query on a table made 
'from an INNER JOIN of the 'tblCru:eerSteps' table to itself, 
1 \·~rherc Name in each table is equal (i.e. they are the same person) 
'and \V1-IERE tl1e value for the field Start Year for the 'destination' 
' job (designated tbljob2 or clmnDestination) is between the values for 
'the fields Stai~Year and (FinishYear +1) for the 'origin' job. 
'>>MOVED TO FRONT OF PROGRAM: KEY INPUTS<< 
'Dim y = "SELECT tbljob1.Name, tbljobl.Caree<Step as clmnOrigin,tbljob2.CareerStep as clmnDestination" & _ 
' "FROM tblCarecrSteps tbljob1 " & _ 
"INNER JOIN " & _ 
"tblCareerSteps tbljob2 " & _ 
"ON tbljob1.Name=tbljob2.Name" & _ 
"WHERE(tbljob2.StartYeru: >= tbljob1.StartYear)" & _ 
"AND tbljob2.StarrYear <= (tbljob1.FinishYear+1)" & _ 
"AND tbljob1.Row!DCareer <> tbljob2.Row!DCareer" 
'<2.iv> DATABASE GRUNT \VORK FOR SECOND QUERY 
' The outputs of this guery are: 
'(1) 'v_steps', a variable which contains a number equal to the the 
' number of rows in query result (i.e. the number of separate 
' career steps for this elite. This is used 1ater to (roughly) detem1ine 
'the number of nodes for the .dl file. 
' (2) 'ds_c]CareerStep', a DataSet which contains the results of tl1c query. 
' (3) 'tb!Origin:\ndDestination', a table within the DataSet ds_qCareerStep. 
Console.WriteLine("About to extract origin and destination set from database.") 
Dim v_command_qCareerStep As OleDbCommand = New OleDbCommand(y) 
Dim da_qCareerStep As New OleDbDataAdapterO 
Dim ds_qCareerStep As New DataSetO 
v_command_qCareerStep.Connection = v_connect 
da_qCareerStep.SelectCommand = v _command_qCareerStep 
Dim v _steps As Integer 
v_steps = da_qCareerStep.Fill(ds_qCareerStep, "tblOrigini\ndDestination") 
Console.WriteLine("Origin and destination set EXTRACTED from database.") 
Console.WriteLine("Rows in Origin and Destination Table= " & v_steps) 
'!\!AKE COPY OF DATASET 
Dim ds_qCareerStep_copy As New DataSetO 
Dim v _steps_copy As Integer 
v_steps_copy = da_qCareerStep.Fill(ds_qCareerStep_copy, "tblOriginAndDestination") 
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Console.WriteLine("copy of dataset made") 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(SOOO) 
'XML TESTING PROCEDURE 
'System.Console.\\7riteLine(ds_qCareerStep.GetXml) 
'<i2> EXTRACT CareerStcps 
'<3> CREATE CONTENTS OF FILE AND STORE IN VARIABLE 
' <3.i> DECLARE THE VARIABLE 'v_output' 
' This win hold the entire file contents before they a.re w.citten 
1 to the file. 
Dim v _output As String 
' <3.ii> CREATE HEADERS FOR VNA File 
1 I'm creating this header variable so that I can add 1t at the very end) 
' after building the rest of the file. 
Dim v _header As String 
'NOTE use ofvbCrLf, which means Carriage Return, Line Feed (i.e. Return) 
Dim v_nodeNumber As Integer 
v _nodeNumber = v _ CareerStep_count 
Select Case v _ vna_dl 
Case "vna" 
v _header = "*Tie data" & vbCrLf 
v_header = v_header & "from to NumbLinks" & vbCrLf 
'*!*1* v_header = v_hcader & "fr01n to money corporation NmnbLinks" & vbCrLf 
Case "dl" 
v_header ="di" & vbCrLf 
v_header = v_header & "n=" & v_nodeNumber & vbCrLf 
v _header = v _header & "format = edgelist" & vbCrLf 
v _header = v _header & "labels embedded" & vbCrLf 
v _header = v _header & "data:" & vbCrLf 
End Select 
'<3.iii> DECLARE VARIABLE 'v_row' 
1 This is a.11 annoying variable I had to create to get around 
'a problem with cycling through the rmvs of 
1 ds_qCareerStcp.Tables("tblOriginAndDcstinationu) in a way which 1 could 
'handle each row separately, so I could feed it's various fields into 
'the variable v_out:put. [See use of'v_row1 in declaration of variable 
1 'v_current_ro\v_contents'.J 
, It is quite frustrating because I'm sure that there must be a way of 
1 doing this, w·ithout ha\•ing to use a cowuer even when I want 
' everv 1:ow of a table. 
' It is 'also annoying because it means I have to use a stopping 
' mechanism, because this method docs not stop when it gets to the end 
' of a table and their are no more rows. 
'Thus I've had to use the line: If Not v_rnw = v_steps Then 
'This is dearly cumbersome and far from elegant, but it does the job 
' until I learn how to pro!,ttrun better. 
' ****COULD TRY USING 'TsNothingQ' function? 
Dim v _row As Integer = 0 
Console.WriteLine("About to write dataset to variable.") 
Dim v_f_holdingBay As St1ing = "c:\temp\f_holdingBay.txt" 
If no_multi_ties = "NoMultiTies" Then 
v_f_holdingBay = v_fileName 
End If 
'<4.ii> WRITING 'v_output' TO HOLDING FILE 
Dim fs_holding As FileStream = _ 
New FileStream(v_f_holdingBay, System.IO.FileMode.Create) 
Dim w_holding As Stream Writer= New StreamWriter(fs_holding) 
If no_multi_ties = "NoMultiTies" Then 
w _holding. W rite(v _header) 
End If 
'<3.iv> \VRJTE DYNA..t\!IC CONTENTS OF FJLE TO 'v_output' 
For Each row_var2 In ds_qCareerStep.Tables('tblOriginAndDestination").Rows 
For Each col_var2 In ds_qCareerStep.Tables("tblOriginJ\ndDestination").Columns 
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If Not v_row = v_steps Then 
Dim v _current_row _contents As DataRow = 
ds_qCareerStep.Tables("tblOriginAndDestination").Rows(v_row) 
Console.WriteLine(''Writing dataset row" & v_row & "to variable.") 
'ORIGIN.Al, 10.8.05: v_output = v_output & 11111111 & _ 
Dim v_dummy As String 
Ifno_multi_ties = "NoMultiTies" Then 
v_dummy = """" &_ 
Trim(v_current_row_contents(''clmnOrigin")) & """" & 11 11 & _ 
'""'" & Trim(v_current_row_contents("clmnDestination")) & """" & "1" & vbCrLf 
Elself no_multi_ties <> "NoMultiTies" Then 
v_dummy = """" & _ 
Trim(v_current_row_contents('clmnOrigin")) & """" & "" & _ 
11111111 & Trim(v_current_row_contents("clmnDestination")) & """" & "" & vbCrLf 
End If 
w _holding.Write(v _dummy) 
'v_output = v_output & v_dutnmy 
'*!*!:t 
'*!*!* 
!*!*!* 
nnnn & v_current_tO\V_contents(ndmnTie_One11) & 11111111 & .. II & _ 
"""" & v_current_row_contents(''clmnTie_Two") & "'""' & 
'*!'!* vbCrLfO 
v_row = v_row + 1 
End If 
Next 
Next 
w _holding.Flush0 
w _holding.CloseQ 
If no_multi_ties = "NoMultiTies" Then 
Console.WriteLine("No multi ties") 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(lOOO) 
Elself no_multi_ties <> "NoMultiTies" Then 
Console.WriteLine("Multi ties") 
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.Sleep(l 000) 
Console.WtiteLine("Dataset WRITTEN to variable.") 
Console.WriteLine("About to write variable to file.") 
'</3> CREATE CONTENTS OF FILE AND STORE IN VARIABLE 
' <4> ADD l'vfULTlPLE TIES 
' <4.i> CREATING HOLDING FILE 
'Dim v_f_holdingBay As String= "c:\tcmp\f_holdingBay.Lxt" 
'<4.ii> \VRITING 'v_output' TO HOLDING FILE 
'Dim fs_holding As FileStream = _ 
' New FileStream(v_f_holdingBay, System.IO.FileMode.Create) 
'Dim w_holding 1\s StreamWriter =New Stream\Vriter(fs_holding) 
'w _holding. W rite(v _output) 
'w _holding.FlushO 
'w_holding.CloseO 
Console.WriteLine("Variable successfully WRITTEN to file.") 
' <4.iii> ADD MULTIPLE TIES: GRUNT WORK 
Dim v _row2 As Integer = 0 
Dim v _frnal_output As String 
Dim v _multiple_ties As String 
Dim v _ties As String 
Dim RemainingString As String 
Dim SourceString As String 
Dim SourceFile As String 
Dim CompareStting As String 
Dim f As System.IO.File 
Dim mystream As System.10.StreamReader 
SourceFile = "c: \temp \f_holdingBay. txt" 
For Each row_var2 In ds_qCareerStep.Tables\'tblOriginAndDestination'').Rows 
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For Each col_var2 In ds_qCareerStep.Tables("tblOriginAndDestination").Columns 
IfNotv_row2 = v_steps Then 
Dim v _current_row _contents As DataRow = 
ds_qCareerStep.Tables(''tb!OriginAndDestination").Rows(v_row2) 
CompareString = 111111 " & _ 
v_current_row_contents('clmnOrigin") & 11111111 & "" & _ 
"""" & v_current_row_contents("clmnDestination") & 11111111 & "" 
'*!*!* & 
11111111 & v_current .... row_contcnts('clmnTie_Onc'') & 11 "" 11 & 11 "&_ 
11111111 & v_current_row_contcnts('dn1nTie_Two") & 111111 " 
Console.WriteLine("Comparing row number " & v _row2) 
Dim mystr As String = " " ' Initialize to not empty. 
Dim WordCount As Integer= 0 
mystream = f.OpenText(SourceFile) 'Open a new stream. 
'Do until the streain returns Nothing at end of file. 
' ****CHANGE: I think that there is a simpler way of doing this 
' ****by reversing the 'mystr' and 'comparestring' in CountlnStringQ 
' **:t=*by essentially asking 'ho\v many times docs mystr appear in 
' **'!'*entire v_ouq:mt, then using 'n1ystr', not 'CompareString\ to 
1 ****copy line to v_fmal_output or to v_inultiple_ties 
'<<<THERE IS AN ERROR HERE: 
'<<<This compare/count function does not deal with spaces at either 
' end of nan1es>>> 
Do Until IsNothing(mystr) 
mystr = mystream.ReadLine 
WordCount += CountlnString(1, mystr, CompareString) 
Loop 
'Dim v _row8 As Integer = 0 
'For Each row_var3 In ds_qCarecrStcp_copy.Tables("tb!OriginAndDestination").Rows 
For Each col_var3 In ds_qCareerStep_copy.Tables("tblOrigjnAndDestination'').Columns 
If Not v _row8 = v _steps_copy Then 
Dim v~._current_row_contents2 As DataRow = 
ds_qCareerStep_copy.Tables("tb!OriginAndDestination").Rows(v_rowS) 
mys tr= 11111111 & _ 
v_current_rmv_contcnts2('clmn0rigin") & """" & It n & _ 
11111111 & v_currcnt_row_contents2("cln111Dcstination") & """" & " 11 
WordCount += CountlnString(l, mystr, CompareString) 
\7 _row8 = v _row8 + 1 
End If 
Next 
'NeAt 
'DL/VNA SETTING #1 
'Removes ties from final file if it is a DL File 
Ifv_vna_dl ="di" Then 
v_ties = "" 
Else 
v_ties = WordCount 
End If 
'CREATE SEP.ARA TE VARIABLE FOR LIES \VITif MULTIPLE TIES 
'lf\VordCount = 1 then copy to variable v_final_output, 
1 ot11eN1ise send to variable- v_nmltiple_ties for further processing. 
IfWordCount = 1 Tben 
v_final_output = v_final_output & CompareString & "" & _ 
v_ties & vbCrLf 
Else 
v _multiple_ties = v _multiple_ties & CompareString & " " & _ 
v_ties & vbCrLf 
End If 
mystream. CloseQ 
v _row2 = v _row2 + 1 
End If 
Next 
Next 
'<5> REMOVE REPEATED LINES 
'<5.i> CREATING SECOND HOLDING FILE: 
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1 For reinoving repeated l:ines for multiple ties 
Dim v_f_holdingBay_2 As String= "c:\temp\f_holdingBay_2.txt" 
Dim fs_holding_2 As FileStream = _ 
New FileStream(v_f_holdingBay_2, System.IO.FileMode.Create) 
Dim w_holding_2 As Stream Writer= New StreamWriter(fs_holding_2) 
w _holding_2.W rite(v _multiple_ties) 
w _holding_2.Flush0 
w _holding_2.Close0 
' <S.ii> REMOVE REPEATED LINES 
Console.WriteLine("Removing Repeated lines") 
Dim v _row3 As Integer = 0 
Dim v _final_multiple_ties As String 
Dim RemainingString_2 As String 
Dim SourceString_2 As String 
Dim SourceFile_2 As String 
Dim CompareString_2 As String 
CompareString_2 = v _multiple_ties 
Dim mystr_2 As String= 11 " ' Initialize to not empty. 
Dim WordCount_2 As Integer= 0 
Dim f_2 As System.IO.File 
Dim mystream_2 As System.IO.StreamReader 
SourceFile_2 = "c:\temp\f_holdingBay_2.txt" 
mystream_2 = f_2.0penText(SourceFile_2) ' Open a new stream. 
Dim count As Integer = 0 
1 DO w1til the stream returns Nothing at end of file. 
Do Until IsNothing(mystr_2) 
1 On first loop, extract mystr_2 at beginning of loop 
Dim line_number As Integer = 1 
Console.WriteLine("Removing repeats for multiple line number" & line_number) 
If count < 1 Then 
mystr_2 = mystream_2.ReadLine 
End If 
1 On second and subsequent loops, mystt_2 will already have 
1 been extracted at end of last loop. 
' IViake sure that 1nystr_2 is not empty. 
If Not IsNothing(mystr_2) Then 
'Consolc.\VriteLineCmystr_2 " & mystr_2) 
'Console.WriteLine("v_fina! ... = " & v_final_multiple_ties) 
WordCount_2 = 0 
WordCount_2 += CountlnString(l, v_final_multiple_ties, mystr_2) 
'Console. W riteLine(W ordCount_2) 
IfWordCount_2 = 0 Then 
v _final_multiple_ties = v _final_multiple_ties & mystr_2 & vbCrLf 
End If 
'These make sure the 1CountlnStringO function does not renirn an error 
1 if mystr_2 is empty. 
count = count + 1 
mystr_2 = mystream_2.ReadLine 
End If 
line_number = line_number + 1 
Loop 
mystream_2.Close0 
'</5> 
' <6> \VRITE VARIABLES TO FILE 
' <6.i> DECLARE VARIABLE 'y_fileNarne' 
1 Note that it can be dynamically generated, based on the 
'PersonlD of the elite. 
'Dim v_Perso:nID_NoSpaces As String 
'v_PersonID_NoSpaces = x.Replacc(" '', "") 
' Console.\\/ riteLine(v_PersonID _NoSpaces) 
'Dim v_fileName As String= 11 c:\temp\vna\" & v_fileNam_eShort & ".vna" 
'<6.ii> BUILDING FINAL OUTPUT 
v_final_output = v_header & v_fina!_output & v_final_multiple_ties & v_testVariable 
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' <6.iii> WRITING 'v _final_output' TO FILE 
Dim fs As FileStteam =New FileStteam(v_fileName, System.IO.FileMode.Create) 
Dim w As Stream Writer= New StteamWriter(fs) 
w.Write(v_final_output) 
w.Flush0 
'</6> \\'RITE CONTENTS OF V1\Ru\J3LE TO FILE 
' <7> FINAL DEBUGGING and CHECKING 
'CONSOLE DISPLi\Y: \l;'RITING ELITE 'X' TO FILE ... 
'3000m.< PAUSE 
If Display = 1 Then 
Console.WriteLine(vbCrLf & "Writing career steps of all elites to file" & v_fileName) 
Console.WriteLine("The following details are being written to this file:" & vbCrLf) 
System.Console.WriteLine(v_final_output) 
If Pause = 1 Then 
System. Threading. Thread. Current Thread.Sleep(l 000) 
End If 
End If 
Console.WriteLine(1'The career-paths of all" & v_elite_count & _ 
"elites have been extracted" & vbCrLf & "and wntten to file:" & 
vbCrLf & v_fileName & vbCrLf & vbCrLf & v_check_message & vbCrLf) 
performance_v_elite_count = v_elite_count 
Call PerformanceO 
'Di:m 1 As Integer 
'For l = 1 To 3 'Loop 100 times. 
1 BcepQ ' Sound a tone. 
' System.Threading.Thread.Current:Thread.Slecp(SOO) 
'Next I 
'Dim co111pletedsou11d As String= "smmd.wav" 
'playMediaFilc(complctedsound) 
Dim re As Long 
Dim I As Integer 
For I = 1 To 1 'Loop 100 times. 
're= PlaySound("c:\sound.wav", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
re= PlaySound("c:\ Wahoo.wav", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
're= PlaySound("C:\boying", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
'System.Threading.Thrcad.Currcnt111read.Slecp(SOO) 
re= PlaySound("C:\boying", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
'SystemThrcading.Thread.CurrentThrcad.Sleep(500) 
're= PlaySound("c:\sound.wav", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
're= PlaySound("c:\ Wahoo.wav", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
'System.Threading.Tiuead.CurrentThread.Sleep(SOO) 
're= PlaySound("c:\simp308h.wav", 0, SND_NOSTOP) 
Next I 
If re= 0 Then 
'Sound did not play, so just beep ... 
BeepO 
End If 
End If 
End Sub 
End Module 
'--------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
'ORIGINAL COLDFUSION CODING FOR A SIMILAR OPERATION 
'WRITTEN BY TIM ROXBURGH for Nick Han-i1,oan 
' March 02, 2005. 
·--------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
'<cfqucry 11arne= 11qPerson 11 datasource="timTest"> 
'SELECT DISTINCT person ID 
'FROM carcerStep_expl 
1</cfqucry> 
'<cfloop qucry="qPerson 11 > 
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' <cfquery name="qCareerStep" datasource="timTest"> 
SELECT jobl.personID, jobl.careerStep as firstJob,job2.careerStl'P as secondJob 
' FROM careerStep_expl jobl 
INNER JOIN 
careerSt~p_expl job2 
ON job1.Person!D=job2.Person!D 
' WHERE job2.StartYear >= jobl.StartYear 
AND job2.StartYear <= Gobl.FinishYear+l) 
AND jobl.personID=#qPerson.person!D# 
' AND jobl.RowIDCareer <> job2.Row!DCareer 
</cfquery> 
' <cfsavccontent variable="thisFilcContent 11 > 
'<cfoutput> 
'dl n=#qCareerStep.recordCount# 
1format=cdgelistl 
'labels embedded 
1<cfloop qucry= 11 qCarccrStcp 11 > 
'"#qCareerStep.firstjob#" "#qCareerStep.secondjob#''</cfloop> 
'</cfoutput> 
' < / cfsavccontent> 
<cfset thlsFilename=qPerson.personlD & 11 .dl 11 > 
1 <cffi]e action = "write" 
file = "E: \shares \sites \tinl··Cxperiments \nickTest\ #thisFilename# 11 
output= 11 #d1lsFileContcnt#"> 
< !-·-- <cfoutput> 
#tbisFileCont.cnr:# 
< / cfoutput> ---> 
1</cfloop> 
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APPENDIX C: CODE FOR CLEANUP 
' Clean Up version 1.08 
Option Compare Text 
'TASKS 
1 *add replace 'since' 
' *add education algor:ithm 
' *add classification system 
'IMPORTS 
Imports System.Data 
Imports System.Data.DataTable 
Imports System.Data.OleDb 
Imports Microsoft.Data.Odbc 
Imports System.IO 
Imports Microsoft.Visua!Basic 
Imports System.Text.RegularExpressions 
Module Module! 
Public found_all_dates As Integer 
Public hold_first_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_first_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_first_ v _finish_date As String 
SOFTWARE 
Public hold_second_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_second_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_second_ v _finish_date As Stting 
Public hold_third_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_third_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_third_ v _fmish_date As String 
Public hold_fourth_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_fourth_ v _start_date As Stting 
Public hold_fourth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_fifth_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_fifth_ v _start_date As Stting 
Public hold_fifth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_sixth_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_sixth_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_sixth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_seventh_fmal_career_step As Stting 
Public hold_seventh_v_start_date As String 
Public hold_seventh_ v _finish_date As Stting 
Public hold_eighth_final_career_step As Stting 
Public hold_eighth_v_start_date As String 
Public hold_eighth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_ninth_fmal_career_step As String 
Public hold_ninth_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_ninth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_tenth_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_tenth_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_tenth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_eleventh_final_career_step As Stting 
Public hold_eleventh_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_eleventh_ v _finish_date As String 
Public hold_twelth_final_career_step As String 
Public hold_twelth_ v _start_date As String 
Public hold_twelth_ v _finish_date As String 
Public education_number As Integer 
Public split_counter As Integer = I 
Public row_countAs Integer= 0 
Public v _hold_row _contents As String 
Public v _hold_RowID As Integer 
Public v_hold_sumame As Stting = "" 
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Public v_hold_givennames As String= "11 
Public v_hold_Title As String="" 
Public v_hold_PostNominals As String="" 
Public v _hold_ Gender As String = " " 
Public v _hold_BirthDetail As String = '"' 
Public v_hold_Education As String="" 
Public v_hold_Occupation As String="" 
Public v_hold_Career As String="" 
Public v_hold_Clubs As String="" 
Public v_hold_Comrnittees As String="" 
Public v_hold_ Voluntary As String="" 
Public v_hold_AwardsMil As String="" 
Public v _hold_fullname As String = "" 
Public mystr As String = " " 
Public final_career_step As String = "" 
Public v _finish_date As String = '"' 
Public v_start_date As String="" 
Public ds_qPersonID2 As DataSet 
Public regex_extraction As Integer = 0 
Public field_extract As String 
Public total_rows_extracted As Integer = 0 
Public start As Double 
Public Performance_ Clean As String 
Public since_setting As String 
Public until_setting As String 
Public resigned_until_setting As String 
Public resigned_noDate_setting As String 
Public retired_until_setting As String 
Public retired_noDate_setting As String 
Public NoStartDate_setting As String 
Public NoFinishDate_setting As String 
Public current_occupation_start As String 
Public current_occupation_finish As String 
Public current_committee_start As String 
Public current_comrnittee_fmish As String 
Public hold_start_date As Integer 
Public hold_statt_date_setting As Integer 
Public v _start_date_integer As Integer 
Public v _start_date_hold_trim As String 
Public v _final_ v _start_date As Integer 
Public v _final_ v _finish_date As Integer 
!---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'SUB MAIN , ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
Sub MainQ 
start = Timer 
Call SettingsQ 
Call CleanQ 
Call PerformanceCleanQ 
start = Timer 
System.Console.WriteLine("Starting program") 
ds_qPersonID2 = GetTableStructureQ 
' Call Extract("Occupation") 
' Call Extract("Career") 
'Call E).-tract("Coinmittees") 
' Call Extract("AwardsiVlil") 
' Call Extract("Voluntary") 
'Call Extr•ct(''Education") 
'Call b."tract("PostNominals") 
Call Extract('' Clubs") 
Call PerformanceQ 
System.Console.WriteLine(vbCrLf & "Program Finished" & vbCrLf) 
End Sub 
! ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
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'END: SUB MAIN 
!---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Public Sub SettingsQ 
since_setting = "2005" 'year to replace 'continuing/since' with 
until_setting = "6" 1 years to take off 'until' finish date for start date 
resigned_until_setting = "6" 1 
resigned_noDate_setting = 1111 
retired_until_setting = 11 6" 
retired_noDate_setting = 1111 
NoStartDate_setting = "" 
NoFinishDate_setting = 1111 
current_occupation_start = "2005" 
current_occupation_finish = 112005" 
current_committee_start = "2005" 
current_committee_finish = "2005" 
hold_start_date_setting = 0 
End Sub 
Public Sub PerformanceQ 
Dim finish As Double 
finish = Timer 
Dim total_time As Double = finish - start 
'total_time = Deci1nal.Round(total_time, 2) 
Console.WriteLine(vbCrLf & "Extraction time: " & total_rows_extracted & " rows (" & Decimal.Round(total_time, 2) & "s)") 
Dim performance As Double 
performance = total_time / total_rows_extracted * 100 
Console.W riteLine(Performance_ Clean) 
Console.WriteLine("Performance (secs/100rows): " & Decimal.Round(performance, 2)) 
End Sub 
Public Sub PerformanceCleanQ 
Dim finish As Double 
finish = Timer 
Dim total_time As Double = finish - start 
'total_time = Decimal.Round(total_time, 2) 
Performance_ Clean= vbCrLf & "Cleaning Time:(" & Decimal.Round(total_time, 2) & "s)" & vbCrLf 
End Sub 
Public Sub EducationHoldDateQ 
'STRUCTURE: 
' If extract_ficld = 11Education'1 Then 
' QUERY tb!CareerSteps and SELECT All records where fullname = ftdlnamethis person 
1 E:xuact each ro-w's start date, and compare till you get the lowest 
' Put lm,vest value in variable: hold_sta11:_date 
'End If 
'SELECT Name and StartDate from tb!CareerStcps, WHERE Nan1e = fullnan1e 
Dim v _databaseLocation4 As String 
Dim field_extract4 As String 
field_extract4 = "Name and StartYear" 
v_databaseLocation4 = "C:\ Temp\DataSet-Sample-Access.mdb" 
Dim v_connect4 As New OleDbConnection( _ 
"Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v_databaseLocation4) 
Dim v _query_ 4 As String = "SELECT " & field_extract4 & " From tblCareerSteps " & _ 
"WHERE Name=" & """ & v_hold_fullname & '"'" 
Dim v_command4 As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_ 4) 
Dim da_qPersonID4 As New OleDbDataAdapterQ 
Dim ds_qPersonID4 As New DataSetQ 
v_command4.Connection = v_connect4 
da_qPersonlD4.SelectCommand = v_command4 
v_connect4.0penQ 
Dim v _elite_count4 As Integer 
v_elite_count4 = da_qPersonID4.Fill(ds_qPersonID4, "tblCareerPath") 
Dim row_ var4 As DataRow 
Dim col_ var4 As DataColumn 
Dim v _output4 As String 
Dim v _row4 As Integer = 0 
Dim v _steps4 As Integer = v _elite_count4 
Dim v_hold_row_start_date As Integer= Nothing 
Console.WriteLine("does it get here? yes") 
Console.WriteLine(ds_qPersonID4.GetXml) 
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For Each row_var4 In ds_qPersonlD4.Tables(''tb!CareerPath").Rows 
For Each col_var4 In ds_qPersonlD4.Tables(''tblCareerPath").Columns 
If Not v_row4 = v_steps4 Then 
Dim v _current_row _contents4 As DataRow = 
ds_qPersonID4.Tables("tblCareerPath").Rows(v_row4) 
v _hold_row _start_date = v _current_row _contents4C'StartDate") 
Console.WriteLine("row contents:" & v_hold_row_start_date) 
If v _hold_row _start_date < hold_start_date Then 
hold_start_date = v_hold_row_start_date 
End If 
Console.WriteLine(hold_start_date) 
v _row4 = v _row4 + 1 
End If 
Next 
Next 
'ALSO: NEED TO SWAP ORDER OF EDUCATION RECORDS 
' WHEN reading records 
' Have a count function before proper reading of records from file 
1 Open file> readline, count, repeat till empty, return count 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_firstO 
'final_career_step = hold_first_final_carecr_step 
v_start_date = hold_first_v_start_date 
v_finish_date = hold_first_v_finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_second0 
'final_career_step = hold_second_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_second_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_second_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_tbirdO 
1final_career_stt-p = hokl_third_final_career_stcp 
v _start_date = hold_tbird_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_tbird_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_fortbO 
1final_career_step = hold_fourth_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_fourth_ v _start_date 
v_finish_date = hold_fourtb_v_finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_fiftbO 
1fina1_career_step = hold_fifth_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_fiftb_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_fiftb_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_sixthO 
'final_carecr_step = hold_sixth_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_sixth_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_sixtb_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call write ToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_seventhO 
'final_career_step = hold_seventh_fin.al_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_seventh_ v _start_date 
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v _finish_date = hold_seventh_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_eighthQ 
'final_career_step = hold_eighth_final_career_step 
v_start_date = hold_eighth_v_start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_eighth_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_ninthQ 
1final_carcer_stcp = hold_ninth_final_carcer_step 
v _start_date = hold_ninth_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_ninth_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
Call writeToDatasetQ 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_tenthQ 
'final_cateer_step = hold_tenth_final_carccr_step 
v _start_date = hold_tenth_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_tenth_ v _fmish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_eleventhQ 
1final_carccr_stcp = hokl_clcventh_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_eleventh_ v _start_date 
v _finish_date = hold_eleventh_ v _finish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
Public Sub write_hold_twelthQ 
1
.final_carecr_step = hold_t:\velth_final_career_step 
v _start_date = hold_twelth_ v _start_date 
v_fmish_date = hold_twelth_v_fmish_date 
Call CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
Call writeToDatasetO 
End Sub 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' DELETE/CLEAN THE OU'D'UT DATABASE 
•---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Public Sub CleanQ 
Console.WriteLine('Starting Cleaning") 
Dim v _databaseLocation2 As String 
Dim field_extract2 As String 
v_databaseLocation2 = "C:\ Temp\DataSet-Sarnple-Access.mdb" 
Dim v_connect2 As New OleDbConnection(_ 
"Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v_databaseLocation2) 
Dim v_query_delete As String= "DELETE RowIDCareer, Name, StartYear," & _ 
"Finish Year, CareerStep From tblCareerSteps WHERE RowIDCareer <> -2" 
Dim v_command_delete As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_delete) 
Dim da_qPersonID_delete As New OleDbDataAdapterQ 
Dim ds_qPersonID_delete As New DataSetQ 
v_command_delete.Connection = v_connect2 
da_qPersonID _delete.SelectCommand = v _command_delete 
v _connect2. OpenO 
da_qPersonID _delete.Fill( ds_qPersonID _delete, "tblCareerPath ") 
'System.Console.\i/riteLine(ds_qPerson!D_delete.GetXml) 
v _connect2. CloseQ 
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Console.WriteLine("Finished Cleaning") 
End Sub 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: DELETE/CLEAN nrn OUTPUT DATABASE 
!---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
, ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
'GET THE TABLE STRUCTURE FOR DATASET 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Public Function GetTableStructureO 
Dim v _databaseLocation2 As String 
Dim field_extract2 As String 
field_extract2 = 11*" 
v _databaseLocation2 = "C: \Temp \DataSet-Sample-Access.mdb" 
Dim v_connect2 As New OleDbConnection(_ 
"Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v_databaseLocation2) 
Dim v_query_3 As String= "SELECT" & field_extract2 & "From tblCareerSteps" 'Default Value 
Dim v_command2 As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_3) 
Dim da_qPerson!D2 As New OleDbDataAdapterO 
Dim ds_qPerson!D2 As New DataSetO 
v _conunand2.Connection = v _connect2 
da_qPerson!D2.SelectCommand = v_command2 
v _connect2. OpenO 
Dim v _elite_count2 As Integer 
v_elite_count2 = da_qPerson!D2.Fill(ds_qPerson!D2, "tblCareerPath") 
'System. Console. W ritcLinc( ds_qPerson!D2. GetXml) 
'v _connect2.CloseQ 
Return ds_qPerson!D2 
End Function 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: GET THE TABLE STRUCTURE FOR DATASET 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------
---------------------------------
'WRITE TO DATASET 
'---------------------------------
---------------------------------
Public Sub writeToDatasetO 
'ADD THIS RO\X'TO DATASET 
Dim anyRow As DataRow = ds_qPersonID2.Tables("tblCareerPath").NewRow 
'Update the new· row as if it were an existing record. 
1 Visual Basic 
anyRow("Row ID Career") = row _count 
anyRow("Name") = v_hold_fullname 
anyRow("CareerStep") = final_career_step 
anyRow("StartYear") = v _fmal_ v _start_date 
anyRow("FinishYear") = v_final_v_finish_date 
anyRow("Row!D") = v_hold_Row!D 
anyRow("Sumame") = v_hold_sumame 
anyRow("GivenNames") = v_hold_givennames 
anyRow("Title") = v_hold_Title 
anyRow("PostNominals") = v_hold_PostNominals 
anyRow('Gender") = v_hold_Gender 
anyRow('BirthDetail") = v _hold_BirthDetail 
anyRow("Education") = v_hold_Education 
anyRow("Occupation") = v_hold_Occupation 
anyRow('Career") = v_hold_Career 
anyRow("Clubs") = v_hold_Clubs 
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anyRow("Committees") = v_hold_Committees 
anyRow("Voluntary") = v_hold_Voluntary 
anyRow(''AwardsMil") = v_hold_AwardsMil 
'Add the new record to the DATASET by calling the Add method of the DataRowCollection object. 
ds_qPersonID2.Tables("tblCareerPath").Rows.Add(anyRow) 
'---------------------------------
---------------------------------
' END: \\'RITE TO DATASET 
'---------------------------------
---------------------------------
End Sub 
Public Sub splitSingleDatesQ 
'---------------------------------
---------------------------------
'SPLIT DATES IN FORM OF SINGLE SET ! ________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------
\~_start_datc = datel 
'v_finish_date = date1 
'final_career_step = fmal_career_step 
'Call Clc:mingUpBeforeDatasetEntryO 
'Call writeToDatasctO 
! ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
'D1\TE VARIABLES 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
, Checking format of dates 
1Console.\VriteLine("Rows: 11 & row_count & 11 I Split Count 11 & split_counter) 
found_all_dates = 0 
final_career_step = " 11 
v _finish_date = " 11 
v _start_date = " " 
mystr = Trim(mystr) 
Dim begin_statt_date As Integer = 0 
Dim length_start_date As Integer 
Dim begin_finish_date As Integer 
Dim length_finish_date As Integer 
Dim v _fmish_date_hold As Integer 
Dim myLen As Integer 
Dim finishLen As Integer 
Dim v _statt_date_swap As String 
Dim v _finish_date_swap As String 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: DATE VARIABLES 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'LIKE EXTRACTIONS OF DATES 
'NOTES: 
'lnake sure it is 11 <space>and<space> .. " format 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* and since####" 
Dim is_it_and_since_format As Boolean 
is_it_and_since_format = mystr Like "* and since ####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"\ since ####" 
Dim is_it_comma_since_format As Boolean 
is_it_comma_since_format = mystr Like 11*, since ####" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT "*(since####)" 
Dim is_it_bracket_since_format As Boolean 
is_it_bracket_since_format = mystr Like "*(since####)" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* since ####" NO CO!vllv!A 
Dim is_it_since_format As Boolean 
is_it_since_format = mystr Like "* since #### 11 
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'IS IT IN FORMAT"* and####-####" 
Dim is_it_and_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate As Boolean 
is_it_and_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate = mystr Like "* and ####?####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT "*, ####-####" 
Dim ts it comma fulldate dash_fulldate_formate As Boolean 
is_it_comma_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate = mystr Like "*, ####?####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"*(####-####)" 
Dim is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate As Boolean 
is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate = mystr Like "*(####?####)" 
'JS IT IN FORMAT"*####-####" 
Dim is_it_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate As Boolean 
is_it_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate = mystr Like "*####?####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* and####-##" 
Dim is_it_and_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate As Boolean 
is_it_and_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate = mystr Like "* and ####?##" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT "*, ####-##" 
Dtm ts 1t comma fulldate dash smalldate_foramate As Boolean 
is_it_comma_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate = mystr Like "*, ####?##" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"'(#### ##)" 
Dim is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate As Boolean 
is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate = mystr Like "*(####?##)" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"*####-##" 
Dim is_it_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate As Boolean 
is_it_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate = mystr Like "*####?##" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* until####" 
Dim is_it_until_format As Boolean 
is_it_until_format = mystr Like "* until ####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* till ####" 
Dim is_it_till_format As Boolean 
is_it_till_format = mystr Like "* till ####" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT "*ti! ####" 
Dim is_it_til_format As Boolean 
is_it_til_format = mystr Like "* ti! ####" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* and####" 
Dim is_it_and_one_fulldate_only As Boolean 
is_it_and_one_fulldate_only = mystr Like "* and ####" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"*,####" 
Dim is_it_comma_one_fulldate_only As Boolean 
is_it_comma_one_fulldate_only = mystr Like "*, ####" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"*(####)" 
Dim is_it_bracket_one_fulldate_only As Boolean 
is_it_bracket_one_fulldate_only = mystr Like"*(####)" 
' IS IT IN FORMAT "* ####" 
Dim is_it_one_fulldate_only As Boolean 
is_it_one_fulldate_only = mystr Like "* ####" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* (rsd ####)" - RESIGNED 
Dim is_it_resigned_format As Boolean 
is_it_resigned_format = mystr Like "* (rsd ####)" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* (rtd ####)" .. RETIRED 
Dim is_it_retired_format As Boolean 
is_it_retired_format = mystr Like "* (rtd ####)" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* (rtd)" - RET!1U'1) NO DATE 
Dim is_it_retired_nodate As Boolean 
is_it_retired_nodate = mystr Like "* (rtd)" 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* and since ####" 
If is_it_and_since_format <> 0 Then 
v _start_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _finish_date = since_serting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
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finishLen = myLen - 15 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"*, since####" 
Elself is_it_comma_since_format <> 0 Then 
v _start_date = Right(mystt, 4) 
v _finish_date = since_setting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = myLen - 12 
final_career_step = Mid(mystt, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORlvfAT "*(since ####)" 
Elself is_it_bracket_since_format <> 0 Then 
hegin_finish_date = myLen - 4 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = myLen - 12 
v _start_date = Mid(mystt, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
v _finish_date = since_setting 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
' IS rr IN FORMAT"* since ####" NO COMMA 
Elself is_it_since_format <> 0 Then 
v _start_date = Right(mystt, 4) 
v _finish_date = since_setting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = my Len - 11 
final_career_step = Mid(mystt, 1, finishLen) 
' IS rr IN FORMAT "*and ####-####" 
Eiself is_it_and_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 8 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 3 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = myLen - 14 
v_start_date = Mid(mystt, hegin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
final_career_step = Mid(mystt, 1, finishLen) 
' IS rr IN FORMAT"*,####-####" 
Elself is_it_comma_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 8 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 3 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = my Len - 11 
v_start_date = Mid(mystt, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date = Mid(mystt, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"*(####-####)" 
Elself is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 9 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 4 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = myLen - 11 
v_start_date = Mid(mystt, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date = Mid(mystt, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
final_career_step = Mid(mystt, 1, finishLen) 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"*####-####" 
Elseif is_it_fulldate_dash_fulldate_formate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 8 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 3 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = myLen - 9 
v _start_date = Mid(mystt, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
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v_finish_date = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* and ####-##" 
Elself is_it_and_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 6 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 1 
length_finish_date = 2 
finishLen = myLen - 12 
v_start_date = Mid(mystr, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date_hold = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
If v _finish_date_hold Like "#" Then 
v _finish_date = "200" & v _finish_date_hold 
Else 
v_finish_date = "19" & v_finish_date_hold 
End If 
'SWAP START AND FINISH DATE 
'IF THEY ARE ROUND THE \VRONG \VAY IN RECORD 
If v _start_date > v _finish_date Then 
v _start_date_swap = v _start_date 
v _finish_date_swap = v _fmish_date 
v _start_date = v _finish_date_swap 
v _finish_date = v _start_date_swap 
End If 
final_careerc_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"*,####-##" 
Elself is_it_comma_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 6 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 1 
length_finish_date = 2 
finishLen = myLen - 9 
v_start_date = Mid(mystr, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date_hold = Mid(mystr, begin_fmish_date, length_finish_date) 
If v _finish_date_hold Like "#" Then 
v _fmish_date = "200" & v _finish_date_hold 
Else 
v _finish_date = "19" & v _finish_date_hold 
End If 
'SWAP START AND FINISH DATE 
'IF THEY ARE ROUND THE \VRONG WAY IN RECORD 
If v _start_date > v _finish_date Then 
v _start_date_swap = v _start_date 
v _finish_date_swap = v _finish_date 
v _start_date = v _finish_date_swap 
v _finish_date = v _start_date_swap 
End If 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, fmishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORtvlAT "*(#### ##)" 
Elself is_it_bracket_fulldate_dash_smalldate_foramate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = myLen - 7 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 2 
length_finish_date = 2 
finishLen = myLen - 9 
v_start_date = Mid(mystr, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date_hold = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
If v _finish_date_hold Like "#" Then 
v _finish_date = "200" & v _finish_date_hold 
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Else 
v finish_date = "19" & v_finish_date_hold 
End If 
'SWAP START AND FINISH DA:IE 
'IF 1HEY ARE ROUND THE WRONG \VAY IN RECORD 
If v _start_date > v _finish_date Then 
v _start_date_swap = v _start_date 
v_finish_date_swap = v_finish_date 
v _start_date = v _finish_date_swap 
v _finish_date = v _start_date_swap 
End If 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
Elself is_it_fulldate_dash_smalldate_forarnate <> 0 Then 
begin_start_date = my Len - 6 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 1 
length_finish_date = 2 
finishLen = myLen - 7 
v_start_date = Mid(mystr, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date_hold = Mid(mystr, begin_fmish_date, length_fmish_date) 
If v _finish_date_hold Like "#" Then 
v _finish_date = "200" & v _finish_date_hold 
Else 
v _finish_date = "19" & v _finish_date_hold 
End If 
'SWAP START AND FINISH DATE 
'IF THEY ARE ROUND THE W1tONG WAY IN RECORD 
If v _start_date > v _finish_date Then 
v _start_date_swap = v _start_date 
v _finish_date_swap = v _fmish_date 
v _start_date = v _finish_date_swap 
v _finish_date = v _start_date_swap 
End If 
fmal_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
' IS IT IN FORMAT"* until ####" 
Elself is_it_until_format Then 
v _ftnish_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _start_date = v _finish_date - until_setting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = myLen - 11 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* till####" 
Elself is_it_till_format Then 
v _finish_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _start_date = v _finish_date - until_setting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = myLen - 10 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORl\IAT "* til ####" 
Elself is_it_til_format Then 
v _finish_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _start_date = v _finish_date - until_setting 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = myLen - 9 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* and####" 
Elself is_it_and_one_fulldate_only <> 0 Then 
If regex_extraction = 1 Then 
'Do nothing, because it's already be done 
Else 
v _start_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _ftnish_date = v _start_date 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
fmishLen = myLen - 9 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
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End If 
' IS ff IN FORMAT"*,####" 
Elself is_it_comma_one_fulldate_only <> 0 Then 
If regex_exttaction = 1 Then 
'Do nothing, because it's already be done 
Else 
v _start_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _finish_date = v _start_date 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
finishLen = myLen - 6 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
End If 
'************************ 
' IS ff IN FORMAT"*(####)" 
Elself is_it_bracket_one_fulldate_only <> 0 Then 
If regex_extraction = 1 Then 
1 Do nothing, because it's already be done 
Else 
begin_start_date = myLen - 4 
length_start_date = 4 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 4 
length_finish_date = 4 
fmishLen = myLen - 6 
v_start_date = Mid(mystr, begin_start_date, length_start_date) 
v_finish_date = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
fmal_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, fmishLen) 
End If 
Elself is_it_one_fulldate_only <> 0 Then 
If regex_exttaction = 1 Then 
' Do nothing .. because it's already be done 
Else 
v _start_date = Right(mystr, 4) 
v _finish_date = v _start_date 
myLen = Len(mystr) 
fmishLen = myLen - 4 
fmal_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
End If 
'IS IT IN FORMAT"* (rsd ####)" - RESIGNED 
Elself is_it_resigned_format <> 0 Then 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 4 
length_finish_date = 4 
ftnishLen = my Len - 10 
v_fmish_date = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
v_start_date = v_finish_date - resigned_until_setting 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
'IS IT JN FORMt\T "* (rtd ####)" - RETIRED 
Elself is_it_retired_format <> 0 Then 
begin_finish_date = myLen - 4 
length_finish_date = 4 
finishLen = myLen - 10 
v_finish_date = Mid(mystr, begin_finish_date, length_finish_date) 
v _start_date = v _finish_date - retired_until_setting 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
Elself is_it_retired_nodate <> 0 Then 
finishLen = myLen - 5 
v _start_date = retired_noDate_setting 
v _fmish_date = retired_noDate_setting 
final_career_step = Mid(mystr, 1, finishLen) 
Elself regex_extraction = 1 Then 
1 Do Nothing, because they are already set. 
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Else' NO DATIIS FOUND 
If split_counter > 1 Then 
found_all_dates = 1 
'Console.\l\!riteLine('NO DATES FOUND. split_counter >1 ") 
final_career_step = mystr 
Else 
final_career_step = mystr 
If field_extract = "Occupation" Then 
v _start_date = current_occupation_start 
v _finish_date = current_occupation_finish 
Elself field_extract = "Committees" Then 
v_start_date = current_committee_start 
v _finish_date = current_committee_finish 
'*****THIS IS FOR A MORE COMPLICATED ROUTINE FOR 
'NUMBERING EDUCATION DATES THAT I NEVER FINISHED*!*!* 
1Elseif field_extract = u:Education" Then 
' EducationHoldDateO 
1 v_start_date = hold_start_date - (cducation_number * 2) 
v_finish_date = ho1d_start_date - (educarion_number * 2) 
education_number = education_number + 1 
Else 
v_start_date = NoStartDate_setting 
v _fmish_date = NoFinishDate_setting 
End If 
End If 
'END: NO DATES FOUND 
End If' END: 'WHAT DATE FORMAT' IF /THEN SERIES 
'Console.\"X/ritel,i11e(1Fina1 Career Step:" & final_career_step) 
'Console.\\-'riteLine("S.D.: 11 &v_start_date & "I F.D.: "&v_finish_date) 
1Console.\\lcitcLinc("Found All Dates: n & found_all_dates & !! I Split Count 11 & split_countcr) 
1v_start_date_ho1d_trim. = Tr.im(v_start_date) 
'If v_start_date_hold_trim = "" Then 
v _start_datc_hold_trim = 11 (J" 
'End If 
'v _start_date_integcr = Clnt(v _start_date_hold_trim) 
'Console.\VriteLine('start date as stting: 11 & v_start:_date & " I as integer:" 
'& v_start_date_integer) 
'If v _start_date_hold_trim < > 0 And v _start_datc_integer < hold_start_date Then 
' hold_start_datc = v_start_dat:e_integer 
'End If 
If found_all_dates = 1 Then 
' Call the write to dataset method for ALL HELD LINES 
If split_counter = 2 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Elself split_counter = 3 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_secondO 
Elself split_counter = 4 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_second0 
Call write_hold_thirdO 
Elself split_counter = 5 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_secondO 
Call write_hold_third0 
Call write_hold_forthO 
Elself split_counter = 6 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_secondO 
Call write_hold_thirdO 
Call write_hold_forthO 
Call write_hold_fifthO 
Elself split_counter = 7 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_secondO 
Call write_hold_thirdO 
Call write_hold_forthO 
Call write_hold_fifthO 
Call write_hold_sixthO 
Elself split_counter = 8 Then 
Call write_hold_firstO 
Call write_hold_secondO 
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Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Elself split_counter = 9 Then 
Call write_hold_firstQ 
Call write_hold_secondQ 
Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Call write_hold_eighthQ 
Elseif split_counter = 10 Then 
Call write_hold_firstQ 
Call write_hold_secondQ 
Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Call write_hold_eighthQ 
Call write_hold_ninthQ 
Elself split_counter = 11 Then 
Call write_hold_firstQ 
Call write_hold_secondQ 
Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Call write_hold_eighthQ 
Call write_hold_ninthQ 
Call write_hold_tenthQ 
Elself split_counter = 12 Then 
Call write_hold_firstQ 
Call write_hold_secondQ 
Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Call write_hold_eighthQ 
Call write_hold_ninthQ 
Call write_hold_tenthQ 
Call write_hold_eleventhQ 
Elseif split_counter = 13 Then 
Call write_hold_firstQ 
Call write_hold_secondQ 
Call write_hold_thirdQ 
Call write_hold_forthQ 
Call write_hold_fifthQ 
Call write_hold_sixthQ 
Call write_hold_seventhQ 
Call write_hold_eighthQ 
Call write_hold_ninthQ 
Call write_hold_tenthQ 
Call write_hold_eleventhQ 
Call write_hold_twelthQ 
End If 
End If 
' Put dates in holding format 
If split_counter = 1 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_first_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_first_v_start_date = v_start_date 
hold_first_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 2 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_second_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_second_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_second_ v _finish_date = v _finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 3 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_third_fmal_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_third_v_start_date = v_start_date 
hold_third_ v _finish_date = v _finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 4 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
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hold_fourth_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_fourth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_fourth_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 5 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_fifth_fmal_career_step = fmal_career_step 
hold_fifth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_fifth_ v _finish_date = v _finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 6 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_sixth_fmal_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_sixth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_sixth_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 7 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_seventh_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_seventh_v_start_date = v_start_date 
hold_seventh_v_fmish_date = v_fmish_date 
Elself split_counter = 8 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_eighth_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_eighth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_eighth_ v _finish_date = v _finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 9 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_ninth_fmal_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_ninth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_ninth_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 10 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_tenth_final_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_tenth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_tenth_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 11 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_eleventh_fmal_career_step = final_career_step 
hold_eleventh_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_eleventh_ v _finish_date = v _finish_date 
Elself split_counter = 12 And found_all_dates <> 1 Then 
hold_twelth_final_career_step = fmal_career_step 
hold_twelth_ v _start_date = v _start_date 
hold_twelth_ v _fmish_date = v _finish_date 
End If 
split_counter = split_counter + 1 
mystr = final_career_step 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: SPLIT DATES IN FORM OF SINGLE SET ! ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
End Sub 
, ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
' CLEAN UP BEFORE DATASET ENTRY 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Public Sub CleaningUpBeforeDatasetEntryQ 
'CLEAN UP ANY \VHITE SP ACES 
'BEFORE ENTRY INTO DATABASE 
final_career_step = Trim(fmal_career_step) 
v_start_date = Trim(v_start_date) 
v_finish_date = Trim(v_finish_date) 
v_final_v_start_date =Nothing 
v _final_ v _finish_date = Nothing 
Dim v _check_start As Integer = 0 
Dim v _check_finish As Integer = 0 
If v_start_date = nn Or v_start_date ="II Or v_start_date =II II Then 
v_final_v_start_date = 0 
v _check_start = 1 
End If 
Ifv finish date= 1111 Or v_finish_date =""Or v_fmish_date =" "Then 
v _final_ v _finish_date = 0 
v _check_fmish = 1 
End If 
Ifv_check_start <> 1 Then 
v_final_v_start_date = v_start_date 
Console.WriteLine(''Integer:" & v_final_v_start_date & " I String: " & v_start_date) 
End If 
If v check_fmish < > 1 Then 
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*" 
v_final_v_finish_date = v_finish_date 
End If 
If final_career_step = ""Then 
final_career_step = " " 
End If 
End Sub 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' END: CLEAN UP BEFORE DATASET ENTRY 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
•---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' SPLIT CAREER 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Public Function Split_Career(ByVal test_string As String) As String 
Dim first_comma As Integer 
Dim first_digitdigit_comma As Integer 
Dim ddc_expression As String 
Dim c_expression As String 
Dim sc_expression As String 
Dim ddc_2_expression As String 
Dim ddr_2_expression As String 
Dim part_result As String 
Dim result As String 
Dim result2 As String 
Dim result3 As String 
Dim match_set_sc As Match 
ddc_expression = "\d\d," 
c_expression = "," 
' ALWAYS SPLIT AT "Ltd," "Co.," OR "Assn," 
Dim search2_string As String= "(?i)(?<word> Ltd),* I (?<word> Co.),* I (?<word> Assn),* I (?<word> Assn.),* I (?<word> Co.), 
Dim replace2_string As String= "${word}" & vbCrLf 
Dim re_object As New Regex(search2_string) 
test_string = re_object.Replace(test_string, replace2_string) 
'NEVER SPLIT AT "\d\, \d\d" 
'Replace all '\d\, \d\d' with '\dCOMMMMA \d\d' 
Dim ddcsdd_2_expression As String= "(?<digit!> \d)(?<comma>,)(?<space> )(?<digitdigit2> \d\d)" 
Dim v2_ddCMAsdd_expression As String = "$ {digit!} COMMMMA $ { digitdigit2}" 
Dim re_ddcsdd_2_ccCMAdd As New Regex(ddcsdd_2_expression) 
test_string = re_ddcsdd_2_ccCMAdd.Replace(test_string, v2_ddCMAsdd_expression) 
'Where is the first "\d\d,"? 
Dim match_set_ddc As Match 
Dim re_ddc As New Regex(ddc_expression) 
match_set_ddc = re_ddc.Match(test_string) 
'Console.WriteLine("lndex DDC: " & (match_set_ddc.lndex + 2)) 
1\X/here is the first 11 ,"? 
Dim match_set_c As Match 
Dim re_c As New Regex(c_expression) 
match_set_c = re_c.Match(test_string) 
'Console.\)\/"riteLine('lndex C: 11 & match_set_c.lndex) 
'Console.Write("RESULT: " & test_string) 
1
.Are they in the same place? 
If match_set_c.Index = (match_set_ddc.Index + 2) Then 
'Console.·writeLine("They Match") 
'\\7here is the first semi-colon? 
sc_expression = ";" 
Dim re_sc As New Regex(sc_expression) 
match_set_sc = re_sc.Match(test_string) 
'Console.\V'riteLine(11Index C: " & match_set_sc.Index) 
'Replace all '\d\d,1 \Vith '\d\d\r' 
ddc_2_expression = "(?<date_digits>\d\d)(?<comma>,)(?<space> )" 
ddr_2_expression = "$ { date_digits}" & vbCrLf 
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Dim re_ddc_2_ddr As New Regex(ddc_2_expression) 
test_string = re_ddc_2_ddr.Replace(test_string, ddr_2_expression) 
test_string = re_ddc_2_ddr.Replace(test_string, ddr_2_expression) 
End If 
"Nevcrsplit after", 1/\ .. --Za-z]," 
Dim cschchc_2_expression As String= ",(?<space_word> [A-Za-z]+),I COMMMMA(?<space_word> [A-Za-
z]+),l ,(?<space_word> [A-Za-z]+)COMMMMA" 
Dim v2_CMAschchCMA_expression As String= "COMMMMA ${space_ word} COMMMMA" 
Dim re_cschchc_2_CMAschchCMA As New Regex(cschchc_2_expression) 
test_string = re_cschchc_2_CMAschchCMA.Replace(test_string, v2_CMAschchCMA_expression) 
test_string = re_cschchc_2_CMAschchCMA.Replace(test_string, v2_CMAschchCMA_expression) 
If match_set_c.Index = (match_set_ddc.Index + 2) Then' i.e. 1st ','=1st '\d\d,' 
'Fr01n one digit before fo'.st ';', rep1ace all';' & ',' with '\r' 
Dim c_2_expression As String = ", I ; I , ! ;" 
Dim r_2_expression As String = vbCrLf 
Dim re_c_2_r As New Regex(c_2_expression) 
test_string = re_c_2_r.Replace(test_string, r_2_expression, 100, match_set_sc.Index) 
'Console.Write("RESULT: " & test_string) 
Else 1 All others, just replace all';' :.md ','with vbCrLf 
'Replace all ';' & ','with vbCrLf 
Dimc_2_expressionAsString= ",I; l,J;" 
Dim r_2_expression As String = vbCrLf 
Dim re_c_2_r As New Regex(c_2_expression) 
test_string = re_c_2_r.Replace(test_string, r_2_expression) 
'Console.Write("RESUGf: " & test_string) 
End If 
'RETURN .ALL THE SKIPPED COMM.A'S 
'Replace "COMM.MMA" with"," 
Dim search_string As String= "COMMMMA" 
Dim replace_string As String="," 
Dim re_search_2_replace As New Regex(search_string) 
test_string = re_search_2_replace.Replace(test_string, replace_string) 
'Console.\Vritc("RESULT: " & vbCrLf & test_string) 
Return test_string 
End Function 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' END: SPLIT CAREER 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'MAIN EXTRACTION SUBROUTINE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'Public Sub Extract(ByVal ficld_to_cxtrnct_now As String, By Val ds_qPersonID2 As DataSet) 
Public Sub Extract(ByVal field_to_extract_now As String) 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'THIS IS ALL JUST CRAP TO ACTIVJ\ TE THE DATABASE CONNECTION FOR LATER 
'---------------------------------------~
Dim v _databaseLocation2 As String 
Dim ficld_extract2 As String 
field_extract2 = "*" 
v _databaseLocation2 = "C: \Temp \DataSet-Sample-Access.mdb" 
Dim v_connect2 As New OleDbConnection(_ 
"Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v_databaseLocation2) 
Dim v_query_3 As String= "SELECT" & ficld_extract2 & "From tblCareerSteps" 'Default Value 
Dim v_command2 As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_3) 
Dim da_qPersonID2 As New OleDbDataAdapterO 
v_command2.Connection = v_connect2 
da_qPersonID2.SclectCommand = v_command2 
v _connect2. OpenQ 
·---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: CRAP TO ACTIVATE THE DATABASE CONNECTION FORLJ\TER 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
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'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' OPEN AND EXTRACT SOURCE DATABASE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Dim v _databaseLocation As String 
' Dim field_extract As String 
Dim select_query As String 
select_query = " * 11 
field_extract = field_to_extract_now 
Console.WriteLine('Starting extraction of" & field_extract) 
Dim v_query_2 As String= "SELECT " & select_query & " From Tablel" 'Default Value 
v _databaseLocation = "C: \Temp \DataSet-Sample-Access.mdb" 
Dim v _connect As New OleDbConnection( _ 
"Provider=MicrosoftJet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & v_databaseLocation) 
Dim v_command As OleDbCommand =New OleDbCommand(v_query_2) 
Dim da_qPersonID As New OleDbDataAdapterO 
Dim ds_qPersonID As New DataSetO 
v_command.Connection = v_connect 
da_qPersonID.SelectCommand = v_command 
v_connect.OpenO 
Dim v _elite_count As Integer 
v_elite_count = da_qPersonID.Fill(ds_qPersonID, "tblX") 
v _connect. CloseO 
!---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: OPEN AND EXTRACT SOURCE DATABASE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' MAIN LOOP I MAIN LOOP I MAIN LOOP 
'EXTRACT E,1\CH ROW, ONE BY ONE ! ______________________________________ _ 
---------------------------------------
'EXTRACT EACH ROW OF THE SOURCE DATABASE 
Dim row_ var2 As DataRow 
Dim col_ var2 As DataColumn 
Dim v _output As String 
Dim v _row As Integer 
Dim v _steps As Integer = v _elite_count 
Dim v _output_hold As String 
Dim v_outpuchold_O As String 
Dim v _output_hold_l As String 
row _count = 0 
v_hold_sumame = "" 
v _hold_givennames = "" 
v_hold_Title = "" 
v_hold_PostNominals = "" 
v_hold_Gender = 11 11 
v _hold_BirthDetail = "" 
v_hold_Education = "" 
v_hold_Occupation = "" 
v_hold_Career = "" 
v_hold_Oubs ="" 
v _hold_ Committees = "" 
v_hold_ Voluntary="" 
v_hold_AwardsMil = '"' 
v _hold_fullname = "" 
For Each row_var2 In ds_qPersonID.Tables\'tblX").Rows 
For Each col_var2 In ds_qPersonID.Tables("tblX").Columns 
If Not v_row = v_steps Then 
Dim v _current_row _contents As DataRow = 
ds_qPersonID.Tables("tblX").Rows(v_row) 
' Reset education_number variable for new row/ person 
education_number = 1 
' Reset hokl_start_date variable for new ro\v i person 
hold_start_date = hold_start_date_setting 
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'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' PUT DATABASE RO\V' INFO INTO VARIABLES 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Dim MyCheck As Boolean = 1 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents(field_extract)) Then' Returns True, 
v _hold_row _contents = v _current_row _contents(field_extract) 
Else 
v _hold_row _contents = 1111 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> lsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("RowID")) Then' Returns True. 
v_hold_RowID = v _current_row_contents("RowID") 
Else 
v_hold_RowID ="" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Sumame")) Then' Rcn1rns Trne, 
v_hold_surname = v_current_row_contents("Surname") 
Else 
v_hold_surname ="" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("GivenNames")) Then' Returns Trne. 
v _hold_givennames = v _current_row _contents('GivenNames") 
Else 
v _hold_givennames = " " 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Title")) Then' Ren1rns True. 
v_hold_Title = v_current_row_contents\'Title") 
Else 
v_hold_Title ="" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents\'PostNominals")) Then' Returns Tree. 
v _hold_PostNominals = v _current_row _contents("PostNominals") 
Else 
v _hold_PostNominals = " " 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents\'Gender")) Then' Returns True. 
v_hold_Gender = v_current_row_contents("Gender") 
Else 
v_hold_Gender = "" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents\'BirthDetail")) Then' Returns Tree. 
v _hold_BirthDetail = v _current_row _contents("BirthDetail") 
Else 
v _hold_BirthDetail = " " 
End If 
IfMyCheek <> lsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Education")) Then' Returns True. 
v _hold_Education = v _current_row _contents("Education") 
Else 
v _hold_Education = " " 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents\'Occupation")) Then' Ren1rns True, 
v _hold_ Occupation = v _current_row _contents('Occupation") 
Else 
I **********CHANGE***********\XlORKED 
v_hold_Occupation ="" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents\'Career")) Then' Returns True, 
v_hold_Career = v_current_row_contents("Career") 
Else 
v _hold_ Career = " " 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Clubs")) Then' Returns True. 
v_hold_Clubs = v_current_row_contents("Clubs") 
Else 
v_hold_Clubs ="" 
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End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Committees")) Then' Returns True. 
v _hold_Committees = v _current_row _contentsf1Committees") 
Else 
v_hold_Committees = "" 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("Voluntary")) Then' Returns Trne. 
v _hold_ Voluntary = v _current_row _contents("Voluntary") 
Else 
v_hold_ Voluntary= 11 " 
End If 
IfMyCheck <> IsDBNull(v_current_row_contents("AwardsMil")) Then' Returns True. 
v _hold_AwardsMil = v _current_row _contents("AwardsMil") 
Else 
v_hold_AwardsMil ="" 
End If 
v_hold_fullname = v_hold_surname & "," & v_hold~vennames 
'---~----------------------------------­
---------------------------------------
'END: PUT DATABASE RO\V INFO INTO VARIABLES 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'SPLIT ROW INFO INTO LINES 
' SA VE LINES TO FILE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'SPLITrING RULES 
Dim .String As String 
'SPLJTI'ING FOR OCCUPATION 
If field_extract = "Occupation" Then 
v_output_hold_O = Replace(v_hold_row_contents, ";", vbCrLf) 
'v_output_hold_l = Replace(v_output_hold_O, ",", vbCrLf) 
v _output_hold = Trim(v _output_hold_O) 
Elself field_extract = "Career" Then 
v_output_hold = Split_Career(v_hold_row_contents) 
v_output_hold = Trim(v_output_hold) 
Else 
'SPLITTING FOR REST 
v_output_hold_O = Replace(v_hold_row_contents, ";", vbCrLf) 
v_output_hold_l = Replace(v_output_hold_O, ",", vbCrLf) 
v_output_hold = Trim(v_output_hold_l) 
End If 
'CREATING HOLDING FlLE 
Dim v_f_holdingBay As String= "c:\temp\f_holdingBay_Clean_Up.txt" 
'WRITING 'v _output_hold' TO HOLDING FILE 
Dim fs_holding As FileStream = _ 
New FileStream(v_f_holdingBay, System.IO.FileMode.Create) 
Dim w _holding As Stream Writer= New StreamWriter(fs_holding) 
w _holding.Write(v _output_hold) 
w _holding.FlushQ 
w _holding. CloseQ 
·---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: SPLJT ROW INFO INTO LINES 
' E..ND: SA VE LJNES TO FILE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' KXTRACT LINES, LINE BY LINE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'EXTRACTING SPLITS, LINE BY LINE 
Dim SourceFile As String 
Dim f As System.IO.File 
mystr = "" 
Dim mystream As System.IO.StreamReader 
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SourceFile = "c:\temp\f_holdingBay_Clean_Up.txt" 
mystream = £0penText(SourceFile)' Open a new stream. 
Do Until IsNothing(mystr) 
'mystr:::: 1111 
mystr = mystream.ReadLine 
' This skips lines that are empty 
Dim MyCheck3 As Boolean = 1 
If MyCheck3 <> IsNothing(mystr) Then' Returns True. 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: EXTRACT LINES, LINE BY LINE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' ENTER Manipulations of dat~, line by line, here: 
' Reset split_counter for every LINE 
split_counter = 1 
found_all_dates = 0 
'Reset hold nriable for career and dates for NEW LINE 
hold_first_final_career_step = "" 
hold_first_v_start_date = 1111 
hold_first_ v _finish_date = '"' 
hold_second_final_career_step = "" 
hold_second_v_start_date = 1111 
hold_second_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_third_final_career_step = "" 
hold_third_ v _start_date = '"' 
hold_third_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_fourth_final_career_step = "" 
hold_fourth_v_start_date = "" 
hold_fourth_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_fifth_final_career_step = "" 
hold_fifth_ v _start_date = "" 
hold_fifth_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_sixth_final_career_step = "" 
hold_sixth_v_start_date = "" 
hold_sixth_ v _finish_date = "" 
hold_seventh_final_career_step = 1111 
hold_seventh_v_start_date = 11 " 
hold_seventh_v_finish_date = '"' 
hold_eighth_final_career_step = "" 
hold_eighth_v_start_date = "" 
hold_eighth_ v _finish_date = "" 
hold_ninth_final_career_step = 1111 
hold_ninth_v_start_date = '"' 
hold_ninth_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_tenth_final_career_step = "11 
hold_tenth_ v _start_date = "" 
hold_tenth_ v _finish_date = "" 
hold_eleventh_final_career_step = "" 
hold_eleventh_v_start_date = 11 " 
hold_eleventh_v_finish_date = "" 
hold_twelth_final_career_step = "" 
hold_twelth_v _start_date = "" 
hold_twelth_v_finish_date = "" 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' This splits. ALL dates, cleans lines them, 
' and saves lines to Dataset. 
Do Until found_all_dates = 1 Or split_counter > 13 
Call splitSingleDatesQ 
Loop 
'======================================= 
•---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'Call CleaninglJpBeforcDatasetEnh)'0 
' Call writeToDatasetQ 
row_count = row_count + 1 
End If 
Loop 
398 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' WRITE TO DATABASE, ENTIRE DATASET FOR ONE RO\V 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'UPDATE DATABASE WITH ENTIRE DATASET 
Dim custCB As OleDbCommandBuilder = New OleDbCommandBuilder(da_qPersonID2) 
da_qPersonID2.Update(ds_qPersonID2.Tables("tb!CareerPath")) 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: WRITE TO DATABASE, ENTIRE DATASET FOR ONE ROW 
·---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' CLEAN UP [MAIN LOOP] 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
v _connect2.Close0 
mystream.CloseO 
' 
ds_qPersonID2.ClearO 
'System.Console.WriteLinc(v_output_hold) 
·---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
' END: CLEAN UP [tv!AIN LOOP] 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
v_row = v_row + 1 
System.Console.WriteLine(field_extract & ": " & v_row & " of" & v_steps) 
End If 
Next 
Next 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: MAIN LOOP I MAIN LOOP I :tv!AIN LOOP 
'END: EXTRACT EACH ROW, ONE BY ONE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'CLEAN UP [MAIN EXTRACTION SUBJ 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
ds_qPersonID.ClearO 
GC.CollectO 
Console.WriteLine\'Finished extracting" & field_extract) 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: CLEAN LTP [MAIN EXI1lACTION SUB] 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
total_rows_extracted = total_rows_extracted + v _steps 
End Sub 
!---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'END: MAIN EXTRN~TION SUBROUTINE 
'---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
'------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
'------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
' 11 11 I ! WORKSPACE I JUNK I WORKSPACE 11 11 11 
' \i \!\/WORKSPACE I JUNK I WORKSPACE\/\/ \i ! _______________________________________________ _ 
------------------------------------------------
'------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
End Module 
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To download the latest copy of this manual go to: 
http://www.sna.unimelb.edu.au/pnet/pnet.html#download 
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Introduction 
PNet for Dummies is intended to walk the new user through one complete 
estimation in PNet. It is not a comprehensive guide to PNet. Currently the 
most comprehensive guide to PNet is the PNet Users Manual. 
PNet for Dummies exists to help get the new user started, helping them 
overcome the most common initial barriers, so that they can begin exploring 
and experimenting with PNet themselves. 
To this end, PNet for Dummies tries to emphasise solutions to some 
common problems, through dealing with issues such as: 
• synchronising your network and attribute data (using VNA files) 
• transforming your data into raw matrix and raw attribute formats. 
• deciding which configurations/parameters to select for your model 
• preventing degeneracy in your model 
• identifying the causes of unreasonable parameter estimates in your 
model 
• fitting your model 
• interpreting goodness of fit statistics. 
For the most part, we have written PNet for Dummies as a way of 
documenting many of the heuristic (that is, rule-of-thumb) solutions which we 
have come across as we have learnt to use PNet. We hope you will find 
some of our solutions useful to your work. 
The vast majority of the solutions documented in PNet forDummies are 
techniques which have been developed by the staff and students of the Social 
Networks Laboratory at the University of Melbourne, in particular, Pip 
Pattison, Garry Robins, Peng Wang, Dean Lusher, Galina Daraganova and 
Johan Koskinen. 
Any suggestions, feedback, comments or corrections would be greatly 
appreciated, and can be emailed to nick_harrigan@yahoo.com or 
nick.harrigan@anu.edu.au 
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Terminology 
You will notice certain indented text that is written in Courier font, such as 
this: 
Data>Import>VNA 
Such text is intended to emphasis that the text is referring to a piece of semi-
programming language text, such as an excel formula, or it is a direction to 
access a program or menu in a computer program. 
The use of the ">" symbol" refers to opening of either folders in a computers 
desktop, or the opening of menus inside a computer program. For example, 
the line above refers to a UCINET menu, and asks the reader to select the 
"Data" menu, then select the "Import" sub-menu, and then the "VNA" sub-
menu. 
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Step 1: Installing PNet 
Before running PNet, you will need to install the program. You can do this my 
going to the downloads part of the PNet section of the MelNet website, which 
can be found here: 
http://www.sna.unimelb.edu.au/pnet/pnet.html#download 
Simply click on the "PNet setup.axe" link under the heading " PNet for Single 
Networks" 
Follow the prompts, selecting "run", "ok" and "next" as appropriate. The 
default setting for PNet are all fine EXCEPT that you should not run PNet from 
the shortcuts. If you do, PNet will leave about 4 or 5 little files on your 
desktop, containing starting statistics and update files. Instead, you should 
always run PNet from the folder it is installed in. If you want to set up a short 
cut, set up a short cut to that folder, not to the PNet file itself. 
If you attempt to run PNet and it does not work, it may be because you do not 
have either Java Platform or the Microsoft .NET framework installed. These 
can both be downloaded from the PNet website under the heading "Required 
Environment" 
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To attach these attributes to their network, I place the data in a VNA file 
(which is a file type for UCINET. It is similar to a DL file type). 
To do this I create a formula at the end of each row in Excel. The formula I 
use for the attributes (i.e. all lines except for the first line, which has the 
attribute names in it) is: 
=""""&A2&""""&" "&C2&" "&02&" "&E2&" "&F2&" "&G2&" 
"&H2&" "&I2&" "&J2&" "&K2&" "&L2&" "&M2&" "&N2&" 
"&02&" "&P2&" "&Q2&" "&R2&" "&S2 
This basically just says, put double inverted commas around the name of the 
node, and then list the attribute values one at a time, with a space between 
each one. 
Write this formula out for the first line of data (not the first row with headings) 
and then copy and paste it down the rest of the row. 
For the top line, which contains the attribute labels, I use this formula: 
=""""&Al&""""&", "&Cl&", "&Dl&", "&El&", "&Fl&", 
"&Gl&", "&Hl&", "&Il&", "&Jl&", "&Kl&", "&Ll&", 
"&Ml&", "&Nl&", "&01&", "&Pl&", "&Ql&", "&Rl&", "&Sl 
This formula says, put the first column heading in double inverted commas, 
and then list the rest of the variable names, with a comma between each one. 
NOTE: TO USE THIS FORUMULA YOUR ATTRIBUTE NAMES MUST NOT 
HAVE ANY SPACES IN THEM. If you want to have spaces in your attribute 
names then you will have to place double inverted commas around each one 
of them (as I have done with the first column in my attribute heading list). 
You should end up with a column in your dataset that looks like this: 
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CONT_Prop I 1 
Esecs_on_G, CONT_Reve I 
~ ovtBds.. nue $bil i "Comp_~g Name'.'.,!;llN_ Think Tank, BIN_BCAChrmsPnl, E;llN BCA ALL, BIN ~ 
0 5.1565 W'B Limited" O O 111 O O O 0 O 113 0. 727272727272727 0.666666666666667 0 0 5.1 
~~t--~·--.o::T---1.2-8-27 PN News 6c Media Limited" 0 0 0 110 0 0 0 0 113 0.81818181818181810 0 1.282793 
0 . ational Australia Bank Limited" 101111000110 3110.2 0 37.406---1·-··-·· 
--~-~- -<-~-,~-~~~----~ ~ -·--··~~----~-~---r-~~~--~~~---,,._,,L,.N,_, ~--•~~, 
O ~ 1.8766 "W'estfield Grou " 11111 0 0 11 0 10 411 0.3 0 1.8766 1 J. 
~-· ....... ~ o+-==·· t551s98 i "Queens1and ~.. o o o 1 o o o o o o 10 31 o.666666666666667 o o'l.551998 
·········-···--QL .. .fi.954 . 'Ten Network Holdings Limited" 0 0 0110 0 11 0 10 3 11 0 0 0.95~586 __ L ____ _ 
0.79589 'ABB Grain Ltd" 000110000010 3110 0 0.795892 ~ i 
j._E3 ·:·· 6.38137 'Leighton Holdings Limited" OOl 0 1 O O 1 O 1 ~ 311 0.111111111111111 0.33333'333333333~ 
~- __ 3.003311 "W'o~~_!troleum_ Ltd".!flJl!Q.~! 9 3 0.6666666666!~67 1Q,.1ll!!ill1111111 0 
II • ' H 
409 
2.2 Integrating Attribute and Network Data in a VNA file 
Attribute Data 
Select this column and press copy. 
Open Notepad, and press paste. 
Type the follow text at the top of the file: 
*node data 
You should have a screen that looks like this: 
toode data 
'company Name'', BIN_Think_Tank, BIN_BCAChrmsPnl, BIN_BCA_ALL, B 
"AWB Limited" 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10011 3 0.727272727272 
"APN News & Media Limited" o o o 1 1 o 0 o o 1 O O O O O 1l 3 O 
"National Australia Bank Limited" 1 O 1 1 1 1 O O O O O O 1 0 1 
"westfi eld Group" 1 1 1 1 1 o o 1 1 1 O o 0 o O 10 4 1 1 O. 3 O 
"Queensland sugar Limited" O O O 1 O O O O O 0 1 O O O O 10 3 l 
"Ten Network Holdings Limited" O O 0 1 l 0 O 1 1 l 0 0 0 0 0 10 
''.ABB Grain Ltd" 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 3 1 1 0 0 0. 79 
"Leighton Holdings L imil:ed" O o 1 O 1 O O 1 O 1 O O O O 1 9 3 l 
"wooaside Petroleum Ltd" 1Ol11OO1OO0O01 1 9 3 0.66 
"Mitre 10 Australia Ltd" O O O 1 o O O O O O O O 1 O O 9 3 0.66 
"col es Myer Ltd" o o 1 1 1 o o 1 o O o o 1 o O 8 3 0. 875 1 O. 25 
"commonwealth Bank of Australia" O 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 O 1 O O O O O 
"Rio Tinto Plc - Rio Tinto Limited" O o 0 1 1 O O O O O O O 1 O 
"Qantas Airways Limited'' 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 8 3 1 1 
"ivesfarmers limited" o O 1 1 1 o o 1 O O O 0 O l O 8 3 1 1 O O 
''Publishing and Broadcasl:ing Limited" O O O 1 1 0 O 1 1 l 0 0 0 
"BHP Billit:on Limit:ed" 0 1 1 1 1 0 O 0 0 0 0 O l 0 0 7 3 1 l O 
"Aus-rralia and New zeal and Banking Group limited" 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
"Brambles Industries L imi-red" 0 1 l 1 1 0 o 0 O 1 0 o O O O 7 3 
"Metcash Trading Limit:ed'' O o O 1 1 O O 1 O l 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 O. 5 
'" .• "'" "' .'ft 
Save this file. As you can see from the title of my file (at the top of the 
Notepad screen) I tend to label my files "node data ... "and then some 
descriptive information about the data set. 
Go back to your Excel file and count the number of Binary, Continuous, and 
Categorical attributes you have in your dataset. Note the order (they should 
be grouped into their attribute types). Write down these three numbers and 
the order (we will use them later). 
Matrix data 
I prepare my matrix data in VNA file format as well. 
If you have your matrix data in any other format, you can convert it to VNA file 
format by opening it in NETDRAW (not UCINET), and then selecting: 
File>Save Data As>VNA>Complete 
410 
When you have done this, select the matrix information, which is located 
under the title "*tie data" 
Alternatively you can prepare your own VNA matrix data using the directions 
contained in "A Brief Guide to Using Netdraw". "A Brief Guide to Using 
Netdraw" is a Word document which is included with UCINET and in Windows 
this can be found by navigating from your desktop to here: 
Start>All Program>UCINET 6> A Brief Guide to Using 
Netdraw 
Once you have your matrix/tie data in VNA format paste the section labelled 
"*tie data" into the node data file prepared earlier. 
You should paste it below the "*node data", like this: 
"Tyco Int:erna1:iona1 Pl:y Limil:ed" O O O O O O O O O 1 O O O O O 
"LG Elecl:ronics Ausnalia Pty Limil:ed" O O O O O O O O O 1 O O 
"Teni x Pt:y Li mil:ed" O O O 1 O O O 1 1 1 O O O O O 1 3 1 0. 66666 
"Robert: Bosch (Aust:ralia) PtY, Ll:d" 0 O O O O O O O O O O O 1 O 
"canon Aust:ralia Pl:y L imil:ed' O O O O O O O O O 1 O O O O O 1 2 
"Mcoonalds Australia Hol'di ngs L imired" O O 1 O O O O O O 1 O O 
"Panasonic Ausnalia Pt:y Limi'ted" O O O O O O O O O 1 O O O O O 
"cKI/HEI Electricil:y oist:ribution Holdings (Australia) P"ty L"t" 
"Amal:ek Indusl:ries PTy Limi-red" O O O O O O O O O 1OOOOO1 
"Schneider Elecrric Ausl:ralia Holdings Pty Limil:ed" O O O O O O 
*Tie data 
from to NumbL inks 
"AMP L imii:ed" "woolwor-rhs L imil:ed" 1 
"Insurance Ausnali a Group L imit:ed" "woolwonhs L imit:ed" 1 
"wool\ .. 'Ort:hs L imit:ed" "AMP Limited" 1 
"Insurance Australia Group Limit:ed" "AMP Limil:ed" 1 
"wool.worths L imi'ted" "Insurance Ausi:rali a Group L imil:ed" 1 
"AMP L imit:ed" "Insurance Ausl:rali a Group L imi1ted" 1 
"xstrat.a coa1 Invesrments Aust:ralia Pi:y l imi"ted" ''xst.rat:a Queen 
"xst:rat.a Queensland L imit:ed" "xst.rat:a coal Invest.ment.s Australi 
"Ansel 1 Limited"' "Nal:i onal Foods Limited" 1 
"Nai:ional Foods L imil:ed" "Ansell L imii:ed" 1 
"Amcor Limited" "col es Myer Ltd" 1 
"Coles M er Lt.d" "Amcor Limited" 1 
" y . . 
Save this file. I tend to name this file "node + tie data ... " 
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2.3 Transforming VNA File into Raw Matrix and Attribute files 
Open UCINET 
Set the default directory to the directory which your files are located in (in 
UCINET 6.138, this is located at the bottom right hand side of the main screen 
of UCINET, and is labelled with a filing-cabinet-draw symbol). 
Import your complete VNA file (the one that contains both node and tie data): 
Data>Import>VNA, Select the VNA file, Press OK. 
Then export each of the resulting UCINET files (the Network and Attribute 
files, labelled with a "-Net" and a "-Att" at the end of the UCINET file names 
respectively). 
Export the Network file as RAW data: 
Data>Export>Raw, The default settings should be fine 
(you want the output format to be 'FULLMATRIX'). 
Select your UCINET Network file, press Ok. 
In Windows, go to the folder in which you've saved this file. Find the raw 
Network/Matrix file you have just created. Change it's name so that it begins 
with "MA TRIX_" and then the number of nodes in the dataset. This will help 
you remember this when you are using the file in PNet. This is your final 
Matrix file for PNet. The file you have created should look like this: 
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10000000000000000000000010000000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Export the Attribute File as EXCEL data: 
Data>Export>Excel, Select your UCINET Attribute file, press Ok. 
Note: if you have any unexplained problems with 
exporting to the Excel file or any other export file, try 
deleting the entire path of the "Output file" or "Output 
dataset", and then just retyping in a name you want to 
call the file, without the rest of the path (i.e. without 
the bit that says "C:\MyDocuments\etc." 
Open the Excel file you have created. 
Select the cells containing the binary data. Do not select the column or row 
headings. Press copy. 
Open Notepad. Press paste. 
Press save. Save as a file with the title "BIN_" and then the number of binary 
variables in this dataset, and then some name you will remember (eg. 
"BIN_ 14-NonExec250nodes.txt"). This is your final Binary attribute file. 
Repeat this process for your Continuous and Categorical attributes. 
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They should each look something like this: 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Step 3: Estimation in PNet 
3.1 Setting up PNet Estimation 
Before you open PNet, take the raw matrix, and attribute files that you have 
created and put them in a new folder on their own. Make a copy of this folder 
and call it something like "Original Network and Attribute files" 
Then name the other folder the name of the session which you are going to 
run in PNet. I like to name my folders/sessions experiments, so I give them a 
name like "Exp 1 -Top250_27Att-6 FEB 07'', which means it's experiment 1, 
and it's of my top 250 corporations network, with 27 attributes, and it's on the 
61h Feb 2007. I am a bit obsessive with naming files. You might prefer 
something simpler. 
Make a mental (or physical) note of where this folder is. 
Open PNet 
Click on the tab labelled "Estimation" 
You should have screen that looks like this: 
Type a session name in the top left hand corner box. 
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Select a session folder by clicking Browse, then finding the folder where your 
raw matrix and attribute files are saved, and then pressing open. I tend to 
name my session the same name as my session folder. 
Type in the number of actors in the "Number of Actors" box. 
Select your "Network file". This is your raw matrix file and should be in the 
session folder you just selected. 
Select your Network Type. Generally you wo not be fixing the maximum 
degree for each actor, so leave this blank. 
Tick the "Structural Parameters" box, then press "Select Parameters". 
In the new form that opens, click on the border in the bottom left hand corner 
and open the box so that you can see as many of the parameters as possible. 
This will make it easier to navigate. 
Note: In each of these "Select Parameter" forms, you 
will be given a range of options depending on the 
network type and whether the form lists structural 
parameters or attribute parameters. This 'PNet for 
Dummies' guide includes suggestions about which 
parameters will be useful for many standard 
estimations. However, it does not include a complete 
list of parameters, nor does it explain how to interpret 
each of these parameters. For a complete list of the 
definitions of all the parameters used in PNet, see 
Appendix B in the PNet User Manual. For 
explanations of the meaning and interpretation of 
these parameters the reader will need to consult 
specific papers which interpret these parameters, 
many of which are included on the MelNet website: 
http://sna.unimelb.edu.au 
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Structural Parameters: Non-directed graphs 
If you have a non-directed network you should have a screen that looks 
something like this: 
If it is a non-directed graph, then generally you will want to select the following 
structural parameters: 
• Edge 
• K-star 
• K-triangle 
• K-2-path 
For the higher order parameters (the K- parameters) the default of lambda of 
2 is fine. 
If you have a significant number of isolates in your model, you may want to 
select the structural parameter: 
• Isolates 
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Structural parameters: directed graphs 
If you have a directed graph, then you should get a screen that looks like this: 
If it is a directed graph, and it is of low density, then generally you will want to 
select the following structural parameters: 
Markov: 
• Arc 
• Reciprocity 
• Isolates (if you have a number of isolates in your dataset) 
High-Order Parameters: 
• K-in-star 
• K-out-star 
• AKT-T (this is an alternating K-triangle - transitive) 
• A2p-T (alternating K-2-path-transitive) 
For more dense networks, you may want to begin increasing the complexity of 
your model by start adding in more higher order triangle effects, such as: 
• AKT-D 
• AKT-U 
• AKT-C 
• and so on. 
For the moment we will assume you have only one network you want to 
model, so we will ignore the dyadic attributes parameter. 
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If you have attributes, select the box next to "Actor Attributes Parameter", and 
then select the boxes for the types of variables (binary, continuous, 
categorical) and then type the number of each type of variables you have into 
the designated box. After doing this, press "Select Parameters". [If this does 
not open, it is because you have not chosen a "Session Folder" (at the top of 
the page). Select a 'session folder' and then the "Select Parameters" button 
should work] 
These "Select Parameters" forms vary depending on the type of network 
(directed or non-directed) and also the number of variables you have for your 
actors. 
Press Browse and select your binary attribute file. 
Non-directed binary attributes 
For non-directed binary attributes, it is generally enough to select two 
parameters for each attribute: 
• R 
• Rb 
Select the box next to each of these parameters for each variable, and press 
OK. 
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Directed binary attributes 
For directed, binary attributes, it is generally sufficient to select the following 
three parameters for each attribute: · 
• Rb 
• Rs 
• Rr 
Non-directed continuous attributes 
For non-directed continuous attributes, it is generally enough to select the 
following parameters for each attribute: 
• sum 
• difference 
Directed continuous attributes 
For directed continuous attributes, it is generally enough to select the 
following parameters for each attribute: 
• sender 
• receiver 
Of the "Estimation Options" the only ones that you will generally change are: 
• Multiplication Factor 
• Number of Runs 
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3.2 Preventing Model Degeneracy. 
In the early stages of running a model, the main problem that you are most 
likely to run into is that of model degeneracy. There are a number of reasons 
why this can occur, but the main cause is when there are no instances of one 
or more "graph configurations" (which we measure using "parameters"). For 
example, if there are no isolates in your graph, and you have said you want to 
estimate the parameter for the isolates configuration (called "isolates" under 
"structural parameters"), then your model will be degenerate because it will 
find it impossible to estimate a parameter for this value. 
To prevent model degeneracy, I suggest that you undertake this procedure 
before attempting to run an estimation. 
After selecting your parameters and setting up your estimation as described in 
the previous section, set the number of "Subphases" to zero, and press 
"Start". 
In less that 5 seconds, a dialogue box should open that says "Estimation 
Finished". Press OK. Notepad will open with a whole lots of statistics. Close 
this file. 
Go to your computers desktop, and then navigate to your session folder. 
Open the file labelled "start-statistics-[your session name]". This should open 
in Notepad. 
Scroll to the very bottom of the file, and then back up until you find a list of 
statistics starting with the line: 
****This graph contains:**** 
• No. of vertices: 
• 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D 0 0 0 0 0 D 0 
000000000000000000000000000000000000 
~·c·w .,78 
* No~oeges: 114 
* No. of Isolat:es: 83.0 
" No. of K-st:ar(2. 00): 179. 3 
" No. of K-Triangel(2.00): 58.5 
" NO. of AhTwoPat:h(2.00): 251.0 
" No. of Rb for Ati:ri but:e2: 4 
" No. of Rb for Att:ri but:e3: 44 
" No. of Rb for At:t:ri but:e4: 94 
* No. of Rb for At:t:ribut:e5: 99 
" No. of Rb for At:t:ribut:e6: 14 
* No. of Rb for At:t:r i but: es: 11 
" No. of Rb for At:t:ribut:e9: 3 
"' No. of Rb for At:t:ribut:elO: 47 
" No. of Rb for At:t:ribut:e13: 15 
* No. of R for At.t:r i but: el: 32 
"' No. of R for At:t:ri but:e2: 36 
"' No. of R for At:t:ri but:e3: 134 
"' No. of R for At:t:ribut:e4: 203 
" No. of R for At:t:ribut:e5: 208 
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3.3 Running an Estimation 
Reset the number of sub-phases to 5. 
The other settings should be fine for a first run. Press Start. 
After a period of time (most small networks will be almost instantaneous. For 
one of my networks with 250 nodes and 88 ties, a run with a MF of 10 takes 
about 30 seconds), a dialogue box will appear "Estimation Finished". Press 
OK. 
The estimation file will open in Notepad. Scroll down to the very bottom of the 
file. The part you are interested is the list of parameter values next to 
configuration names, under the title: 
*Estimation Result for Network SUMMARY 
You should see something like this: 
*Est:imat:ion Result for Net:work SUMMARY (paramet:er, st:andard error, t: 
NOTE: t:-st:atistics = (observat:ion - sample mean)/standard error 
Edge: -8.531393, 3.11497, -0.00141 * 
Isol at:es: 1. 611401, O. 79827, 0. 00779 * 
K-St:ar(2.00): -0.903968, 0.66223, 0.00463 
AKT-T(2.00): 1.172021, 0.15187, 0.01524 * 
A2P-T(2.00): -0.109786, 0.15107, 0.02050 
Rb for Att:ribut:e2: 0.294296, 0.77132, 0.01205 
Rb for Att:ribute3: 0.327114, 0.37907, -0.05848 
Rb for At:t:ribut:e4: 0.930864, 0.85759, 0.00308 
Rb for At.t.ribute5: 1. 791082, o. 95367, -0. 00776 
Rb for Attribut:e6: 0.163366, 0.45101, 0.10496 
Rb for A"tt:ii but:e8: -0. 016413, o. 49164, -0. 00920 
Rb for At:t:ribm:e9: O. 778351, O. 72629, -0. 03711 
Rb for At:t:ribut:elO: 0.603144, 0.56737, -0.01133 
Rb for At:t:ribut:e13: 0.385550, 0.59533, -0.12868 
R for At:t:ributel: 0.053504, 0.27209, -0.02081 
R for At:t:ribut:e2: -0.042092, 0.31588, -0.06174 
R for Atl:ribut:e3: -0.047976, 0.29521, -0.05286 
R for At:t:ribut:e4: -0.640202, 0.73629, -0.01184 
R for At:tribut:e5: -0.612086, 0.77674, -0.01725 
R for At:t:r1but:e6: 0.108902, 0.23781, 0.08275 
After the title information you have a list of configurations and three values 
next to each one. The first value is the parameter estimate, the second is 
the standard error of that parameter estimate, the third is the t-statistic, 
which compares the observed number of this configuration in your graph with 
the mean number of configurations in a sample of 500 graphs generated with 
these parameter estimates. On some rows you will notice an asterisk (*). 
This means that the parameter estimate is at least 1.96 (essentially 2) 
standard errors away from zero, and is thus indicates that there is a 95% or 
more chance that the parameter estimate is statistically significant (commonly 
expressed as p < 0.05). 
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3.4 Fitting an Estimation 
What does a fitted estimation look like? 
It is extremely unlikely that your first estimation run will be an adequate fit to 
your observed data. An adequate fit is generally defined as: 
1. The parameter estimates and standard errors are within the bounds of 
a reasonable model. 
2. The t-statistic for all the configurations in the model are less than 0.1 
1. Reasonable parameter estimates and standard errors 
The first of these conditions is not a scientific test, but nonetheless it is 
important. Below is a list of the main problems that give 'unreasonable' 
parameter estimates: 
High values for all estimates, SEs and t-statistics: If you get high values 
for all, or almost all, of your parameter estimates, standard errors and t-
statistics, this is generally because your model has 'wandered into parameter 
space wilderness' and cannot get itself back. This is not a major problem. 
The best thing to do is to return all the parameter estimates to zero (that is, if 
you have updated them and they are not already zero), and run the model 
again. You may have many first runs (up to perhaps 5 or 1 O?) that end up in 
the wilderness, but this is not generally a serious problem. 
Rare configurations: In the section on preventing model degeneracy, we 
removed all of the configurations which were not found in the observed graph. 
However, we left all other configurations in the model. Some of those 
configurations will have had values of just 1 or 2, and in a large graph, these 
values may be very difficult to statistically analyse, and give unrealistically 
large parameter values. In this case, it is best to remove these configurations 
from your model (and to update your "Excluded Configurations" table 
accordingly) 
Separation: Another problem which can occur is complete separation or 
quasicomplete separation, where the independent variables, in this case, one 
of the configurations, completely predicts the dependent variable, in this case 
the formation of a tie. When this occurs you will get large or very large 
parameter estimates with high standard errors. How you treat these will 
depend on your dataset, but in general it may be better to take them out, or to 
find a better way of specifying this attribute in your model. Make sure you 
mark this configuration on your "Excluded Configurations" table. 
Reference category for a set of dummy variables: A further problem which 
can occur is when you put in a set of dummy variables which are actually 
different values for a categorical variable (for example, variables that 
represent each state in a country). In this case, you must remove one of the 
variables, which will then be used as a base or reference category. For those 
who have done logistic regressions before, this will be a familiar concept. 
Make sure you mark this configuration on your "Excluded Configurations" 
table. 
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Interactions: Occasionally you can get strange interactions between different 
configurations in your model. A classic sign of this is when you have two 
variables with large, equal but opposite values (eg. 12.1275 ... and minus-
12.1275 ... ). In this type of situation, it is generally the case that the two 
variables are interacting strongly. One solution is to look at the observed 
value of these configuratioRs in your graph, and the theoretical meaning of the 
two configurations, and then choose one of the configurations to drop out of 
your model. Make sure you mark this configuration on your "Excluded 
Configurations" table. 
Other problems: There are a number of other problems which will occur 
when attempting to specify a ERGM model. If you are having trouble fitting a 
model, or it is not having the expected results, look over the results of the 
estimations and look for patterns in the movements of the parameter values. 
Try to see which variables are moving together, and see if these movements 
of the parameter values make sense, or if instead they might be errors 
created by a poorly specified model, or some form of interaction within the 
model itself. If you find something like this, choose the theoretically least 
important configuration and drop it out of your model, and run it again. Make 
sure you mark this configuration on your "Excluded Configurations" table. 
2. Reducing the t-statistics to less than 0.1 
Once you have got reasonable numbers for your parameter estimates and 
standard errors, the major challenge is to reduce the t-statistic for each 
configuration to less than 0.1. The general process for this is: 
1. Run an estimate 
2. If this is: 
o one of your first runs, before you first press 'update', then, if 
the estimate has t-statistics lower than 2 for most values, and 
lower than 4 for all values (for your first run) then press "update". 
o after your first update, then, if the estimate has better t-
statistics (that is, lower t-statistics, on average) that your current 
parameter estimates, then press "update". 
3. Repeat. 
For small datasets (nodes < -40) with few configurations then the default 
settings should be adequate. 
For models with more configurations and a larger numbers of nodes, the best 
way to get convergence is to slowly increase the multiplication factor. 
The multiplication factor reflects the amount which PNet is able to experiment 
with different values for your parameter values. When PNet runs and 
estimation, it spends most of its time 'walking' around the parameter space -
meaning that it is slowly changing the parameter values for each of the 
different configurations in your dataset, and measuring whether these new 
estimates fit your model better or worse. When you increase the 
multiplication factor, you give PNet more time to explore different values for 
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your parameter values, and thus more time to make a more accurate 
parameter estimate. 
The problem with increasing the multiplication factor (MF) is that it increases 
the processing time. At the moment, we think that the processing time 
increases linearly with the increase in the multiplication factor (so if a MF of 1 O 
take 30 seconds, a MF of 20 will take 1 minute, and a MF of 200 will take 
20minutes). 
So far, we have experimented with MF of up to 1000, and have noticed 
dramatically improved results with higher MFs. 
Our suggestion is, however, that you only increase the MF slowly, from one 
estimate to the next. We generally start with the default setting of 10, and if 
that gives an estimate that has no t-statistics more than 2, then we increase 
the MF to 20. If the estimates keep getting better, we continually update our 
parameter values, and approximately double the MF for each estimation run. 
Generally 200-600 is high enough to fit most models. 
Sometimes, however, you may have difficultly getting some of the t-statistics 
to go below 0.1, even with a MF of 500 or 1000. 
In this case, an option is to get a model that almost fits (most t-stats below 
0.1, and 1-5 below -0.3), and then set the number of runs to, say 20, and then 
leave the computer to run over night, or for several days. While this is 
running, you can check the estimation file at any time to see the results of the 
estimations that PNet has run. Checking the estimation file will not interfere 
with the running of PNet. 
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Step 4: Goodness of Fit 
4.1 Running a Goodness of Fit 
Once you have estimated a model which has t-statistics for all configurations 
of less than 0.1, then you are ready to check the goodness of fit of the model. 
To do this you press the "Goodness of Fit" tab in PNet. You then need to re-
enter all the data which you have entered for the Estimation, including the 
exact parameter values obtained in your fitted estimate. 
The main difference with running a goodness of fit and an estimation, is that 
when you "Select Parameters", you not only select the configurations which 
you have values for in your estimation procedure, but you also need to 
select the configurations which you want to use to check the goodness · 
of fit for your model. In practical terms this generally means pressing 
"Select All" when you are in the various "Select Parameters" windows. You 
then enter the values for the parameters you have estimates for, and leave 
the remained at zero. The exception to this is when you are selecting 
structural parameters for larger networks (n >40). In this case you generally 
want to leave out all or most of the parameters labelled "New Parameters", 
since they take an incredibly long time to calculate, and the goodness of fit 
may take days or weeks or months to finish (especially the new parameter "C" 
for 5-cliques!). 
For smaller networks (n<40) the default settings for the "Simulations Options" 
are fine. For larger networks you will need to adjust the "Number of 
ltinerations". For a network of 250 nodes with 88 ties, instead of the normal 
1,000,000 itinerations we ran 88,000,000 itinerations (and left the number of 
samples to pick up as 1000). 
4.2 Interpreting GOF statistics 
When PNet has finished the GOF a dialogue box will open stating this. Press 
OK. the GOF statistics will open in Notepad. 
Scroll down the document until you get to the following lines: 
* There are 10000000 proposed digraphs. 
* Statistic samples are picked up at 1 per 10000 digraphs. 
* Accepted 27932 proposed digraphs. 
observation, sample mean (standard error), t-statistic 
t-statistics = (observation - sample mean)/standard deviation 
Under these lines are the main GOF statistics you will be interested in. The 
most important statistic is the t-statistic for each configuration. The rules for a 
good model are these: 
1. If the parameter was estimated and specified in your model (that is, if 
you had to type in the parameter estimate when you were setting up 
the GOF) then the t-statistic needs to be below 0.1 (as it was in the 
estimation). 
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2. If the parameter was not estimated and specified in your model (that is, 
if you did not type the parameter estimate when you were setting up 
the GOF, but rather just selected the configuration and left the 
parameter value as zero) then the t-statistic should be below 2 for the 
model to not be a bad fit. 
If you model does not fit these criteria then it's not a perfect fit. There should 
be no reason why if the first criteria should not be met if the estimation was 
run correctly (since the estimation should have made sure that the t-statistic is 
below 0.1 for those parameters). However, for the parameters that were not-
estimated, it is highly likely that some of the t-statistics will be greater than 2. 
Given that it is highly likely that one or more of these t-statistics will be greater 
than 2 (because no ERGM model is perfect!) then the decision as to whether 
to accept the model or to attempt to find another model is one which is up the 
individual researcher and their interpretation of the nature of the poorly fit 
configurations in your model. 
# Receiver of conrinuous A1:1:r2: 0.01481 
# Receiver of conrinuous A1:tr3: 0.18761 
* There are 10000000 prop<?sed digraphs. 
* statisi:ic samples are. i:>icked up a1: 1 per 10000 digraphs. 
* Accep1:ed 27932 proposed digraphs. 
observat:i on, sampl.e mean (standard error), t:-s1:a1:i st.i c 
1:-st:at:istics = (observarion - sample mean)/srandard deviarion 
# Arc: 88. 0000 Mean= 86. 9550 ( 12. 6092 ) 1: = 0. 0829 
# Reciprocii:y: 4.0000 Mean= 3.7170 ( 1.9659) r = 0.1440 
# 2-In-star: 44.0000 Mean= 41.9170 ( 14.4555) t = 0.1441 
# 2-out:-star: 34. 0000 Mean= 31. 3210 ( 10.1916 ) r = o. 2629 
# 3-In-si:ar: 18.0000 Mean= 18.4280 ( 13.6730) t: = -0.0313 
# 3-oui:-star: 8.0000 Mean= 9.7030 ( 8.1168) r -0.2098 
# Mixed-2-star: 62.0000 Mean= 66.2060 ( 20.2322 ) t = -0.2079 
#Tl: 0.0000 Mean= 0.0110 ( 0.1044 ) 1: -0.1054 
# T2: 0.0000 Mean= 0.1170 ( 0.6766 ) 1: = -0.1729 
# T3: 0.0000 Mean= 0.2440 ( 0.8539) 1: = -0.2857 
# T4: 0.0000 Mean= 0.2080 ( 0.5666) 1: = -0.3671 
#TS: 0.0000 Mean= 0.1780 ( 0.5163) 1: = -0.3447 
# T6: 1. 0000 Mean= 0. 5640 ( 1. 0015 ) 1: = 0. 4354 
# T7: 4.0000 Mean= 9.1370 ( 6.8828) 1: = -0.7463 
#TS: 7.0000 Mean= 7.0340 ( 5.4117 ) 1: = -0.0063 
# T9(030T): 2.0000 Mean= 1.2920 ( 1.7555) t = 0.4033 
# T~0(030C): 0.0000 Mean= 0.2350 ( 0.5235) 1: = -0.4489 
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Appendices 
These appendices are designed to act as a quick reference guides, compiling the 
most useful information in easy to read tables and check lists. 
Appendix 1: Interpreting GOF statistics 
1. If the parameter was estimated: t-statistic needs to be below 0.1 
2. If the parameter was not estimated: t-statistic of less that 1 is a good fit, more 
that 2 is a bad fit. 
Appendix 2: Recommended Starting Configurations 
Structural Configurations Attribute Configurations 
Non-directed graph Non-directed graph 
• Edge Binary attributes 
• K-star • R 
• K-triangle • Rb 
• K-2-path Continuous attributes 
• Isolates • sum 
• difference 
Directed graph Directed graph 
Low density graph: Binary attributes 
• Arc • Rb 
• Reciprocity • Rs 
• Isolates • Rr 
• K-in-star Continuous attributes 
• K-out-star • sender 
• AKT-T • receiver 
• A2p-T 
Higher density graph also include: 
• AKT-D 
• AKT-U 
• AKT-C 
• and so on . 
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Appendix 3: Running an estimation (Summary) 
1) Preparing matrix and attribute files. 
Attribute Data 
D Create Excel file with attributes 
D Use Excel formulas to create VNA file 
Matrix Data 
D Make VNA file of matrix data 
D Paste into attribute data VNA file 
Creating Raw Matrix and Attribute files 
D Import VNA file 
D Export as RAW Matrix and EXCEL Attribute 
D Cut and paste Binary, Continuous, etc attributes into own RAW files. 
D put files into their own folder and make a copy called "originals ... " 
2) Make an excluded configurations file (to prevent degeneracy): 
D Select parameters and set up estimation 
D Set "Subphases" to zero. Press "Start". 
D Open the file labelled "start-statistics-[your session name]". 
D Select all the text after "****This graph contains:****" and before "*Graph 
Density:". 
D Copy into new Excel document, 
D Delete the blank row 
D Save as "Excluded Configurations [experiment name]" 
D Insert a row where configuration missing and type name of missing 
configuration. 
D In PNet: deselect the excluded configurations 
3) Run an Estimation 
D Reset the number of sub-phases to 5. Press Start. 
D If has t-statistics lower than 2 for most values, and lower than 4 for all values 
AND it is better that your current parameter estimates, then press "update". 
D Repeat, while: 
D doubling the MF for each estimation run. 
D Generally 200-600 is high enough to fit most models. 
D If it is not fitting with runs of 500 or 1000, but is getting close (say all 
numbers less that 0.2-0.5, then set the number of runs to, say 20, and 
then leave the computer to run over night. 
4) Causes of unreasonable parameter estimates and standard errors 
D High values for all estimates, SEs and t-statistics 
D Rare configurations 
D Separation 
D Reference category for a set of dummy variables 
D Interactions 
D Other problems 
5) Goodness of Fit 
D re-enter all the data in the "Goodness of Fit" tab in PNet 
For large number of nodes: 
D select all other parameters, except "new parameters" 
For low density networks: 
D adjust number of itinerations to approx number of edges x 1,000,000 
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To download the latest copy of this manual go to: 
http://www.sna.unimelb.edu.au/pnet/pnet.html#download 
Any suggestions, feedback, comments or 
corrections would be greatly appreciated, and 
can be emailed to nick_harrigan@yahoo.com 
or nick.harrigan@anu.edu.au 
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APPENDIX E: CALCULATING MEASURES 
OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN UCINET 
This is an example based on a dataset of interlocking companies and their 
corporate political donations. 
Aim: To create a variable which measures, for each company, the number of ties 
(interlocks) it has to companies who make political donations. 
Final product: A number for each company (node) in your dataset, which represents 
the number of ties (interlocks) to companies which make political donations. We call 
this 'Donor Degree'. When we differentiate between indegree and outdegree, we call 
them 'Donor Indegree' and 'Donor Outdegree'. 
Method: 
• Start with a VNA file (called 'the original file') containing the "tie data" for the 
network you are interested in. 
• Create a 'Node Data' file for donor ties (i.e. starting with the words "*node 
data"), as per the "A Brief Guide to using Netdraw" overview ofVNA file 
formats (which is in the UCINET folder of your programs menu: 
START>Programs>UCINET 6>A BriefGuide to using Netdraw).This contains 
a a list of company names with companies having a value for the attribute 
"donor" of "1" for non-donors, and "O" for donors. 
• With Notebook or another text editor, Open 'the original file' and paste the 
"*node data" information for donors at the front of this file, before "*tie data". 
Save the file. 
• Import the VNA file to UCINET. Two (actually four) UCINET files will be 
created: a network and an attribute file. The network file contains all the ties of 
the complete matrix, the attribute file contains the "*node data" 
• In UCINET, go to "Data> Extract" and set the settings to (see list at end of 
correct setting for each measure): 
o Input dataset: [find the 'network' UCINET file just imported] 
o Keep or Delete: DELETE 
o Which rows: [find the 'attribute' UCINET file just imported] 
o Which columns: NONE 
o Which matrices: NONE 
o Output dataset: [insert some easy to remember, interim file name here] 
and then run this extraction. 
• In UCINET, go to "Transform> Matrix Operations>within 
dataset>aggregations" and set the settings to: 
o Input dataset: [find output of previous extraction] 
o Arithmetic Operation: Sum 
o Breakout results: by columns [generally, except in case of Executive Ties] 
o Diagonal valid: No 
o Output Dataset: [Some easy to remember, interim file name] 
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And run this aggregation 
• If the output of this operation is a single row [which it generally will be in if you 
have summed down columns], then go to "Data> Transpose", and transpose the 
dataset to a column. 
• Go to "Data> Export> Excel", and export data as Excel file. [if this does not 
work, it is generally because the information is a row, and needs to be transposed 
into one column (see previous step)]. 
• Open Excel file. Create a new heading in the next empty column: "Ties to 
Donors". In each row of this column create an equation "=[insert cell of ties, eg. 
B2]*2". This will give the number of ties to&from donors. Cut and paste this 
equation down the column, and it will calculate the ties for every corporation. 
• Highlight this entire column. Press Cut. Do not move the selected cells. Press 
"Paste Special". Choose "Values", and press OK. 
• Select all cells in the excel sheet (press the top left hand grey square in the 
heading row/columns). Press "Data>Sort". Click "header row", and then sort by 
ascending "Corporation Name". 
• Select the "Ties to Donors" column, cut and paste it into the master dataset (after 
making sure that the master dataset is sorted in an ascending alphabetical order 
by "Corporation Name). 
Measure, for each corporation 
** Ties with ALL 
**Ties with DONORS 
**Non-executive Ties with ALL 
**Non-executive Ties with DONORS 
** Incidental Ties with ALL 
**Incidental Ties with DONORS 
** Executive Ties to ALL 
= DEGREE of ALL 
= 2 x Column Sum of DONOR Rows 
= DEGREE of Non-executive 
= 2 x Column Sum of DONOR Rows 
= DEGREE of Incidental 
= 2 x Column Sum of DONOR Rows 
= INDEGREE of Executive 
= OUTDEGREE of Executive ** Executive Ties from ALL 
**Executive Ties to DONORS 
** Executive Ties from DONORS 
= Row Sum of DONOR Columns 
= Column Sum of DONOR Rows 
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